In the 1920s, Carnap and Schlick both made an important use of definitions in their main publications: Schlick, in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918, 2nd ed. 1925) and Carnap in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928, mostly written by 1925). In this paper, we first provide an analysis of the kinds of definitions that are distinguished in these books and a few other papers, and we then propose a systematic comparison of Schlick’s and Carnap’s diverging conceptions of definitions in the 1920s, (...) relating them, in both cases, to their respective philosophical projects in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre and in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. (shrink)

« La métaphysique d’Aristote n’est, au sens aristotélicien, dialectique et par là incapable de tout achèvement déductif, que parce qu’elle est une métaphysique du mouvement, c’est-à-dire de la scission. » Le propos de l’auteur est simple : sans vouloir rajouter et apporter du nouveau sur Aristote, il tente au contraire de désapprendre tout ce que la tradition a ajouté à l’aristotélisme primitif. Car l’aristotélisme que nous connaissons est surtout celui des commentateurs grecs. L’image ainsi révélée est celle d’un Aristote aporétique, (...) mais « cette voix qui parle est celle plus fraternelle qui continue de chercher en nous ce qu’est l’être et de se taire parfois ». (shrink)

In this article, we develop tame topology over dp-minimal structures equipped with definable uniformities satisfying certain assumptions. Our assumptions are enough to ensure that definable sets are tame: there is a good notion of dimension on definable sets, definable functions are almost everywhere continuous, and definable sets are finite unions of graphs of definable continuous “multivalued functions.” This generalizes known statements about weakly o-minimal, C-minimal, and P-minimal theories.

Carnap's ideal of explication has become a key concept in analytic philosophy and the basis of a method of analysis which may be considered as an alternative to various forms of naturalism, including Quine's conception of a naturalized epistemology. More recently, new light has been shed on this aspect of the classical Carnap-Quine debate by contemporary philosophers. Whereas Michael Friedman articulated a notion of relativized a priori which owes much to Carnap's internal/external distinction, André Carus attempted to restate Carnap's ideal (...) of explication in a way that bridges the gap between conceptual engineering and naturalism. On the other hand, Mark Wilson argued that concepts develop in unpredictable ways and cannot be planned in the way classical analytic philosophy has assumed from Frege and Russell onwards. This book consists of a series of defences as well as critiques of Carnap's programme, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and enriching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy.Carnap's ideal of explication has become a key concept in analytic philosophy and the basis of a method of analysis which may be considered as an alternative to various forms of naturalism, including Quine's conception of a naturalized epistemology. More recently, new light has been shed on this aspect of the classical Carnap-Quine debate by contemporary philosophers. Whereas Michael Friedman articulated a notion of relativized a priori which owes much to Carnap's internal/external distinction, André Carus attempted to restate Carnap's ideal of explication in a way that bridges the gap between conceptual engineering and naturalism. On the other hand, Mark Wilson argued that concepts develop in unpredictable ways and cannot be planned in the way classical analytic philosophy has assumed from Frege and Russell onwards. This book consists of a series of defences as well as critiques of Carnap's programme, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and enriching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

We prove in particular that, in a large class of dp-minimal theories including the p-adics, definable types are dense amongst nonforking types.

Johnson-Laird's mental models theory claims that reasoning is a semantic process of construction and manipulation of models in working memory of limited capacity. Accordingly, both a deduction and a given interpretation of a premise would be all the harder the higher the number of models they require. The purpose of the present experiment was twofold. First, it aimed to demonstrate that the interpretation of if...then conditional sentences in children (third, sixth, and ninth graders) evolves as a function of the number (...) of models the children can produce. We proposed a theory of conditional reasoning development that hypothesises a developmental trend of three successive levels of interpretations underlain by one, two, and then three models, i.e. conjunctive, biconditional, and conditional respectively. Second, we aimed to show that these different levels correlate with working memory capacities: the higher the working memory span, the higher the number of models underlying the conditional interpretation. These two hypotheses were verified, supporting the mental models theory. The results are compared with the rival theory of mental logic. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to study complex ecological models exhibiting simple dynamics. We consider large scale systems which can be decomposed into weakly coupled subsystems. Perturbation Theory is used in order to get a reduced set of differential equations governing slow time varying global variables. As examples, we study the influence of the individual behaviour of animals in competition and predator-prey models. The animals are assumed to do many activities all day long such as searching for food of (...) different types. The degree of competition as well as the predation pressure are dependent upon these activities. Preys are more vulnerable when doing some activities during which they are very exposed to predators attacks rather than for others during which they are hidden. We study the effect of a change in the average individual behaviour of the animals on interspecific relationships. Computer simulations of the whole sets of equations are compared to simulations of the reduced sets of equations. (shrink)

Through a detailed study of Spinoza's concept of 'experience', Moreau shows how Spinoza extends the power of reason to capture the singularity of individuals: their lives, languages, passions and societies.

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...) on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour. (shrink)

This paper shows that the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt test of locality of correlations which was originally designed to be used with binary observables can actually be used for any couples of quantum-like bounded continuous observables, and then for any experimental situation describable within the mathematical framework of quantum theory.

Spinoza formule ainsi l’une des dernières propositions de l’Éthique, la 39e de la cinquième partie : « Qui a un corps apte au plus grand nombre d’actions, a un esprit dont la plus grande partie est éternelle. » Par rapport à ce qui a été dit de l’unité de l’esprit et du corps humains depuis la deuxième partie, cette proposition semble aller de soi : qui a un corps puissant aura des affects conformes à l’ordre de l’entendement, et donc aura (...) un esprit également puissant, c’est-à-dire éternel. Toutefois, une telle proposition n’en est pas moins étrange par rapport à l’ordre concret du salut qui, dans l’Éthique, en tant que béatitude ou connaissance du troisième genre, est uniquement d’ordre intellectuel. Y aurait-il donc un autre salut par le corps que Spinoza ne décrit pas mais qui aurait spinozistement un sens? Et si oui, comment parvenir ainsi à « se sauver » en réformant primordialement non son âme mais son corps? L’ensemble de cet article tente de répondre à cette question. (shrink)

Dans cet article l’auteur définit sa notion de spaciogramme comme une représentation projective groupale de l’espace familial vécu. C’est une médiation thérapeutique favorisant un travail psychique de figurabilité. Il donne accès par un effet « squiggle » à une interfantasmatisation en thérapie psychanalytique. Le spaciogramme est décrit en analogie isomorphe avec l’image projective du génogramme, avec les contenants généalogiques, et avec l’image inconsciente du corps psychique groupal familial (le corps généalogique). Il traduit dans le transfert et la régression, une représentation (...) des mécanismes de défense groupaux, du maillage des liens de filiation et d’affiliation, de la transmission généalogique de l’héritage psychique de la famille. (shrink)

In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...) cognition. (shrink)

A widely accepted thesis in the philosophy of language is that natural language proper names are rigid designators, and that they are so de jure, or as a matter of the “semantic rules of the language.” This paper questions this claim, arguing that rigidity cannot be plausibly construed as a property of name types and that the alternative, rigidity construed as a property of tokens, means that they cannot be considered rigid de jure; rigidity in this case must be viewed (...) as a pragmatic and not a semantic property. (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » ou un symptôme, et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute », où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne (...) moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale, c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche (Richard Wagner à Bayreuth) est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » (« Der Fall ») ou un symptôme (« Das Symptom »), et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute » (« Der Vorfall »), (...) où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale (Gesamtkunstwerk), c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)

We show a transfer principle for the property that all types realised in a given elementary extension are definable. It can be written as follows: a Henselian valued field is stably embedded in an elementary extension if and only if its value group is stably embedded in its corresponding extension, its residue field is stably embedded in its corresponding extension, and the extension of valued fields satisfies a certain algebraic condition. We show for instance that all types over the Hahn (...) field $$\mathbb {R}((\mathbb {Z}))$$ are definable. Similarly, all types over the quotient field of the Witt ring $$W(\mathbb {F}_p^{\text {alg}})$$ are definable. This extends a work of Cubides and Delon and of Cubides and Ye. (shrink)

The first theory of confirmation that Carnap developed in detail is to be found in "Testability and Meaning". In this paper, he addressed the issue of a definition of empiricism, several years after abandoning the quest for a unique and universal logical framework supposed to be the basis of a clear distinction between the meaningful sentences of science and the pseudo-sentences of metaphysics. The principle of tolerance (according to which everyone is free to build up his own form of language (...) as he wishes) had been adopted near the end of 1932, at a time when it was already obvious to Carnap that a strictly verificationist criterion of meaning was inadequate. He therefore considered a variety of empiricisms and a variety of choices for the language of science. As Carnap put it, "there are many different possibilities in framing an empiricist language" and, correspondingly, several degrees of liberalization of the criterion of meaning. It was in this context that Carnap provided both a logical (syntactical) and an empirical analysis of confirmation (and of testing), before distinguishing requirements of different strengths which served the purpose of defining several versions of empiricism. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to present aggregation methods of hierarchically organized systems allowing one to replace the initial micro-system by a macro-system described by a few global variables. We also study the relations between the fast micro-dynamics and the slow macro-dynamics which can produce global properties. Emergence corresponds to a bottom-up coupling that is the result effected by a micro-level at a macro-level. As an example, we present prey-predator models with different time scales in an heterogeneous environment. A (...) fast time scale is associated to the migration process on spatial patches and a slow time scale is associated to growth and interactions between the populations. Preys must go on spatial patches where resources are located and where predators can attack them. The efficiency of the predators to catch preys is patch dependent. Perturbation methods allow us to aggregate the initial system of differential equations for the patch sub-populations into a macro-system of two differential equations governing the total population densities. We study the case of density independent and density dependent migrations. In the latter case, we show that different functional responses can emerge in the macro prey-predator model as a result of the coupling between the slow and fast systems. (shrink)

Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...) its deployment in an ingenious new argument advanced by Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (2009) which, if sound, establishes that there is a kind of knowledge that amounts to nothing more than true belief. I rebut their argument and in doing so delineate some important epistemological lessons brought to light by the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. (shrink)

The importance given by historian and philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem to the role of practice, techniques, and experimentation in concept-formation was largely overlooked by commentators. After placing Canguilhem’s contributions within the larger history of historical epistemology in France, and clarifying his views regarding this expression, I re-evaluate the relation between concepts and experimental practices in Canguilhem’s philosophy of science. Drawing on his early writings on the relations between science and technology in the 1930s, on the Essai sur quelques problèmes (...) concernant le normal et le pathologique, and on La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, I argue that the formation and rectification of concepts in Canguilhem’s sense are intrinsically bound with the experimental, material, technical, and cultural contexts in which concepts are operationalized. (shrink)

Alors que la narratologie prétendait dévoiler les structures du récit en général, Vincent Descombes, dans son livre sur Proust, affirme qu’une science conséquente de la littérature doit rendre compte de la manière particulière qu’a chaque genre littéraire de produire du sens. Nous présentons dans cet article une approche noétique des genres qui, tentant de dépasser l’opposition entre sémiologie et herméneutique, s’intéresse à la manière dont les structures symboliques créent des modes de pensée particuliers. En remarquant que les fondateurs de la (...) narratologie, sous couvert de fiction, ont en réalité analysé le seul genre romanesque, elle propose de repartir de leur travail pour mettre au jour le fonctionnement des synthèses diachronique et synchronique propres au roman. N’en restant pas à cette analyse des structures sémiotiques, la noétique procède à leur interprétation phénoménologique, et montre que le mode de pensée du roman est celui de ce que Hegel appelle l’expérience de la conscience. (shrink)