Within the causal modeling literature, debates about the Causal Faithfulness Condition have concerned whether it is probable that the parameters in causal models will have values such that distinct causal paths will cancel. As the parameters in a model are fixed by the probability distribution over its variables, it is initially puzzling what it means to assign probabilities to these parameters. I propose that to assign a probability to a parameter in a model is to treat that parameter as a (...) function of a variable in an augmented model. By combining this proposal with widely adopted principles regarding which variables must be included in a model, I argue that the various proposed counterexamples to CFC involving coordinated parameters are not genuine counterexamples. I then consider the cases in which CFC fails due not to coordination, but by coincidence, and propose explanatory and predictive bases for ruling out such coincidences without presuming that they are improbable. The aim of the proposed defenses is not to show that CFC never fails, but rather to argue that its use in a particular context may be defended using general modeling assumptions rather than by relying on claims about how often it fails. (shrink)

Some recent accounts of constitutive relevance have identified mechanism components with entities that are causal intermediaries between the input and output of a mechanism. I argue that on such accounts there is no distinctive inter-level form of mechanistic explanation and that this highlights an absence in the literature of a compelling argument that there are such explanations. Nevertheless, the entities that these accounts call ‘components’ do play an explanatory role. Studying causal intermediaries linking variables Xand Y provides knowledge of the (...) counterfactual conditions under which X will continue to bring about Y. This explanatory role does not depend on whether intermediate variables count as components. The question of whether there are distinctively mechanistic explanations remains open. (shrink)

Dynamical models of cognition have played a central role in recent cognitive science. In this paper, we consider a common strategy by which dynamical models describe their target systems neither as purely static nor as purely dynamic, but rather using a hybrid approach. This hybridity reveals how dynamical models involve representational choices that are important for understanding the relationship between dynamical and non-dynamical representations of a system.

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The author outlines his views on the essence of philosophical logic. There are two means of philosophical argumentation: intuition and analysis of the problem situation under examination. Logical intuition can be replaced by improved intuition based on new intellectual constructions. Then the author explains—in opposition to von Wright—the main philosophical traits of his conception of norm logic. The structure of the information processing determining action justifies the application of dichotomous semantics in action theory and in practical philosophy. The theory of (...) action and institutions is based on three anthropological features of man: our capacity of acting, our being a zoon politikon, and our capacity to form institutions. These features determine our ontology, our semantics and the logics of practical thinking. The action‐theoretical approach leads to a formal and finalistic theory of action in which action is not only analysed as an element of the norm content, but as the essential basis of the whole field of practical philosophy. In the frame of this action theory a conception of freedom of will is provided which does not contrast with determinism. The formalism of action is applied in two different problem situations: in action deliberation and in motive interpretation. Jørgensen's dilemma is discussed and overcome by the introduction of a generalised notion of inference. Deontic logic is confronted with the idea of a genuine logic of norms. The main principles of norm logic are discussed and a normative conditional is introduced. Von Wright's conception of a genuine norm logic is confronted with the present author's conception. The author shows that norm‐logical skepticism would be detrimental to analytical jurisprudence. (shrink)

Die analytische Jurisprudenz ist abhängig von der Normenlogik, die bisher keine voll befriedigenden Ergebnisse erzielt hat. Der Autor diskutiert die verschiedenen Wege der Normenlogik und deren Schwierigkeiten, insbesondere weist er nach, daß die normenlogische Deduktion nicht auf der Idee der deontisch perfekten Welten aufgebaut werden kann. Trotz der Grundlagenschwierigkeiten der Normenlogik muß diese als Basis der juristischen Analysen angesehen werden. Neben den inneren Schwierigkeiten der Normenlogik steht die analytische Jurisprudenz vor dem Problem, inwieweit das juristische Denken auf rein logischen und (...) inwieweit es auf rhetorischen Argumentationen fußt. Es wird auch ein Katalog der aktuellen Probleme der analytischen Jurisprudenz vorgelegt. (shrink)

Rescher charakterisiert die Gesetzesaussage durch a) nomische Notwendigkeit, b) hypothetische Kraft; Gesetzeshaftigkeit sei Bereitschaft zur faktentranszendenten Anwendungeines Allsatzes. Dem wird die These gegenübergestellt, daß die Struktur des nomischen Allsatzes so zu bestimmen ist, daß die faktentranszendente Anwendung durch den Satz begründet erscheint. Dies wird durch einen Allsatz erreicht, der nicht nur über die reale Welt, sondern auch über ein System von Alternativwelten über der realen Welt spricht. Durch den nomischen Allsatz wird gleichzeitig die nomische Notwendigkeit expliziert. Die Begründung der faktentranszendenten (...) Geltung ist gleich stark wie jene der erfahrungszendenten Gehung in der realen Weh. (shrink)

Kant’s criticism is based on the idea that all possible knowledge of facts is determined by the immanent structure of our apparatus of cognition, and that therefore we have no access to reality as it is per se (“Ding an sich”). In modern analytical philosophy some elements of this view survived, namely, the distinction between framework construction and actual data of experience, supposition or voluntary setting. The conditio humana is characterised by our capacity of acting. Acting is defined as behaviour (...) determined and controlled by information processes. The structure of these processes defines the semantics and logical principles of practical philosophy. From this view follows the conception of value judgments, the logic of preferences, formal teleology, the analysis of utility and norm logic. The framework theories should be open in order to be able to express all possible theoretical views, namely, subjectivism as well as objectivism. The paper gives a concise account of the systems of practical thought (formal axiology, formal teleology, preference logic and norm logic) and their gnoseological problems. (shrink)

Read audit in artes for the transmitted audet in artes in Gratt. 498. The correction has the effect that the phrase audere (ardere Gronovius) in proelia in Verg. Aen. 2,347 no longer has linguistic support.

Recent evidence indicates that transcriptional bursts are intrinsically amplified by messenger RNA cytoplasmic processing to generate large stochastic fluctuations in protein levels. These fluctuations can be exploited by cells to enable probabilistic bet‐hedging decisions. But large fluctuations in gene expression can also destabilize cell‐fate commitment. Thus, it is unclear if cells temporally switch from high to low noise, and what mechanisms enable this switch. Here, the discovery of a post‐transcriptional mechanism that attenuates noise in HIV is reviewed. Early in its (...) life cycle, HIV amplifies transcriptional fluctuations to probabilistically select alternate fates, whereas at late times, HIV utilizes a post‐transcriptional feedback mechanism to commit to a specific fate. Reanalyzing various reported post‐transcriptional negative feedback architectures reveals that they attenuate noise more efficiently than classic transcriptional autorepression, leading to the derivation of an assay to detect post‐transcriptional motifs. It is hypothesized that coupling transcriptional and post‐transcriptional autoregulation enables efficient temporal noise control to benefit developmental bet‐hedging decisions. (shrink)

Normally, if A knows B, B knows A, and ‘Lake Garda knows me’ is a poetic way of saying ‘I know Lake Garda’. The exchange of subject and object elevates diction and sentiment, but it can also help with the metre, especially where nouns such as gloria. and femina are concerned. Thus in 1.8. 46 the poet says ista meam norit gloria canitiem when in strict logic he should have said istam mea norit gloriam canities. Similarly here what he really (...) wants to says is qua dum iter faciam feminam nullam norim. He must have been aware that the relationship is reciprocal, and something like oblitusque mearum, obliuiscendus et illis may well have been in his mind. But his main desire was to forget and not to know anything of women any more. (shrink)