Human beings are strange animals. Although evolutionary theory has brilliantly accounted for the features we share with other creatures—from the genetic code that directs the construction of our bodies to the details of how our muscles and neurons work—we still stand out in countless ways. Our brains are exceptionally large, we alone have truly grammatical language, and we alone compose symphonies, drive cars, eat spaghetti with a fork and wonder about the origins of the universe.

Model checking, a prominent formal method used to predict and explain the behaviour of software and hardware systems, is examined on the basis of reflective work in the philosophy of science concerning the ontology of scientific theories and model-based reasoning. The empirical theories of computational systems that model checking techniques enable one to build are identified, in the light of the semantic conception of scientific theories, with families of models that are interconnected by simulation relations. (...) And the mappings between these scientific theories and computational systems in their scope are analyzed in terms of suitable specializations of the notions of model of experiment and model of data. Furthermore, the extensively mechanized character of model-based reasoning in model checking is highlighted by a comparison with proof procedures adopted by other formal methods in computer science. Finally, potential epistemic benefits flowing from the application of model checking in other areas of scientific inquiry are emphasized in the context of computer simulation studies of biological information processing. (shrink)

According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view -- if taken seriously as a formal explication -- leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are truly distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are truly equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view -- as (...) currently formulated -- threatens to undermine scientific structuralism. (shrink)

According to the semantic view, a theory is characterized by a class of models. In this paper, we examine critically some of the assumptions that underlie this approach. First, we recall that models are models of something. Thus we cannot leave completely aside the axiomatization of the theories under consideration, nor can we ignore the metamathematics used to elaborate these models, for changes in the metamathematics often impose restrictions on the resulting models. Second, based on a parallel between van (...) Fraassen’s modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and Skolem’s relativism regarding set-theoretic concepts, we introduce a distinction between relative and absolute concepts in the context of the models of a scientific theory. And we discuss the significance of that distinction. Finally, by focusing on contemporary particle physics, we raise the question: since there is no general accepted unification of the parts of the standard model (namely, QED and QCD), we have no theory, in the usual sense of the term. This poses a difficulty: if there is no theory, how can we speak of its models? What are the latter models of? We conclude by noting that it is unclear that the semantic view can be applied to contemporary physical theories. (shrink)

We model scientific theories as Bayesian networks. Nodes carry credences and function as abstract representations of propositions within the structure. Directed links carry conditional probabilities and represent connections between those propositions. Updating is Bayesian across the network as a whole. The impact of evidence at one point within a scientific theory can have a very different impact on the network than does evidence of the same strength at a different point. A Bayesian model allows us to envisage (...) and analyze the differential impact of evidence and credence change at different points within a single network and across different theoretical structures. (shrink)

This book is about the methods used for unifying different scientific theories under one all-embracing theory. The process has characterized much of the history of science and is prominent in contemporary physics; the search for a 'theory of everything' involves the same attempt at unification. Margaret Morrison argues that, contrary to popular philosophical views, unification and explanation often have little to do with each other. The mechanisms that facilitate unification are not those that enable us to explain how (...) or why phenomena behave as they do. A feature of this book is an account of many case studies of theory unification in nineteenth- and twentieth-century physics and of how evolution by natural selection and Mendelian genetics were unified into what we now term evolutionary genetics. (shrink)

This paper analyzes recent work in psychology on the nature of the representation of complex forms of knowledge with the goal of understanding how theories are represented. The analysis suggests that, as a psychological form of representation, theories are mental structures that include theoretical entities (usually nonobservable), relationships among the theoretical entities, and relationships of the theoretical entities to the phenomena of some domain. A theory explains the phenomena in its domain by providing a conceptual framework for the (...) phenomena that leads to a feeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptual framework goes beyond the original phenomena, integrates diverse aspects of the world, and shows how the original phenomena follow from the framework. This analysis is used to argue that mental models are the subclass of theories that use causal/mechanical explanatory frameworks. In addition, an argument is made for a new psychologism in the philosophy of science, in which the mental representation of scientific theories must be taken into account. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science have asked, "what kind of thing is a scientific theory?" The logical positivists answered: a scientific theory is a mathematical theory, plus an empirical interpretation of that theory. Moreover, they assumed that a mathematical theory is specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. Later 20th century philosophers questioned this account, arguing instead that a scientific theory need not include a mathematical component; or that the (...) mathematical component need not be specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. We survey various accounts of scientific theories entertained in the 20th century -- removing some misconceptions, and clearing a path for future research. (shrink)

Ernest Barnes was invited to Aberdeen as Gifford Lecturer (1927-1929) to deliver lectures under the title of 'Scientific Theory and Religion'. The lectures were originally published in 1933 and sought to bring Christian doctrines together with the possibility of life on other planets. The magnitude of the universe, accompanied with some basic observations on biological development within it, makes speculation about the possibility of intelligent life in distant galaxies reasonable. Barnes believed that the Creation was made precisely for the (...) higher forms of' consciousness. The scope of the background to scientific theory and religious ideas of creation presented here is extensive and covers topics including Jewish cosmology as the basis for later Christian thought to early quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology. However, as Barnes himself noted of this scope in his lectures, 'Wide as is their range, they have an inner coherence. I trust that they express the attitude of the modern man of science who, as he hopefully makes theories, is aware of the limitations of his knowledge and also, in part because of his loyalty to truth, bears in mind the reality and the claims of the spiritual world.'. (shrink)

The positivistic Received View construed scientific theories syntactically as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms were given a partial semantic interpretation via correspondence rules connecting them to observation statements. This paper assesses what, with hindsight, seem the most important defects in the Received View; surveys the main proposed successor analyses to the Received View--various Semantic Conception versions and the Structuralist Analysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; examines what new problems they face and where the most promising require (...) further development or leave unanswered questions; explores implications of recent work on models for understanding theories; and rebuts the few criticisms of the Semantic Conception that have surfaced. (shrink)

Attempts by 20th century philosophers of science to define inductive concepts and methods concerning the support provided to scientific theories by empirical data have been unsuccessful. Although 20th century philosophers of science largely ignored statistical methods for testing theories, when they did address them they argued against rather than for their use. In contrast, this study demonstrates that traditional statistical methods used for validating computer simulation models provide tests of the scientific theories that those models (...) may embody. This study shows that these statistical methods are applicable regardless of whether the scientific theory or model is deterministic, stochastic, or chaos-based in nature. Traditional statistical methods, such as hypothesis testing, test theories by providing measures of their goodness-of-fit with the portion of the world the theories describe. Nothing more is needed to portray the agreement between theory and the world. Furthermore, the statistical measures of goodness-of-fit are not ampliative inductive measures. Therefore, the ultimate value and direction of the 20 th century ampliative inductive program within philosophy of science is thrown into question. This study also suggests that advanced statistical, visualization, and hybrid quantitative qualitative methods hold promise for offering scientists additional methods for testing scientific theories through validating their computer model representations. As a prerequisite to the above discussions, this study proves that scientific theories, when applied to concrete physical systems, can indeed be represented by computer models. (shrink)

Scientific theories are used for a variety of purposes. For example, physical theories such as classical mechanics and electrodynamics have important applications in engineering and technology, and we trust that this results in useful machines, stable bridges, and the like. Similarly, theories such as quantum mechanics and relativity theory have many applications as well. Beyond that, these theories provide us with an understanding of the world and address fundamental questions about space, time, and matter. Here (...) we trust that the answers scientific theories give are reliable and that we have good reason to believe that the features of the world are similar to what the theories say about them. But why do we trust scientific theories, and what counts as evidence in favor of them? (shrink)

The contributions to Testing Scientific Theories are unified by an in-terest in responding to criticisms directed by Glymour against existing models of confirmation—chiefly H-D and Bayesian schemas—and in assessing and correcting the "bootstrap" model of confirmation that he proposed as an alternative in Theory and Evidence (1980). As such, they provide a representative sample of objections to Glymour's model and of the wide range of new initiatives in thinking about scientific confirmation that it has influenced. The effect (...) is a sense of engagement and focus, and of significant advance at least in articulation of the problems that require solution; as Earman observes, "it is . . . heartening to report that the various opposing camps learned from each other" (p. vi).' In what follows I am concerned to assess what has been learned both critically, about Glymour's model, and constructively about the resources of the alternatives he challenges. My thesis is that while the theories emerging in this debate do deal with a wider range of scientific practice than before, their remaining limitations raise important questions about the ambitions and criteria of adequacy that have traditionally governed philosophical inquiry in this area. (shrink)

Most philosophical accounts on scientific theories are affected by three dogmas or ingrained attitudes. These dogmas have led philosophers to choose between analyzing the internal structure of theories or their historical evolution. In this paper, I turn these three dogmas upside down. I argue (i) that mathematical practices are not epistemically neutral, (ii) that the morphology of theories can be very complex, and (iii) that one should view theoretical knowledge as the combination of internal factors and (...) their intrinsic historicity. (shrink)

First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and that it better accommodates the phenomenon of inconsistent (...) scientific theories. (shrink)

The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing (...) my attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I introduce ‘theory eliminativism’ as a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it has the potential to be a highly effective way to make progress in the face of the noted problem: post-reformulation disagreements about theory cannot compromise the debate, and the questions that really matter can still be asked and answered. In addition the reformulation process demands that philosophers engage with science and the history of science in a more serious way than is usual in order to answer important questions about the justification for targeting a particular set of propositions (say) in a given context. All things considered, we should expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type. (shrink)

(2013). Is scientific theory change similar to early cognitive development? Gopnik on science and childhood. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 109-128. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625114.

This article considers the psychology of meditation and other introverted forms of mystical development from a neo-Piagetian perspective, which has commonalities with biogenetic structuralist and neurotheological approaches. Evidence is found that lines of meditative development unfold through Patañjali’s stages at different rates in an echo of the unfolding of lines of cognitive development through Piaget’s stages at different rates. Similar factors predicting the degree of independence of development apply to both conventional cognitive and meditative contents. As the same brain and (...) the same nervous system are involved in both cognitive developmental psychology and meditation there are likely to be commonalities between conventional psychological and transpersonal development. Neo-Piagetian transpersonal psychology predicts a variable landscape of spiritual development across traditions and individuals, in line with variability in the cultural learning environment. (shrink)

In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation berween empirical facts and theoretical laws in (...) a new way. (shrink)

Suppe, F. The search for philosophic understanding of scientific theories (p. [1]-241)--Proceedings of the symposium.--Bibliography, compiled by Rew A. Godow, Jr. (p. [615]-646).

Churchland proposes a radically new way of representing theories and their acquisition in the terms of connectionist neuro- science. ...

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Once Received View (ORV) Criticisms of the ORV The “Model Model” of Scientific Theories Mechanisms: Investigating Nonformal Patterns in Scientific Theories Conclusion.

Der Band enthält Beiträge von Juristen, Medizinern und Philosophen aus Australien, Estland, Polen, Rußland, Tschechien, den U.S.A. und Deutschland zu Themen der Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie der Medizin. Die Mehrzahl der Beiträge sind von Nachwuchswissenschaftlern des College for Advanced Central European Studies an der Europa-Universität Viadrina erarbeitet worden. Sie wurden im Rahmen der Jahrestagung des Arbeitskreises für Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie der Medizin in Ostmitteleuropa neben weiteren Beiträgen, die hier zum Abdruck kommen, zur Diskussion gestellt. Der Arbeitskreis beruht auf einer Kooperationsvereinbarung des (...) Interdisziplinären Zentrums für Ethik der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) und des Instituts für Geschichte und Ethik der Medizin der Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Die Beiträge befassen sich u. a. mit der Gesundheitsreform in Polen, mit ethischen und rechtlichen Problemen bei der künstlichen Befruchtung, der Abtreibung, medizinischen Experimenten an Menschen, der Gentechnik, der Patientenautonomie, Außenseitermethoden in der Medizin, dem Patiententestament, dem Todesbegriff, Drogenkonsum, der Sterbehilfe und der Gentechnik. (shrink)

A close examination of the literature on ontology may strike one with roughly two distinct senses of this word. According to the first of them, which we shall call traditional ontology , ontology is characterized as the a priori study of various “ontological categories”. In a second sense, which may be called naturalized ontology , ontology relies on our best scientific theories and from them it tries to derive the ultimate furniture of the world. From a methodological point (...) of view these two senses of ontology are very far away. Here, we discuss a possible relationship between these senses and argue that they may be made compatible and complement each other. We also examine how logic, understood as a linguistic device dealing with the conceptual framework of a theory and its basic inference patterns must be taken into account in this kind of study. The idea guiding our proposal may be put as follows: naturalized ontology checks for the applicability of the ontological categories proposed by traditional ontology and give substantial feedback for it. The adequate expression of some of the resulting ontological frameworks may require a different logic. We conclude with a discussion of the case of orthodox quantum mechanics, arguing that this theory exemplifies the kind of relationship between the two senses of ontology. We also argue that the view proposed here may throw some light in ontological questions concerning this theory. (shrink)

Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2° Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to (...) explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe. (shrink)

Associated with Bayesianism is the claim that insofar as thereis anything like scientific theory-commitment, it is not a doxastic commitment to the truth of the theory or any proposition involving the theory, but is rather an essentiallypractical commitment to behaving in accordance with a theory. While there are a number of a priori reasons to think that this should be true, there is stronga posteriori reason to think that it is not in fact true of current scientific practice.After (...) outlining a feature that distinguishes doxastic from practical commitment, I presentempirical evidence that suggests that, like perhaps all other theoretical commitment,scientific theory-commitment is doxastic. (shrink)

In this paper we use some ideas of Hertz and Duhem to propose a new concept of representation that overcomes the dichotomy between representation and intervention. It is based on the category-theoretical notion of adjoint situations and is used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in (...) a new way. (shrink)

Question: What is a (or the) scientific theory V based on a set B of syntactical L-formulas, interpreted according to the intended interpretations of the language L? What probably corresponds to the traditional candidate for V is found to be inadequate for use in deductively explaining experimental facts of a certain form. A second candidate for V, called a strong scientific theory (SST), does not suffer such an inadequacy because it is existentially strong, i.e., it has considerable existential (...) import. It even satisfies the particle physicist's dictum: WHAT IS NOT FORBIDDEN WILL HAPPEN. (shrink)

In this paper we use some ideas of Hertz and Duhem to propose a new concept of representation that overcomes the dichotomy between representation and intervention. It is based on the category-theoretical notion of adjoint situations and is used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technological successes, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories. Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, and continue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics, biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabit comparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climate science, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic Information Science (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, help supply legitimate explanations, and assist (...) in formulating predictions. Moving from their knowledge-producing representational functions to their interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. -/- This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these views answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the best characterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehension of the core structure of a scientific theory? How are these three views ultimately related? (shrink)