How human musical experience emerges from the audition of organized tones is a riddle of long standing. In "The Musical Representation," Charles Nussbaum offers a philosophical naturalist's solution.

How human musical experience emerges from the audition of organized tones is a riddle of long standing. In _The Musical Representation_, Charles Nussbaum offers a philosophical naturalist's solution. Nussbaum founds his naturalistic theory of musical representation on the collusion between the physics of sound and the organization of the human mind-brain. He argues that important varieties of experience afforded by Western tonal art music since 1650 arise through the feeling of tone, the sense of movement in musical space, cognition, emotional (...) arousal, and the engagement, by way of specific emotional responses, of deeply rooted human ideals. Construing the art music of the modern West as representational, as a symbolic system that carries extramusical content, Nussbaum attempts to make normative principles of musical representation explicit and bring them into reflective equilibrium with the intuitions of competent listeners. The human mind-brain, writes Nussbaum, is a living record of its evolutionary history; relatively recent cognitive acquisitions derive from older representational functions of which we are hardly aware. Consideration of musical art can help bring to light the more ancient cognitive functions that underlie modern human cognition. (shrink)

Two chronic problems have plagued functionalism in the philosophy of mind. The first is the chauvinism/liberalism dilemma, the second the absent qualia problem. The first problem is addressed by blocking excessively liberal counterexamples at a level of functional abstraction that is high enough to avoid chauvinism. This argument introduces the notion of emotional functional organization. The second problem is addressed by granting Block's skeptical conclusions with respect to mentality as such, while arguing that qualitative experience is a concomitant of human (...) mentality considered as a special case: a system with EFO implemented in an organic substrate. (shrink)

The transition in Kant's writings form a pre-critical to a critical standpoint has been thoroughly documented with regard to Kant's changing conception of metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of mathematics. But a similar alteration in standpoint in Kant's philosophy of logic has received little or no attention. This paper documents the existence of this shift in Kant's philosophy of logic and examines its nature. The resulting analysis provides evidence for the thesis that Kant began with a strictly intensional term (...) logic and with a theory of inference based on the analytic composition of concepts, and ended with a view of logic which, while remaining fundamentally intensional and term-based, shows movement towards a logic of propositions and propositional connectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concepts, Judgments, and Unity in Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Relational Categories CHARLES NUSSBAUM 1. INTRODUCTION TO ANY ATTENTIVEREADERof the section of the Critique of Pure Reason' known as the "Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories" (A67/B92-A83/B to9), one paragraph in that section stands out particularly by virtue of its special importance for Kant's developing argument: The same function Which gives unity to the various representations in ajudgment also gives (...) unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general.... (CPR A79/B loS) The importance of this paragraph is, however, more than equaled by its difficulties, which center on the question of how the function which operates by means of analytical unity can be the same as one that operates by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general. Put shortly, the problem is this. If the functions are really the same, then how do we distinguish at all between analytic and synthetic operations? But if they are different, then how can these forms of judgment serve as a clue for the discovery of the categories? ' Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason, trans. Norman KempSmith (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1963).Hereafter CPR. [89] 9~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 1990 The results of this dilemma which can be observed in the literature are not surprising: commentators tend to grasp one horn or the other. They either emphasize the difference between analysis and synthesis, and reject or dilute the claims as to sameness of function; or they take seriously Kant's argument concerning sameness of functions, and try to minimize the difference between analysis and synthesis. The major twentieth-century representant of the former approach is Kemp Smith," and of the latter, Paton. 3 This latter approach has found a formidable contemporary champion in the person of Henry Allison. By Allison's own admission,4 however, his position on this controversial topic was suggested (in part) by arguments first put forward over fifty years ago by Klaus Reich in a most remarkable book entitled Die Volls~ndigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel, 5 a book, by the way, also greatly admired by Paton. 6 In the first section of this paper I will try to show that Reich's arguments are rather more subtle than Allison apparently takes them to be, and that Reich is one commentator who attempts to go between the horns of the dilemma described above, and who essays an interpretation of our crucial paragraph that unifies its seemingly divergent tendencies. In the second section of the paper I will introduce some interpretive elements of my own. 2. Let us begin by reacquainting ourselves with Kant's notion of analytical unity, one aspect of this debate which is not particularly controversial and is largely agreed upon by all parties. For Kant, analytical unity is the sort of unity achieved by all general concepts (conceptus communes) insofar as they abstract from all differences that subsist between the objects under them, or the lower concepts subordinated to them. 7 A general concept unifies these objects or concepts by means of a common mark or set of marks. Thus Kant's example at CPR A69/B94 of the unification of bodies under the concepts 'body' and 'divisible' is a perfectly representative instance of unification via analytical unity, as the function upon which such concepts "rest." Let us note that the " Norman KempSmith,A CommentarytoKant's "Cr/t~rueofPureReason"(NewYork:HumanitiesPress, 196~). 3 H.J. Paton, Kant's MetaphysicofExperience, 2 vols.(London:George Allenand Unwin,Ltd., 1936). 4 Henry Allison,Kant's TranscendentalIdealum (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1983), 144 n. 3o. Hereafter KTI. 5 KlausReich,Die Vollst~ndigkeitderKantischenUrteilstafel,3rd. ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986). Hereafter VKU. 6 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic, 1:302. Kant, we should note, does not makethis important logicaldistinctionbetweensubordination... (shrink)

Abstract:Much of Western speculative metaphysics has subscribed to what has been called “explanatory rationalism,” which holds that there is a reason for everything that is and for the way everything is. Theodicies, or metaphysical attempts to solve the problem of evil, have relied on a special application of this principle of explanatory rationalism, namely, the principle of plenitude, which holds that the evil in the world is a necessary ingredient in the world's overall perfection or degree of reality. This essay (...) argues that the principle of plenitude is aesthetically motivated, and that only in art and perhaps in revealed religion can the demands of explanatory rationalism be satisfied. (shrink)

Abstract:The term "tragedy" is widely misused in common parlance to designate any disastrous occurrence of great magnitude. If this practice is to be resisted and reformed, an alternative account of real-life tragedy must be sustained. I attempt to offer one that is grounded in the connections between agency and luck. More specifically, I argue that in a universe lacking any supernatural power of fate, real-life tragedy occurs when the exercise of agency results, through a confluence of constitutive and circumstantial bad (...) luck, in the suffering and the destruction of the agent. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titles: Introduction and Conspectus: Naturalizing the Logical Modalities The Law of Noncontradiction and Possible Worlds Craning Noncontradiction Natural Necessity and Metaphysical Necessity in Millikan's Philosophy The Son, the Daughter, and the Mighty Dead: Debunking the Myth of the Logical Given23.

RÉSUMÉ: Dans son ouvrage de 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Dretske propose une analyse de l’introspection qui s’appuie sur la notion de perception déplacée. Tout comme Dretske perçoit qu’il pèse 170 livres en percevant la lecture indiquée sur sa balance, il perçoit qu’il se représente un objet bleu en percevant cet objet bleu. Dans les deux cas, le sujet percevant procède à partir d’un «fait intermédiaire» à l’inférence d’un «fait cible» déplacé. Le présent article dévoile une confusion au sujet des faits (...) intermédiaires dans l’approche de Dretske, explore certaines des conséquences de cette confusion, et suggère une manière d’y remédier. (shrink)

RésuméDans son ouvrage de 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Dretske propose une analyse de l'introspection qui s'appuie sur la notion de perception déplacée. Tout comme Dretske perçoit qu'il pèse 170 livres en percevant la lecture indiquée sur sa balance, il perçoit qu'il se représente un objet bleu en percevant cet objet bleu. Dans les deux cas, le sujet percevant procède à partir d'un «fait intermédiare» à l'inférence d'un «fait cible» déplacé. Le présent article dévoile une confusion au sujet des faits intermédiaires (...) dans l'approche de Dretske, explore certaines des conséquences de cette confusion, et suggère une manière d'y remédier. (shrink)

Charles Nussbaum´s reply to Malcom Budd´s review essay on Nussbaum´s book, The Musical Representation.

Musicians sometimes shake their heads in wonderment at the remarkable incidence of musical creativity that occurred in Germany and Austria between the years 1750 and 1900. One after another, a series of musical giants arose in rapid succession, each unique, and each exemplifying human artistic genius of the highest possible order. That the German-speaking world dominated music composition during this period is scarcely open to question. But it was not always this way. In the seventeenth century, the first phase of (...) the period which has come to be known as the Baroque, the Italians were dominant, and in the centuries before that the Flemish composers of the Renaissance and the high Middle Ages like Ockeghem and Josquin des Pres were second to none in importance. (shrink)

Kant is the last classical practitioner of foundationalist epistemology in the Cartesian tradition, a tradition which saw the major problem of the theory of knowledge as one of providing a metaphysical account of the way in which the subjective contents of the individual mind come to have indubitable objective reference. But he is also the inaugurator of a very different approach to epistemology, one that sees methodology or rules of cognitive procedure as fundamental in determining the objectivity of knowledge. An (...) examination of Kant's reconstruction of the traditional form-matter distinction and his application of it to the manifold of intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason brings out the transitional character of his philosophy with particular force, and shows the immense impact of his work on the central epistemological issues of representation, explanation, and justification. While Kant continues to employ the traditional term Vorstellung , he extends its signification beyond that of a subjective mental content to an intersubjectively shared scheme of description. Where he adopts scholastic usage in referring to categories as concepts, he does not regard them as highest genera, but interprets them as rules of connection, thereby providing a logical framework suitable for functional, rather than essentialist explanation. Finally, while retaining in his transcendental psychology the conception of mental activity derivative of the older empirical psychology, Kant still manages to distinguish successfully the previously conflated questions of the causal origins vs. the grounds of justification of knowledge. Consideration of subsequent developments in regard to these issues in the light of Kant's work not only lends a certain amount of support to pragmatic conceptions of the nature of knowledge and its justification, but also suggests some promising directions for future epistemological investigation along evolutionary lines. (shrink)

While purely causal theories of reference have provided a plausible account of the meanings of names and natural kind terms, they cannot handle vacuous theoretical terms. The causal homeostasis theory can but incurs other difficulties. Theories of reference that are intensional and not purely causal tend to be molecularist or holist. Holist theories threaten transtheoretic reference, whereas molecularist theories must supply a principled basis for selecting privileged meaning-determining relations between terms. The causal homeostasis theory is a two-factor molecularist theory, but (...) it fails to provide such a principled basis and collapses into holism. A naturalistic, non-foundationalist holism that deploys strategies of intertheoretic reduction and co-evolutionary pluralism can, however, yield a credible version of transtheoretic reference. (shrink)