Les débats qui ont eu lieu, lors du Congrès de philosophie scientifique de 1935, sur la sémantique et sa portée philosophique présentent un grand intérêt historique pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, on s’accorde à y reconnaître un des évènements majeurs du congrès. En second lieu, et de façon plus substantielle, ils ont joué un rôle décisif dans le développement de la sémantique comme discipline philosophique. C’est Carnap qui en a pris l’initiative en invitant Tarski à donner deux conférences. Ce sont (...) eux qui, avec Kokoszyńska, deviendront les porte-parole de la sémantique. Neurath, qui a préparé le résumé de la discussion, avait plusieurs objections contre la sémantique à la Tarski. En particulier, il craignait que la sémantique n’introduise la métaphysique dans la philosophie. La suite a montré que les partisans de la sémantique ont gagné. (shrink)

Les débats qui ont eu lieu, lors du Congrès de philosophie scientifique de 1935, sur la sémantique et sa portée philosophique présentent un grand intérêt historique pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, on s’accorde à y reconnaître un des évènements majeurs du congrès. En second lieu, et de façon plus substantielle, ils ont joué un rôle décisif dans le développement de la sémantique comme discipline philosophique. C’est Carnap qui en a pris l’initiative en invitant Tarski à donner deux conférences. Ce sont (...) eux qui, avec Kokoszyńska, deviendront les porte-parole de la sémantique. Neurath, qui a préparé le résumé de la discussion, avait plusieurs objections contre la sémantique à la Tarski. En particulier, il craignait que la sémantique n’introduise la métaphysique (au sens que les Viennois donnaient au mot) dans la philosophie. La suite a montré que les partisans de la sémantique ont gagné. (shrink)

This volume contains the papers read at the conference on 'Semantics from different points of view' that took place at Konstanz University in Septem ber 1978. This interdisciplinary conference Vias organized by the':Sonderfor schungsbereich 99 - Linguistik' and sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsge meinschaft. Li~guists, philosophers, logicians, and psychologists met to dis cuss recent developments in the study of the semantics of natural language from the point of view of their disciplines. But this is not to say that (...) there was one particular topic shared by all the participants. The conference was organized because the seven research groups that constitute the Sonderforschungsbereich wanted to discuss their results in an international context and to get advice and guidance for the work still to be done. Therefore, quite a number of topics were covered, though at different levels of precision, under the general label 'semantics'. And the selection of topics, as well as the relative importance given to them, is due to the research interests currently represented in the Sonderforschungs bereich. (shrink)

A volume of studies in natural language semantics which brings together work by philosophers, logicians and linguists. The main topics treated are: quantification and reference in natural language; the relations between formal logic, programming languages and natural language; pragmatics and discourse meaning; surface syntax and logical meaning. The volume derives from a colloquium organised in 1973 by the Kings College Research Centre, Cambridge and the papers have been edited for publication by Professor Keenan. It is hoped that the collection (...) will make available some of the best work in this fast-moving field and will stimulate further progress by juxtaposing the different approaches and interests represented here. (shrink)

Contributing Authors Include Oliver L. Reiser, Alvin Priestly Bradford, Irving J. Lee, And Others. Non-Aristotelian Methodology Applied For Sanity In Our Time.

This volume contains selected contributions to the interdisciplinary symposium on 'Models of Meaning' held in Varna, September 25-28, 1988, under the auspices of the Institute of the Bulgarian Language of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The aim of the meeting was to broaden the horizons of meaning research and the modeling of linguistic semantics, with contributions centering on the appropriate modeling of lexical, syntactic, and textual-semantic representations. The papers challenge some basic notions of semantics and reveal two main (...) avenues of development in contemporary investigations. One is toward broadening the scope of investigativeness, the second is toward a greater domain-specificity as expressed in a greater sensitivity to pragmatics and meta-pragmatic concerns. (shrink)

Some Generalizations of Categorical Grammars Emmon Bach 0. INTRODUCTION The last decade of work in syntax has seen a marked demotion in the importance of ...

With the use symbols by political subjects arises the problem of their understanding. Groups of symbols can be created in such a way to contain a message. The state coat of arms is a political symbol, in which is concentrated a number of meanings and significance. The coat of arms — it is a symbol garnished with colossal endless meaning and potential withing its power. Besides this, the state coat of arms appears in numbers like mandalas: it is like this (...) archaic symbol, that combines various geometric shapes expressing the idea of order. The state coat of arms perceptively unites people of different genders, ages, social status andfaith into a united orderly community. A person contemplating the state coat of arms understands it as the center of the universe. The coat of arms is transformed into endlessness, attaining the result of uniting the macrocosm — society and state — and with the macrocosm — man. The function of political symbols exists so as to represent the “body” of a concrete political subject or society as a whole, at the same time in every part of a text “is highlighted” yet another part of the endless semantical richness of the symbol. Political symbols have important significance for the support or destruction of socio-political order. But the chief essence ofpolitical symbols — is the ability to give meaning to all political activities, and the regular “exposition” of state symbols guarantees the stability of the existing socio-political system. (shrink)

Semantics and metaphysics are different. However, many philosophers maintain that the two are very closely related. Semantics is usually considered as a linguistic subject that deals with the meanings of linguistic expressions. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a philosophical enterprise that purports to explore the nature of the world and to describe the structures and constituents of it. It is not difficult to see why the two distinct areas can merge so intimately together. After all, we all (...) agree that human languages and the world we know are closely connected. Because of this, some philosophers approach the topics of linguistic issues from the metaphysical perspectives and construct their theses of philosophical semantics based on their metaphysical standpoints. It naturally results invarious confusions of the semantic debates and projects with the metaphysical ones. This paper aims to explore the confusions which lie between semantics and metaphysics and to suggest that we can execute the semantic project successfully without taking up any metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

If semantic paradoxes such as the Liar arise because ‘true’ and other metalinguistic expressions can change their reference with changes of linguistic context, is that due to indexicality (they have the same linguistic meaning as reference changes) or ambiguity (their linguistic meaning itself changes)? An argument from communication that appears to favour the indexicality interpretation is not compelling. This paper defends the ambiguity interpretation. It is left open whether its considerations generalize to other kinds of paradox.

This paper will look at three closely interrelated questions about necessary a posteriori identities, in particular concerning natural kinds. First-ly, what is the semantic phenomenon responsible for a posteriori necessities in general, and theoretical identity statements concerning natural kinds in particular? I will argue that rigidity, as it is usually defined, cannot do the job for theoretical identity statements. Rather, a posteriori necessities are grounded in a semantic phenomenon that I have in earlier work called actuality-dependence. Secondly, what is the (...) basis for this semantic phenomenon? In other words, what makes a given expression actuality-dependent, and thereby fit for appearing in a posteriori necessities? I will argue that actuality-dependence is grounded in our linguistic patterns and dispositions of application and interpretation. Thirdly and finally, what does this tell us about what essences are, and how we possess knowledge of them? I will claim that the view I am proposing gives direct support to a conferralist view of essences, at least when it comes to natural kinds. Moreover, the explanation of a posteriori necessities does not rely on independent essentialist premises; however, it does rely on essentialist beliefs or expectations on the part of ordinary speakers. (shrink)

The modification of Frege's semantics that consists in using only one reference (Bedeutung, denotate) truth instead of two references truth and falsity is proposed. According to Frege 1) every true sentence stands for truth, 2) every false sentence stands for falsity. We modify the second statement: 2*) every false sentence doesn't stand for truth. The modification of sentential logic interpretation will consist in change of semantic rules: a) every formula A stands either for truth or falsity, b.1) the formula (...) A has value T iff the formula A stands for truth, b.2) the formula A has value F iff the formula A stands for falsity. Let’s change rules a) and b.2) on: a*) every formula A either stands or doesn't stand for truth, b.2*) the formula A has value F iff the formula A doesn't stand for truth. So, we have only one reference but still two values. The proposed approach can be extended to non-classical cases, for which the bivalence principle doesn't take place. An ordered pair of the sentences A, ~A is put in correspondence to the sentence A. Each sentence of ordered pair can either stands or doesn't stand for truthindependently from the other. Thus for each pair of sentences we have four possible variants of reference which are generate four functional values. (shrink)

I argue that if we distinguish between ontological realism and semantic realism, then we no longer have to choose between platonism and formalism. If we take category theory as the language of mathematics, then a linguistic analysis of the content and structure of what we say in and about mathematical theories allows us to justify the inclusion of mathematical concepts and theories as legitimate objects of philosophical study. Insofar as this analysis relies on a distinction between ontological and semantic realism, (...) it relies also on an implicit distinction between mathematics as a descriptive science and mathematics as a descriptive discourse. It is this latter distinction which gives rise to the tension between the mathematician qua philosopher. In conclusion, I argue that the tensions between formalism and platonism, indeed between mathematician and philosopher, arise because of an assumption that there is an analogy between mathematical talk and talk in the physical sciences. (shrink)

The International Union of History and Philosophy of Science organizing the 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science is at its cross-road: the alternative is mass-performance or creative exchange of ideas. The program is criticized because the thematic center in History and Philosophy of Science has been shifted too far into the realm of micro-fields of Logic and the time reduction for presentation and discussion of papers to 20 minutes should be reconsidered. Several outstanding papers are shortly (...) discussed: Martin-Löw on "Formalized Tarski-Semantics of Type Theory", Hoyningen-Huene on "Feyerabend and Kuhn", Leroux on "Helmholtz and Hertz", and Muller on "Bell meets Dirac". Finally the visiting-program is gratefully appreciated. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantics of derived statives, deverbal adjectives that fail to entail there to have been a preceding (temporal) event of the kind named by the verb they are derived from, e.g. darkened in a darkened portion of skin. Building on Gawron’s (The lexical semantics of extent verbs, San Diego State University, ms, 2009) recent observations regarding the semantics of extent uses of change of state verbs (e.g., Kim’s skin darkens between the knee and the (...) calf) and Kennedy and Levin’s (Adjectives and adverbs: syntax, semantics and disclosure, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) theory of change, it is shown, contrary to previous analyses, that a fully compositional semantic analysis is possible, and thus that there is no argument from derived statives for word formation differing from semantic composition above the word level in requiring deletion operations, as in Dubinsky and Simango’s (Language 72:749–781, 1996) analysis. Further, such an analysis, by contrast with previous ones, both compositional (Jackson in Resultatives, derived statives, lexical semantic structure, Doctoral dissertation, UCLA, 2005b; Condoravdi and Deo in Proceedings of the 18th International Congress of Linguists (CIL 18), Seoul, 2008 and non-compositional (Dubinsky and Simango 1996), correctly predicts, as shown by a range of arguments, that the meaning of the derived stative contains the meaning of the verb it is derived from and that it therefore contrasts fundamentally with morphologically simple adjectives in the kind of meaning that it has. (shrink)

Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby’s et al. (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and the (...) hybrid theory, and support strict externalism. Ourconclusion is that lay speakers’ natural kind concepts involve a belief in an external category essence, which determines reference. (shrink)

Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- relational (...) and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana. (shrink)

Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics was introduced in the early seventies of the past century. RM-semantics was intended to model classical relevant logics such as the logic of the relevant conditional R and the logic of Entailment E. But, ever since Routley and Meyer’s first papers on the topic, this essentially malleable semantics has been used for characterizing more general relevant logics or even non-relevant logics. The aim of this paper is to provide an RM-semantics with respect (...) to which Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic Ł3 is sound and complete. Ł3 is understood as the set of all valid formulas in Łukasiewicz 3-valued matrices MŁ3. In this sense, leaning on previous work by us, Ł3 is axiomatized as an extension of Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+, labelled Ł3. And the RM-semantics for Ł3 is actually defined for this particular axiomatization of Ł3. The result presented in the paper is interesting from the Universal Logic perspective, in the sense that it connects Łukasiewicz many-valued logics and similar systems to relevant logics from the point of view of the latter, the 3-termed relational point of view, in particular. (shrink)

Many philosophers deny that two different material objects can “coincide”, i.e. share their spatial location and microscopic parts. But, there seems to be a difficulty in identifying these coinciding objects, since we have many kinds of predicates that appear to show differences between them. One prominent strategy to avoid such a difficulty is to argue that such “problematic” predicates merely indicate our ways of describing objects, and thus that any difference between coinciding objects is only apparent. I call this move (...) "the semantic solution". The goal of this paper is to show that the semantic solution is unmotivated. The semantic solution, I argue, must distinguish problematic predicates from ones that indicate genuine properties. But the trouble is that in doing so it bringsmassive indeterminacy into our understanding of vast numbers predicates. Furthermore, indeterminacy would be hopelessly massive if every actual material object is made of “atomless gunk”, i.e. matter divisible into proper parts ad infinitum. (shrink)

Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness that wants to preserve the Law of Excluded Middle and, consequently, claims Horwich, the Principle of Bivalence. He defends, thus, that vague predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable of knowing. Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall present what they call ‘Semantic Epistemicism’, an application of Horwich’s account of vagueness to the Liar paradox within the frame of Minimalism; according to SE the Liar is either true or false, but we cannot know (...) its truth value; in this sense, says Horwich, the Liar is indeterminate. I want to argue that Horwich’s theory of truth cannot include all the non-paradoxical instances of the T-schema, which is what he claims that can be done. Some liar-like propositions built with indeterminate sentences show that some non-paradoxical propositions are not to be included in Horwich’s theory of truth. (shrink)

This book gives a state-of-the-art survey of current research in logic and philosophy of science, as viewed by invited speakers selected by the most prestigious international organization in the field. In particular, it gives a coherent picture of foundational research into the various sciences, both natural and social. In addition, it has special interest items such as symposia on interfaces between logic and methodology, semantics and semiotics, as well as updates on the current state of the field in Eastern (...) Europe and the Far East. (shrink)

This book gives a state-of-the-art survey of current research in logic and philosophy of science, as viewed by invited speakers selected by the most prestigious international organization in the field. In particular, it gives a coherent picture of foundational research into the various sciences, both natural and social. In addition, it has special interest items such as symposia on interfaces between logic and methodology, semantics and semiotics, as well as updates on the current state of the field in Eastern (...) Europe and the Far East. (shrink)

Logic and linguistics have engaged in a many-faceted dialogue since the very beginnings of both disciplines in Antiquity. While participants may have had diverse views over the ages, arguably, the dialogue has always revolved around the relationship between human thought and natural language. While there are those who see these two domains as one and the same, or as a case of one-directional influence , we beg to differ. To us, the long historical tradition of authors such as Arnauld, Boole, (...) Turing, or Jespersen demonstrates the much richer perspectives on language and reasoning that are needed, including connections with intelligence and computability.Another major historical theme in the above dialogue are similarities or convergences between natural and artificial languages. It is clear that natural languages are not only semantically broader, but also much closer to human communication than artificial languages, and so linguistic grammars have long dealt with a larger set of problems than logical formalism. This specal issue of JoLLI consists six selected papers presented in the "Logic and Linguisics" Workshop in UNI-LOG 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, plus two papers by invited authors: Johan van Benthem, and Marcus Kracht and Uno Klein. It contains a number of samples of what is intriguing and promising work at the interfaces of logic and language. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of standards being used in the domain of digital cultural heritage with focus on the Metadata Encoding and Transmission Standard created by the Library of Congress in the United States of America. The process of digitization of cultural heritage requires silo breaking in a number of areas—one area is that of academic disciplines to enable the performance of rich interdisciplinary work. This lays the foundation for the emancipation of the second form of silo which are (...) the silos of knowledge, both traditional and born digital, held in individual institutions, such as galleries, libraries, archives and museums. Disciplinary silo breaking is the key to unlocking these institutional knowledge silos. Interdisciplinary teams, such as developers and librarians, work together to make the data accessible as open data on the “semantic web”. Description logic is the area of mathematics which underpins many ontology building applications today. Creating these ontologies requires a human–machine symbiosis. Currently in the cultural heritage domain, the institutions’ role is that of provider of this open data to the national aggregator which in turn can make the data available to the trans-European aggregator known as Europeana. Current ingests to the aggregators are in the form of machine readable cataloguing metadata which is limited in the richness it provides to disparate object descriptions. METS can provide this richness. (shrink)