We argue that the fundamental assertion underlying Mach's critique of Newton's first law is that inertial motion is not motion in the absence of causes; rather, it is motion whose cause lies in some homogeneous aspect of the environment. We distinguish this formal requirement (Mach's principle) from two hypotheses which Mach considers concerning the origin of inertia: that the distant stars play (1) a merely “collateral” or (2) a “fundamental” role in the causal determination of inertial motion. (...) -/- In his later writings, Mach deliberately avoids referring to the concept of causation, and indeed, this has made the interpretation of Mach's principle a subject of widespread controversy. However, in his earlier writings, the substance of Mach's critique is less ambiguously expressed. Therefore, close attention is given to Mach's early writings and the evolution of his thought. Various accounts in the secondary literature on Mach's principle, in particular those of Norton and DiSalle, are assessed on this basis. We end with a defence of the Machian status and legitimacy of the early Einstein's research program. (shrink)

Two definitions of Mach’s principle are proposed. Both are related to gauge theory, are universal in scope and amount to formulations of causality that take into account the relational nature of position, time, and size. One of them leads directly to general relativity and may have relevance to the problem of creating a quantum theory of gravity.

The relationGM=RC 2 is used as a definition ofG, withM andR defined by integrals of the energy-momentum and Einstein curvature tensors over a particular spacelike surface. Modified field equations then do not admit source-free solutions, in agreement with a strong form of Mach's principle.

Recession of the galaxies indicates a repulsive force and suggests that Newton's formulation of gravitation is not complete. A possible modification is proposed, and this Neo-Newtonian equation allows a quantitative treatment of Mach's principle. It also limits the velocity of matter to c and gives a correct prediction for the perihelion of Mercury.

Mach's principle is discussed as a fundamental statement on kinematics, and an apparent contradiction is identified in the Lorentz-Minkowski form of the inertial metric. To resolve the incompatibility, length is redefined so that the speed of light is a field-dependent variable, although still constant for all inertial observers at a point in space-time. Gravitational theories with variableG are considered, and it is shown that a redefinition of length and time results in constantG and variablec.

A modified form of Mach's principle is proposed, and its consequences are discussed.

According to the Einstein-Mayer theory of the Riemanniann space-time with Einstein-Cartan teleparallelism, the local Lorentz invariance is broken by the gravitational field defining Machian reference systems. This breaking of symmetry implies the occurrence of “hidden matter” in the Einstein equations of gravity. The hidden matter is described by the non-Lorentz-invariant energy-momentum tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ satisfying the relation $\hat \Theta _{i;k}^k = 0$ . The tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ is formed from the Einstein-Cartan torsion field given by the anholonomy objects, (...) FAik=2hA[i,k], and appears together with Hilbert’s energy-momentum tensor T* ik and Poincaré’s pressure λgik on the right-hand side of Einstein’s equations so that one has $$R_{ik} - (1/2)g_{ik} R = - \kappa T*_{ik} - \lambda g_{ik} - \hat \Theta _{ik}$$ According to this theory, in the universe and in cosmic systems one must excep “invisible masses” described by the Poincaré and Einstein-Cartan terms to exist. The torsion field FAik makes the space-time a Machian universe; it is of the same nature as the “weak interacting matter” discussed in astrophysics. (shrink)

The relation between Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein is probably one of the most debated issues in the history of twentieth century physics. For many physicists general relativity is the paradigm ofhow a mature theory should look. This opinion was supported by philosophers, in particular logical empiricists, to whom general relativity was the main touchstone of their principles of theory formation. Mach’s principle penetrates all three domains. Einstein’s first formulation of it in 1918 read: “The G-field is without remainder (...) determined by the masses of the bodies. Since mass and energy are... the same.. .this therefore entails that the G-field be condi tioned and determined by the energy tensor”. (shrink)

Empirical and theoretical evidence show that the astrophysical problem of dark matter might be solved by a theory of Einstein-Mayer type. In this theory, up to global Lorentz rotations, the reference system is determined by the motion of cosmic matter. Thus, one is led to a “Riemannian space with teleparallelism” realizing a geometric version of the Mach-Einstein doctrine. The field equations of this gravitational theory contain hidden matter terms, where the existence of hidden matter is inferred solely from its gravitational (...) effects. It is argued that, in the nonrelativistic mechanical approximation, they provide an inertia-free mechanics, where the inertial mass of a body is induced by the gravitational action of the comic masses. Interpreted from the Newtonian point of view, this mechanics shows that the effective gravitational mass of astrophysical objects depends on r such that one expects the existence of dark matter. (shrink)

The introduction of an “elementary length”a representing the ultimate limit for the smallest measurable distance leads to a generalization of Einstein's energy-momentum relation and of the usual Lorentz transformation. The value ofa is left unspecified, but is found to be equal tohc/2E u, whereE u is the total energy content of our universe. Particles of zero rest mass can only move at the velocityc of light in vacuum, while material bodies can move slower or faster than light, whena≠0, without violating (...) the principle of causality. The laws of relativistic mechanics are actually generalized so that they include Mach's principle, since it is found that the universe as a whole can only be in a state of rest for any particular inertial observer. (shrink)

xi should hope for "first and foremost" from any historical investigation, including his own, was that "it may not be too tedious. " II That hope is generally realized in Mach's historical writings, most of which are as lively and interesting now as they were when they appeared. Mach did not follow any existing model of historical or philosophical or scientific exposition, but went at things his own way combining the various approaches as needed to reach the goals he (...) set for himself. When he is at his best we get a sense of the Mach whom William James met on a visit to Prague, the Mach whose four hours of "unforgettable conversation" gave the forty year old, well traveled James the strongest "impression of pure intellectual genius" he had yet received, and whose "absolute simplicity of manner and winningness of smile" captivated him completely. 12 Consider, for example, the first few chapters of this book, Principles of the Theory of Heat, which Mach devotes to the notion of temperature, that most fundamental of all thermal concepts. He begins by trying to trace the path that leads from our sensations of hot and cold to a numerical temperature scale. (shrink)

manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to.

Ernst Mach’s defense of relativist theories of motion in Die Mechanik involves a well-known criticism of Newton’s theory appealing to absolute space, and of Newton’s “bucket” experiment. Sympathetic readers (Norton 1995) and critics (Stein 1967, 1977) agree that there’s a tension in Mach’s view: he allows for some constructed scientific concepts, but not others, and some kinds of reasoning about unobserved phenomena, but not others. Following Banks (2003), I argue that this tension can be interpreted as a constructive one, springing (...) from Mach’s approach to scientific reasoning. Mach’s “economy of science” allows for a principled distinction to be made, between natural and artificial hypothetical reasoning, and Mach defends a division of labor between the sciences in a 1903 paper for The Monist, “Space and Geometry from the Point of View of Physical Inquiry”. That division supports counterfactual reasoning in Mach’s system, something that’s long been denied is possible for him. (shrink)

In the search for elementary particles, such principles are used as Gell?mann's that ?anything which is possible is compulsory?. This is an example of a teleological principle according to which the scientist tries to realize in science the kind of world that he desires on prior emotional grounds. Mendeleev's classical discovery of the Periodic Law and Table of Elements was thus guided by his mystical values. A mechanistic anti?teleologist such as Jacques Loeb was indeed a crypto?teleologist who wished science (...) to fulfil his radical, socialistic aims. Hoyle's ?perfect cosmological principle? projected conservative values, while such conceptions as Oppenheimer's ?catastrophic collapse?, and Mach's Principle likewise had their teleological bases. Anti?mystical and individualistic values inspired Bridgman's operationism. A ?perfect operational principle? would stipulate that every imaginable state of affairs would be operationally differentiable from others. Teleological principles are essential to the functioning of sciences; in the Theory of Theories, the principle of plenitude may hold: that for every mode of theory, there is some segment of reality for which it provides the best explanation. Naturalistic accounts of basic teleological principles seem inadequate. (shrink)

Ernst Mach is the only person whom Einstein included on both the list of physicists he considered his true precursors, and the list of the philosophers who had most affected him. Einstein scholars have been less generous in their estimation of Mach's contributions to Einstein's work, and even amongst the more generous of them, Mach's great achievements in physics are seldom mentioned in this context. This is odd, considering Mach was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Physics three (...) times. In this paper, I examine some of Mach's work in physics that bears conceptually on Einstein's 1905 paper on Special Relativity ("On The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies"). Mach was the first to give the correct explanation of the Doppler Effect, and he presented it in a way that Einstein echoes in his 1905 paper: laying out two apparently contradictory principles and showing how both can be retained. It is also notable that Mach's explanation was explicit about not relying on the existence of a medium of transmission for the propagation of light waves. In his work on supersonic shock waves, Mach invokes the constancy of the velocity of sound (i.e., its independence of the motion of the sound source) , just as he had invoked the constancy of the velocity of light in his work on the Doppler Effect for Light. I examine the analogies between light and sound that were drawn upon by Einstein and Mach, as well as one analogy that Einstein could have, but did not make: Cherenkov radiation, or "singing electrons", i.e., cases in which the sound of light in the medium of transmission is exceeded, which results in an optical analogue of supersonic shock waves. (shrink)

The present authors have given a mathematical model of Mach's principle and of the Mach–Einstein doctrine about the complete induction of the inertial masses by the gravitation of the universe. The analytical formulation of the Mach–Einstein doctrine is based on Riemann's generalization of the Lagrangian analytical mechanics (with a generalization of the Galilean transformation) on Mach's definition of the inertial mass and on Einstein's principle of equivalence. All local and cosmological effects—which are postulated as consequences of (...) Mach's principle by C. Neumann, Mach, Friedländer and Einstein—result from the Riemannian dynamics with the Mach–Einstein doctrine. In celestial mechanics it follows, in addition, Einstein's formula for the perihelion motion. In cosmology, the Riemannian mechanics yields two models of an evolutionary universe with the expansion lows R ~ t or R ~ t2. In this paper, secular consequences of the Mach–Einstein doctrine are examined concerning palaeogeophysics and celestial mechanics. The research predicted secular decrease of the Earth's flattening and secular acceleration of the motion of the Moon and of the planets. The numerical values of this secular effect agree very well with the empirical facts. In all cases, the secular variation $\dot{\alpha}$ of the parameter α is the order of magnitude $\dot{\alpha}=-H_0 \alpha$ , where H0 is the instantaneous value of the Hubble constant: $H_0 =\left({\dot{R}/R} \right)_0 \approx \left( {0.5-1.0} \right) \times 10^{-10}a^{-1}$ . The relation of the secular consequences of the Mach–Einstein doctrine to those of Dirac's hypothesis on the expanding Earth, and to Darwin's theory of tidal friction are also discussed. (shrink)

The Wadsworth series of Studies in Philosophical Criticism under the general editorship of Alexander Sesonske, presents collections of critical writings related to a single classical philosophical text for use in undergraduate teaching. Although others of Berkeley's writings are drawn upon by various authors, the selections in this volume are divided into five problem areas which are covered in the Principles. Many of the essays present strong points of view and should help involve students in the dialogue of philosophy. In some, (...) Berkeley serves chiefly as the occasion for the exercise of contemporary philosophical techniques. This accords with the intended function of the series to show the relevance of historical texts to current issues, openly acknowledging that each time teaches the philosophical past in its own terms. The section "Minds and Ideas" includes essays by S. A. Grave, Turbayne, and Monroe Beardsley. The section "Perception and Existence" reprints Mill on the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, Hume on Personal Identity, Chisholm on Phenomenalism, and an essay by Konrad Marc-Wogau on the Esse-Est-Percipi principle. The third section is "Philosophy and Science." It has two essays, one by T. E. Jessop, the other, Popper's note on Berkeley as precursor of Mach and Einstein, which makes considerable use of De Motu. "Primary and Secondary Qualities" are treated in a selection from Thomas Reid, and an essay by Jonathan Bennett. The final section, "The Existence of God," consists of articles by Bennett and E. J. Furlong. There is a short general bibliography and a list of critical essays which includes many items from the 1950s and 1960s on each sectional topic.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The Wadsworth series of Studies in Philosophical Criticism under the general editorship of Alexander Sesonske, presents collections of critical writings related to a single classical philosophical text for use in undergraduate teaching. Although others of Berkeley's writings are drawn upon by various authors, the selections in this volume are divided into five problem areas which are covered in the Principles. Many of the essays present strong points of view and should help involve students in the dialogue of philosophy. In some, (...) Berkeley serves chiefly as the occasion for the exercise of contemporary philosophical techniques. This accords with the intended function of the series to show the relevance of historical texts to current issues, openly acknowledging that each time teaches the philosophical past in its own terms. The section "Minds and Ideas" includes essays by S. A. Grave, Turbayne, and Monroe Beardsley. The section "Perception and Existence" reprints Mill on the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, Hume on Personal Identity, Chisholm on Phenomenalism, and an essay by Konrad Marc-Wogau on the Esse-Est-Percipi principle. The third section is "Philosophy and Science." It has two essays, one by T. E. Jessop, the other, Popper's note on Berkeley as precursor of Mach and Einstein, which makes considerable use of De Motu. "Primary and Secondary Qualities" are treated in a selection from Thomas Reid, and an essay by Jonathan Bennett. The final section, "The Existence of God," consists of articles by Bennett and E. J. Furlong. There is a short general bibliography and a list of critical essays which includes many items from the 1950s and 1960s on each sectional topic.--M. B. M. (shrink)

How do we reconcile Husserl’s repeated criticism of Mach’s phenomenalism almost everywhere in his work with the leading role that Husserl seems to attribute to Mach in the genesis of his own phenomenology? To answer this question, we shall examine, first, the narrow relation that Husserl establishes between his phenomenological method and Mach’s descriptivism. Second, we shall examine two aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Mach: the first concerns phenomenalism and Mach’s doctrine of elements, while the second concerns the principle (...) of economy of thought, which Husserl closely associates with a form of psychologism in his Logical Investigations . Our working hypothesis is that the apparent contradictory comments of Husserl regarding Mach’s positivism can be partially explained by the double status he confers to his own phenomenology—as a philosophical program radically opposed to positivism, and as a method akin to Mach’s descriptivism. (shrink)

Ernst Mach’s and Bertrand Russell’s philosophical outlooks contributed to shaping the philosophy of science of the 20th century. Mach is a philosophical interpreter of science, a positivist, and a historian, considering the general principles of science as condensed economic descriptions of observed facts. Russell held a view of the nature and relation of philosophy to science and to logic that can be described as essentially consistent. In this article, the aim is to explore how both Mach and Russell defended the (...) classical version of “Neutral Monism”. Since it was developed as a reaction to the mechanical philosophy of nature, Neural Monism also emerged along with scientific psychology in the late 19th century. The attempt in this article is to examine their versions of neutral monism and emphasize their differences and convergences. (shrink)

In this book, leading theorists present new contributions and reviews addressing longstanding challenges and ongoing progress in spacetime physics. In the anniversary year of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity, developed 100 years ago, this collection reflects the subsequent and continuing fruitful development of spacetime theories. The volume is published in honour of Carl Brans on the occasion of his 80th birthday. Carl H. Brans, who also contributes personally, is a creative and independent researcher and one of the founders of the (...) scalar-tensor theory, also known as Jordan-Brans-Dicke theory. In the present book, much space is devoted to scalar-tensor theories. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Brans has worked on new models of spacetime, collectively known as exotic smoothness, a field largely established by him. In this Festschrift, one finds an outstanding and unique collection of articles about exotic smoothness. Also featured are Bell's inequality and Mach's principle. Personal memories and historical aspects round off the collection. (shrink)

It is a common view in cognitive psychology that there is a fundamental difference between what may be called descriptive information, on the one hand, and depictive information, on the other. While the first kind of information is — ideally spoken — non-pictorial and usually equated with the content of a proposition, the second kind of information is pictorial by defmition and accordingly equated with the content of a mental image. Granting the correctness of this distinction, cognitive scientists differ on (...) the role played by mental images in epistemic processes. One faction, represented by the writings of Zenon Pylyshyn, asserts that mental images are merely an epiphenomenon of a more general and abstract processing system, and that they are in principle dispensable since they do not have any truth value.1 Another faction, represented by the writings of Stephen Kosslyn, favors the opposite view, maintaining that mental images are indispensable since they play, in spite of their lack of truth value, a fundamental role in human thinking.2 As Arthur I. Miller has proposed in his book Imagery in Scientific Thought , these two factions may be labeled as the “antiimagist” and the “pro-imagist” view, respectively. (shrink)

It is a common view in cognitive psychology that there is a fundamental difference between what may be called descriptive information, on the one hand, and depictive information, on the other. While the first kind of information is — ideally spoken — non-pictorial and usually equated with the content of a proposition, the second kind of information is pictorial by defmition and accordingly equated with the content of a mental image. Granting the correctness of this distinction, cognitive scientists differ on (...) the role played by mental images in epistemic processes. One faction, represented by the writings of Zenon Pylyshyn, asserts that mental images are merely an epiphenomenon of a more general and abstract processing system, and that they are in principle dispensable since they do not have any truth value.1 Another faction, represented by the writings of Stephen Kosslyn, favors the opposite view, maintaining that mental images are indispensable since they play, in spite of their lack of truth value, a fundamental role in human thinking.2 As Arthur I. Miller has proposed in his book Imagery in Scientific Thought, these two factions may be labeled as the “antiimagist” and the “pro-imagist” view, respectively. (shrink)

The place of Heinrich Hertz’s The principles of mechanics in the history of the philosophy of science is disputed. Here I critically assess positivist interpretations, concluding that they are inadequate.There is a group of commentators who seek to align Hertz with positivism, or with specific positivists such as Ernst Mach, who were enormously influential at the time. Max Jammer is prominent among this group, the most recent member of which is Joseph Kockelmans. I begin by discussing what Hertz and Mach (...) had to say about one another, and I specify certain respects in which their views are indeed similar. I then go on to detail their differences, looking at Hertz’s attitude to the atomic theory, to the mechanical world-view, to simplicity, to unobservables and metaphysics, and his objections to Newtonian forces. I conclude that the positivist interpretation of Hertz’s mechanics significantly overplays its similarities to Mach’s views.Keywords: Ernst Mach; Heinrich Hertz; Mechanics; Positivism; Atomism; Force; Metaphysics. (shrink)

The present paper investigates why logical empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of their day, the principle of least action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a (...) new rigorous basis. These three developments prompted Max Planck to consider the PLA as formal embodiment of his convergent realist methodology. Typically rejecting ontological reductionism, David Hilbert took the PLA as the key concept in his axiomatizations of physical theories. It served one of the main goals of the axiomatic method: ''deepening the foundations.'' Although Moritz Schlick was a student of Planck's, and Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank enjoyed close ties to Gottingen, the PLA became a veritable Shibboleth to them. Rather than being worried by its historical connections with teleology and determinism, they erroneously identified Hilbert's axiomatic method tout court with Planck's metaphysical realism. Logical empiricists' strict containment policy against metaphysics required so strict a separation between physics and mathematics to exclude even those features of the PLA and the axiomatic method not tainted with metaphysics. (shrink)

Ernst Mach’s positivism, it is argued in this paper, may be regarded as a version of pragmatist philosophy of science. Already James’s biographer Perry detected such tendencies in Mach and this is confirmed here by close attention to Mach’s early works, esp. History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy and The Science of Mechanics. Both Mach’s principle of the economy of thought and his principle of scientific significance are shown to bear out his (...) pragmatism. A similar conclusion is shown to hold for the philosophy of Wilhelm Jerusalem already long before he became the translator of James’s Pragmatism into German. But while Jerusalem early on relied perhaps even more than Mach on evolutionary theory for promptings of pragmatist insights, he soon too linked them, as Mach had all along, to broadly sociological observations concerning the condition of human cognition. (shrink)

Although Mach insisted that he was a scientist, not a philosopher, many of his ideas were genuinely philosophical. This collection of essays indicates, among other matters of mathematical and scientific interest, how such ideas grew from Mach's work and something of their philosophical significance. In particular, discussions of Mach's experiments in aerodynamics and psychology show how he made physical phenomena observable and applied "causal" concepts to sensory processes. Having done this, Mach felt that he could hold a phenomenalism (...) of neutral elements which are neither subjective nor objective. He thought that a unified science could be based on such elements and that he would then no longer have to change his conceptual frame in going from one discipline to another, as from "atoms" to "mind" in going from physics to biology. Young Albert Einstein was deeply impressed by Mach's attitude toward fundamental concepts. One essay discusses the influence on Einstein's theory of general relativity of Mach's Principle, i.e., Mach's substitution of the concept of motion with respect to the distant stars for the unobservable Newtonian concept of motion with respect to absolute space. A discussion of Mach's own use of the atomic theory illustrates his attitude toward theories and suggests that he was able to reject the atom because this concept is not particularly useful in the fields with which he was primarily concerned. An essay by editor Cohen on the implications of Mach's theory of knowledge argues that a phenomenalism of neutral elements collapses into mysticism, i.e., into a submergence of the ego in the universal consciousness. Also interesting is Philipp Frank's classification of Mach as an "Enlightment" philosopher, or one who criticizes the abuse of concepts. Just as the men of the eighteenth century Enlightenment opposed theological concepts in physics, so Mach opposed physical concepts in biology, thereby clearing science of old error to make way for new truth. Some biographical data and an extensive bibliography are appended, as well as an index of proper names.--L. G. (shrink)

The explanation of inertia based on “Mach's principle” is briefly revisited and an experiment whereby the gravitational origin of inertia can be tested is described. The test consists of detecting a small stationary force with a sensitive force sensor. The force is presumably induced when a periodic transient Mach effect mass fluctuation is driven in high voltage, high energy density capacitors that are subjected to 50 kHz, 1.3 kV amplitude voltage signal, and threaded by an alternating magnetic flux (...) of the same frequency. An effect of the sort predicted is shown to be present in the device tested. It has the expected magnitude and depends on the relative phase of the Mach effect mass fluctuation and the alternating magnetic flux as expected. The observed effect also displays scaling behaviors that are unique to Mach effects. Other tests for spurious signals suggest that the observed effect is real. (shrink)

This volume presents new essays on the work and thought of physicist, psychologist, and philosopher Ernst Mach. Moving away from previous estimations of Mach as a pre-logical positivist, the essays reflect his rehabilitation as a thinker of direct relevance to debates in the contemporary philosophies of natural science, psychology, metaphysics, and mind. Topics covered include Mach's work on acoustical psychophysics and physics; his ideas on analogy and the principle of conservation of energy; the correct interpretation of his scheme (...) of 'elements' and its relationship to his 'historical-critical' method; the relationship of his thought to movements such as American pragmatism, realism, and neutral monism, as well as to contemporary figures such as Friedrich Nietzsche; and the reception and influence of his works in Germany and Austria, particularly by the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

The present paper studies a specific way of addressing the question whether the laws involving the basic constituents of nature are statistical. While most German physicists, above all Planck, treated the issues of determinism and causality within a Kantian framework, the tradition which I call Vienna Indeterminism began from Mach’s reinterpretation of causality as functional dependence. This severed the bond between causality and realism because one could no longer avail oneself of a priori categories as a criterion for empirical reality. (...) Hence, an independent reality criterion had to be sought, a problem which all three physicists to be studied solved in different ways that were mainly conditioned by their different concepts of probability. In order to prevent a dissipation of intuited facts, Mach had to resort to a principle of unique determination as his reality criterion, especially when discussing the Principle of Least Action. Giving theories more independence, Boltzmann understood atomism as property reduction to precisely defined theoretical entities and their interactions. While this served as a relative reality criterion, he also advocated a constructivist one because atomism was already implied by our finitary reasoning power. Finally, Exner contemplated the idea that all apparently deterministic laws are only a macroscopic limit of an irreducible indeterminism, because by adopting the frequency interpretation, observable collectives could be considered as the real basic entities. (shrink)

In recounting his discovery of special relativity, Einstein recalled a debt to the philosophical writings of Hume and Mach. I review the path Einstein took to special relativity and urge that, at a critical juncture, he was aided decisively not by any specific doctrine of space and time, but by a general account of concepts that Einstein found in Hume and Mach’s writings. That account required that concepts, used to represent the physical, must be properly grounded in experience. In so (...) far as they extended beyond that grounding, they were fictional and to be abjured (Mach) or at best tolerated (Hume). Einstein drew a different moral. These fictional concepts revealed an arbitrariness in our physical theorizing and may still be introduced through freely chosen definitions, as long as these definitions do not commit us to false presumptions. After years of failed efforts to conform electrodynamics to the principle of relativity and with his frustration mounting, Einstein applied this account to the concept of simultaneity. The resulting definition of simultaneity provided the reconceptualization that solved the problem in electrodynamics and led directly to the special theory of relativity. (shrink)

Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle are linked historically, but conceptually the views of Mach do not fit well with logical positivism. My purpose in the present paper is to reconsider 1) Mach’s positive natural philosophy 2) what Mach meant by “anti-metaphysics”, 3) whether Mach really was “anti-metaphysical” in the sense of demanding verification in principle for every term or statement in science, and 4) how Mach’s views on metaphysics differed from those of many Vienna Circle philosophers. I believe (...) a strong case can be made for separating Mach’s realistic version of empiricism from that of the Vienna Circle, but perhaps the “received view” of the Vienna Circle philosophers does not describe their views very well either. (shrink)

To make out in what way Einstein’s manifold 1905 ‘annus mirabilis’ writings hang together one has to take into consideration Einstein’s strive for unity evinced in his persistent attempts to reconcile the basic research traditions of classical physics. Light quanta hypothesis and special theory of relativity turn out to be the contours of a more profound design, mere milestones of implementation of maxwellian electrodynamics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics reconciliation programme. The conception of luminiferous ether was an insurmountable obstacle for Einstein’s (...) statistical thermodynamics in which the leading role was played by the light quanta paper. In his critical stand against the entrenched research traditions of classical physics Einstein was apparently influenced by David Hume and Ernst Mach. However, when related to creative momenta, Einstein’s 1905 unificationist modus operandi was drawn upon Mach’s principle of economy of thought taken in the context of his ‘instinctive knowledge’ doctrine and with promising inclinations of Kantian epistemology presuming the coincidence of both constructing theory and integrating intuition of Principle. (shrink)