This book reassesses the role and impact of skepticism in early modern philosophy, revisiting and reinterpreting the positions of some of the main early modern philosophers in relation to this tradition and showing its relevance to others who have not previously been connected to skepticism.

Weatherson argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. Even though it is not clearly stated, they all seem to be committed to the assumption that reality is ultimately constituted by mereological atoms. This assumption is (...) not granted by standard mereology which instead remains silent on whether reality is atomic or gunky; therefore, I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams’s proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. (shrink)

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague (...) objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided. (shrink)

À travers l’analyse des articles « florentins » du Dictionnaire historique et critique (Machiavel, Guichardin, Savonarole) l’auteur essaie de voir comment Bayle a lu Le Prince et les Discours de Machiavel sur des sujets cruciaux pour sa pensée : le rapport religion-politique, mais aussi la réflexion sur la république et la démocratie, la relation entre morale et société, la figure du prophète « armé » ou « désarmé ». Avec son anti-conformisme intellectuel coutumier, Bayle se distingue tant de l’appréciation libertine (...) (Naudé est l’une de ses sources) que de la condamnation huguenote, représentée par Innocent Gentillet. Derrière la figure historique de Savonarole se profile l’ombre inquiétante d’un prophète contemporain de Bayle, Pierre Jurieu. (shrink)

Background: The intensive care unit environment focuses on interventions and support therapies that prolong life. The exercise by nurses of their autonomy impacts on perception of the role they assume in the multidisciplinary team and on their function in the intensive care unit context. There is much international research relating to nurses’ involvement in end-of-life situations; however, there is a paucity of research in this area in Brazil. In the Brazilian medical scenario, life support limitation generated a certain reluctance of (...) a legal nature, which has now become unjustifiable with the publication of a resolution by the Federal Medical Council. In Brazil, the lack of medical commitments to end-of-life care is evident. Objective: To understand the process by which nurses exercise autonomy in making end-of-life decisions in intensive care units. Research design: Symbolic Interactionism and Corbin and Strauss theory methodology were used for this study. Participants and research context: Data were collected through single audio-recorded qualitative interviews with 14 critical care nurses. The comparative analysis of the data has permitted the understanding of the meaning of nurse’s experience in exercising autonomy relating to end-of-life decision-making. Ethical considerations: Institutional ethics approval was obtained for data collection. Participants gave informed consent. All data were anonymized. Findings: The results revealed that nurses experience the need to exercise autonomy in intensive care units on a daily basis. Their experience expressed by the process of increase opportunities to exercise autonomy is conditioned by the pressure of the intensive care unit environment, in which nurses can grow, feel empowered, and exercise their autonomy or else can continuously depend on the decisions made by other professionals. Conclusion: Nurses exercise their autonomy through care. They work to create new spaces at the same time that they acquire new knowledge and make decisions. Because of the complexity of the end-of-life situation, nurses must adopt a proactive attitude that inserts them into the decision-making process. (shrink)

This book reassesses the role and impact of skepticism in early modern philosophy, revisiting and reinterpreting the positions of some of the main early modern ...

The purpose of this article is to initiate a philosophical discussion about the ethical component of professional competence in nursing from the perspective of Brazilian nurses. Specifically, this article discusses professional competence in nursing practice in the Brazilian health context, based on two different conceptual frameworks. The first framework is derived from the idealistic and traditional approach while the second views professional competence through the lens of historical and dialectical materialism theory. The philosophical analyses show that the idealistic view of (...) professional competence differs greatly from practice. Combining nursing professional competence with philosophical perspectives becomes a challenge when ideals are opposed by the reality and implications of everyday nursing practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to initiate a philosophical discussion about the ethical component of professional competence in nursing from the perspective of Brazilian nurses. Specifically, this article discusses professional competence in nursing practice in the Brazilian health context, based on two different conceptual frameworks. The first framework is derived from the idealistic and traditional approach while the second views professional competence through the lens of historical and dialectical materialism theory. The philosophical analyses show that the idealistic view of (...) professional competence differs greatly from practice. Combining nursing professional competence with philosophical perspectives becomes a challenge when ideals are opposed by the reality and implications of everyday nursing practice. (shrink)

Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. is a philosopher and a physician who has devoted all his life and all his creative power to developing and promoting a Christian bioethics. At the same time, the American is a personality who polarizes and has received euphoric praise on the one hand and malicious criticism on the other. This has already been the case during his lifetime and will presumably remain so even after his death, which we wish to commemorate here. In the following (...) contribution I intend to investigate why Engelhardt provokes so different reactions in the scientific community, and I will try to bring closer together the two seemingly irreconcilable parties of Engelhardt admirers and Engelhardt critics. I will do this by focusing on the two most controversial aspects of his research, his critique of the status quo and his concept of an independent Christian bioethics. (shrink)

Private associations abounded in the ancient Greek world and beyond, and this volume provides the first large-scale study of the strategies of governance which they employed. Emphasis is placed on the values fostered by the regulations of associations, the complexities of the private-public divide and the dynamics of regional and global networks and group identity. The attested links between rules and religious sanctions also illuminate the relationship between legal history and religion. Moreover, possible links between ancient associations and the early (...) Christian churches will prove particularly valuable for scholars of the New Testament. The book concludes by using the regulations of associations to explore a novel and revealing aspect of the interaction between the Mediterranean world, India and China. (shrink)

Frege's puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of reaction: it explains why Frege's puzzle seems to resist the traditional objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter of Frege's puzzle. The (...) final outcome is negative, no satisfactory formulation of the evidential datum is found and Frege's puzzle is challenged until a better formulation of it is found. (shrink)

Difficulties with periodization are often symptoms of internal diseases affecting the history of philosophy. Renaissance scholars and historians of early modern philosophy represent two scholarly communities that do not communicate with each other, as if an abrupt change of scenery had taken place from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, from the age of Campanella to the age of Descartes. The assumption of an arbitrary division between these two periods continues to have unfortunate effects on the study of the history (...) of philosophy. This chapter provides a diagnosis of this problem by looking at the way in which periodization crystallized in the history of philosophy. It then lays a foundation for attempting a new approach to this issue, which consists in mapping direct connections and conceptual links of seventeenth-century philosophers with the philosophies of the Renaissance. We intend to shift the weight from the problem of assessing the ‘modernity’ of Renaissance philosophers to the creation of a space of interaction between Renaissance and early modern thinkers in the spirit of ‘conversation’, with special attention to tracing sources, direct allusions, confutations and continuities. (shrink)

Comment les modernes ont-ils ete amenes a considerer sous un nouveau jour le probleme de la certitude et de la connaissance? L'etude proposee ici vise a mettre en evidence le role joue par la renaissance du scepticisme et a montrer comment et par quels detours le phenomene du scepticisme pyrrhonien est devenu l'apparence des modernes. Dans cette histoire, les sceptiques declares n'ont pas seul opere ce travail de reprise et de transformation: une part decisive revient aussi aux adversaires du scepticisme (...) (Campanella, Mersenne, Descartes, mais aussi Hobbes). Le renouveau sceptique ne tire pas son importance de sa seule dimension critique; par ses objections, il a joue un role majeur dans la reforme moderne de la philosophie premiere. Faire de la connaissance un rapport entre le monde interne de la representation et le monde exterieur des choses, a evidemment une origine sceptique. Mais cette conception a son histoire complexe et multiforme. Elle passe notamment par la dissolution de la doctrine aristotelicienne des species (Sanches et Campanella), par la reprise de la conception du phenomene tiree de Sextus (Montaigne et La Mothe Le Vayer), par une reflexion sur les effets destructeurs du scepticisme libertin (Descartes), mais aussi par la conjonction du relativisme de Montaigne et des resultats de la nouvelle science (Hobbes). Ainsi, en rouvrant le dossier sceptique, Bayle peut mener sa critique des presupposes de la philosophie premiere en debat a la fin du XVIIe siecle. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI propose a different account of fictional objects from the ones already present in the literature. According to my account, fictional objects are culturally created abstract objects dependent for their existence on the pretence attitude adopted by a group of people towards a single fictional content. My work is divided into three parts: in the first one, I present how fictional objects come into existence according to my proposal; in the second part, I illustrate how the existence of fictional objects (...) so conceived may be ontically indeterminate; in the last part, I consider what happens when vague existence and indeterminate identity are claimed within fictional texts. (shrink)

À l’origine de ce recueil, un double colloque international, l’un à Lyon, l’autre à Naples, a réuni des spécialistes de philosophes du XVIIe siècle et du XVIIIe siècle pour traiter de l’apport des courants dits "libertins" et, plus largement, de la libre pensée à ceux qu’une historiographie traditionnelle, mais encore vivace, reconnaît comme seuls "philosophes": Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Pascal, Bayle, Leibniz, Kant... Il s’agit donc, d’une part, de reconnaître l’apport de la libre pensée à l’évolution des idées et, d’autre part, (...) de mettre les grands penseurs en dialogue avec le contexte historique qui fut le leur. L’ensemble des interventions met remarquablement en évidence l’importance des arguments de la pensée critique et de la libre pensée à l’âge classique, qu’ils soient acceptés, refusés ou réutilisés, tout en montrant la complexité d’une époque où, malgré la censure régnante, les idées progressent à travers et grâce à un dialogue constant, qu’il soit paisible ou conflictuel, entre les penseurs plus ou moins religieux. --. (shrink)

En identifiant l'âme du monde avec le feu et celui-ci avec Dieu, la représentation stoïcienne du monde comme grand animal doué d'intelligence et de sensibilité pose de graves problèmes à un chrétien, comme le souligne l'interlocuteur du dialogue de la Physiologia Stoicorum de Juste Lipse. Quelle est la position de Lipse par rapport à la question, largement débattue au xvie siècle, de l'animation des astres ? On évoque les conceptions de Scaliger, Patrizi et Kepler, et on montre que c'est très (...) vraisemblablement Giordano Bruno que Lipse indique sous la forme anonyme «quidam nostro aevo», pour se démarquer de ses positions. Même si la cosmologie de Lipse n'est pas héliocentrique, elle a l'avantage d'expliquer le mouvement des astres sans référence à leur âme et sur la base de considérations purement physiques. By identifying the soul of the world with fire and the latter with God, the Stoic representation of the world as a great animal blessed with intelligence and sensitivity raises serious problems for a Christian, as emphasized by the interlocutor of the dialogue Physiologia Stoicorum of Justus Lipsius. What position does Lipsius take regarding the question (widely discussed in the sixteenth century) of the life of the stars? After having called to mind the concepts of Scaliger, Patrizi and Kepler, we will see that it is quite likely Giordano Bruno to whom Lipsius refers anonymously as «quidam nostro aevo» to distance himself from his positions. Even if the cosmology of Lipsus is not heliocentric, it has the advantage of explaining the movement of the stars without reference to their soul and on the basis of purely physical considerations. (shrink)

En identifiant l’âme du monde avec le feu et celui-ci avec Dieu, la représentation stoïcienne du monde comme grand animal doué d’intelligence et de sensibilité pose de graves problèmes à un chrétien, comme le souligne l’interlocuteur du dialogue de la Physiologia Stoicorum de Juste Lipse. Quelle est la position de Lipse par rapport à la question, largement débattue au xvie siècle, de l’animation des astres? On évoque les conceptions de Scaliger, Patrizi et Kepler, et on montre que c’est très vraisemblablement (...) Giordano Bruno que Lipse indique sous la forme anonyme « quidam nostro aevo », pour se démarquer de ses positions. Même si la cosmologie de Lipse n’est pas héliocentrique, elle a l’avantage d’expliquer le mouvement des astres sans référence à leur âme et sur la base de considérations purement physiques.By identifying the soul of the world with fire and the latter with God, the Stoic representation of the world as a great animal blessed with intelligence and sensitivity raises serious problems for a Christian, as emphasized by the interlocutor of the dialogue Physiologia Stoicorum of Justus Lipsius. What position does Lipsius take regarding the question of the life of the stars? After having called to mind the concepts of Scaliger, Patrizi and Kepler, we will see that it is quite likely Giordano Bruno to whom Lipsius refers anonymously as « quidam nostro aevo » to distance himself from his positions. Even if the cosmology of Lipsus is not heliocentric, it has the advantage of explaining the movement of the stars without reference to their soul and on the basis of purely physical considerations. (shrink)

The disappearance of the technical notion ofspeciesin Montaignes’sEssaysis characteristic of the transformation that took place around the beginning of the trial of knowledge. The theory of the species is then replaced by a doctrine of the appearance as “fantasy”. The problem, which is epistemological, takes its source in the debate opposing Stoics, Neo-academicians and Pyrrhonists on the topic of the truth value of representation. The conclusive passages in theApologyenable us to grasp the neo-pyrrhonian problematic in all its complexity. In it, (...) Montaigne focuses on the difference between appearance and reality, or appearance and essence, by opposing — as Sextus did — the “nature”, in itself inaccessible, to the quality as we perceive it through our senses. The role of the senses in this process is described either as a qualification or alteration of the object, or as a “falsification” of it, which entails the classical sceptical problem of the difficulty to choose between one representation or another — and to discriminate between the qualities that are “normal” and those that are not. A comparison with Henri Estienne’s commentary to thePyrrhonianae Hypotyposesfinally sheds some light on Montaigne’s dependence toward Greek sources and Renaissance philology. (shrink)

McTaggart’s Paradox has been considered a special case of Lewis’s Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (see Craig (1998), Rea (2003) and Rettler (2012)). I argue instead that the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics cannot simply be applied to the Problem of the passage of time and therefore that McTaggart’s Paradox cannot be a special case of the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. This observation is relevant in order to point out the difference between the change in objects or events over time (i.e. the (...) subject of Lewis’s Problem) and the change (or passage) of time (i.e. the subject of McTaggart’s Paradox). (shrink)

We introduce the Causal Compatibility Conjecture for the Events, Trees, Histories approach to Quantum Theory in the semi-classical setting. We then prove that under the assumptions of the conjecture, points on closed causal curves are physically indistinguishable in the context of the ETH approach to QT and thus the conjecture implies a compatibility of the causal structures even in presence of closed causal curves. As a consequence of this result there is no observation that could be made by an observer (...) to tell any two points on a closed causal curve apart. We thus conclude that closed causal curves have no physical significance in the context of the ETH approach to QT. This is an indication that time travel will not be possible in a full quantum theory of gravity and thus forever remain a fantasy. (shrink)

Williams (2012) recently proposed the Normative Silence model of Indeterminacy in order to account for a single phenomenon running through all cases of indeterminacy and to reach consensus on the correct epistemic attitude to adopt towards borderline cases of paradigmatically vague predicates. Williams’s Normative Silence model says there is no general normative rule governing God’s and humans’ belief attitudes towards indeterminacies. I claim instead that human rationality and philosophical inquiry require general normative rules leading our belief attitudes towards indeterminacies and (...) that God’s belief attitudes are more difficult to define than Williams assumes. (shrink)

Most philosophers who had the opportunity to meet Paolo Casalegno (1952-2009) have been impressed by his sharp acumen, his passion for discussing philosophy and his human and intellectual generosity. I had the chance more than others to appreciate his qualities and benefit from them: we worked in the same university in Milan for many years and we had many occasions to discuss philosophy and other non-philosophical topics. I owe a debt of gratitude to him and, together with Paolo’s friends and (...) colleagues, I look for opportunities to remember his work and to continue to discuss it. One of them is the conference 'Good Points. Paolo Casalegno’s criticisms of some analytic philosophers' held in Milan in April 2011; the present special issue of dialectica collects the contributions on Paolo’s work presented on this occasion together with the reviews of two books published posthumously. (shrink)

In the last half century, the image of the Enlightenment underwent many changes and no longer is monolithic, as was the case with Paul Hazard, Peter Gay, and Ernst Cassirer. It is usual nowadays to talk about national Enlightenments, moderate and radical Enlightenment, religious Enlightenments, counter-Enlightenment, and so on. In this process of widening the notion of Enlightenment, which the editors depict as a real "explosion," there is also room for a skeptical Enlightenment, which not so long ago was limited (...) to a few, supposedly fringe figures: Bayle, Hume, and Rousseau. The ubiquitous "specter" of skepticism that Burson and Matytsin see as present all along the eighteenth century comprises also the reactions... (shrink)

We commonly recognize vague predicates when we do not find boundaries to their extension. Would an omniscient being find it equally impossible to establish such boundaries? I will argue that if a semantic theory of vagueness like supervaluationism is correct, we cannot answer the question. The reason is that, under this assumption, cooperative behaviour is not possible for an omniscient being.

Ontic vagueness is defended by appealing to a realist and objectivist perspective. First, ontic vagueness is distinguished from epistemic vagueness and semantic vagueness. Subsequently, the realist approach to semantics adopted by David Lewis and more recently by Theodor Sider is presented. It is argued that, contrary to what has been maintained by both Lewis and Sider, ontic vagueness is compatible with the realist perspective they endorse.

While most scholars who have discussed the letters of Elisabeth and Descartes exchanged in 1646 on the subject of the Prince focused on Descartes, whether he was Machiavellian or not, I shall deal here more in depth with the position of Elisabeth. I shall address then four main points: the so-called “methodological” question raised by Descartes about the Prince and quickly dismissed by Elisabeth; the issue of political realism, that is one of the great themes of Machiavelli’s thought; the problem (...) of the “good man,” namely whether and how the natural law can bind in a “wicked” world; Elisabeth’s focus on the passions against Descartes’s political and providential mereology. Finally, I shall try to draw some more general conclusions as regards the place of Elisabeth in the broader context of seventeenth century political philosophy, especially in regard to Hobbes. (shrink)