Through an example of the prohibition against dating in a technical school in southwest China in 1978, this article analyzes how three intersecting forces - the ideology of socialist collectivism, the structure of the work unit system and the socialist sovereign ownership of the body - account for sexual repression in the Maoist period in China. Rather than being an ahistorical, essential component of Maoist socialism, sexual repression (psychic and social) was a historically specific and complex (...) phenomenon. The transformation of sexual repression at a historical moment took the form of an assemblage of the return of love discourse and an emergent desire-centered subjectivity in the great transformation from Maoist socialism to the post-Mao reform period. (shrink)

Through an example of the prohibition against dating in a technical school in southwest China in 1978, this article analyzes how three intersecting forces - the ideology of socialist collectivism, the structure of the work unit system and the socialist sovereign ownership of the body - account for sexual repression in the Maoist period in China. Rather than being an ahistorical, essential component of Maoist socialism, sexual repression (psychic and social) was a historically specific and complex (...) phenomenon. The transformation of sexual repression at a historical moment took the form of an assemblage of the return of love discourse and an emergent desire-centered subjectivity in the great transformation from Maoist socialism to the post-Mao reform period. (shrink)

Axée autour de la différence d’âge entre partenaires masculins, contrevenant tant, en matière érotique, aux conventions d’âge qu’aux prescriptions sexuées, la configuration de l’« amour vieux-jeune » (laoshaolian) homosexuel diffère singulièrement des formes de culture gay qui se déploient dans les espaces urbains centraux fréquentés par les nouvelles classes moyennes et supérieures chinoises. Constituée des liens sexuels et affectifs qui s’établissent dans la métropole entre vieux « locaux » et jeunes travailleurs migrants, imbriquée dans les formes et les lieux ordinaires (...) d’une sociabilité principalement masculine, populaire et intergénérationnelle, elle apparaît avant tout ancrée dans le contexte de la Chine des réformes et de l’ouverture post-maoïstes, au sein duquel les reconfigurations de l’espace discursif, de l’organisation économique et de la structure sociale jouent un rôle central. (shrink)

In the 1950s, embryology in socialist China underwent a series of changes that adjusted the disciplinary apparatus to suit socialism and the national goal of self-reliance. As the Communist state called on scientists to learn from the Soviets, embryologists’ comprehensive view on heredity, which did not contradict Trofim Lysenko (1898–1976)’s doctrines, provided a space for them to advance their discipline. Leading scientists, often trained abroad in the tradition of experimental embryology, rode on the tides of Maoist ideology and (...) repositioned their research. Some of their creative realignment of previous research questions, materials, and traditions to Marxist philosophy and agricultural objectives generated productive programs. In particular, Tong Dizhou (1902–1979) translated Engels’s dialectics of nature into a research question about cytoplasmic inheritance. His continuing investigation on it led to the first goldfish “clone” through a nuclear transplantation experiment; Zhu Xi and his associates transferred a goldfish model in embryology into studies on improving carp aquaculture, leading to a rare success in the Great Leap Forward of 1958. These directions for embryology continued well into the 1960s. At a time when global embryology was diversifying and began to be molecularized, eventually forming “developmental biology,” socialist embryology took shape in China with a different set of epistemic and practical commitments. The history of its development challenges and enriches our understanding of the concrete process of change in one discipline under Mao, showing ways in which scientists creatively adapted state-sanctioned ideologies and visions to do productive work outside the framework of molecular biology during the Cold War. (shrink)

In the 1950s, embryology in socialist China underwent a series of changes that adjusted the disciplinary apparatus to suit socialism and the national goal of self-reliance. As the Communist state called on scientists to learn from the Soviets, embryologists’ comprehensive view on heredity, which did not contradict Trofim Lysenko ’s doctrines, provided a space for them to advance their discipline. Leading scientists, often trained abroad in the tradition of experimental embryology, rode on the tides of Maoist ideology and (...) repositioned their research. Some of their creative realignment of previous research questions, materials, and traditions to Marxist philosophy and agricultural objectives generated productive programs. In particular, Tong Dizhou translated Engels’s dialectics of nature into a research question about cytoplasmic inheritance. His continuing investigation on it led to the first goldfish “clone” through a nuclear transplantation experiment; Zhu Xi and his associates transferred a goldfish model in embryology into studies on improving carp aquaculture, leading to a rare success in the Great Leap Forward of 1958. These directions for embryology continued well into the 1960s. At a time when global embryology was diversifying and began to be molecularized, eventually forming “developmental biology,” socialist embryology took shape in China with a different set of epistemic and practical commitments. The history of its development challenges and enriches our understanding of the concrete process of change in one discipline under Mao, showing ways in which scientists creatively adapted state-sanctioned ideologies and visions to do productive work outside the framework of molecular biology during the Cold War. (shrink)

The book narrates how, called to embody this selfless spirit, medical doctors were trapped in a spiral between cultivation and abolition, leading to the explosion of ideology during the Cultural Revolution.

During the autumn of 1949, Hannah Arendt completed the manuscript of The Origins of Totalitarianism. On 1 October of the same year, the People’s Republic of China was founded under the leadership of Mao Zedong. This article documents Arendt’s claim in 1949 that the prospects of totalitarianism in China were ‘frighteningly good’, and yet her ambivalent judgment, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, about the totalitarian character of the Maoist regime. Despite being the premier theorist of (...) totalitarian formations, Arendt’s interest in China was half-hearted and her analysis often wildly inaccurate. The concern of this paper, however, is less with the veracity of her remarks, than with a counterfactual question. If Arendt had known what we know now, would she have considered Maoist China to be a totalitarian regime? Put another way: to what extent is our modern picture of Mao’s regime consistent with Arendt’s depiction of the Soviet Union under Stalin or Germany under Hitler? While Arendt got many of her facts wrong, her theory of totalitarianism — as shapeless, febrile, voracious of human flesh, and endlessly turbulent — was in good measure applicable to Mao’s regime, even though she failed to recognize it. (shrink)

Three misleading notions of post-Mao dynamics pervade thinking on recent reforms in China. In one, a tragic defeat has been suffered by true third-world revolutionaries, Maoists, who were in the process of emancipating the rural poor. In place of Maoism, China is said to be emplanting or re-emplanting a Soviet style system, rationalized Stalinism. In another understanding of China's reforms, self-reliant socialism has been replaced by dependent capitalism. Post-Mao China has decollectivized agriculture, made price, market and (...) material incentives more central to the economy, accepted the idea of a capitalist Hong Kong as part of China, opened ports and special economic zones to the laws, investments and logic of the capitalist world market and, in search of advanced science and technology. (shrink)

In the early 1950s, the Chinese communist party promoted a massive Learning-from-the-Soviet-Union Campaign and made Pavlov’s reflexology the political-academic orthodoxy in physiology, medical science and psychology. In the late 1950s, however, while Pavlov’s theory was continuously advocated by physiologists and medical scientists, it suffered a major setback in psychology as Pavlovian psychology was criticized as being bourgeois and reactionary. How was it possible for such sheer contrast across disciplines to take place within a few years? This paper argues that the (...) greater ideologization of Pavlovian psychology was conditioned by a number of factors: the Sino-Soviet relations, the shifting Chinese communist policies, professional practices, local social conditions, disciplinary cultures and discursive performances. This historical reconstruction rejects a homogenizing view of the relation between politics and science in the Maoist China, and demonstrates ways in which historical localities and dynamics ruptured the overarching political context. (shrink)

This paper attempts to test to what level the distinction can be made between Maoism, Mao Tse-Sung’s theory of revolutionary communism, as it functioned in China during the People’s Revolution and in South America. This paper will compare the Maoist ideology of two Maoist leaders and their revolutionary movements: Mexico’s Florencio Medrano and Peru’s Abimael Guzman.

This paper attempts to test to what level the distinction can be made between Maoism, Mao Tse-Sung’s theory of revolutionary communism, as it functioned in China during the People’s Revolution and in South America. This paper will compare the Maoist ideology of two Maoist leaders and their revolutionary movements: Mexico’s Florencio Medrano and Peru’s Abimael Guzman.

During the autumn of 1949, Hannah Arendt completed the manuscript of The Origins of Totalitarianism. On 1 October of the same year, the People’s Republic of China was founded under the leadership of Mao Zedong. This article documents Arendt’s claim in 1949 that the prospects of totalitarianism in China were ‘frighteningly good’, and yet her ambivalent judgment, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, about the totalitarian character of the Maoist regime. Despite being the premier theorist of (...) totalitarian formations, Arendt’s interest in China was half-hearted and her analysis often wildly inaccurate. The concern of this paper, however, is less with the veracity of her remarks, than with a counterfactual question. If Arendt had known what we know now, would she have considered Maoist China to be a totalitarian regime? Put another way: to what extent is our modern picture of Mao’s regime consistent with Arendt’s depiction of the Soviet Union under Stalin or Germany under Hitler? While Arendt got many of her facts wrong, her theory of totalitarianism — as shapeless, febrile, voracious of human flesh, and endlessly turbulent — was in good measure applicable to Mao’s regime, even though she failed to recognize it. (shrink)

In the Western media, stories about China seem to fall into one of two categories: China’s astounding economic development or its human rights abuses. As human rights discourses follow increasingly hegemonic conventions, especially with regard to China, many of their key assumptions remain unexamined. This special issue—the second in a two-part series beginning with “Cosmologies of the Human”—critically investigates the relationship between China and the human as it plays out in law, politics, biopolitics, political economy, labor, (...) medicine, and culture. The contributors interrogate the evolving meanings of “China” and “the human,” both inside China and internationally. The issue tracks the ways in which global discourses treat China—still officially socialist—as similar to, different from, and alternative to Western capitalist modernities. Several essays probe the modern theoretical underpinnings of human rights abuses in China, including a crucial distinction between “the human” and “the people.” Others review the impact of Maoism on Marxist debates in China and in the West, as well as the specific influences of Mao’s writings on French politics and theory in the 1960s. A visual dossier compares eight contemporary Chinese artists, directors, and public image-makers in order to discuss the figure of the human from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. While many contributors discuss China and the West comparatively, the issue interrogates the universalizing claims of both Western and Chinese norms of the human by privileging the local, particular, and eccentric. Contributors: Ackbar Abbas, Michael Dutton, David L. Eng, Doug Howland, Petrus Liu, Camille Robcis, Teemu Ruskola, Shuang Shen, Shu-mei Shih, Wang Xiaoming David L. Eng is Professor of English, Comparative Literature, and Asian American Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of _The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy_ and _Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America_, both also published by Duke University Press. Teemu Ruskola is Professor of Law at Emory University and Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University. Shuang Shen is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature and Chinese at Pennsylvania State University. (shrink)

1966, the inaugural year of China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was also the thirtieth anniversary of Lu Xun’s death. Quotations from and praise of China’s best known and preeminent modern writer were in abundance that year and an official commemorative event, reportedly attended by more than seventy thousand people, was held in Beijing. The anniversary date presented the Maoist state with a prime opportunity for boosting the cultural and intellectual authority of their doctrinal assertions by association with (...) Lu Xun. In asking what Lu Xun was in 1966, I seek to bring to view the thingness of his afterlife (or afterlives) under CCP rule. This paper discusses how the Maoist treatment of Lu Xun turned him into a political icon, to add aesthetic value to Mao Zedong Thought. Insofar as aesthetics turns on what can be felt, heard, seen, sensed, touched, or imagined, aestheticization is generally accompanied by a certain process of reification. I thus consider the concrete instances by which people came to experience Lu Xun—such as selected quotations from Lu Xun, Chairman Mao’s formulations about Lu Xun, and images of the writer in poster art—focusing in particular on the widely publicized speeches presented at the official commemoration of his death in October 1966. Since the 1980s, these 1966 commemorations have been routinely disparaged in China as an aberration. To take the Maoist version of Lu Xun seriously as the careful construction of an aesthetic object is to do more than elucidate its ideological abuse of Lu Xun. By engaging productively with the Maoist craving for an ideal revolutionary comportment, we may yet catch a glimpse of the kind of world it took for Lu Xun to make sense as a Maoist icon. Without this Maoist intensity of feeling, there would not have been the post-Maoist preoccupation with recovering or defending, as it were, Lu Xun’s true or real form (if such a phenomenologically pure act is even possible). (shrink)

This article looks at marriage registration as a window into state building and state-family relations in Maoist China. It focuses on the interaction between officials and citizens as they tried to make sense of the new state's unprecedented demand that people register their marriages prior to their consummation. Marriage registration was expected to make Chinese society more “legible” to the state, as well as contribute to a “healthier” nation. While much of the literature of Maoist China (...) would anticipate state success, archival evidence points to widespread evasion and resistance, as well as accommodation, to the state's effort to reshape family relations. (shrink)

Communist discourses are resurging in various disciplines across the globe. Philosophy has its share of this resurgence especially after the global financial crisis of 2008 made a number of its thinkers convene in various conferences and intellectually meet in a host of publications. In these intellectual engagements, the idea of communism is once again interrogated as the moribund capitalist system failed humanity its promise. Alain Badiou is among the leading figures in the philosophical task of (re)interrogating the idea of communism. (...) Badiou raised the urgency of reformulating what he calls as the communist hypothesis for it to both reconsider its supposed failures of the past and better suit the current conditions. Badiou is particularly guided by the lessons of the May ’68 of France, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of China, and various contemporary popular uprisings to develop a reformulation of the communist hypothesis. In advancing a laborious task of reformulation, Badiou inevitably rejected a core category of the Marxist-Leninist tradition: the party. The rejection is supported by a view of the party that reduced it to its supposed fusion with the State, i.e., the party-State fusion. Such a fusion is characterized by either parliamentarian or insurrectionary politics. In this politics, Badiou argues that the party is obstructed from advancing further the proletarian revolution as it is tied to a Statist procedure. This work develops a Maoist reformulation of the communist hypothesis. Along the course of the socialist constructions of Russia and China, certain moments of what can be called as indigenized and mobilizational politics characterized periods that escape what Badiou reduced the party into, i.e., the party-State fusion. The Maoist notions of the mass line and protractedness come out as indispensable requisites in developing the concepts of indigenized and mobilizational politics. These moments depicted what can be called as the party-masses fusion and provided practical resources not only for the rectification of the supposed failures of the past but also for a reformulation of the communist hypothesis. Through the development and employment of the category of the party-masses fusion and the politics that determine it, the reformulation of the communist hypothesis is supported by a discourse of success rather than of defeat. (shrink)

As part of a larger project, this paper serves as an overview that examines how “ai” 愛 as an affective concept made its way into the Chinese vocabulary, how it gained popularity at specific junctures in modern Chinese history, and the ways in which it has been adapted as a marker of modernity and a political discourse in Republican and Communist China in distinct ways. Although literary scholars have noted the significance of the shaping of love as an affective (...) concept for the project of Chinese modernity, they mainly focus on the conceptions and interpretations of love in the literature, and with a time frame from late imperial to Maoist China. The few studies about love in post-Mao era usually attribute the sources of such affect to Christianity. My paper makes a fresh contribution in three aspects. First, I take a longer historical perspective, from the 1910s to the 2010s, and dedicate, secondly, a large part of my study to the decisive impact from revolutionary radicalism to popular religions on the formation of the discourse of state propaganda and everyday politics, rather than manifestations in the literature and sources from Christianity. Third, I study some of the most controversial political figures in modern China, including Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Xi Jinping, rather than intellectuals and writers only. (shrink)

This article investigates the specific cultural and collaborative nature of China’s public spaces and how they are formed through performative appropriations. Collective cultural practices as political participation were encouraged during the Mao era when cultural activities played a key role in workers’ education and participation. Since the opening-up period, performance in public space has become widespread in China and creates alternative community spaces that constitute alternatives to capitalist spaces of consumption. Using Habermas’s theory of communicative action, we argue (...) that cultural practices performed in public space create a proletariat public sphere that plays a wider role in governance and China’s democratization. Further, the article examines performative practices in public space. It traces the popular activity of public square dancing through history and counters this research with a parallel study of a much younger skateboarding practice. The two practices are very differently rooted. Yet both practices appear to move through cycles of disruption and appropriation, followed by an affirmation of governmental rule. The studies reveal that western ideas of citizenship and individual leisure are less applicable. Public spaces are largely managed through collaborative practices, whereas contemporary scholarship reaffirms Fei Xiaotong’s description of Chinese society as individuals positioned within a complex network of concentric circles. (shrink)

This article compares the growth trajectories of Catholicism and Protestantism in modern China and tackles a puzzle: Why did Catholicism, which maintained a substantial numerical advantage in Chinese converts over Protestantism before 1949, come to lag so far behind Protestantism today? The article identifies three crucial differences in the institutional features of Catholicism and Protestantism, but shows that an institutional argument alone is insufficient to explain their reversal of fortune. It argues that the growth trajectories of Catholicism and Protestantism (...) changed less because their institutional features have experienced major changes, but more because their institutional features played out differently in the sociopolitical contexts of pre-1949 China, Maoist China, and post-Mao China. The article advances a new approach that combines the currently dominant institutional argument with a historical perspective that stresses the importance of political forces in order to understand the growth dynamics of religions. It concludes by making some preliminary observations on the generalized patterns of how institutional features of Catholicism and Protestantism play out under different kinds of political structures, shaping their waxing and waning in a global context. (shrink)

La politique de « réformes et ouverture » vers l’étranger, initiée par Deng Xiaoping au sortir de la Révolution culturelle en 1978 s’est avérée, d’un point de vue économique, une véritable réussite qui a amené la Chine au rang des grandes puissances mondiales en à peine trente ans. D’un point de vue social par contre, le résultat est tout autre : transfigurée par ces réformes qui ont acté le basculement d’une économie planifiée vers une économie de marché, la société chinoise (...) s’est retrouvée bouleversée par la disparition de l’État-providence et la restructuration du secteur de production étatique, autant de dommages collatéraux qui vont brutalement vulnérabiliser et « précariser » des millions d’individus. Dès la fin des années 1980, vont se constituer de nouvelles « classes dangereuses » de paysans sans terres, de chômeurs et de pauvres, des « masses dangereuses » que l’État-parti chinois va devoir discipliner, puisque c’est sur leur exploitation que va se construire le miracle chinois. C’est donc un véritable arsenal discursif, une langue de bois élaborée et complétée sur trois décennies, que les dirigeants du Parti communiste chinois vont mettre en place pour formuler les perceptions et « corriger les consciences erronées » de ces populations vers une acceptation d’un ordre social qui leur est foncièrement défavorable.From the economic point of view, the policy for « reform and openness » to other countries initiated by Deng Xiaoping as the Cultural Revolution ended in 1978 was a genuine success that made China a top-ranking world power in the space of barely thirty years. The outcome was very different from the social point of view, however: the reforms that turned a planned economy into a market economy caused radical upheaval in Chinese society as collateral damage from the demise of the welfare state and the restructuring of the State-controlled production sector plunged millions into precariousness and insecurity. The late 1980s saw the emergence of a new « dangerous class » of landless peasants, unemployed workers and poverty-stricken individuals: the « dangerous masses » that the Chinese party-state would have to discipline so that the « Chinese miracle » could be built by exploiting their labour. Thus did China’s Communist party leadership deploy a whole arsenal of political doublespeak, developed and honed over three decades, designed to formulate perceptions and « correct » the « erroneous conceptions » of these populations to lead them to acceptance of a social order which is fundamentally opposed to their interests. (shrink)

China in the post-Mao era was transformed by a veritable economic miracle and simultaneously underwent a series of radical époque-making changes in the Chinese ruling classes’ political and ideological approach to government. The continued rapid growth and the expansion of a consumer society have also contributed to the discrediting of those traditional values which for many years underpinned and fortified the force of communism. In addition to the demise of traditional values, the waning belief in Maoist ideology and (...) the rise of consumerism as the new ideological credo, there have also been transformations in some of the main pillars of Chinese society, in particular the family, as a result of a resurgence of social practices that were thought to belong to the past. The most widespread in contemporary China is the “bao ernai” phenomenon, or the taking of a second wife, which involves mainly businessmen and politicians, strictly related to the increase of corruption. The increasingly worrying proportions assumed in recent years by such practice, while risking to compromise the sustenance of the much exalted harmonious society, have favoured the emergence of a heated debate inside the Chinese society. (shrink)

With advances in medical technology, the potential uses for human blood have proliferated, and in turn, so has the demand for blood. Blood and blood products circulate in a medical marketplace as a `good' that can be bought and sold to meet various health and commercial demands. Nevertheless, its point of origin — or `production' — remains the individual human body, and reliance on voluntary blood donation remains a cornerstone for meeting this growing market demand. This article examines the contradictions (...) surrounding blood donation in the ethnographic context of contemporary urban China. Specifically, it focuses on both how the circulation of blood outside the individual body interfaces with its circulation in the Chinese social body, and how individual Chinese conceptualize their acts of donation in this process. In ethnographic interviews for this project, many urbanites describe donation as both voluntary and as meeting a social obligation. Yet their donation practices remain structured by meeting work unit quotas and are compensated with monetary and food donations and paid time off. Their descriptions of the mechanisms for motivating and compensating donors echo the socialist calls for contributing to society's greater good typical of the Maoist era propaganda. These descriptions highlight the complexities of sociocultural change in what has come to be described in much of the literature as a `postsocialist' Chinese society characterized by a burgeoning consumer culture and increasing emergence of individual autonomy. Our interviews suggest that the socialist workplace remains a critical social and economic structure in China through which workers' production is transformed into a social `good'. This transformation originates within the individual bodies of workers (not on the factory floor) and is extracted through exhortations to contribute to better society via the work unit and one's obligations to the work unit. Rather than a shift to individual autonomy and self-improvement, or a re-emergence of traditional values — both of which have been described as hallmarks of the postsocialist era — this process highlights the role that the socialist work unit plays in defining Chinese citizenship, consumer culture and embodied desires. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 47, no. 2. © 2021 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 419 Paul Amar Insurgent African Intimacies in Pandemic Times: Deimperial Queer Logics of China’s New Global Family inWolf Warrior 2 This essay offers a new paradigm of “deimperial queer analysis” that reveals the tension between the People’s Republic of China’s extractive expansionism in Africa and its claim to solidarity with Africans against white supremacy and Northern (...) imperialism. China has been labeled an “anti-imperial empire” that forcefully challenges previous Euro-American imperial legacies—all while it verges on reenacting them.1 A critical way it resolves this geopolitical tension is through the articulation of a mission for global China, and since 2017, the heroic filmic fictional figure of the “Wolf Warrior” anchors such an approach. The Wolf Warrior is a gorgeous, muscled, Chinese male rogue soldier in exile who adventures through the archipelago of the PRC’s shipping, mining, and medical projects across the Global South to battle white mercenaries, corrupt Asian businessmen, and local pirates—all while saving Africa from a ravaging pandemic. Extending a hugely popular film series, the release in 2017 of the blockbuster Wolf Warrior 2 (abbreviated below as Wolf 2) unleashed a worldwide social media frenzy as well as a revolution in diplomatic tone and protocol for China. In these ways, Wolf Warrior 2 came to mark the debut of the global PRC as a hegemonic structure 1. David Armitage, “The Anti-Imperial Empire?” Times Literary Supplement, no. 6018, August 3, 2018, https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/the-anti-imperialempire -american. 420 Paul Amar of feeling with an attendant popular cultural logic, launching a cast of military characters, humanitarian imaginaries, and gendered rebranding initiatives. These fused into a global cultural megaproject with the PRC presenting itself as a leader in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Global South—a time the PRC has officially branded as its “Rejuvenation Era” of “Stepping Out into the World.” This essay shows how exactly this Wolf Warrior imagination has legitimized a new global regime, but I also reveal how, paradoxically, the Wolf Warrior regime has offered a distinct, more subversive worlding project. I argue here that the utopia immanent in this project can be revealed by interpretively turning this Wolf universe inside out through a deimperial queer analysis that honors and combines a Third World feminist lens and the “Asia as Method” approach with Danmei/BL and Slash queer-feminist fanfiction hacks. Danmei is a Chinese (originally mainly Tawainese) fanfiction genre that subverts mainstream heteronormative narratives by erotically aestheticizing and renarrating male-male intimacies within mainstream plotlines from feminist perspectives. BL (short for “boylove ”) is a similar Japanese fanfiction genre, and Slash is the term used in English for the queer/feminist hacking and excavation of sublimated and particularly utopian gender and sexuality plots from within seemingly conventional heteronormative or patriarchal popular-cultural texts. The everted or inside-out epistemology given expression here uses a set of non-phallogocentric lenses and decolonial feminist decoding practices. At stake is the urgency of not repeating the epistemic violence of conventional “anti-imperial” arguments, which tend to be heteronormative, statist, macho, and monolithic. Instead, the form of critique elaborated here brings questions of gender, race, and sexuality to the fore through a three-part approach. First, I identify the homoerotic register of the techno-infrastructural elements in the film. I generate close readings that detail the visual and genre codes of battle scenes, thug subjects, and piracy plots that forge a homoerotic model of rogue or “wolf” governmentality and that act as a metaphor for China’s techno -infrastructural rule. Second, this essay explores the gendered hauntings of supremacist humanism. I deploy a decolonial feminist lens to map the configuration of African women, female doctors, Maoist women insurgents, and feminized “flowerboys” as a rebel protectorate overseen by China’s phallic prerogative that is itself haunted by the specters of Euro-American humanist betrayal and white supremacy. Third, Paul Amar 421 I trace queer kinship utopias. I demonstrate that Wolf Warrior 2 rejuvenates a non-Western, queer, globalist kinship structure that triangulates Asian, white, and Black through adoption dramas and bromance bonds. Through these intimacies, an... (shrink)

From Comrades to Bodhisattvas is the first book-length study of Han Chinese Buddhism in post-Mao China. Using an ethnographic approach supported by over a decade of field research, it provides an intimate portrait of lay Buddhist practitioners in Beijing who have recently embraced a religion that they were once socialized to see as harmful superstition. The book focuses on the lively discourses and debates that take place among these new practitioners in an unused courtyard of a Beijing temple. In (...) this non-monastic space, which shrinks each year as the temple authorities expand their commercial activities, laypersons gather to distribute and exchange Buddhist-themed media, listen to the fiery sermons of charismatic preachers, and seek solutions to personal moral crises. Applying recent theories in the anthropology of morality and ethics, Gareth Fisher argues that the practitioners are attracted to the courtyard as a place where they can find ethical resources to re-make both themselves and others in a rapidly changing nation that they believe lacks a coherent moral direction. Spurred on by the lessons of the preachers and the stories in the media they share, these courtyard practitioners inventively combine moral elements from China’s recent Maoist past with Buddhist teachings on the workings of karma and the importance of universal compassion. Their aim is to articulate a moral antidote to what they see as blind obsession with consumption and wealth accumulation among twenty-first century Chinese. Often socially marginalized and sidelined from meaningful roles in China’s new economy, these former communist comrades look to their new moral roles along a bodhisattva path to rebuild their self-worth. Each chapter focuses on a central trope in the courtyard practitioners’ projects to form new moral identities. The Chinese government’s restrictions on the spread of religious teachings in urban areas curtail these practitioners' ability to insert their moral visions into an emerging public sphere. Nevertheless, they succeed, at least partially, Fisher argues, in creating their own discursive space characterized by a morality of concern for fellow humans and animals and a recognition of the organizational abilities and pedagogical talents of its members that are unacknowledged in society at large. Moreover, as the later chapters of the book discuss, by writing, copying, and distributing Buddhist-themed materials, the practitioners participate in creating a religious network of fellow-Buddhists across the country, thereby forming a counter-cultural community within contemporary urban China. Highly readable and full of engaging descriptions of the real lives of practicing lay Buddhists in contemporary China, From Comrades to Bodhisattvas will interest specialists in Chinese Buddhism, anthropologists of contemporary Asia, and all scholars interested in the relationship between religion and cultural change. (shrink)

Congress on "Modern Cultural Relations between East and West". Dezember 15-19 in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The Congress shows two tendencies: (1) A growing open-mindedness and concern for the surrounding pacific cultures and the West. (2) A Renaissance of classical studies in order to fuse genuine chinese with western ideas in a new transcultural dialogue. Occidental provincialists are invited to enter the debate.

China’s efforts in Universal Health Coverage since the birth of the People’s Republic in 1949 has passed four stages: 1949–1983, Maoist UHC; 1984–2003, Deng’s Free-market healthcare experiment; 2004–2008, response to people’s call and restorative efforts; 2009-present, reducing fragmentation, co-payment and improving primary care. The efforts of the first three stages aimed more at extending coverage and service scope, and those of the fourth stage for better equity, quality, and affordability. This article updates recent efforts in the fourth stage (...) and looks ahead to the future after 2018, with the hope of providing references for the world in healthcare reform and development. (shrink)

The idea of entangled modernities is best understood as a complement and corrective to that of `multiple modernities': it serves to theorize the global unity and interconnections of modern socio-cultural formations in a non-reductionist and non-functionalist way. But it can also help to highlight complexity and divergence behind the outwardly uniform or parallel patterns of development. This line of thought seems particularly relevant to the history of Communism. The interdependent but divergent trajectories of the two imperial revolutions, Russian and Chinese, (...) exemplify the multiple patterns of entanglement in unusually instructive ways. In both cases, imperial legacies and traditions interacted with modernizing imperatives and geopolitical constraints, as well as with the revolutionary projects proposed as solutions to the imperial crises. The Sino-Soviet entanglement was highly asymmetric; although the Chinese connection seems to have been important at several critical junctures in Soviet history, the impact of the Soviet model on Chinese Communism was incomparably more formative. But the Chinese metamorphoses of the Soviet model deviated from the original in various ways; they were too complex and sometimes too self-destructive to be explained in terms of an adaptive logic. Rather, the transfigurations that took place at various stages - from the beginnings of Chinese Bolshevism to the aberrations of Maoism in power - can be understood as changing patterns of entanglement, combining radicalizing twists to the Soviet model with selective reactivation of Chinese traditions. (shrink)

The material life of the vast majority of Chinese peasants is at a much higher level than during the totalitarian period of Mao’s rule. Despite corruption and social polarization, there is no chance that a large-scale famine will take place. Why is it that during the Maoist period, when tens of millions of peasants starved to death, we did not see any large-scale resistance movements, whereas today, during this relatively prosperous time, large-scale spontaneous resistance movements rise nearly ceaselessly? The (...) main factor behind the emergence of resistance from the grassroots is the people’s growing awareness of their rights and economic interests, and in the diversification of ideas and values. Behind economic interests lies the people’s hunger for rights. Thus, the question of how to provide a political space to the mobilization of the grassroots, how to guide the new civil rights movement towards a nonviolent and legal form of expression; how to limit the negative developments caused by the reform through political reform, protect society’s rights and constrain officials’ rights in order to establish a political system that respects human rights—these are the challenges confronting the Chinese Communist regime if it wants to appease the wrath of the people. (shrink)

Abstract Up to now Chinese academia has been addicted to inviting the twin goddesses of democracy and science, but has regrettably ignored the innate incongruity between them, which has led to the rise of scientism. May 4th pioneers first introduced this value system, but tension between these values subsequently led to a prevailing preference for science over freedom. The early Marxists defined freedom as obedience to social laws formulated in Marxist ?science?, while Maoism finalized the Sinicization of Marxism with a (...) belief in iron?bound social laws and in human beings as mere political means, mercilessly suppressing any expression of free will. (shrink)

The Congress shows two tendencies: (1) A growing open-mindedness and concern for the surrounding pacific cultures and the West. (2) A Renaissance of classical studies in order to fuse genuine chinese with western ideas in a new transcultural dialogue. Occidental provincialists are invited to enter the debate.

James A. Diefenbeck, Wayward Reflections on the History ofPhilosophyThomas R. Flynn Sartre, Foucault and Historical Reason. Volume 1:Toward an Existential Theory of HistoryMark Golden and Peter Toohey Inventing Ancient Culture:Historicism, Periodization and the Ancient WorldZenonas Norkus Istorika: Istorinis IvadasEverett Zimmerman The Boundaries of Fiction: History and theEighteenth‐Century British Novel.

We, the residents of modernity, live in an unquiet house.This essay examines the relationship between human subjects and their built environment, but it does so less by focusing on architecture than on what one might call ‘architecture once removed'. It is less concerned with the built environment itself than with a prevalent image of that environment in ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture, in literature, in film and painting. It is my contention that a particular unsettling image of buildings has gained increasing (...) currency in the modern epoch. I will attempt to show that such an image — and a concomitant anxiety — exists, and to offer an explanation for its provenance. (shrink)