We are in the midst of a fundamental shift, as more enterprises start to use services enabled by cloud technologies. This will heavily impact IT services providers, who must now consider strategies for coping with profound changes in the marketplace or risk being left behind. This research will be of interest to IT services vendors, as well as consumers of IT services.

In our current era, a new rapidly spreading pandemic disease called coronavirus disease, caused by a virus identified as a novel coronavirus, is becoming a crucial threat for the whole world. Currently, the number of patients infected by the virus is expanding exponentially, but there is no commercially available COVID-19 medication for this pandemic. However, numerous antiviral drugs are utilized for the treatment of the COVID-19 disease. Identification of the appropriate antivirus medicine to treat the infection of COVID-19 is still (...) a complicated and uncertain decision. This study’s key objective is to develop a novel approach called _q_-rung orthopair probabilistic hesitant fuzzy rough set, which incorporates the _q_-rung orthopair fuzzy set, probabilistic hesitant fuzzy set, and rough set structures. New _q_-ROPHFR aggregation operators have been established: the _q_-ROPHFR Einstein weighted averaging operator and the _q_-ROPHFR Einstein weighted geometric operator. In this study, we explored some basic features of the developed operators. Afterward, to demonstrate the viability and feasibility of the established decision-making approach in real-world applications, a case study related to selecting drugs for COVID-19 pandemic is addressed. Furthermore, a comprehensive comparison with the _q_-rung orthopair probabilistic hesitant fuzzy rough TOPSIS technique is also presented to illustrate the benefits of the new framework. The obtained results confirm the reliability and effectiveness of the proposed approach for finding uncertainty in real-world decision-making. (shrink)

We are living through a new phase in human development where much of everyday life – at least in the most technologically developed parts of the world – has come to depend upon our interaction with “smart” artefacts. Alongside this increasing adoption and ever-deepening reliance on intelligent machines, important changes have been taking place, often in the background, as to how we think of ourselves and how we conceptualize our relationship with technology. As we design, create and learn to live (...) with a new order of artefacts which exhibit behavior that, were it to be carried out by human beings would be seen as intelligent, the ways in which we conceptualize intelligence, minds, reasoning and related notions such as self and agency are undergoing profound shifts. We argue that the basic background assumptions informing our concepts of mind, and the underlying conceptual scheme structuring our reasoning about minds has recently been transformed in the process. This shift has changed the nature and quality of both our folk understanding of mind, our scientific psychology, and the philosophical problems that the interaction of these realms produce. Many of the traditional problems in the philosophy of mind have become reconfigured in the process. This introduction sets the scene for our book that treats this reconfiguration of our concepts of mind and of technology, and the new casting of philosophical problems this reconfiguration engenders. (shrink)

Friendship (philia) plays a prominent role in Aristotle’s ethical thought. It is only within the context of his discussions of philia that Aristotle explicitly mentions acting for the sake of another’s good: friends, he claims, wish and do good things for one another for the sake of the friend. However, it is not clear whether Aristotle limits disinterested wishing well to the complete friendships of virtuous agents. I argue that he does not; friends of all varieties, to the extent that (...) they are friends at all, wish and act well for the friend’s sake. I also consider whether Aristotle’s remarks on self-love and friendship might provide reason for thinking that love for others is and ought to be an extension of self-love. I reject the idea that love for a friend is justified by self-love: the virtuous agent does not care about the good of her friends only insofar as she sees those friends as her other selves. (shrink)

In recent years, the idea of mind uploading has left the genre of science fiction. Uploading our minds as a form of immortality, or so it has been argued, is now within our reach. Of course, this depends on the assumption that our mind is nothing more than some sort of computer software running on the brain as hardware paving the way for a standard procedure of mind uploading, namely instantaneous destructive uploading – where the brain is simulated on a (...) computer - or gradual destructive uploading – where brain regions are gradually replaced by micro-chips. Lately, however, there has been sustained doubts that things are so simple. In this volume alone Susan Schneider & Joe Corabi and Gualtiero Piccinini argue that a person cannot survive standard procedures of mind uploading. The main reasons are that the uploading process violates identity criteria for the person and that it is unclear that conscious mental states can be uploaded. In this article, we argue that while the sceptics about the standard methods of uploading are probably right, there are more options to be evaluated. We introduce what we call slow continuous mind uploading as an alternative procedure. Slow continuous uploading is based on the extended mind thesis which claims that artefacts can under specific circumstances come to count as part of the realization basis for an individual’s mind. In this context, we explore a form of mind uploading which may already be being innovated today through our deep reliance upon cognitive incorporation of “smart” internet technologies. We will argue that this process may give us the right kind of tools to survive mind uploading, or more minimally, to create an agent that can be considered a psychological continuity of an individual. We think that, at least, the objections so far developed in the literature do not rule this out. (shrink)

According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary (...) alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem, we will argue that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this, we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity. (shrink)

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...) of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential for psychic conflict within Seneca's moral psychology. Some scholars have taken Seneca's explicit claim in De Ira that the soul is unitary to preclude any kind of simultaneous psychic conflict, while other interpreters have suggested that Seneca views all cases of anger as instances of akrasia. I argue that Seneca's account of anger provides the resources for accommodating some types of simultaneous psychic conflict; however, he denies the possibility of psychic conflict between two action-generating impulses, (...) thus rejecting the phenomena of genuine akrasia and enkrateia. Although superficially counterintuitive, Seneca's cognitivist account of anger, according to which anger is complex and requires assent to the propositions that ‘I have been wronged’ and ‘I ought to seek revenge’, renders his denial of akrasia and enkrateia more plausible. (shrink)

The topics of ethical conduct and governance in academic research in the business field have attracted scientific and public attention. The concern is that research misconduct in organizations such as business schools and universities might result in practitioners, policymakers, and researchers grounding their decisions on biased research results. This study addresses ethical research misconduct by investigating whether the ethical orientation of business researchers is related to the likelihood of research misconduct, such as selective reporting of research findings. We distinguish between (...) deontological and consequentialist ethical orientations and the competition between researchers and investigate the moderating role of their perceived autonomy. Based on global data collected from 1031 business scholars, we find that researchers with a strong deontological ethical orientation are less prone to misconduct. This effect is robust against different levels of perceived autonomy and competition. In contrast, researchers having a consequentialist ethical orientation is positively associated with misconduct in business research. High levels of competition in the research environment reinforce this effect. Our results reveal a potentially toxic combination comprising researchers with a strong consequentialist orientation who are embedded in highly competitive research environments. Our research calls for the development of ethical orientations grounded on maxims rather than anticipated consequences among researchers. We conclude that measures for ethical governance in business schools should consider the ethical orientation that underlies researchers’ decision-making and the organizational and institutional environment in which business researchers are embedded. (shrink)

This book addresses the urgent need for a large and systematic analysis of current interdisciplinary (ID) research and practice. It demonstrates how ID is essentially a cognitive phenomenon, something different from the frivolous and inconsequential attempt of trying to overcome the disciplinary competencies and exigencies. By ID, the authors show that it is a manifestation of the transversal rationality that underlies current scientific activity. It is the very progress of specialized disciplines that requires interdisciplinary new research practices and new forms (...) of articulation between domains, something that has a strong impact on the traditional disciplinary structure of scientific and educational institutions. Divided into two parts, the book presents a conceptual framework as well as several case studies on ID practices. The book aims at covering three main themes. It contributes to the stabilization of ID meaning and characterizes the main ID theorizations which have been proposed until now. It builds an innovative and broad understanding of the several ID determinations as an essentially cognitive phenomenon and of its institutional implications at the level of disciplinary structures and curricular organization. Finally, it distinguishes and maps the diversity of ID procedures and practices which are being used and tested by contemporary scientific and educational institutions. This book is addressed to philosophers, scientists and every one interested in science production and reproduction, including science teaching. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle on Thought and Feeling by Paula GottliebCorinne GartnerPaula Gottlieb. Aristotle on Thought and Feeling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 173. Hardback, $99.99.Paula Gottlieb's recent book is an illuminating, synoptic study of Aristotle's theory of human motivation, according to which his innovative notion of prohairesis (choice)—specifically, the virtuous agent's prohairesis—is the cornerstone. She argues against both Kantian-flavored readings, which prioritize reason's role in motivating ethical action, and (...) Humean-flavored readings, which emphasize the virtuous agent's well-habituated feelings. Gottlieb's account explains how the virtuous agent's prohairesis incorporates his or her feelings, desires, and thoughts, building in the motivational contributions of both the rational and nonrational parts of the psyche. The resulting treatment does justice to Aristotle's prima facie incongruous characterizations of prohairesis: on the one hand, it is the conclusion of deliberation, an explicitly rational process; on the other, it is an expression of character virtue.Although prohairesis is the unifying focus of the book, Gottlieb's project touches on a number of related controversies concerning Aristotle's ethics, including the process of moral habituation, the thorny phenomenon of akrasia, the relationship between contemplation and practically virtuous activity, and how to conceive of the connection between the aesthetic and ethical sides of to kalon (the fine). And it does so in a way that is attuned to ongoing scholarly debates without getting bogged down in them. Similarly, while she primarily concerns herself with the Nicomachean Ethics, Gottlieb helpfully draws upon material from other parts of the corpus—for example, she invokes, with appropriate caveats, Aristotle's discussion of feelings in the Rhetoric as well as De Anima. Lastly, some interesting subsidiary motifs animate the book, perhaps the most novel and provocative of which is the through line that connects her insightful understanding of eleos—which she translates, with helpful qualifications, as "sympathy" rather than "pity" (31)—with learning to be virtuous, as her fresh reading of Aristotle's Neoptolemus case exemplifies (98–102, 134–35). According to Gottlieb's hybridized picture of the good person's motivation, in the rational part of the soul the agent's wish is channeled via deliberation, which itself involves situation-specific information from the feelings, into the agent's prohairesis. In the nonrational part of the soul, the agent experiences a feeling that, strictly speaking, includes (a) a physiological component; (b) an impression of the circumstances, itself partly shaped by the agent's thought; and (c) a specific desire (chapter 2). The virtuous agent's nonrational desire will always correspond to—indeed, it, too, is channeled into—his or her prohairesis (79), the unified desiderative thought or thoughtful desire (NE VI.2, 1139b4–5), from which he or she then acts (chapter 4). The virtuous agent never experiences even mild psychic conflict, having a fully integrated soul whose two parts are in perfect harmony.At some points of Gottlieb's discussion, it seems as if all of these psychic components involved in the production of an action actually constitute the agent's prohairesis, while in other places it seems as though prohairesis is the discrete desiderative product. If one adopts the former conception, it is difficult to make sense of Aristotle's claim that the choice of the akratic agent, who acts on his or her errant nonrational desire, is correct. It turns out that the akratic agent's choice is correct because he or she has rightly judged what he or she should do, but it is distinct in composition from the good person's choice, since it does not [End Page 703] include his or her nonrational desire. One consequence of Gottlieb's view is thus that, as she indicates, the good person's prohairesis is sui generis. Another consequence is that, within the nonrational part of the soul, there may be physiological responses plus accompanying impressions (phantasiai) that, it seems, contain "motivational oomph" (40) but do not get channeled into desires. While her view avoids conflating the virtuous agent and the enkratic agent (who, despite acting correctly, experiences an occurrent nonrational desire to the contrary), there may be cases in which the virtuous... (shrink)

The cosmological myth in Plato’s Statesman has generated several longstanding scholarly disputes, among them a controversy concerning the number and nature of the cosmic rotation cycles that it depicts. According to the standard interpretation, there are two cycles of rotation: west-to-east rotation occurs during the age of Cronus, and east-to-west rotation occurs during the age of Zeus, which is also our present era. Recent readings have challenged this two-cycle interpretation, arguing that the period of rotation opposed to our own is (...) governed neither by Cronus nor by Zeus, but is instead a separate rotational cycle during which chaos reigns before a divine ruler reestablishes control. We introduce a new constraint on any plausible interpretation of the myth. According to the Correspondence Principle, changes in fundamental cyclical processes that shape the way of life on earth (mode of generation, growth, aging, and mode of death) occur if and only if there is a change in the direction of cosmic rotation. We use the Correspondence Principle to defend a version of the standard two-cycle interpretation. (shrink)

In her rich and provocative paper, Susan Levin seeks to defend the value of anger against the views of Stoics and transhumanists, both of whom regard anger as irrational and to be eliminated. In her defense, Levin draws on Aristotle, relating his position to contemporary appraisal theorists as well as anti-racism activists and scholars, for Aristotle holds, in contrast with the Stoics, that some cases of anger are justified. The virtuous Aristotelian agent will become angry in response to injustice. I (...) explore the extent to which Levin endorses Aristotle’s account of anger, complicating some of the associations she aims to establish. In particular, while the Stoics and Aristotle disagree about the rationality, morality, and prudential value of anger, they share a very similar conception of the emotion, according to which a desire for revenge partly constitutes anger. By contrast, Levin defends a forward-looking conception of anger, focusing on rectifying current injustice and preventing future injustice. It turns out, then, that Levin’s justified forward-looking anger may have more in common with the spirit of the Stoic response to injustice than with Aristotle’s retributive view. (shrink)

Scheitern wie Gelingen sind ambivalente und zugleich existentielle Erfahrungen des Menschen. Die Sehnsucht, das eigene Leben als gelingend zu erfahren, ist dabei Ausdruck des menschlichen Strebens nach Glück. Das Wagnis einer unwiderruflichen Lebensentscheidung ist dabei der verbindlichste Ausdruck individueller Sinnstiftung für ein gelingendes Leben. Zur Frage, welche Gründe dem Gelingen oder Scheitern eines biografischen Lebensprojektes zugrunde liegen, hat Klaus Demmer wesentliche Überlegungen angestellt, denen in dieser Arbeit nachgegangen wird. Zentral ist dabei die Verhältnisbestimmung von sittlicher Persönlichkeit und Identität. Indem das (...) vorgelegte Konzept aus philosophischer, soziologischer und psychologischer Perspektive befragt wird, zeigt der Autor die Anschlussfähigkeit der moraltheologischen Erwägungen für den gegenwärtigen Diskurs um denBegriff der Identität auf. (shrink)

Si l’argument classique du scepticisme est valable, alors nous ne pouvons pas affirmer savoir quelque chose, et cela influe également sur nos affirmations quotidiennes au sujet de la vie, de la nature et de nous-męmes. DeRose propose une nouvelle solution contextuelle. Schiffer argumente contre l’explication de DeRose de la force de la position épistémologique. Il considčre comme problématique l’affirmation des contextualistes que, dans les propositions qui attribuent un savoir sans termes indexicaux, apparaît un paradoxe sceptique. Dans cet article, je présente (...) des arguments en faveur de la nécessité d’observer des exemples qui imliquent un męme objet, des personnes différentes et des normes différentes. Dans ce cas, il est difficile d’ętre d’accord soit avec les solutions proposées par Schiffer, soit avec celles proposés par DeRose. (shrink)

This essay contributes to the discussions about the end, or rather reform, of the Counseling Movement. One central problem concerns the question of whether, apart from the positive impact psychology has had on pastoral counseling, this influence may not also have led to an obfuscation of theological profile. This question is addressed in view of the language used in pastoral counseling. First, various implications of the use of psychological terms are exposed insofar as these influence pastors’ professional identity as well (...) as the pastoral communication. In a second step, a parishioner-oriented communication model is proposed, which renders different language games complementary to each other. (shrink)

Wenn das klassische Argument des Skeptizismus wahrhaftig ist, dann können wir nicht behaupten, dass wir etwas wissen, und dies beeinflusst unsere täglichen Aussagen über das Leben, die Natur und uns selbst. DeRose schlägt eine neue kontextualistische Lösung vor. Shiffer bringt Argumente gegen DeRoses Erklärungen über die Stärke der epistemischen Position vor. Für problematisch hält er auch die Behauptung der Kontextualisten, dass in Wissenssätzen ohne indexikalische Ausdrücke ein skeptisches Paradoxon auftritt. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich für die Notwendigkeit des Inbetrachtziehens von (...) Beispielen zu argumentieren, die dasselbe Objekt, verschiedene Personen und verschiedene Wissensstandards einbeziehen. In diesem Fall wird man sowohl Shiffers als auch DeRoses Lösungen kaum zustimmen können. (shrink)

If the classical argument from skepticism is true, then we cannot claim that we know something and this also affects our ordinary claims about life, nature and us. DeRose proposes the New Contextualist Solution. Shiffer argues against DeRose’s explanation about the strength of the epistemic position. He also finds contextualist’s claim that in knowledge sentences without indexical terms the skeptical paradox arises, problematic. In this paper, I am trying to argue that we should look at examples in which the same (...) object, different persons and different standards of knowing are involved. In that case it is hard to agree either with Shiffer’s or with DeRose’s solutions. (shrink)

In recent years we have seen the rise of a new framework within the study of the mind, namely Predictive Processing. This framework essentially holds that the brain is a prediction machine constantly postulating perceptual models which are tested against incoming information. At the same time, the notion of the minimal or core self has become very influential as a way of explaining, or explaining away, pre-reflective self-awareness. The four most widely discussed alternatives for thinking through the metaphysical implications the (...) pre-reflective sense of self are the standard phenomenological view, the substance view, the no-self view and by now the relational view. In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework. (shrink)

The majority of contemporary models of wisdom define it in terms of a cognitive ability that is located in an agent’s mind. Even those models that include emotions, affective states, gut feelings etc. hardly recognise the relation between those non-cognitive dimensions, agents’ bodies and how they shape the content of experiences and how social practices of wisdom enfold. This paper will address this gap by providing a phenomenological account that depicts wisdom not as generated by wise individuals but as being (...) produced by and within embodied practices of agents relating to other people, artefacts, concepts, and ways of using others and things. It is argued that management should aim at building facilitative contexts that afford people to make use of and exploit the embodied dimension of wise practices. Exemplary strategies and tools that establish such sites, where embodied social practices of wisdom happen, are described. (shrink)

Nature-inspired optimization techniques are useful tools in electrical engineering problems to minimize or maximize an objective function. In this paper, we use the firefly algorithm to improve the optimal solution for the problem of directional overcurrent relays (DOCRs). It is a complex and highly nonlinear constrained optimization problem. In this problem, we have two types of design variables, which are variables for plug settings (PSs) and the time dial settings (TDSs) for each relay in the circuit. The objective function is (...) to minimize the total operating time of all the basic relays to avoid unnecessary delays. We have considered four models in this paper which are IEEE (3-bus, 4-bus, 6-bus, and 8-bus) models. From the numerical results, it is obvious that the firefly algorithm with certain parameter settings performs better than the other state-of-the-art algorithms. (shrink)

The majority of contemporary models of wisdom define it in terms of a cognitive ability that is located in an agent’s mind. Even those models that include emotions, affective states, gut feelings etc. hardly recognise the relation between those non-cognitive dimensions, agents’ bodies and how they shape the content of experiences and how social practices of wisdom enfold. This paper will address this gap by providing a phenomenological account that depicts wisdom not as generated by wise individuals but as being (...) produced by and within embodied practices of agents relating to other people, artefacts, concepts, and ways of using others and things. It is argued that management should aim at building facilitative contexts that afford people to make use of and exploit the embodied dimension of wise practices. Exemplary strategies and tools that establish such sites, where embodied social practices of wisdom happen, are described. (shrink)

Being conscious or experiencing the world with all its vivid qualities is something humans intimately cherish. The fact that consciousness provides us with a lively phenomenology is what makes life worth living. Yet, when it comes to understanding how consciousness fits into the natural world, we feel deeply puzzled. In this context, one important claim about consciousness consists in the idea that our awareness is not only about the world but also reveals an intimate subjectivity. This aspect of phenomenal consciousness (...) is often referred to as pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is often held that this type of self-awareness is intrinsic and essential to any form of conscious experience, i.e. there is no conscious experience without also being implicitly self-conscious. Being of such importance to the nature of consciousness, the recent literature mainly discusses two ways of accounting for pre-reflective self-consciousness, its role for conscious experience and how it fits into the natural world. On the one hand, there are relational views; on the other hand, there are non-relational accounts. This paper will argue that both approaches are not sustainable as they stand, since either important aspects are lost or not sufficiently embedded in the natural world. Consequently, I will argue for an alternative that allows for both a functional and an embodied nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness. (shrink)

Addiction is increasingly described as a “chronic and relapsing brain disease”. The potential impact of the brain disease model on the treatment of addiction or addicted individuals’ treatment behaviour remains uncertain. We conducted a qualitative study to examine: (i) the extent to which leading Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians accept the brain disease view of addiction; and (ii) their views on the likely impacts of this view on addicted individuals’ beliefs and behaviour. Thirty-one Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians (10 females (...) and 21 males; 16 with clinical experience and 15 with no clinical experience) took part in 1 h semi-structured interviews. Most addiction neuroscientists and clinicians did not uncritically support the use of brain disease model of addiction. Most were cautious about the potential for adverse impacts on individuals’ recovery and motivation to enter treatment. While some recognised the possibility that the brain disease model of addiction may provide a rationale for addicted persons to seek treatment and motivate behaviour change, Australian addiction neuroscientist and clinicians do not assume that messages about “diseased brains” will always lead to increased treatment-seeking and reduced drug use. Research is needed on how neuroscience research could be used in ways that optimise positive outcomes for addicted persons. (shrink)

Appeal to standard set theory in minimalist syntax is shown to be in conflict with the goal of analyzing dependency formation, a.k.a. movement, as involving genuine constituent copies. The underlying tension is due to extensionality, which—other things being equal—favors a perspective on dependencies in terms of multidominance. The above argument is developed against the backdrop of a recent exposition of minimalist syntax :229–261, 2019), which can be seen as exemplary. The resulting critical assessment should be taken as removing obstacles on (...) the way toward proper minimalist foundations for syntactic theory. (shrink)

Apollo's failure to give oracles in P. Oxy. 3723 has its closest parallel in Tibullus' elegy 2, 3, where the god is described as completely helpless and bereft of all his divine attributes as a result of his servitium amoris. The seeming parallel in Ovid's narration of the story of Apollo and Daphne in the first book of the Metamorphoses exhibits a more complicated concept: Apollo presents himself in command of all divine powers, but mourns the failure of these powers (...) to archieve the love of Daphne. He does not humiliate himself as in Tib. 2, 3, but the comic element in his appearance consists in the self-reflected discrepancy between his divine self-confidence and his erotic failure. The haughtiness of Ovid's Apollo is in line with the broader context of met. 1, especially his defeat of Pytho and his quarrel with Cupido. Ovid regularly contrasts in the early books of the Metamorphoses ‘epic’ and ‘elegiac’ structural sections. In book one he programmatically contrasts his modified concept of divine love not absorbing completely the god's personality with the exhausting and uncompromising divine servitium amoris in Tib. 2, 3. (shrink)

Over the last decades, Interdisciplinarity (ID) has become one of the leading research practices. Traditionally, cognitive science is considered one of the most prominent examples of ID research by including disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (AI), neuroscience, anthropology and linguistics. Recently, however the ID character of cognitive science has become under pressure. According to a study by Leydesdorff and Goldstone (2013), research in this domain gets more and more absorbed by cognitive psychology and the interdisciplinary character of cognitive (...) science is steadily fading away. In this paper, we will examine this claim and argue that its conclusion is premature. We will show that there are reasons to think that the interdisciplinary character of cognitive science is more robust and that the configuration of ID relations may be more dynamic than portrayed by ID skeptics. The reason, or so we will argue, is that ID research is a consequence of the theoretical framework(s) in place, i.e. it is in the nature of ID that fluctuations occur depending on what is held to be the nature of cognition. Our findings are twofold. On the one hand, we will show that the reintegration of cognitive science into cognitive psychology – and with it an approximation towards biology and neuroscience – is, as a matter of fact, the fruit of past ID research. On the other hand, we will demonstrate that novel conceptual frameworks open the possibility for restoring ID relations and foster new ID research. (shrink)