Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6 (1953)

The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.
Keywords Philosophy of Science   Values
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DOI 10.1086/287231
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On Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Willard van Orman Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (5):65--72.

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Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.
In Defence of the Value Free Ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.

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