This chapter examines the developments that led from Wittgenstein’s early logical atomist view that all meaningful discourse can be analyzed into logically independent elementary propositions to his later philosophy. In 1929, Wittgenstein rejected logical atomism for a “logical holist” conception of language as composed of calculi, formal systems characterized by their constitutive rules. By the mid-1930s, he had rejected the model of a calculus, emphasizing that language is action within a social and natural context — more (...) like a game than a calculus — and that rule-governed behavior is dependent on a background of practices which cannot themselves be explicitly formulated as rules. The discussion of these central developments for the emergence of his later “practical holism” focuses on changes in his conception of the nature of measurement and the role of mind and mental processes in linguistic meaning. (shrink)

THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental (...) in philosophy, and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysic. My own logic is atomic, and it is this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. Therefore I prefer to describe my philosophy as "logical atomism," rather than as "realism," whether with or without some prefixed adjective. (shrink)

While operators for logical necessity and possibility represent "internal" conditions of propositions (or of their corresponding states of affairs), These conditions will be "formal", As is required by logical atomism, And not "material" in content if from the (pseudo) semantical point of view the modal operators range over "all the possible worlds" of a logical space rather than over arbitrary non-Empty sets of worlds (as is usually done in modal logic). Some of the implications of this (...) requirement are noted and though several variants of realist logical atomism are distinguished and discussed, The theory of logical form developed is nominalist. Many of nominalism's difficulties and inadequacies become transparent in the context of logical atomism and are so noted. (shrink)

An essay examining logical atomism as it arises in Russell and the early Wittgenstein.

Logical Atomism is a philosophy that sought to account for the world in all its various aspects by relating it to the structure of the language in which we articulate information. In _The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,_ Bertrand Russell, with input from his young student Ludwig Wittgenstein, developed the concept and argues for a reformed language based on pure logic. Despite Russell’s own future doubts surrounding the concept, this founding and definitive work in analytical philosophy by (...) one of the world’s most significant philosophers is a remarkable attempt to establish a novel way of thinking. (shrink)

He explores Russell's logical atomism, which applies logic to problems in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics and was central to Russell's work over this period.

A propositional logic with modal operators for logical necessity and possibility is formulated as a formal ontology for logical atomism (with negative facts). It is shown that such modal operators represent purely formal, Internal 'properties' of propositions if and only if the notion of 'all possible worlds' has its standard and not the secondary interpretation which it is usually given (as, E.G., In kripke model-Structures). Allowing arbitrary restrictions on the notion of 'all possible worlds', At least in (...) such a framework as logical atomism, Generates internal 'properties' of propositions with material instead of purely formal content. (shrink)

A summary of Russell’s logical atomism, understood to include both a metaphysical view and a certain methodology for doing philosophy. The metaphysical view amounts to the claim that the world consists of a plurality of independently existing things exhibiting qualities and standing in relations. The methodological view recommends a process of analysis, whereby one attempts to define or reconstruct more complex notions or vocabularies in terms of simpler ones. The origins of this theory, and its influence and reception (...) are also discussed. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus, Wittgenstein adopts a version of logical atomism. This chapter offers an exposition of the Tractarian version of logical atomism. Wittgenstein argues that the constituents of the end products of complete analysis are simple signs, and that there are necessarily existent objects. The chapter explains Wittgenstein's main argument for the possibility of complete analysis. It comments on three recent interpretations of the substance argument and offers an exposition of the substance argument. According to (...) the Tractatus, propositions show the logical form of reality, which is constituted by the logical forms of states of affairs. The substance argument is a reductio ad absurdum. The reductio is the premise that the world had no substance, which is equivalent to the claim that there were no necessarily existent simple objects. The world has substance constituted by necessarily existent simple objects. (shrink)

The philosophy of logical atomism.--Logical atomism.

Three kinds of "atoms" figure in russell's logical atomism, Though he seems to see no differences between them: logical atoms (the referents of logically proper names); epistemological atoms (things known directly or by acquaintance); and ontological atoms (basic constituents of the universe). This paper speculates on why russell believed that all three of these notions coincide, Thereby bringing out some of his unacknowledged background assumptions.

In the first part of the article the author discusses the use of the word 'fact'. In the second he uses his conclusions to "throw light on some of the discussions of the logical atomists." he discusses austin, Russell, And strawson. The author concludes that it a mistake to identify questions of ontology with questions of language, Which arises because of a confusion with the term 'fact'. (staff).

This book offers a comprehensive critical survey of issues of historical interpretation and evaluation in Bertrand Russell's 1918 logical atomism lectures and logical atomism itself. These lectures record the culmination of Russell's thought in response to discussions with Wittgenstein on the nature of judgement and philosophy of logic and with Moore and other philosophical realists about epistemology and ontological atomism, and to Whitehead and Russell’s novel extension of revolutionary nineteenth-century work in mathematics and logic. Russell's (...) logical atomism lectures have had a lasting impact on analytic philosophy and on Russell's contemporaries including Carnap, Ramsey, Stebbing, and Wittgenstein. Comprised of 14 original essays, this book will demonstrate how the direct and indirect influence of these lectures thus runs deep and wide. (shrink)

An article explicating Wittgenstein's logical atomism and surveying the relevant secondary literature.

The author addresses remarks he considers fallacious made by panayot butchvarov concerning russell's views on the nature of language ("on denoting"). Butchvarov thought that russell and wittgenstein were advancing purely empirical theories. The author claims that this is patently false in the case of wittgenstein and only partially true of russell. Russell "did "not" hold, But emphatically denied, That every word in a significant sentence must correspond to an element in reality." the author holds that russell's principle about constituents "applies (...) to all propositions that we can think about." (staff). (shrink)

I characterize and argue against the standard interpretation of logical atomism. The argument against this reading is historical: the standard interpretation of logical atomism (1) fails to explain how the view is inspired by nineteenth-century developments in mathematics, (2) fails to explain how logic is central to logical atomism, and (3) fails to explain how logical atomism is a revolutionary and new "scientific philosophy." In short, the standard interpretation is a bad history (...) of logical atomism. A novel interpretation of the view that repairs these difficulties is sketched in the concluding section. (shrink)

Studies the central topics of Wittgenstein's philosophy prior to and within the first parts of the Tractatus, covering such subjects as objects, substance, states of affairs, elementary propositions, pictures, and thoughts. He concludes that analysis is reduction to what is basic not in experience but in reference, and argues that the Tractatus is concerned not with problems of knowledge but with problems of sense.

В книге выявлены аргументы, противоречия и границы философии логического атомизма. Выделены отдельные варианты логического атомизма Рассела и дана характеристика каждого из них. Философские идеи Витгенштейна классифицированы и квалифицированы на основе детального анализа и сопоставления афоризмов "Дневников 1914-1916" и "Трактата", его многочисленных писем, а также воспоминаний о нем. Делается попытка проанализировать по-новому его логические и философские понятия на основе его "теории символов" и "теории выражения". Результаты анализа, который сделан в работе, могут служить основой дальнейшего исследования логического атомизма, логического позитивизма, а также (...) оксфордской философии обыденного языка. Книга предназначена для студентов, аспирантов и университетских преподавателей не только логики и философии, но также теории языка и теории наук. (shrink)

The theme of this paper was inspired by studies related to the subject of my doctoral dissertation,1 and, more specifically, by the work of A. Richardson and M. Friedman on the same subject presented in their two recently published books.2 The material in these books which addresses the connection between Russell and Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt reveals the same basic perspective in both authors and, in fact, represents the first in depth enquiry of this connection, despite certain fairly (...) essential limitations which I hope to reveal in this paper. The line of investigation I intend to take in the following may therefore be outlined as such; to examine, albeit briefly, the extent to which Richardson’s and Friedman’s perspective can offer us a correct historical and philosophical approach to the influence of Russell’s philosophy on the Aufbau, and, by confirming the existence of the limitations alluded to, to determine whether this perspective may be adequately reformulated independently of their existence, and to determine how, in general terms, it may in fact be reformulated. Thus, although my analyses and commentaries do not fall within a strictly historiographical framework, as is the case in the work developed by Richardson and Friedman, it is nevertheless possible to achieve certain objectives characteristic of this framework which, eventually, may become the subject of a future historiography of the philosophy of Russell and his influence on the Aufbau.3 In order to achieve these objectives my main aim is neither negative nor destructive but essentially philosophical; I see myself together with the authors in question as partners in the investigation and resolution of problems arising from the presentation, discussion and testing of competitive theories, an example of what occurs in the scientific enquiry. In these circumstances, and from this point of view, I see myself as a philosopher who points to certain difficulties and problems in the theory put forward by these authors to explain the Aufbau, and, with particular reference to Russell’s philosophy, concludes by suggesting an alternative theory. (shrink)

This volume collects together all of Russell's philosophical papers inspired by his work with Whitehead on Principia Mathematica.