The idea to work on this topic was come to my mind when I came across Masaaki Hattori’s comment that Dinnaga has accepted Bhartrhari’s views regarding the meaning of a sentence although their theories of word meaning are completely different from each other. According to Bhartrhari, in all phenomenal entities there are two elements viz. jati and vyakti; jati refers to the real element and vyakti to the unreal. Vyakti suffer changes, whereas jati remains constant. Again according to him the (...) real unit of language is a sentence, and not words or letters, because only a sentence conveys one full idea of the speaker. It’s meaning is also an instantaneous flash of pratibha or intuition, which has no parts. Dinnaga, on the other hand did not accept the reality of word‐ meaning (samanya),but maintained that words deal directly with conceptual images or vikalpas, which are purely subjective constructions of the mind, and therefore there can be no direct connection between words and external objects. The function of a word in a sentence is similar to the function of an inferential mark (linga) in the process of inference and it indicates its object through the exclusion of other things (apoha). Thus, there seems to be some contradictions in Dinnaga’s views on sentence meaning. But I think Dinnaga did not accept Bhartrhari’s views in toto. He could not possibly have done so. There is, however, a resemblance between Dinnaga and Bhartrhari in that each accepted that the primary unit of linguistic meaning is the entire sentence; the meaning of an individual word is abstracted from the whole meaning of the sentence. It is only in that respect that the two philosophers can be said to have roughly the same theory of sentential meaning. (shrink)

Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- relational (...) and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana. (shrink)