The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.
I wish, for the sake of the vivacity of any discussion which might ensue, that I could find myself more in disagreement with Dr. Brodbeck than I do. As a matter of fact, however, I find myself in substantial agreement with her on practically all of the points upon which she takes issue with Hayek. There are, to be sure a few questions of relatively minor import that I should like to ask Dr. Brodbeck, but in the main I have (...) confined my own discussion to an elaboration and supplementation of some of the points considered in her paper, and some related considerations raised in Hayek's book but which Dr. Brodbeck did not have the time, perhaps, to treat. (shrink)
IN a recent article Dr. Paul D. Wienpahl proposes an explication for Frege's notion of sense that, he believes, "fits the data of Frege's discussion and does not make sense a subsistent entity" (p. 483). Wienpahl's proposal is that "the sense of a sign is the combination of its physical properties" (p. 488). But in the face of the requirements which he has set himself, there seem to be three considerations which lead to the conclusion that his proposal is defective.
In some ways, I think, the analytic method in philosophy and science suffers from an embarrassment of riches. It has too many distinctions—in the sense that any distinction which is infirm, but which is yet carted about along with the necessary apparatus of a method, is superfluous. In these pages I propose to examine one such distinction.A principle which is subscribed to by almost all of the “analysers” with whose work I am acquainted is that which is constituted by a (...) certain kind of dichotomization between what we may for the present loosely characterize as the “formal” and the “non-formal.” Sometimes this distinction is presented as one existing between the “formal sciences” and the “non-formal sciences”; more frequently, perhaps, it is taken as a distinction holding between certain kinds of expressions, i.e., analytic and synthetic statements. It will be the thesis of this paper that there are good reasons for believing that this distinction in either of its forms is not a cogent one. (shrink)