Sumário - Introdução; Ética e política; Jornada de seis horas; As utopias do século XXI; Dois mil e cinquenta; Política e ética; Política e ética II; Política e ética III; Desenvolvimento moral; O programa de direitos humanos; A verdade e o futuro da nação; Restaurando a ética; Moral e interesse; A eficácia sempre vence; A volta da política; O policial Beltrame; O amor cidadão.

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

Physiological responses in futsal have not been studied together with temporal information about the players’ stay on the court. The aim of this study was to compare heart rate and blood lactate concentration responses between 1-H and 2-H considering the time of permanency of the players on the court at each substitution in a futsal match. HR was recorded during entire match and [La−] was analyzed after each substitution of seven players. %HRmean and [La−] mean did not differ between 1-H (...) and 2-H. Time in intensity zones of 50–100 %HRmax differed only in 60–70 %HRmax. HR coefficient of variation throughout the match was low and among the four outfield players on the court. Substitutions, time of permanence on the court, ratio between time in- and out-ratio on the court also were similar between 1-H and 2-H. Balancing the number of substitutions, and the In:Outcourt ratio of players in both halves of the match, playing lower time at 1-H, ~8 min for each participation in the match, made it possible to maintain intensity of the match in 2-H similar to the 1H. These results are a good guidance to coaches and for application in future studies. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a interpretação pragmatista da tradição da Teoria Crítica, e o papel que as idealizações neokantianas assumem nesta interpretação. Tentaremos mostrar que, em uma interpretação pragmatista, o cerne da Teoria Crítica consiste em uma tensão argumentativa vinculada à estruturação comunicativo-discursiva típica das sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, como estruturação que confere às discussões práticas um papel primordial na dinâmica social concreta. Partindo de uma análise das diferenças entre as perspectivas antiga e moderna de compreensão da discussão prática, (...) procuramos mostrar que, no âmbito das discussões práticas modernas ou contemporâneas, as idealizações neokantianas assumem um papel central, definido através da oposição a fatores objetivos ou objetivados, alheios à racionalidade, que admitidamente afetam tais discussões. Nesse contexto, as idealizações neokantianas se configuram como suposições idealizadoras, com as quais os participantes das discussões não podem deixar de em alguma medida se comprometer. AbstractThe aim of this paper is to analyze the pragmatist interpretation of Critical Theory, and the role that the neo-kantians idealizations assume in this interpretation. We argue that, in the pragmatist interpretation, the core of Critical Theory is located in an argumentative tension linked to the communicative and discursive structuring typical of the contemporary democratic societies, as a structuring which gives to the practical discussions a primordial role in the concrete dynamics of society. Starting from an analysis of the differences between the ancient and the modern perspectives of comprehension of practical discussion, we argue that, in the context of the modern or contemporary practical discussions, the neo-kantians idealizations assume a key role, defined by the opposition to objective or objectified elements, which are alien to rationality, and affect such discussions. In this context, the neo-kantians idealizations take the figure of idealizing suppositions, with which the participants cannot help engaging. (shrink)

A cognitivist and discursive ethics must distinguish itself from two other metaethical positions: on one side, a cognitivist but non-discursive ethics; on the other side, a noncognitivist but communicative, argumentative and procedural ethics. The aim of the present work is to use Habermas’ reflections on the topic of truth to develop an ideal-typical scheme which could be helpful in explaining those distinctions. This scheme will contain three typical conceptions about the truth of theoretical statements: realist-intuitionist conception, objectivist-semantic conception and discursive-consensual (...) conception. The distinctiveness of the cognitive-discursive ethics will then be explained by relating the cognitivist but non-discursive ethics and the noncognitivist but procedural ethics to their respective conceptions of truth: the realist-intuitionist conception and the objectivist-semantic conception. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

A wide family of many-valued logics—for instance, those based on the weak Kleene algebra—includes a non-classical truth-value that is ‘contaminating’ in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula φ⁠, any complex formula in which φ appears is assigned that value as well. In such systems, the contaminating value enjoys a wide range of interpretations, suggesting scenarios in which more than one of these interpretations are called for. This calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating (...) values. In this paper, we consider the countably infinite family of multiple-conclusion consequence relations in which classical logic is enriched with one or more contaminating values whose behavior is determined by a linear ordering between them. We consider some motivations and applications for such systems and provide general characterizations for all consequence relations in this family. Finally, we provide sequent calculi for a pair of four-valued logics including two linearly ordered contaminating values before defining two-sided sequent calculi corresponding to each of the infinite family of many-valued logics studied in this paper. (shrink)

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi (...) for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues. (shrink)

Logics based on weak Kleene algebra (WKA) and related structures have been recently proposed as a tool for reasoning about flaws in computer programs. The key element of this proposal is the presence, in WKA and related structures, of a non-classical truth-value that is “contaminating” in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula ϕ, any complex formula in which ϕ appears is assigned that value as well. Under such interpretations, the contaminating states represent occurrences of a (...) flaw. However, since different programs and machines can interact with (or be nested into) one another, we need to account for different kind of errors, and this calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating values. In this paper, we make steps toward these evaluation systems by considering two logics, HYB1 and HYB2, whose semantic interpretations account for two contaminating values beside classical values 0 and 1. In particular, we provide two main formal contributions. First, we give a characterization of their relations of (multiple-conclusion) logical consequence—that is, necessary and sufficient conditions for a set Δ of formulas to logically follow from a set Γ of formulas in HYB1 or HYB2 . Second, we provide sound and complete sequent calculi for the two logics. (shrink)

Philosophical ethology draws heavily upon the methods and findings of ethological traditions but must be a properly philosophical undertaking that reframes them in terms of critical and speculative questions about animal mind and animal subjectivity. Both traditional ethology and later cognitive ethology failed to call into question the dualistic Cartesian ontological paradigm that introduced and justified an unbridgeable divide between human and nonhuman animals. Following the implications of Darwinian evolution and immanentist ontological philosophy, philosophical ethology presents a model of animal (...) subjectivity and desire that encompasses nonhuman and human animals. Martin Heidegger was correct in his phenomenological description of being-in-the-world, but he erred badly in failing to extend this model to other animals. Relationships to temporality and desire indicate that subjectivity is widespread among animals. (shrink)

In Christianity, Otherization and Contemporary Politics, Roberto E. Alejandro argues that the identity politics of the American far-left follow an identity paradigm established by early Christian thinkers, and warns that such politics may incline towards the same violence Christianity succumbed to once imbued with political power.

In The Crucifixion and Resurrection of Freddie Gray, Roberto E. Alejandro argues that confessional commitments related to race, society, and structure dominated the interpretation of Gray’s death, stripping the man and his significance from a grieving, impoverished community.

I present an argument proving that there are no fundamental facts, which is similar to an argument recently presented by Mark Jago for truthmaker maximalism. I suggest that this argument gives us at least some prima facie, defeasible reason to believe that there are no fundamental facts.

In this paper I will present three arguments (based on the notions of constitution, metaphysical reality, and truth, respectively) with the aim of shedding some new light on the structure of Fine’s (2005, 2006) ‘McTaggartian’ arguments against the reality of tense. Along the way, I will also (i) draw a novel map of the main realist positions about tense, (ii) unearth a previously unnoticed but potentially interesting form of external relativism (which I will label ‘hyper-presentism’) and (iii) sketch a novel (...) interpretation of Fine’s fragmentalism (which I contrast with Lipman’s 2015, 2016b, forthcoming). (shrink)

Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.

According to Composition is Identity, a whole is literally identical to the plurality of its parts. According to Mereological Nihilism, nothing has proper parts. In this note, it is argued that Composition is Identity can be shown to entail Mereological Nihilism in a much more simple and direct way than the one recently proposed by Claudio Calosi.

What is the relation between parts taken together and the whole that they compose? The recent literature appears to be dominated by two different answers to this question, which are normally thought of as being incompatible. According to the first, parts taken together are identical to the whole that they compose. According to the second, the whole is grounded in its parts. The aim of this paper is to make some theoretical room for the view according to which parts ground (...) the whole they compose while being, at the same time, identical to it. (shrink)

Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental existence. Recently, (...) Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine’s tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call ‘dynamic absolutism’. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine’s trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all (...) the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory. (shrink)

In this paper I address two important objections to the theory called ‘ Composition as Identity’ : the ‘wall-bricks-and-atoms problem’, and the claim that CAI entails mereological nihilism. I aim to argue that the best version of CAI capable of addressing both problems is the theory I will call ‘Atomic Composition as Identity’ which consists in taking the plural quantifier to range only over proper pluralities of mereological atoms and every non-atomic entity to be identical to the plurality of atoms (...) it fuses. I will proceed in three main steps. First, I will defend Sider’s Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211–221, 2014) idea of weakening the comprehension principle for pluralities and I will show that :219–235, 2016a) it can ward off both the WaBrA problem and the threat of mereological nihilism. Second, I will argue that CAI-theorists should uphold an ‘atomic comprehension principle’ which, jointly with CAI, entails that there are only proper pluralities of mereological atoms. Finally, I will present a novel reading of the ‘one of’ relation that not only avoids the problems presented by Yi Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 169–191, 2014) and Calosi :429–443, 2016b, Am Philos Q 55:281–292, 2018) but can also help ACAI-theorists to make sense of the idea that a composite entity is both one and many. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect”, to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition of (...) an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

Semen est sanguis Christianorum!—‘the blood of Christians is seed’—writes Tertullian at the end of his Apologeticum. This summing-up has justly become a cornerstone of Christian the...

I present a ‘stage-theoretical’ interpretation of the supervaluationist semantics for the growing-block theory of time according to which the ‘nodes’ on the branching tree of historical possibilities are taken to be possible stages of the growth of the growing-block. As I will argue, the resulting interpretation (i) is very intuitive, (ii) can easily ward off an objection to supervaluationist treatments of the growing-block theory presented by Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz, and (iii) is also not saddled by the problems affecting (...) the supervaluationist version of the growing-block theory defended by R. A. Briggs and Graeme A. Forbes. (shrink)

Joseph Keim Campbell has recently criticized Peter van Inwagen's Third Argument against compatibilism for its reliance on the existence of a remote past. In response, Anthony Brueckner has offered a new version of the Third Argument showing that determinism and free will are incompatible for all times t relative to which there is a past . In this paper I argue that although Brueckner's retooled argument fails to prove anything in favour of incompatibilism, its conclusion can be exploited to provide (...) another version of van Inwagen's original argument that doesn't rely on the existence of past times, thus withstanding Campbell's criticism. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to address the “Grounding Grounding Problem,” that is, the question as to what, if anything, grounds facts about grounding. I aim to show that, if a seemingly plausible principle of modal recombination between fundamental facts and the principle customarily called “Entailment” are assumed, it is possible to prove not only that grounding facts featuring fundamental, contingent grounds are derivative but also that either they are partially grounded in the grounds they feature or they are (...) “abysses”. (shrink)

According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’, if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what (...) may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most ‘joint-carving’ plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, ‘unrestricted’ plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over ‘super-pluralities’ of entities. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect” (1977), to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition (...) of an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

In its simplest form, a Spritz is an aperitif made with (sparkling) water and (white) wine. A ‘gunky Spritz’, as I will call it, is a Spritz in which the water and the wine are mixed through and through, so that every proper part of the Spritz has a proper part containing both water and wine. In the literature on the notion of location the possibility of mixtures like a gunky Spritz has been thought of as either threatening seemingly intuitive (...) locative principles, or as requiring the position of multiple primitive locative relations. In this paper I present a new theory of location which assumes as primitive only the notion of pervasive location and show that it can account for the possibility of gunky Spritz in an intuitive and adequate way. (shrink)

O artigo tenta diferenciar, caracterizar e ordenar diversas figuras da identidade na fenomenologia pós-husserliana. Em primeiro lugar, assinalam-se questões formuladas pela análise da ipseidade em Heidegger. Em segundo lugar, chama-se a atenção para duas tendências divergentes. Por um lado, Lévinas sustenta que uma fissão da identidade é o resultado da responsabilidade pelos outros, e Waldenfels desenvolve uma lógica da responsividade que questiona o autodesenvolvimento e a autopreservação. Por outro lado, Ricoeur sustenta que o ordenamento da vida num relato equivale a (...) uma identidade narrativa, e M. Henry oferece uma elaborada análise da vida interior como um processo de auto-afecção. Por último, tendo como base as distinções delineadas por X. Zubiri, afirma-se que existem fenômenos que oferecem um sustento a um sentido experiencial da identidade, e que isso pode se vincular à noção husserliana do eu como pólo, isto é, ao ponto de partida dos desenvolvimentos fenomenológicos.El artículo intenta diferenciar, caracterizar y ordenar diversas figuras de la identidad en la fenomenología post-husserliana. En primer lugar, se señalan cuestiones planteadas por el análisis de la ipseidad en Heidegger. En segundo lugar, se presta atención a dos tendencias divergentes. Por un lado, Levinas sostiene que una fisión de la identidad es el resultado de la responsabilidad por lo otros, y Waldenfels desarrolla una lógica de la responsividad que cuestiona el autodesarrollo y la autopreservación. Por otro lado, Ricoeur sostiene que el ordenamiento de la vida en un relato equivale a una identidad narrativa, y M. Henry ofrece un elaborado análisis de la vida interior como un proceso de autoafección. Por último, sobre la base de distinciones delineadas por X. Zubiri, se sostiene que hay fenómenos que ofrecen un sustento a un sentido experiencial de la identidad, y que esto puede vinculares a la noción husserliana de yo como polo, esto es, al punto de partida de los desarrollos fenomenológicos.This article attempts to differentiate, characterize and order various figures of identity in post-Husserlian phenomenology. First, issues raised by Heidegger's analysis of selfhood are pointed out. Secondly, attention is given to two divergent trends. On the one hand, Levinas contends that a fission of identity is the outcome of responsibility for others, and Waldenfels advances a logic of responsiveness that questions self-development and self-preservation. On the other hand, Ricoeur argues that the ordering of life in a story amounts to a narrative identity, and M. Henry affords an elaborate analysis of inward life as a process of self-affection. Finally, on the basis of distinctions outlined by X. Zubiri, it is contended that there are phenomena that uphold an experiential sense of identity. This can be linked to the Husserlian notion of an ego as a pole of acts, i.e., the starting point of phenomenological developments. (shrink)

Summary The paper presents the result of a collective reflection inspired by the individual suggestions of 30 researchers working in different research areas. They are all familiar with the Experimental Phenomenology of Perception, and are aware of the importance that this approach might represent nowadays in their specific research field. The picture that emerges from this ‘mosaic’ stimulates us to consider the potential future developments of this approach if we accept that we need to push its borders beyond the traditional (...) aims of the study of perception (as masterfully developed by the historic Italian Maestri of this approach). If we take this broader view, the Experimental Phenomenology of Perception can extend its perimeters from an analysis of strictly perceptual aspects to an analysis of cognitive and metacognitive aspects (such as aesthetic evaluations, the perception of risk, the experience of certainty/uncertainty in a reasoning process, the perception of proximity to/distance from the solution to a problem and meaning-making in language). The cognitive and metacognitive aspects referred to are grounded in and modelled on the perceiver’s experience of a given situation. (shrink)

In the literature on mereology it is often accepted that mereological universalism entails extensionalism. More precisely, many accept that, if parthood is assumed to be a partial order, the thesis that every plurality of entities has a mereological fusion entails the thesis that different composite entities have different proper parts. Central to this idea is the principle known as ‘Weak Supplementation’ which many take to impose an important constraint on the relation of proper parthood. In this paper I argue that (...) this claim is false as the principle that I will call ‘Minimal Supplementation’ appears to be capable of doing all the work done by Weak Supplementation but without entailing extensionalism if conjoined with universalism and core mereology. (shrink)

El trabajo tiene como hilo conductor la diferenciación efectuada por P. Ricoeur respecto del lenguaje entre la lengua, el discurso oral, la escritura y la lectura. Cada uno de estos modos de lenguaje puede ser examinado según los fenómenos de la temporalidad, la subjetividad, el mundo y la intersubjetividad. Siguiendo a M. Presas, este esquema se aplica al arte y a su función de dejar que las cosas se manifiesten en su plena presencia. Se destaca su énfasis en la liberación (...) efectuada por el arte respecto de la limitación fáctica de nuestra situación finita. Esto se logra mediante la apertura a la verdad de una existencia posible que no se identifica con una evasión de la realidad. Los análisis de Presas se centran en P. Klee y F. Marc, y destacan los rasgos distintivos relacionados con los mencionados fenómenos. En el intento de ofrecer un complemento a este examen, se mencionan las interpretaciones de Merleau-Ponty sobre P. Cézanne, de M. Henry sobre V. Kandinsky y de J.-C. Marion sobre G. Courbet. Se muestra que en ellas también se encuentran explicitaciones de lo que Presas ha afirmado sobre la discordia, el ser insular y la ausencia de apremio. (shrink)

Most of the theories of location on the market appear to be ideologically parsimonious at least in the sense that they take as primitive just one locative notion and define all the other locative notions in terms of it. Recently, however, the possibility of some exotic metaphysical scenarios involving gunky mixtures and extended simple regions of space has been argued to pose a significant threat to parsimonious theories of locations. The aim of this paper is to show that a theory (...) taking as primitive a notion of plural pervasive location and allowing for irreducibly plural locative facts can account for all the putatively problematic scenarios for parsimonious theories of location. Furthermore, I will also argue that the notion of plural pervasive location is compatible with the possibility of multilocation. (shrink)

Technoscientific progress brings into question both anthropocentric epistemology and anthropocentric/humanistic ontology, which considers the human being as a self-constructing and self-sufficient entity. Even though, Darwinism recomposes the humanistic disjunction between reality and representation: by defining the human being as the result of an adaptive reflection, it reveals the idealistic character of post-Cartesian thought, which is the backbone of philosophical anthropocentrism. The non-human can be a dialogic entity if and only if it is considered not as “animal-by” but “animal-with”, that is, (...) free to express its authenticity in terms of subjectivity, diversity and uniqueness. Whilst the post-human laboratory celebrates the power of human beings, the post-humanistic perspective emphasizes the conjugation with the non-human. (shrink)

This article argues that, to distinguish between “critical” and “uncritical” solidarity, the normative concept of solidarity must be grounded on the principle of respect for persons. I start analyzing the principle of respect for persons from a modified Kantian perspective, arguing that it must be interpreted as a normative relation of power in which each person must recognize the autonomy of the other as a source of power. In this perspective, the principle of respect offers a foundation for an ethical (...) assessment of situations in which ethical solidarity is required. By drawing on the distinction between passive and active respect, I argue that solidarity is grounded on the duty of active respect in the face of danger or oppression and that this foundation allows us to distinguish between critical (i.e. appropriate) and uncritical (i.e. inappropriate) solidarity. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v57-walton.

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 359-374, September 2022.

En el curso de 1934/35 Heidegger se refiere a cuatro momentos esenciales del temple fundamental: desplazamiento hacia los límites del ente, inserción en la existencia histórica y arraigo en la tierra y el suelo natal, apertura del ente en conjunto como la unidad de un mundo, y fundación del ser. El artículo explora el vínculo de los cuatro momentos con las siguientes oposiciones: indigencia/disponibilidad, no-hogareño/hogareño, duelo/alegría, lejanía/cercanía y condición-de-oculto/condición-de-no-oculto. Se analiza esta quinta oposición en relación con las diversas modalidades en (...) que se manifiesta el ánimo. Las oposiciones pueden ser consideradas también rasgos distintivos del temple fundamental. Se interrelacionan, y, además, se despliegan siempre a partir de una intimidad fundamental que opera como un nexo en medio de los antagonismos. El énfasis está puesto en el curso de 1934/35 con referencias a ulteriores textos complementarios. (shrink)

Most of the theories of location on the market appear to be ideologically parsimonious at least in the sense that they take as primitive just one locative notion and define all the other locative notions in terms of it. Recently, however, the possibility of some exotic metaphysical scenarios involving gunky mixtures and extended simple regions of space has been argued to pose a significant threat to parsimonious theories of locations. The aim of this paper is to show that a theory (...) taking as primitive a notion of plural pervasive location and allowing for irreducibly plural locative facts can account for all the putatively problematic scenarios for parsimonious theories of location. Furthermore, I will also argue that the notion of plural pervasive location is compatible with the possibility of multilocation. (shrink)

Alessandro Torza argues that Ted Sider’s Lewisian argument against vague existence is insufficient to rule out the possibility of what he calls ‘super-vague existence’, that is the idea that existence is higher-order vague, for all orders. In this chapter it is argued that the possibility of super-vague existence is ineffective against the conclusion of Sider’s argument since super-vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to be a kind of linguistic vagueness. Torza’s idea of super-vague existence seems to be better suited to (...) model vague existence under the assumption that vague existence is instead a form of ontic indeterminacy, contra what Ted Sider and David Lewis assume. (shrink)

The paper presents color as a case study for the analysis of phenomena that pertain to several levels of reality and are typically framed by different sciences and disciplines. Color, in fact, is studied by physics, biology, phenomenology, and esthetics, among others. Our thesis is that color is a different entity for each level of reality, and that for this reason color generates different observables in the epistemologies of the different sciences. By analyzing color as a paradigmatic case of an (...) entity naturally spreading over different levels of reality, the paper raises the question as to whether making explicit the usually implicit ontological assumptions embedded within the different observables exploited by the different sciences may eventually clarify some of the difficulties of developing a comprehensive theory of color. (shrink)