Citizenship, with its presumptive rights, privileges and obligations, has been a fundamental challenge confronting the state since the classical Greek era and the transformation and reorganization of the centralized medieval Holy Roman Empire after the Thirty Years War. With the changing patterns of state formation from the large and unwieldy empires organized into absolutist states to the more nationalistic/linguistic formations a recurring issue has been the constitutional or legal guarantees of the rights of the citizen as well as his/her obligations (...) to the state. This paper engaged in a nuanced study of Plato’s Crito as it relates the contradictions of citizenship as social membership and as participation in the modern state. The primary objective was to adapt Socrates’ experience to discuss the citizenship challenge in the modern state and driven by the research question on the implications of the emergence of new challenges to the contradictions of citizenship. Social contract theory by Thomas Hobbes served as the theoretical framework. Data collection was mainly from secondary sources such as academic journals, books, newspapers and internet sources, and data analysis based on the content and textual analysis of extant and relevant literature on the subject matter. Conclusively, the study realized that citizenship in the modern state is determined largely by the protection, in various ramifications, given to the citizen by the state, but that given a change in the circumstances many would decline to die for the state. Accordingly, it recommended a mutualism in the relationship and responsibilities between that state and the citizen of the modern state, particularly the underdeveloped states of the Third World. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the complex relation between ethics andpolitics in Plato’s Crito. While the issue is presented from a contemporaryperspective, the problems of civil disobedience and politicalobligation are the present study’s primarily concern. The issue of civildisobedience concerns moral reasons for breaking the law, whereasthe concept of political obligation refers to a moral duty to obey the law.When disagreeing with the view that Socrates in the dialogue arguesfor an unconditional obedience to the state, the article builds on (...) theApology. Subsequently, the similarities between the position of Socratesand that of H.D. Thoreau are investigated. Finally, the paper discussesthe concept of political obligation so as to show that the argumentin the Crito anticipates several modern theories. The modern controversiesthat this article covers are shown to play an important role in Plato’sdialogue, as they are the basis of Socrates’ political obligation. (shrink)

It is argued that the Crito hinges on the relation between words and deeds. Socrates sets out a standard of agreement reached through persuasive argument or words. In this case the argument is deliberative: a general shared principle (do not do wrong) is juxtaposed to a particular minor premise (this act of escape is wrong) to reach a conclusion (do not escape). Crito baulks at the perception of the minor premise. At this juncture the Laws of Athens are (...) introduced, who set out a standard of agreement established instead by deeds. Both standards apply to Socrates, constituting the drama of the dialogue. (shrink)

The Crito dramatizes the impossibility, and the indispensability, of persuasion sby locating it between two extremes, Socrates and the Laws, the truths of philosophy and the force of politics. The question is whether those two limits are themselves inside or outside rhetoric. Can philosophy persuade, ormust it always be an alternative sto persuasion? Socrates insists on ignoring the opinion, and the power, of the many, and so the Laws have to show themselves as different from the opinion of the (...) many in order for him to obey. If Socrates and the Laws cannot talk to each other, it is because philosophy and politics are incommensurable. If there is common ground, it is because persuasion can make the two, philosophy and politics, commensurable to each other. Socrates exhibits the philosopher’s task as transforming himself from a universal thinker into a particular agent, while the Laws face the opposite challenge, aspiring to a generality that makes them rational and normative, and so open to discourse and persuasion. The many whom Socrates constantly denigrates have the particularity of being fickle and changeable, while the Laws look rigid. Socrates, as he says in the Apology, is always the same. Both sides look to the flexibility and adaptability to circumstances central to rhetoric. (shrink)

The Crito dramatizes the impossibility, and the indispensability, of persuasion sby locating it between two extremes, Socrates and the Laws, the truths of philosophy and the force of politics. The question is whether those two limits are themselves inside or outside rhetoric. Can philosophy persuade, ormust it always be an alternative sto persuasion? Socrates insists on ignoring the opinion, and the power, of the many, and so the Laws have to show themselves as different from the opinion of the (...) many in order for him to obey. If Socrates and the Laws cannot talk to each other, it is because philosophy and politics are incommensurable. If there is common ground, it is because persuasion can make the two, philosophy and politics, commensurable to each other. Socrates exhibits the philosopher’s task as transforming himself from a universal thinker into a particular agent, while the Laws face the opposite challenge, aspiring to a generality that makes them rational and normative, and so open to discourse and persuasion. The many whom Socrates constantly denigrates have the particularity of being fickle and changeable, while the Laws look rigid. Socrates, as he says in the Apology, is always the same. Both sides look to the flexibility and adaptability to circumstances central to rhetoric. (shrink)

These dramatized, unabridged versions of Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo present the trial, imprisonment, and execution of Socrates, who Phaedo said was the "wisest, best, and most righteous person I have ever known."In the Euthyphro Socrates approaches the court where he will be tried on charges of atheism and corrupting the young. On the way he meets Euthyphro, an expert in religious matters. Socrates challenges Euthyphro's claim that ethics should be based on religion.In the Apology Socrates presents (...) his own defense. He explains why he has devoted his life to challenging the most powerful and important people, a process that has generated great resentment and has led to his indictment. He insists that instead of being punished he should be rewarded for his services to his fellow citizens. Socrates fails in his attempt to avoid the death sentence, but his friend Crito has bribed the guards offers him a way to escape. In the third dialogue Crito tries to persuade Socrates that it is right to flee from the unjust sentence imposed on him. In the course of their conversations they probe the foundations of civil and moral law, and treat issues that are as relevant to our time as to theirs.The Phaedo presents Socrates' final conversation. What will become of him once he drinks the poison prescribed for his execution? Socrates and his friends examine several arguments to prove that the death of the body does not kill the soul. (shrink)

These dramatized, unabridged versions of Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo present the trial, imprisonment, and execution of Socrates, who Phaedo said was the "wisest, best, and most righteous person I have ever known."In the Euthyphro Socrates approaches the court where he will be tried on charges of atheism and corrupting the young. On the way he meets Euthyphro, an expert in religious matters. Socrates challenges Euthyphro's claim that ethics should be based on religion.In the Apology Socrates presents (...) his own defense. He explains why he has devoted his life to challenging the most powerful and important people, a process that has generated great resentment and has led to his indictment. He insists that instead of being punished he should be rewarded for his services to his fellow citizens. Socrates fails in his attempt to avoid the death sentence, but his friend Crito has bribed the guards offers him a way to escape. In the third dialogue Crito tries to persuade Socrates that it is right to flee from the unjust sentence imposed on him. In the course of their conversations they probe the foundations of civil and moral law, and treat issues that are as relevant to our time as to theirs.The Phaedo presents Socrates' final conversation. What will become of him once he drinks the poison prescribed for his execution? Socrates and his friends examine several arguments to prove that the death of the body does not kill the soul. (shrink)

I propose a revisionary reading of Plato’s Crito focusing on the dramatic rendering of the friendship between Crito and Socrates, which I argue affords a model for political participation in a social contract. Their friendship models how citizens can come to be conventionally related to one another, and how they should treat one another internal to that relationship. This approach is apt for contemporary democratic theory, perhaps more so than standard interpretations of the political theory traditionally mined from (...) the text, rather than drama, of the Crito. My account moves beyond questions of civility in deliberative democratic politics and deepens an account of how and why we ought to regard those with whom we disagree, but to whom we have nonetheless quasi-voluntarily bound ourselves within the same project of democracy. Friendship also addresses regard for those who have not previously received equal consideration within a putatively democratic social contract. (shrink)

My paper has two aims. The first is to challenge the widespread assumption that the personified Laws of Athens, whom Socrates gives voice to during the second half of the _Crito express Socrates' own views. I shall argue that the principles which the Laws espouse not only differ from those which Socrates sets out in his own person within the dialogue, but are in fact in conflict with Socrates' states principles. (edited).

This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must accept his sentence of (...) death, because he must regard the court’s verdict as a command from a practical authority – the city. The Laws’ arguments rely on special features of authority-reasons that many commentators have overlooked. This article explains why the Law’s arguments are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that Socrates’ description of ‘the many’ suggests that the city lacks the deliberative capacity necessary for possessing practical authority. (shrink)

Plato's Crito is not a treatise on obedience to the law, but a dialogue whose interpretation is not determined by its surface meaning. The initial dream is not mere ornamentation; rather it points to the range of possibilities in Socrates' situation. The speeches of the Laws, with which the dialogue closes, are not intended to be philosophically cogent, since they are inconsistent with the principles laid out in the preceding conversation between Socrates and Crito. The arguments of (...) the Laws are rather directed towards Crito, Socrates' decent and unphilosophic friend. (shrink)

Faced with a choice between escaping without consequences and submitting to a democratic decision, Socrates chooses the latter. So immense is Socrates’ duty to obey law, we are led to believe, that even the threat of death is insufficient to abrogate it. Crito proposes several arguments purporting to ground Socrates’ strong duty to obey, with the appeal to the Athenian system’s democratic credentials carrying most of the normative weight. A careful reading of the dialogue, in conjunction with the ‘Apology’, (...) reveals, however, a more complex picture. If Crito sets the conditions that render a regime legitimate, and therefore warranting of obedience, the Apology reveals a legal system’s shortcomings that justify disobedience. This article substantiates this position by delineating circumstances that can justify resistance. Contemporary forms of political resistance can also rely on similar conditions. Plato’s texts anticipate the current democratic turn of civil disobedience. (shrink)

In studying Plato’s Crito with a primary concern for Plato's friend Crito, this book reveals the rarity of the philosopher, the tension between the citizen’s natural understanding of justice and the city’s necessary understanding of justice, and how one might attempt to ease this tension.

Plato's Euthyrphro, Apology, andCrito portray Socrates' words and deeds during his trial for disbelieving in the Gods of Athens and corrupting the Athenian youth, and constitute a defense of the man Socrates and of his way of life, the philosophic life. The twelve essays in the volume, written by leading classical philosophers, investigate various aspects of these works of Plato, including the significance of Plato's characters, Socrates's revolutionary religious ideas, and the relationship between historical events and Plato's (...) texts. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a close analysis of the first scene in Plato’s Crito. Understanding a Platonic dialogue as a philosophical drama turns apparent scene-setting into an integral and essential part of the philosophical discussion. The two apparently innocent questions Socrates asks at the beginning of the Crito anticipate Crito’s two problems, namely how he regards his friendship with Socrates as opposed to his complicated relations with the polis and its sovereignty. These two questions are an (...) integral part of the philosophical discussion presented throughout the dialogue. (shrink)

A prevailing theme of the scholarship on Plato’s Crito has been civil disobedience, with many scholars agreeing that the Athenian Laws do not demand a slavish, authoritarian kind of obedience. While this focus on civil disobedience has yielded consensus, it has left another issue in the text relatively unexplored—that is, the challenges and attractions of leaving one’s homeland or of “exit.” Reading for exit reveals two fundamental, yet contradictory, desires in the Crito: a yearning to escape the injustice (...) of the homeland for self-preservation and freedom and a deep-seated need to honor one’s obligations and attachments to the homeland. By exposing the conflicted nature of leaving one’s native land, Plato’s Crito enriches an understanding of the meaning and consequences of an exit for the individual. (shrink)

Speeches and persuasion dominate Plato’s Crito. This paper, paying particular attention to the final passage in the dialogue, shows that the focus on speeches, persuasion and allusions to many other elements of rhetoric is an integral part of Plato’s severe criticism of democracy, one of the main points of the Crito. Speeches allow members of a democracy – represented in our dialogue by Crito – firstly to break the law for self-interested reasons while considering themselves still to (...) be law-abiding citizens, and secondly to feel that they are in a tolerant society preferring logos/persuasive speech above bia/compulsion. Socrates counters Crito’s speeches with speeches of his own, not only to defeat him at his own game, but also to make him aware how dangerous the game is. Real knowledge is preferable to speeches, but a democracy without speeches and rhetoric is doomed. (shrink)

Widely adopted for classroom use, this book offers translations of four major works of ancient Greek literature which treat the life and thought of Socrates, focusing particularly on his trial and defense (the platonic dialogues Euthyphro,...

In this article I analyze the speech of the Laws in Plato’s Crito from a jurisprudential perspective. More specifically I explore the Laws’ views about the authority of law. I offer new interpretations of their famous ‘persuade or obey’ alternative and of their arguments about their superior moral status and the agreements of the citizens with them. I also explore the rather neglected topic of the mental attitude towards their authority that they demand from the citizens and conclude with (...) a discussion of their understanding of the relation between law and morality. I approach the speech of the Laws as a historian of legal thought and try to locate their arguments firmly within both the context of the ancient Athenian legal system and the context of Platonic philosophy. (shrink)

In studying Plato's Crito with a primary concern for Plato's friend Crito, this book reveals the rarity of the philosopher, the tension between the citizen's natural understanding of justice and the city's necessary understanding of justice, and how one might attempt to ease this tension.

최근 우리에게 부각된 『크리톤』의 해석적 과제는 의인(화된) 법률연설의 위상과 의미인데, 권위와 복종의 문제에 대한 하트(V. Harte) 등의 문제제기에 제대로 답해야 한다. 바람직함이 당연시되는 민주주의 역시 숙고의 대상인데, 거기에 이용될 만한 자산인 플라톤은 친민주-반민주 이분법 도식 하에 민주주의 반대편에 정위되어 둘 사이의 만남은 아주 제한적으로만 논의되어 왔다. 이 글은 이런 해석적, 실천적 과제에 부응하면서 『크리톤』에서 드러나는 민주주의에 관한 플라톤 철학의 적극적 함축의 실마리들을 탐색하려 시도한다. 우선 작품 서두가 부각하는 은밀함을 화두 삼아 소크라테스가 선생이나 조언자가 아닌 시민으로 설정됨을 확인하고, 이런 설정이 『변명』에서 (...) 『크리톤』전반부, 그리고 후반부로 이어지는 일련의 ‘소크라테스의 하강’과 그것을 관통하는 ‘로고스에 대한 복종’을 부각하기 위한 것임을 밝힌다(2절). 이어 전반부 대화와 후반부 법률 연설을 시민 소크라테스가 참여하는 두 대화 모델, 즉 대칭적 관계에서의 설득 모델과 비대칭적 관계에서의 설득 모델이라는 측면에서 조명한다. 먼저 전문가주의적 신념을 가진 소크라테스가 다중의 의견을 존중하는 크리톤과 나누는 대화인 전자에서는 당대 민주주의 절차와 정신에 대한 의식적 반성과 반영이 이루어진다는 점을 음미한다(3절). 그리고 법률에 빙의한 자신과의 대화인 후자에서는 민주주의 하 시민이 권위에 대한 복종을 ‘권위주의적’이지 않은 방식으로 받아들이는 과정이 재현된다는 점에 주목하는데, 특히 법률 연설이 전반부 논의와 연속적이며 ‘하물며’ 논법과 ‘자기 설득’이라는 장치 등에 의해 전반부 논의에 긴밀히 통합된다는 점을 선명히 하면서 하트 등 웨이스(R. Weiss) 식 해석의 강한 지점을 공략한다(4절). 끝으로 소크라테스의 하강과 은밀함을 통해 이 작품이 결국 플라톤 정치철학의 시작점과 끝점에 위치한 『변명』과 『법률』을 연결시키는 접점으로 드러난다는 점을 부각한다(5절). (shrink)

The crito takes no stand on the question of whether violating the law is ever morally justified, despite modern attempts to derive a civil disobedience doctrine from it. The argument is largely ad hoc and ad hominem and resistant to generalization as political theory. The central claim is that socrates' escape would be unjust because escape would be an act whose maxim is incompatible with the principle of effective legality. A new construal of the crito's argument is offered (...) and several problems with the argument are discussed. (shrink)

In Socrates Dissatisfied, Weiss argues against the prevailing view that the personified Laws in the latter part of the Crito are Socrates' spokesmen. She reveals and explores many indications that Socrates and the Laws are, both in style and in substance, adversaries. Deft, provocative, and compelling, with new translations providing groundbreaking interpretations of key passages, Socrates Dissatisfied challenges the standard conception of the history of political thought.

The argument attributed to the Laws of Athens at Crito 50 a ff. relies on three main propositions, firstly that disobedience to law harms persons, secondly that the relationship between citizen and state is analogous to that between child and parent, and thirdly that the citizen makes a tacit compact to obey the laws. The connection between these three is not entirely clear and I shall consider how the first proposition is related to the second, and then how the (...) second is related to the third. Both these problems, which are important for the assessment of Plato's conclusions, appear in obscurities in the structure of the speech of the Laws. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito by Roslyn WeissMark L. McPherranRoslyn Weiss. Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xii + 187. Cloth, $39.95.The speech by ‘the Laws’ of the Crito has commonly been understood as a case of Socratic ventriloquism, voicing a doctrine of authoritarian civic obligation that Socrates himself endorses. This, of course, generates the (...) standard problem of reconciling this docile son of Athens with the radically autonomous Socrates of the Apology, a man obedient only to the dictates of his own reason. Roslyn Weiss’s book sets out to challenge this mainstream reading.On Weiss’s account, the speech of the Laws is a piece of crafty Socratic rhetoric antithetical to Socrates’ own convictions. Its purpose, then, is to convince not the reader but the lawless and unphilosophical Crito that Socrates ought to remain in Athens, using terms that Crito can comprehend (terms that will benefit his soul by making him more law-abiding). Despite this false ‘oratory’ (50b6–8), however, Socrates’ own first allegiance is to “justice and philosophy” (3) whose principles dictate that he suffer the court’s judgment, “abiding by the things agreed to” at his trial (Cr. 50a2–3).Although others have argued for this thesis, this is the first book-length argument of its kind and it supersedes all previous attempts in its persuasiveness and its thorough and detailed treatment: sensitive not only to the dialogue’s Greek and argumentative structure, but also to its literary/characterological nuances, it establishes an important scholarly outpost on the interpretation of the Crito and a worthy challenge to Richard Kraut’s reading. It is, finally, written in a remarkably engaging, clean and effective style, addressing the secondary scholarship adequately, and providing a useful bibliography and general index (though, regrettably, no Index Locorum).The book essentially follows the text of the Crito in a series of nine chapters. After a short Introduction, Chapter 2 begins by portraying Socrates as an autonomous moral agent utterly devoted to justice; Chapter 3 distinguishes Crito from Socrates; Chapter 4 contends that 46b–50a outlines Socrates’ complete argument against escape (one compatible with the principles of the Apology); Chapter 5 unpacks Socrates’ hint at 50a–d that the Laws will be offering only rhetorical arguments; Chapter 6 outlines these arguments and their logical flaws; Chapter 7 addresses Socrates’ characterization of their effect as ‘Corybantic’ (54d); Chapter 8 explains how the Laws are able to “boost Crito to a higher rung on the moral ladder,” (6); and finally, Chapter 9 reaffirms the radical moral independence of Socrates.Provocative and impressive, the book is bound to provoke criticism and reservations in its readers. Here I can only record a sample of my own. First, it seems to me that Weiss’s desire to portray Socrates as a slave of reason and not the state leads her astray when she tries to account for Socrates’ apparent reliance on the extrarational (15–23). Weiss, for example, tries to map out a new third alternative to the opposition between Vlastos’ view that the daimonion is no more than a kind of subjective, contentless hunch and the Brickhouse, Smith and McPherran view that the daimonion can oppose and ‘trump’ the results of rational deliberation. As she sees it, for Socrates the daimonion is not a voice independent of, and in potential conflict with, his own thinking; rather, it is the voice of his own unconscious beliefs, restraining him for his own reasons from [End Page 620] doing what he is tempted to do in moments of weakness. There is much to be said against this account, but it will suffice to point out that whatever the true nature of the daimonion might have been, Socrates is not likely to have been sympathetic to Weiss’s analysis of it. All our evidence, after all, indicates that Socrates takes the cause of the daimonion to be a god or daimoôn in the traditional sense of those terms (see, e.g., Ap. 27b–28a). Weiss’s proposal also runs up against texts such as Lysis 218C4–8 and 215C4–5, where Socrates recounts an... (shrink)

Ion -- Meno (Menon) -- Symposium (The banquet) -- The republic -- The apology (The defence of Socrates) -- Crito (Criton) -- Phaedo (Phaidon) -- The Greek alphabet -- Pronouncing index.

One noticeable omission in the otherwise ever flourishing literature on Plato's Crito is the recognition that Plato is presenting a problem from a virtue ethical angle. This is no doubt due to the fact that Aristotle, rather than Plato is regarded as the originator of Virtue Ethics as a branch of philosophy.1 Plato's own contribution to the discipline is more often than not bypassed.2 This has unfortunate consequences not only for Platonic scholarship, but also for the study (...) of Virtue Ethics. What the latter loses by not considering the Crito as a central text is an opportunity to expand into the domain of political philosophy.3.. (shrink)

While the article discusses the factors that motivated Socrates’ decisionin the Crito, it emphasizes the possible cultural import of the choiceundertaken in the aftermath of the political upheavals in the late fifthcentury. It is also argued here that as Plato’s dialogue were written inthe period that followed the renewal of the Athenian politeia, it shouldbe perceived as having its roots both in the historical reality of its narrativefocus and in the then reality of Plato’s Athens.

Typescript. Play, corrected in Housman's hand. Published in 1925 by Sidgwick and Jackson.