Cognitive reserve postulates that individual differences in task performance can be attributed to differences in the brain’s ability to recruit additional networks or adopt alternative cognitive strategies. Variables that are descriptive of lifetime experience such as socioeconomic status, educational attainment, and leisure activity are common proxies of CR. CR is mostly studied using neuroimaging techniques such as functional MRI in which case individuals with a higher CR were observed to activate a smaller brain network compared to individuals with a lower (...) CR, when performing a task equally effectively, and electroencephalography where a particular EEG component that reflects the attention and working memory load, has been targeted. Despite the contribution of multiple factors such as age, education, working, leisure, and household activities in CR formation, most neuroimaging studies, and those using EEG in particular, focus on formal education level only. The aim of the current EEG study is to investigate how the P300 component, evoked in response to an oddball paradigm, is associated with other components of CR besides education, such as working and leisure activity in older adults. We have used hereto a recently introduced CR index questionnaire that quantifies both professional and leisure activities in terms of their cognitive demand and number of years practiced, as well as a data-driven approach for EEG analysis. We observed complex relationships between CRIq subcomponents and P300 characteristics. These results are especially important given that, unlike previous studies, our measurements do not require active use of the same executive function and, thus, render our results free of a collinearity bias. (shrink)

In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal. Kohar focuses on the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience. The work significantly contributes to two areas of literature: 1) the debate between representationalism and non-representationalism, and 2) the literature on mechanistic explanation. Kohar begins with (...) an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience. (shrink)

Tattoos are widely regarded as morally neutral, and the decision to have them as carrying no ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to question this assumption. I argue that decisions to have tattoos involve risks that are not merely prudential—they are normative. The argument starts with a thesis that the power we presently have over our lives is constrained by the need to respect our future selves. If we make a discretionary choice that disregards our future interests and (...) preferences, then, under certain circumstances, we can be morally to blame. I argue that certain decisions to get tattoos fit this description. Therefore, getting some tattoos makes us blameworthy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning—the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context‐dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can (a) explain a wide range (...) of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures, and (b) explain partial understanding of an utterance. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations (...) that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences. (shrink)

For more than a decade now a profound rule-of-law crisis has gripped the European Union, and while the fight for the rule of law has topped not only the academic but also the judicial and political agenda, the results have been disappointingly meagre. This article argues that the main reason for that should be sought in a political strategic move of justifying the assaults on the rule of law by resorting to an “illiberal democracy.” This premeditated political narrative shift has (...) unleashed onto the political sphere and onto public discourse at large comprehensive doctrines which had hitherto been left dormant thanks to an overlapping consensus on the rule of law as a central building block of the political conception of justice à la Rawls. Once this overlapping consensus was broken, the rule of law itself lost its neutral character as a referee on the right among the many conceptions of the good, itself becoming part of the highly politicized power play for dominance among irreconcilable—liberal and illiberal—comprehensive doctrines. The overlapping consensus in the EU is thus broken, but there are no conceptual reasons inherent to the rule of law itself for which it could not be rebuilt in the future. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the process of European integration. It is argued that the nature of this relationship has been both mutually informative and transformative. As a particular understanding of sovereignty has influenced and determined the perception of European integration, i.e., its conceptualization, so the process of European integration has reflected back on sovereignty and entailed its rethinking. This poses a particular challenge for legal theorists: how to pin down the meaning of sovereignty (...) and European integration so as to put both in the best conceptual and normative light. The article begins by looking at the traditional perspective on sovereignty and how this has been challenged by European integration. The focus then shifts from sovereignty to European integration in order to examine how different perspectives on sovereignty, when used as an epistemic lens for understanding the process of European integration, have produced uneven conceptions of this integration. Finally, the article concludes by making a choice between the various conceptions of sovereignty and European integration. It is argued that the best conception of European integration is offered by the constitutional form of a union founded on pluralist sovereignty. (shrink)

Ispitujuci ulogu porodice u procesu intergeneracijskog/transgeneracijskog prenosenja traume i secanja, rad pokusava da odgovori na pitanje na koji nacin suocavanje sa neprozivljenom prosloscu utice na zivote potomaka neposrednih pocinilaca i zrtava holokausta, odnosno, na formiranje identiteta tzv. postgeneracije? Sto je vremenska distanca u odnosu na Drugi svetski rat veca, i sto je broj onih sa neposrednim iskustvom i secanjem manji, termini kao sto su pamcenje i sec?anje poceli su da gube svoje ustaljeno znacenje. Kako je istrazivanje pokazalo, i pored odsustva (...) licnog secanja, pripadnici potomaka onih koji su preziveli masivne traumatske dogadjaje subjektivno su duboko povezani sa secanjem prethodne generacije. U skladu sa cinjenicom da samu traumu i secanje nije moguce fizicki preneti na potomke, rad analizira i poredi termine koje je strucna literatura do sada usvojila, kao sto su sekundarna traumatizacija, tercijarna traumatizacija, zatim, eho traume, ali i postpamcenje. Osnovna teza ovog rada jeste da eho secanja, eho traume, suocavanje s prosloscu, ali i istovremena nemogucnost izmirenja s njom, dovode do tzv. krize identiteta postgeneracije holokausta. (shrink)

Ispitujuci ulogu porodice u procesu intergeneracijskog/transgeneracijskog prenosenja traume i secanja, rad pokusava da odgovori na pitanje na koji nacin suocavanje sa neprozivljenom prosloscu utice na zivote potomaka neposrednih pocinilaca i zrtava holokausta, odnosno, na formiranje identiteta tzv. postgeneracije? Sto je vremenska distanca u odnosu na Drugi svetski rat veca, i sto je broj onih sa neposrednim iskustvom i secanjem manji, termini kao sto su pamcenje i sec?anje poceli su da gube svoje ustaljeno znacenje. Kako je istrazivanje pokazalo, i pored odsustva (...) licnog secanja, pripadnici potomaka onih koji su preziveli masivne traumatske dogadjaje subjektivno su duboko povezani sa secanjem prethodne generacije. U skladu sa cinjenicom da samu traumu i secanje nije moguce fizicki preneti na potomke, rad analizira i poredi termine koje je strucna literatura do sada usvojila, kao sto su sekundarna traumatizacija, tercijarna traumatizacija, zatim, eho traume, ali i postpamcenje. Osnovna teza ovog rada jeste da eho secanja, eho traume, suocavanje s prosloscu, ali i istovremena nemogucnost izmirenja s njom, dovode do tzv. krize identiteta postgeneracije holokausta. (shrink)

Continuously from the 1940s, Michael Polanyi comments on topics that have resonated later since the 1960s in the works of his fellow theorists of science, philosophers of natural sciences, and epistemologists. First part of this article provides a brief reconstruction of Polanyi’s concept of „personal knowledge“ which focuses mainly on the interconnection of the individual level of scientific research with its social dimension. My aim is to evaluate the potential of this concept for the interpretation of research fields where sciences (...) are in close contact with other disciplines. I am convinced that Polanyi’s original approach to the problem of reality should be read as an advocacy of diversity of thought. In my interpretation, Polanyi carries out some form of philosophical therapy of science and its self-concept, which, like the whole of Western society, has undergone dramatic changes over the last century. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce Speedith which is an interactive diagrammatic theorem prover for the well-known language of spider diagrams. Speedith provides a way to input spider diagrams, transform them via the diagrammatic inference rules, and prove diagrammatic theorems. Speedith’s inference rules are sound and complete, extending previous research by including all the classical logic connectives. In addition to being a stand-alone proof system, Speedith is also designed as a program that plugs into existing general purpose theorem provers. This allows (...) for other systems to access diagrammatic reasoning via Speedith, as well as a formal verification of diagrammatic proof steps within standard sentential proof assistants. We describe the general structure of Speedith, the diagrammatic language, the automatic mechanism that draws the diagrams when inference rules are applied on them, and how formal diagrammatic proofs are constructed. (shrink)

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response, which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify the grounds on which the state is justified in acting (...) against them. This article argues that the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria. Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such ‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that they can serve as a useful guide for public policy. (shrink)

A new theory is considered according to which extended objects in n-dimensional space are described in terms of multivector coordinates which are interpreted as generalizing the concept of center of mass coordinates. While the usual center of mass is a point, by generalizing the latter concept, we associate with every extended object a set of r-loops, r=0,1,...,n−1, enclosing oriented (r+1)-dimensional surfaces represented by Clifford numbers called (r+1)-vectors or multivectors. Superpositions of multivectors are called polyvectors or Clifford aggregates and they are (...) elements of Clifford algebra. The set of all possible polyvectors forms a manifold, called C-space. We assume that the arena in which physics takes place is in fact not Minkowski space, but C-space. This has many far reaching physical implications, some of which are discussed in this paper. The most notable is the finding that although we start from the constrained relativity in C-space we arrive at the unconstrained Stueckelberg relativistic dynamics in Minkowski space which is a subspace of C-space. (shrink)

Medieval interpretations of hylomorphism, in which substances are conceived as metaphysical composites of prime matter and substantial form, are receiving attention in contemporary philosophy. It has even been suggested that a recovery of Aquinas's conception of prime matter as a ‘pure potentiality’, lacking any actuality apart from substantial form, may be expedient in hylomorphic interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a recent hylomorphic interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the theory of Cosmic Hylomorphism, which does not explicitly invoke (...) any notion of prime matter in its original formulation. We argue that prime matter does in fact play a role in constituting and individuating particles in this theory. However, we demonstrate that the notion of prime matter which features in the extended version of Cosmic Hylomorphism that we propose here is distinct from Aquinas's conception of prime matter, inasmuch as it has discrete metaphysical parts. (shrink)

In the corpus of phenomenological philosophy (as far as it is influenced by the works of Jacob von Uexküll and the debate of phenomenologists with philosophical anthropologists such as E. Cassirer, F. J. J. Buytendijk, and A. Portmann), we find the allegation that one of the fundamental differences between human and non-human animals is that while the non-human animal has a species-specific umwelt, humans have access to (a certain idea of) welt. In this sense, Heidegger speaks of the animal as (...) a being “poor-in-world” in contrast to man as a “world-making” being. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty states that language helps a human person step out of her umwelt into the idea of welt. In the present study, I proceed from the critical reflection of this umwelt–welt distinction, emphasizing the question of the status of this “world.” For a better understanding of this problem, I illustrate it by the example of sign language acquisition by congenitally deafblind people, using phenomenological analysis of intercorporeality and associated phenomena in combination with “dialogical epistemology” as an interpretive framework. Claude Romano’s thesis of “evential hermeneutics” can illuminate this situation, as it explains the vital role various events play in establishing the world through our experience. From this point of view, the “world” plays a role not as a sum of objects in a play of objective causes, but rather it is a transcendental field from which events arise. (shrink)

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social co...

Práce se zabývá filosofickou analýzou vědeckého výzkumu, kterou v polovině minulého století provedla botanička Agnes Arberová. Její koncepce je cenným příspěvkem k otázce kontextu vzniku vědeckého objevu a procesu jeho zdůvodnění v biologických disciplínách. Ve stati se pokusím doložit, že její úvahy mají ráz v zásadě fenomenologický, a proto bude její koncepce interpretována na pozadí úvah Maurice Merleau-Pontyho o tělesné povaze smyslů. Taková interpretace napovídá, že Arberová ve shodě s Merleau-Pontym uvažuje o fenoménech nikoli jako o objektech, které lze zkoumat (...) odděleně, nýbrž nám představuje fenomenální pole, v němž se fenomény vyjevují v souvislosti s předcházející zkušeností. Orientace v předmětu výzkumu lze vnímat jako otázku rovnováhy, jíž badatel výzkumem aktivně vyhledává. (shrink)

Članek je posvečen vprašanju, katere vire je pri pisanju svoje Cerkvene zgodovine oziroma dodatka k prevodu Evzebijevega istoimenskega dela uporabljal Rufin iz Akvileje. Iz samega besedila izhaja, da je upora­bljal tako ustne kot pisne vire, pri čemer Rufin prve večkrat navaja, drugih pa skorajda ne. Kljub temu je danes moč zanesljivo reči, da se je pri pisanju opiral na številne tako latinske kot grške vire. Rufinov ugled na področju (cerkvene) zgodovine je v zadnjem stoletju precej omajala teza, da je za (...) večji del svojega dodatka enostavno prevedel danes izgubljeno cerkveno zgodovino Gelazija iz Cezareje. Ker naj bi bilo vsebino slednje moč rekonstruirati iz kasnejših grških virov, je Rufinov dodatek v strokovnih krogih deležen manj pozornosti, kot si kljub svojim pomanjkljivostim zasluži. Članek se tako osredotoča predvsem na dva vidika Rufinovih pisnih virov — na vprašanje njegove odvisnosti od Gelazija in na vprašanje, za katere pisne vire dejansko lahko rečemo, da jih je uporabljal. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as “widely shared”. In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of (...) Peregrin’s proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin’s response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations – a specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition. (shrink)

The invariant evolution parameter τ is often used in the formulation of a so-called unconstrained relativistic quantum theoryof a point particle. Such a theory is very elegant, and contains the usual Klein-Gordon or the Dirac particle as a special case. In the present paper we extend the unconstrained theory to describe a continuous set of point particles forming a string or, in general, a membrane of arbitrary dimension p.The action of this system is not invariant with respect to reparametrizations of (...) the evolution parameter τ and therefore there is no constraints among the dynamical variables, and no need for ghosts in the quantized theory. Then we show that such an unconstrained membrane is equivalent to a wiggly membranewhich has variable tension on its (p+1)-dimensional worldsheet. The equations of motion admit the usual well-known Dirac-Nambu-Goto membranes as particular solutions. (shrink)

Internalisti razloga smatraju da je prisutnost motiva preduvjet za postojanje razloga. Prema humeovskoj interpretaciji ovog stajališta, razlozi za djelovanje uvijek su relativni budući da njihovo postojanje ovisi o arbitrarnim elementima koji čine nečiji subjektivni motivacijski skup. Jedan od najvećih izazova humeovskom internalizmu predstavlja kantovska interpretacija internalističkog stajališta. Glavna intencija kantovskog pristupa jest dokazati mogućnost racionalne motivacije te tako osporiti humeovski relativizam. U članku kritički prikazujem ovu raspravu te nastojim obraniti humeovski internalizam od jednog suvremenog kantovskog prijedloga.Internalists about reasons argue that (...) the presence of a motive is a precondition for the existence of a reason. According to the Humean interpretation of this view, reasons for action are always relative since their existence depends on the arbitrary elements which form one’s subjective motivational set. One of the greatest challenges to Humean internalism is the Kantian interpretation of the internalist position. The main intention of Kantian approach is to prove the possibility of rational motivation and thus deny Humean internalism. In this article I critically examine this discussion and attempt to defend Humean internalism against one contemporary Kantian proposal. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is probably the most influential version of moral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknown Mackie’s “argument from querness”. In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can (...) ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties. (shrink)

Predmet ovog rada je vjerojatno najutjecajnija verzija moralnog realizma, poznata kao “moralni realizam naturalizam”. Nakon što predložim formulaciju za koju smatram da najpotpunije opisuje poziciju moralnog realizma, raspravljam o tome je li moguće provesti aposteriornu identifikaciju moralnih i prirodnih svojstava. U drugom dijelu nastojim pokazati da moralni realisti naturalisti ne uspijevaju izbjeći poznatom Mackievu “argumentu iz čudnosti” . Na kraju raspravljam o tome mogu li realisti naturalisti moralnim svojstvima pripisati eksplanatornu moć.The subject of this paper is probably the most influential (...) version ofmoral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknownMackie’s “argument from querness” . In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties. (shrink)

Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that strong motivational internalism is false because it cannot accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I argue that the reasons for endorsing (...) weak motivational internalism of any form are not compelling. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge production is a domain of human excellence, but recently this position became progressively challenged by machine intelligence. Some human tasks will be conquered sooner; others, which include design, may still require human intuition. Would the automated knowledge production truly challenge the human, or is one just an extension – a prosthetic – of the other? What could be the place of art in such environment? Mess and messy scientific models have the potential to provide paradigm shifts in molecular (...) modelling, cancer research and systems biology where not only living humans but also machine learning algorithms craft knowledge. Together with art they have the potential for different reading and re-framing, which are the qualities scientists are looking for when engaging works of art within their molecular modelling process. In my opinion, these are the same qualities scientists are also looking for in the outputs of machine learning and computational chemistry modelling. (shrink)

After a brief discussion of the terms determinism and free will, the paper sets out to compare some recent philosophical approaches to the problem of free will with a theological anthropology account of the notion. It aims to defend the claim, that even though different kind of questions are asked on both sides, they tackle similar issues and a complementary approach is needed. Recent philosophy considers the problem mostly from the standpoint of logic, naturalist evolutionary ontology and cognitive science. In (...) the Christian theological tradition, the idea of free will has been discussed mostly from the perspective of the problem of sin and grace, thus on the grounds of soteriology, hamartiology and theological ethics. The paper shows similarities between the approaches, mainly between the problem of physical determinism and theological determinism and also divine foreknowledge. (shrink)

Though historically important, the notion of tacit consent plays little role in contemporary discussions of political legitimacy. The idea, in fact, is often dismissed as obviously implausible. The ambition of this paper is to challenge this assumption and show that tacit consent can become a key ingredient in a theory of legitimacy. Instead of defining tacit consent through residence (where, according to John Locke or Plato's Socrates, staying in the country amounts to tacitly consenting to its system of rule), the (...) paper explores a different strategy, delimiting tacit consent as an absence of active dissent. The basic idea starts from the fact that widespread anti-government protests and demonstrations always carry a potent delegitimating force. Political legitimacy is therefore never permanent and unchangeable, regardless of the nature of the regime, and can be undermined at all times by active dissent from the population. Having established the relationship between dissent and delegitimation of political power, even the inverted, stronger claim is defended: the absence of active dissent (i.e., tacit consent) can, under certain circumstances, serve to legitimize political power. The paper sets up and defends several conditions that need to be met for the right normative mandate to be created by the population tacitly accepting the existing power arrangements. If those are fulfilled (especially when full freedom of expression and information is granted), tacit consent can become a vital element of political legitimacy. (shrink)

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to (...) be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute (...) a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program. (shrink)

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to (...) be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges. (shrink)

Lidová psychologie coby základ naší schopnosti vysvětlovat a předvídat jednání je významné téma filozofie mysli. Debaty, které ji obklopují, se nicméně v minulosti zaměřovaly primárně na otázky jejího statusu v rámci vědeckého zkoumání mysli a formy ji zakládajících mechanismů (teorie, simulace aj.). Relativně menší pozornost byla věnována otázce obsahu lidové psychologie – tedy tomu, které koncepty či schopnosti pod označení „lidová psychologie“ řadit. V článku se zabývám právě otázkou obsahu a možné odpovědi na otázku obsahu předloženou pluralistickým pojetím lidové psychologie. (...) Nejdříve uvádím některé argumenty zpochybňující standardní pojetí lidové psychologie a následně představuji pojetí pluralismu rozšiřující lidovou psychologii o řadu sociálně kognitivních schopností. V závěru se krátce věnuji tomu, jaké dopady by takto šířeji pojímaná lidová psychologie mohla mít pro otázky jejího statusu a formy. (shrink)

The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the sceptical arguments in semantics by comparing the naturalness of meaning candidates. Recently, the criterion has been challenged by a new sceptical argument. Williams argues that the criterion cannot rule out the candidates which are not permuted versions of an intended interpretation. He presents such a candidate – the arithmetical interpretation semantics by comparing the naturalness of meaning candidates. Recently, the criterion has been challenged by a new sceptical (...) argument. Williams argues that the criterion cannot rule out the candidates which are not permuted versions of an intended interpretation. He presents such a candidate – the arithmetical interpretation, and he argues that it opens up the possibility of Pythagorean worlds, i.e. the worlds similar to ours in which the arithmetical interpretation is the best candidate for a semantic theory. The aim of this paper is a) to reconsider the general conditions for the applicability of Lewis’s criterion of naturalness and b) to show that Williams’s new sceptical challenge is based on a problematic assumption that the arithmetical interpretation is independent of fundamental properties and relations. As I show, if the criterion of naturalness is applied properly, it can respond even to the new sceptical challenge. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of Scanlon’s Promises and Practices and What We Owe to Each Other, expectations have become an important topic within discussions on promises. However, confining the role of expectations to promises does not do justice to their importance in creating obligations more generally. This paper argues that expectations are one of the major sources of obligations created within our personal relationships. What we owe to our friends, partners, or siblings very often follows neither from the duties associated (...) with the given role, nor from our explicit promises, commitments, declarations, or consents. The obligations that our close relationships create often arise from a shared understanding of those relationships—and subsequent mutually acknowledged expectations. (shrink)

Prema hjumovskoj teoriji motivacije, motivacijski se proces sastoji od dva međusobno nezavisna mentalna stanja , što znači da subjekt ne može biti u potpunosti motiviran na djelovanje ako mu jedno od tih stanja nedostaje. U prvom dijelu članka prikazujem središnja obilježja ove teorije, a potom pokazujem da prihvaćanje Humeove distinkcije između divljih i tihih strasti može biti vrlo koristan alat za obranu ovog modela od nekih standardnih prigovora.

Engineers fine-tune the design of robot bodies for control purposes, however, a methodology or set of tools is largely absent, and optimization of morphology (shape, material properties of robot bodies, etc.) is lagging behind the development of controllers. This has become even more prominent with the advent of compliant, deformable or ”soft” bodies. These carry substantial potential regarding their exploitation for control—sometimes referred to as ”morphological computation”. In this article, we briefly review different notions of computation by physical systems and (...) propose the dynamical systems framework as the most useful in the context of describing and eventually designing the interactions of controllers and bodies. Then, we look at the pros and cons of simple vs. complex bodies, critically reviewing the attractive notion of ”soft” bodies automatically taking over control tasks. We address another key dimension of the design space—whether model-based control should be used and to what extent it is feasible to develop faithful models for different morphologies. (shrink)

The relativistic quantum mechanics with Lorentz-invariant evolution parameter and indefinite mass is a very elegant theory. But it cannot be derived by quantizing the usual classical relativity in which there is the mass-shell constraint. In this paper the classical theory is modified so that it remains Lorentz invariant, but the constraint disappears; mass is no longer fixed—it is an arbitrary constant of motion. The quantization of this unconstrained theory gives the relativistic quantum mechanics in which wave functions are localized and (...) normalized in spacetime. Though many authors have published good works in support for such a localization in time, the latter has been generally considered as problematic. Here I show that wave packets restricted to a finite region of spacetime are not a nuisance, but just the contrary. They have the physical interpretation in the fact that an observer perceives a world line event by event, as his experience of “now” proceeds in spacetime. Quantum mechanically this means that at a certain value of the evolution parameter τ the event is most probably to occur within the spacetime region around {ie1005-1} occupied by the wave packet; at later value of τ the position {ie1005-2}—and hence the time coordinate t—of the wave packet is changed. This is closely related to the interpretation of quantum mechanics in general. (shrink)

Business ethics’ theories have come under a lot of criticism lately. The problem has been the lack of a philosophical base or the inadequate implementation of it. We are trying to solve this problem by examining the roots of ethics and then applying it to the business environment. The root that has been undeservedly overlooked has been the concept of free will, the oldest philosophical problem on which every ethics theory lies. We have chosen two theories that we think would (...) be the best base for business ethics. We will shortly present the others. Since free will presents the core of business ethics, business ethicists must first agree on which theory to implement. Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ theory of free will best amplify the core of economic theory, because it gives reason a central and most important role in the theory. The concept of free will is mainly philosophical as is business ethics so the article follows this tradition, but we tried to give business examples where possible. We do not give a final conclusion because it should be reached by debate and mutual agreement between business ethicists. (shrink)

I argue that Robert Nozick, in his well-known book “Anarchy, State, Utopia”, is working with Locke’s notion of the natural right to property merely instrumentally. I use the term “instrumentally” in the sense that the pieces of the source are not used within the context of the original work but are used atomically to support one’s argument or theory. Instrumental use of Locke’s theory causes incoherence in his theory. This paper introduces the incoherence in the question and explains how this (...) incoherency is inherent to Nozick’s interpretation and usage of Lockean Proviso. (shrink)