In Plutarch's account of the younger Cato's mission to Cyprus a fairly prominent place is given to one Canidius, described as one of Cato's friends. He is also twice mentioned in connection with the same events in Brut. 3. 2–3, but here the great majority of our MSS. read κανίνΉον, while only one family, and perhaps a later hand in the early MS. L, have κανί΄ων.Canidius is a very rare gentilicium—a fact obscured perhaps by scholars' familiarity with Horace's witch—and besides (...) the subject of the present investigation there is only one known bearer of the name in Republican times, namely P. Canidius Crassus cos. stiff. 40. He served with Lepidus in Gaul and then became a partisan of Antony, whom he accompanied to the East after earning a suffect consulship. (shrink)

Compte tenu de l'augmentation des voyages et des changes commerciaux internationaux et de l'mergence ou de la rmergence de nouvelles menaces internationales pour la sant la Quarante-huitime Assemble mondiale de la Sant a appel une rvision substantielle du Rglement sanitaire international. Le nouveau rglement prsent dans cet ouvrage entrera en vigueur le 15 juin 2007. L'objet et la porte du nouveau Rglement consistent prvenir la propagation internationale des maladies, s'en protger, la matriser et y ragir par une action de sant (...) publique proportionne et limite aux risques qu'elle prsente pour la sant publique en vitant de crer des entraves inutiles au trafic et au commerce internationaux . Parce que le nouveau Rglement ne se limite pas certaines maladies, mais s'applique des menaces nouvelles ou mergentes pour la sant il est prvu qu'il sera actualis compte tenu de l'volution des maladies et des facteurs affectant leur mergence ou leur transmission. Les nouvelles dispositions actualisent et rvisent galement de nombreuses fonctions techniques et autres fonctions rglementaires, y compris les certificats applicables aux voyages et aux transports internationaux, et les prescriptions applicable aux ports, aroports et postes-frontires internationaux. (shrink)

In Plutarch's account of the younger Cato's mission to Cyprus a fairly prominent place is given to one Canidius, described as one of Cato's friends. He is also twice mentioned in connection with the same events in Brut. 3. 2–3, but here the great majority of our MSS. read κανίνΉον, while only one family , and perhaps a later hand in the early MS. L, have κανί΄ων. Canidius is a very rare gentilicium—a fact obscured perhaps by scholars' familiarity with Horace's (...) witch—and besides the subject of the present investigation there is only one known bearer of the name in Republican times, namely P. Canidius Crassus cos. stiff. 40. He served with Lepidus in Gaul and then became a partisan of Antony, whom he accompanied to the East after earning a suffect consulship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Love of God above SelfJordan OlverIS THERE ANY LOVE that is not ultimately a form of self-love? Anders Nygren famously maintained that for Thomas Aquinas there is not. Nygren was led to this conclusion in large part by Aquinas’s claims that love is an act of the will and that the ultimate end of the will is happiness: if every act of love is on account of happiness as (...) an ultimate end, it seems to follow that all love of others is motivated by, and reducible to, love of self.1 Others have drawn this conclusion for similar reasons. Scott MacDonald, for example, interprets Aquinas as proposing “egoistic rationalism”; he believes that this ethical position follows from Aquinas’s claim that human beings, like all creatures, seek their perfection.2Texts, however, can be produced to show that Aquinas himself believes that nonegoistic love is possible.3 If he is an [End Page 97] egoist, he is not so intentionally; he can only be so in the sense that his principles, despite his wishes, necessitate such a position. While Nygren interpreted Aquinas as an unwilling egoist of this sort,4 most modern scholars of Aquinas’s thought on love have held that his principles do not necessitate egoism, and they have endeavored to explain how nonegoistic love is possible on Thomistic grounds. Modern attempts to solve the “problem of love in Thomas Aquinas” normally look back to Pierre Rousselot’s 1908 work Pour l’histoire du problème de l’amour au moyen âge.5 Rousselot identified the “problem of love” as whether a love that is not egoistic is possible and, if it is, what the relation might be between this love and the love of self which appears to be the foundation of natural tendencies.6 Rousselot believed that in the Middle Ages this problem was primarily dealt with through the consideration of the more particular problem of whether it is possible to love God above self apart from grace. This approach, he thought, offered significant advantages: it was simultaneously concrete and profound, and the object of love was both the last end and the author of all natural appetites.7 If genuine love for another is possible, that possibility would be discoverable in this case and through analysis of love of God above self it would seem that one could [End Page 98] arrive at the principles needed to make sense of other nonegoistic loves.8 Accordingly, when Rousselot presented Aquinas’s solution to the problem of love, he did so exclusively through an explanation of Aquinas’s teaching on love of God above self.9 The most notable feature of this account was its appeal to the part-whole relation: Rousselot proposed that for Aquinas our love for God above self is due to the fact that we relate to God as a part to a whole.Rousselot’s work inspired a scholarly discussion that has persisted now for over a century. This discussion may be roughly divided into three stages: the early twentieth century, the mid-twentieth century, and the late-twentieth century to the present. General agreement with Rousselot characterizes early twentieth-century scholarship. Scholars of this period, such as Charles-Vincent Héris, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, and H.-D. Simonin, may claim that Rousselot neglects or overemphasizes something, but they do not assert that he is substantially wrong.10 By contrast, rejection or neglect of the “part-whole” approach to love of God above self characterizes the scholarship of the mid-twentieth century. Étienne Gilson, in his 1932 work L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, vigorously objects to Rousselot’s account, arguing that the part-whole relationship, as it functions in Aquinas’s arguments for love of God above self, should not be understood in “a distressingly literal way,” but simply as “a metaphor, the first moment in a manuductio.”11 [End Page 99] Louis-Bertrand Geiger also emphatically rejects Rousselot’s account, arguing that the real explanation of disinterested love is to be found in the will’s special, “objective” inclination to the “good in itself” as opposed to the “good for me”; we love God... (shrink)