24 found
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  1. The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena.Marie I. Kaiser & Beate Krickel - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3).
    The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis (...)
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  2.  92
    The Mechanical World: The Metaphysical Commitments of the New Mechanistic Approach.Beate Krickel - 2018 - Cham: Springer Verlag.
    his monograph examines the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic philosophy, a way of thinking that has returned to center stage. It challenges a variant of reductionism with regard to higher-level phenomena, which has crystallized as a default position among these so-called New Mechanists. Furthermore, it opposes those philosophers who reject the possibility of interlevel causation. Contemporary philosophers believe that the explanation of scientific phenomena requires the discovery of relevant mechanisms. As a result, new mechanists are, in the main, concerned (...)
  3. Saving the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance.Beate Krickel - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68:58-67.
    Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this constitution relation is Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability approach to constitutive relevance. Recently, the mutual manipulability approach has come under attack (Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015; Harinen 2014; Casini and Baumgartner 2016). Roughly, it is argued that this approach is inconsistent because it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas (...)
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  4. The Unconscious Mind Worry: A Mechanistic-Explanatory Strategy.Beate Krickel - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):39-59.
    Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to center stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” should be scientifically useful relative to the explanatory research goals. I argue that this is the case if by categorizing an unconscious phenomenon as “mental” one picks out explanatorily relevant similarities (...)
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  5. Extended Cognition, The New Mechanists’ Mutual Manipulability Criterion, and The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness.Beate Krickel - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):539–561.
    Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can (...)
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  6. Making Sense of Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms from a Metaphysical Perspective.Beate Krickel - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):453-468.
    According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than another acting entity if and only if the former is a component in the mechanism for the latter. Craver and Bechtel :547–563, 2007. doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8) argue that a consequence of this view is that there cannot be causal interactions between acting entities at different mechanistic levels. Their main reason seems to be what I will call the Metaphysical Argument: things at different levels of a mechanism (...)
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  7. Are the States Underlying Implicit Biases Unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian Answer.Beate Krickel - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):1007-1026.
    Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski et al. (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious (...)
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  8.  20
    Extended Cognition and the Search for the Mark of Constitution – A Promising Strategy?Beate Krickel - 2023 - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds.), Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations. Springer Verlag. pp. 129-146.
    The disagreement between defenders and opponents of extended cognition is often framed in terms of constitution. The underlying principle of this discussion is what I will call the co-location principle: cognition is located where its constituents are located. The crucial question is under which conditions something is to be counted as a constituent of cognition. I will formulate three criteria of adequacy that an account of constitution must satisfy to be applicable to the dispute on extended cognition. I will evaluate (...)
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  9. A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation.Beate Krickel - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1123-1153.
    Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful scientific explanation (Illari 2013; Craver 2014). The minimal claim is that scientific explanations have objective truthmakers, namely mechanisms that exist in the physical world independently of any observer and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to- be-explained. How can this idea be applied to type-level explanations? Many authors at least implicitly assume that in order for mechanisms to be the truthmakers of type-level explanation they need to be regular (Andersen (...)
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  10.  36
    Cognitive Ontology in Terms of Cognitive Homology: The Role of Brain, Behavior, and Environment for Individuating Cognitive Categories.Beate Krickel & Mariel Goddu - forthcoming - In Gualtiero Piccinini (ed.), Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind. Routledge.
    How should scientists carve up cognition to generate good predictions, explanations, and models of cognition? This chapter argues that cognitive categories should be constructed the same way that biological categories are: in terms of homology. The chapter adapts a developmental account of trait identity from evolutionary-developmental biology to make sense of the notion of “cognitive homology.” The consequence is that both brain structures and the organism’s ongoing interactions with the environment are crucial for individuating cognitive homologies, and thus for cognitive (...)
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  11. How and when are topological explanations complete mechanistic explanations? The case of multilayer network models.Beate Krickel, Leon de Bruin & Linda Douw - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-21.
    The relationship between topological explanation and mechanistic explanation is unclear. Most philosophers agree that at least some topological explanations are mechanistic explanations. The crucial question is how to make sense of this claim. Zednik (Philos Psychol 32(1):23–51, 2019) argues that topological explanations are mechanistic if they (i) describe mechanism sketches that (ii) pick out organizational properties of mechanisms. While we agree with Zednik’s conclusion, we critically discuss Zednik’s account and show that it fails as a general account of how and (...)
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  12.  29
    Individuation of Cross-Cutting Causal Systems in Cognitive Science and Behavioral Ecology.Beate Krickel & Marie I. Kaiser - forthcoming - In Federica Russo & Phyllis Illari (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Causality and Causal Methods,. Routledge.
    For many causal endeavors, such as measuring, predicting, and explaining, individuating causal systems plays a crucial role. In this chapter, we focus on the individuation of a specific type of causal systems, what we call cross-cutting systems. These are systems that lack natural boundaries and that are not restricted to the spatiotemporal region of the individuals to which they belong. Based on examples taken from cognitive science and behavioral ecology, we explore how scientists individuate such cross-cutting causal systems.
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  13.  36
    The New Mechanistic Approach and Cognitive Ontology—Or: What role do (neural) mechanisms play in cognitive ontology?Beate Krickel - 2024 - Minds and Machines 34 (3):1-19.
    Cognitive ontology has become a popular topic in philosophy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. At its center is the question of which cognitive capacities should be included in the ontology of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. One common strategy for answering this question is to look at brain structures and determine the cognitive capacities for which they are responsible. Some authors interpret this strategy as a search for neural mechanisms, as understood by the so-called new mechanistic approach. In this article, (...)
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  14.  32
    (1 other version)Compare and Contrast: How to assess the completeness of mechanistic explanation.Matej Kohár & Beate Krickel - 2020 - In Fabrizio Calzavarini & Marco Viola (eds.), Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. Springer. pp. 395-424.
    Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to (...)
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  15.  14
    A Psychological “How-Possibly” Model of Repression.Beate Krickel - 2024 - Neuropsychoanalysis.
    In recent philosophical and (neuro)psychological discussions of phenomena such as motivated forgetting, memory inhibition, self-deception, and implicit bias, various authors have suggested that repression might be a useful notion to make sense of these phenomena, or that these phenomena indeed provide evidence for repression. However, surprisingly, these claims usually do not rely on any explicit model of repression. Consequently, it remains unclear whether invoking repression in these discussions is justified. In this paper, I propose a psychological “how-possibly” model that can (...)
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  16.  46
    Reply to Cartwright, Pemberton, Wieten: “mechanisms, laws and explanation”.Beate Krickel - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-9.
    Cartwright et al. in European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10 and the new mechanists agree that regular behaviors described in cp laws are generated by mechanisms. However, there is disagreement with regard to the two questions that Cartwright at al. ask: the epistemological question and the ontological question. Most importantly, Cartwright et al. argue that the explanation involved is a CL-explanation, while the new mechanists insist that mechanistic explanation and CL-explanation are competitors. In this reply, I will highlight some (...)
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  17.  22
    Basieren (alle) psychischen Störungen auf der Unfähigkeit, auf Gründe angemessen zu reagieren? Ein Kommentar zu Philosophy of Mental Disorder.Beate Krickel - 2024 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 78 (1):114-119.
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  18.  38
    Different Types of Mechanistic Explanation and Their Ontological Implications.Beate Krickel - 2023 - In João L. Cordovil, Gil Santos & Davide Vecchi (eds.), New Mechanism Explanation, Emergence and Reduction. Springer. pp. 9-28.
    One assumption of the new mechanistic approach is that there are two kinds of mechanistic explanations: etiological and constitutive ones. While the former explain phenomena in terms of their preceding causes, the latter are supposed to refer to mechanisms that constitute phenomena. Based on arguments by Kaiser and Krickel (Br J Philos Sci 68(3):745–779, 2017) and Krickel (The mechanical world, vol. 13, Springer International Publishing, 2018), I will show that this view is too narrow. Indeed, three different types of explanation (...)
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  19. Der Sitz des Geistes und das Unbewusste - Philosophische Probleme im Lichte Situierter Ansätze.Beate Krickel - 2022 - In Helmut Fink & Rainer Rosenzweig (eds.), Wo sitzt der Geist? Von Leib und Seele zur erweiterten Kognition. Kortizes. pp. 173-190.
    Das Unbewusste ist wieder in aller Munde: Populärwissenschaftliche Bücher, die den unbewussten Geist thematisieren, werden internationale Bestseller 1 und es gibt sicherlich keine populärwissenschaftliche Psychologie-Zeitschrift, die nicht schon mehrfach über das Thema berichtet hat2 . Dieses neue Interesse am unbewussten Geist ist vor allem neuen Erkenntnissen aus der kognitiven Psychologie und der Sozialpsychologie zu verdanken.
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  20.  18
    Why Diachronic Constitution Won’t Help. Commentary on “Dissolving the Causal-Constitution Fallacy”.Beate Krickel - 2023 - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds.), Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations. Springer Verlag. pp. 175-180.
    In this short commentary, I will first show why Kiverstein & Kirchhoff's (this volume) analysis of the CC-fallacy is inadequate in an important way and show why their strategy for avoiding the CC-fallacy based on diachronic constitution is problematic. Second, I will reply to their criticism of the mechanistic account of constitution.
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  21.  46
    Correction to: Reply to Cartwright, Pemberton, Wieten: “mechanisms, laws and explanation”.Beate Krickel - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-2.
    A Correction to this paper has been published (changed to open access).
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  22. Introduction.Beate Krickel - 2018 - In The Mechanical World: The Metaphysical Commitments of the New Mechanistic Approach. Cham: Springer Verlag.
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  23. Types of Mechanisms: Ephemeral, Regular, Functional.Beate Krickel - 2018 - In The Mechanical World: The Metaphysical Commitments of the New Mechanistic Approach. Cham: Springer Verlag.
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  24. Theories of Mechanism.Beate Krickel - 2018 - In The Mechanical World: The Metaphysical Commitments of the New Mechanistic Approach. Cham: Springer Verlag.
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