Generalized anxiety disorder can cause significant socioeconomic burden and daily life dysfunction; hence, therapeutic intervention through early detection is important. This study was the final stage of a 3-year anxiety screening tool development project that evaluated the psychometric properties and diagnostic screening utility of the Mental Health Screening Tool for Anxiety Disorders, which measures GAD. A total of 527 Koreans completed online and offline versions of the MHS: A, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7, and Penn State Worry Questionnaire. The (...) participants had an average age of 38.6 years and included 340 females. Participants were also administered the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview. Internal consistency, convergent/criterion validity, item characteristics, and test information were assessed based on the item response theory, and a factor analysis and cut-off score analyses were conducted. The MHS: A had good internal consistency and good convergent validity with other anxiety scales. The two versions of the MHS: A were nearly identical. It had a one-factor structure and showed better diagnostic accuracy for GAD detection than the GAD-7 and BAI. The IRT analysis indicated that the MHS: A was most informative as a screening tool for GAD. The MHS: A can serve as a clinically useful screening tool for GAD in Korea. Furthermore, it can be administered both online and offline and can be flexibly used as a brief mental health screener, especially with the current rise in telehealth. (shrink)

Background: An association between gaming disorder and the symptoms of common mental disorders is unraveled yet. In this preregistered study, we quantitatively synthesized reliability, convergent and discriminant validity of GD scales to examine association between GD and other constructs.Methods: Five representative GD instruments were chosen based on recommendations by the previous systematic review study to conduct correlation meta-analyses and reliability generalization. A systematic literature search was conducted through Pubmed, Proquest, Embase, and Google Scholar to identify studies that reported information on (...) either reliability or correlation with related variables. 2,124 studies were full-text assessed as of October 2020, and 184 were quantitatively synthesized. Conventional Hedges two-level meta-analytic method was utilized.Results: The result of reliability generalization reported a mean coefficient alpha of 0.86 and a mean test-retest estimate of 0.86. Estimated effect sizes of correlation between GD and the variables were as follows: 0.33 with depression, 0.29 with anxiety, 0.30 with aggression, –0.22 with quality of life, 0.29 with loneliness, 0.56 with internet addiction, and 0.40 with game playtime, respectively. The result of moderator analyses, funnel and forest plots, and publication bias analyses were also presented.Discussion and Conclusion: All five GD instruments have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Relatively few studies reported the test-retest reliability. The result of correlation meta-analysis revealed that GD scores were only moderately associated with game playtime. Common psychological problems such as depression and anxiety were found to have a slightly smaller association with GD than the gaming behavior. GD scores were strongly correlated with internet addiction. Further studies should adopt a rigorous methodological procedure to unravel the bidirectional relationship between GD and other psychopathologies.Limitations: The current study did not include gray literature. The representativeness of the five tools included in the current study could be questioned. High heterogeneity is another limitation of the study.Systematic Review Registration: [https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO/], identifier [CRD42020219781]. (shrink)

Temporal Changes in Ovarian Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone mRNA Levels by Gonadotropins in the Rat Sung Ho Lee, Eun-Seob Song, Sun Kyeong Yu, Changmee Kim, Dae Kee Lee, Wan Sung Choi l and Kyungjin Kim* Department of Molecular Biofogy and SRC for Cell Differentiation, Seoul National University, Seoul 150-742, Korea; IDepartment of Anatomy, College of Medicine, Gyeongsanf; National University, Chinju 660-280, Korea (Recei·. cd on December 29, 1993) The present study examines whether gonadotropins are involved in the regulation of ovarian GnRH gene (...) expression and how ovarian GnRH gene expression temporalJy correlates with alterations in hypothalamic GnRH, pituitary LH~ gene expression in respons to gonadotropins. Hypothalamic and ovarian GnRH mRNA and pituitary LH~ mRNA levels were determined by respective RNA-blot hybridizations, and ovarian GnRH and estradiol contents and serum LH levels were measured by respective radioimmunoassays. Three animal models such as 1) PMSG-treated, 2) PMSG and heG-treated immature rats and 3) proestrous stage of adult rats were used. Immature rats (25-days old) were administered with PMSG (10 iu) at 10:00 hand 48 h later with heG (10 iu) to induce ovulation. In the PMSG-injected model, hypothalamic GnRH mRNA levels were markedly augmented about 9-fold at 50 h, and pituitary LH mRNA 3-fold at 52 h after PMSG administration. Serum LH levels were increased to the preovulatory surge levels at 56 h, and ovarian GnRH mRNA levels were augmented 4-fold at 60 h after PMSG injection. Administration of heG also induced a marked enhancement in ovarian GnRH mRNA levels in comparison to the values shown in both intact and PMSGtreated rats at 52 hand 54 h, respectively. In the proestrous stage of normal adult rats, pituitary LH~ mRNA levels were peaked at 16:00 h. The preovulatory LH surge was evident at 4 h before increment in ovarian GnRH mRNA levels as shown in PMSG-treated rats. The present study clearly showed the sequential increase in hypothalamic GnRH mRNA, pituitary LH~ mRNA and ovarian GnRH mRNA levels, indicating that ovarian GnRH may play a possible role in the control of follicular maturation and the ovulation process. (shrink)

Joseph Henrich and Richard McElreath begin their survey of theories of cultural evolution with a striking historical example. They contrast the fate of the Bourke and Wills expedition — an attempt to explore some of the arid areas of inland Australia — with the routine survival of the local aboriginals in exactly the same area. That expedition ended in failure and death, despite the fact that it was well equipped, and despite the fact that those on the expedition were tough (...) and experienced. For survival in such areas depended on accumulated local knowledge. The locals had learned how detoxify seeds before making bread from them, and how to catch the local fish. Bourke and Wills and their companions lacked this local knowledge, and died as a result (Henrich and McElreath 2003). (shrink)

In this paper I argue, first, that human lifeways depend on cognitive capital that has typically been built over many generations. This process of gradual accumulation produces an adaptive fit between human agents and their environments; an adaptive fit that is the result of hidden‐hand, evolutionary mechanisms. To explain distinctive features of human life, we need to understand how cultures evolve. Second, I distinguish a range of different evolutionary models of culture. Third, I argue that none of meme‐based models, dual (...) inheritance models, nor Boyd and Richerson's models fully succeed in explaining this adaptive fit between agent and the world. I then briefly develop an alternative. Finally, I explore (in a preliminary way) constraints on cultural adaptation. The processes of cultural evolution sometimes built a fit between agents and their environment, but they do not always do so. Why is folk medicine, for example, so much less reliable than folk natural history? (shrink)

What Is Biodiversity? is a theoretical and conceptual exploration of the biological world and how diversity is valued. Maclaurin and Sterelny explore not only the origins of the concept of biodiversity, but also how that concept has been shaped by ecology and more recently by conservation biology. They explain the different types of biodiversity important in evolutionary theory, developmental biology, ecology, morphology and taxonomy and conclude that biological heritage is rich in not just one biodiversity but many. Maclaurin and Sterelny (...) also explore the case for the conservation of these biodiversities using option value theory, a tool borrowed from economics. (shrink)

Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” (...) type identity theory is the claim that mental-physical identities are contingent, not necessary. Suppose M has a single physical realizer, P. On my account, the statement that M = P is not metaphysically or logically necessary. It is contingent since the statement that P realizes M is contingent. This is so because for P to realize M is for it to fulfill the causal specification that defines M, and what causal relations P actually enters into is a question that depends on the laws prevailing in a given world. Thus, P may be a realizer of M in this world but perhaps not in another in which different laws hold; in some worlds M may have no realizers at all. None of this is in violation of the idea that identities are necessary. For, according to me, if M has realizers, M is a functional property defined by a causal specification. This means that “M” is not a rigid designator, though it is, as we might call it, “nomologically rigid” or “semi-rigid”. (shrink)

Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” (...) type identity theory is the claim that mental-physical identities are contingent, not necessary. Suppose M has a single physical realizer, P. On my account, the statement that M = P is not metaphysically or logically necessary. It is contingent since the statement that P realizes M is contingent. This is so because for P to realize M is for it to fulfill the causal specification that defines M, and what causal relations P actually enters into is a question that depends on the laws prevailing in a given world. Thus, P may be a realizer of M in this world but perhaps not in another in which different laws hold; in some worlds M may have no realizers at all. None of this is in violation of the idea that identities are necessary. For, according to me, if M has realizers, M is a functional property defined by a causal specification. This means that “M” is not a rigid designator, though it is, as we might call it, “nomologically rigid” or “semi-rigid”. (shrink)

Books reviewed:Stephen R. L. Clark, The Political – Biology, Ethics and PoliticsTorbjörn Tannsjö, Coercive CareDavid Carr and Jan Steutel, Virture Ethics and Moral EducationLaura Westra and Patricia Werhane, The Business of Consumption: Environmental Ethics and the Global CommunityDavid Conway, Free‐Market Feminism.

Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” (...) type identity theory is the claim that mental-physical identities are contingent, not necessary. Suppose M has a single physical realizer, P. On my account, the statement that M = P is not metaphysically or logically necessary. It is contingent since the statement that P realizes M is contingent. This is so because for P to realize M is for it to fulfill the causal specification that defines M, and what causal relations P actually enters into is a question that depends on the laws prevailing in a given world. Thus, P may be a realizer of M in this world but perhaps not in another in which different laws hold; in some worlds M may have no realizers at all. None of this is in violation of the idea that identities are necessary. For, according to me, if M has realizers, M is a functional property defined by a causal specification. This means that “M” is not a rigid designator, though it is, as we might call it, “nomologically rigid” or “semi-rigid”. (shrink)

Bernard Williams’ Shame and Necessity (1993) was an influential early contribution to what has become a broader movement to rehabilitate shame as a moral emotion. But there is a tension in Williams’ discussion that presents an under-appreciated difficulty for efforts to rehabilitate shame. The tension arises between what Williams takes shame in its essence to be and what shame can do—the role that shame can be expected to play in ethical life. Williams can—and we argue, should—be read as avoiding the (...) difficulties stemming from this tension, but this requires a reevaluation of several of his central claims about shame’s role in ethical thought and experience. For instance, his broad claims that the “structures of shame” can “give a conception of one’s ethical identity” (93), and that shame “mediates … between ethical demands and the rest of life” (102), cannot be taken at face value. What emerges is a view that is in a sense less ambitious, but also more in tune with the spirit of Williams’ larger project. There may also, we suggest, be a more general lesson: We should be suspicious of the temptation to seek some special affinity between shame and ethical life, lest we distort our understanding of both. (shrink)

Hurley is right to reject the dichotomy between intentional agents and mere stimulus/response habit machines, and she is also right in thinking that it is important to map the space of systems for the adaptive control of behaviour. So there is much in this paper with which I agree. My disagreement concerns folk psychology. Hurley thinks that control space can be charted by asking whether and to what extent animals are intentional agents. In contrast, I doubt that the concepts of (...) folk psychology, especially folk psychology construed as an interpretative practice, are the right mapping tools. If the main function of folk psychology is to make sense of one another, coordinate joint action, or make decisions about moral and legal responsibility, then there is no point in applying folk psychological notions to nonhuman minds. These interpretative functions simply do not arise for our interaction with nonhuman minds, and if folk psychology serves largely as a social tool serving them, there is no need to apply it to nonhumans, nor is there a reasonable expectation that we can usefully do so. If folk psychology does not even carve our sensing and control mechanisms at the joints, if it is not a good theory of human cognitive architecture, then it is not likely to be wellsuited for describing those of nonhuman agents. (shrink)

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 355-373, October 2021.

Criticizing psychologism about logic in the Foreword of Grundgesetze, Frege examines an answer to the question of how we can justify our acknowledgment of logical axioms as true—the logical laws that cannot be proved from other laws. The answer he entertains states that we cannot reject logical axioms if we do not want to give up our judgment altogether. Suspending his judgment about this answer, Frege points out that it is still compatible with his anti-psychologist conception of logic. There are (...) two issues with this paragraph. First, it is difficult to read this paragraph consistently. Second, it is not clear why Frege brings up this particular view regarding the justification for logical axioms in the middle of his criticism of psychologism. This paper develops a consistent interpretation of this paragraph. The view on the justification for logical axioms, which Frege is dealing with, is neo-Kantian. In the paragraph, Frege is criticizing a psychologistic misunderstanding of the neo-Kantian justification for logical axioms. The way Frege explains away this misunderstanding shows that he takes the neo-Kantian justification for logical axioms to be a non-evidential epistemic warrant if it is an epistemic warrant. It is this notion of non-evidential epistemic warrant that Frege suspends his judgment about. Thus, the paragraph shows that Frege has a reason to have reservations about neo-Kantianism. Furthermore, it turns out that the sole issue between Frege and psychological logicians is whether truth is objective, which provides a different way to explain away a much-discussed tension between Begriffsschrift and Frege's anti-psychologism. (shrink)

Hurley is right to reject the dichotomy between intentional agents and mere stimulus/response habit machines, and she is also right in thinking that it is important to map the space of systems for the adaptive control of behaviour. So there is much in this paper with which I agree. My disagreement concerns folk psychology. Hurley thinks that control space can be charted by asking whether and to what extent animals are intentional agents. In contrast, I doubt that the concepts of (...) folk psychology, especially folk psychology construed as an interpretative practice, are the right mapping tools. If the main function of folk psychology is to make sense of one another, co‐ordinate joint action, or make decisions about moral and legal responsibility, then there is no point in applying folk psychological notions to nonhuman minds. These interpretative functions simply do not arise for our interaction with non‐human minds, and if folk psychology serves largely as a social tool serving them, there is no need to apply it to non‐humans, nor is there a reasonable expectation that we can usefully do so. If folk psychology does not even carve our sensing and control mechanisms at the joints, if it is not a good theory of human cognitive architecture, then it is not likely to be well‐suited for describing those of nonhuman agents. (shrink)

The present study explores a neglected area of ethical leadership: lateral behavioral effect from peer team leaders as a key predictor of ethical leadership. Using the lens of social learning theory, we posit that peer team leader ethical voice fosters focal team leader ethical leadership through team leader moral efficacy. In line with social learning perspective, we also posit the moderating effect of ethical role modeling of peer team leader in relationship between peer team leader ethical voice and team leader (...) moral efficacy. We conducted a two-wave study over a 6-week interval between waves from military teams. Our results provided support for all of our hypotheses. In addition, we also found an incremental validity of peer ethical voice behavior by controlling other relevant factors such as upper leaders’ ethical role modeling and peer ethical leadership. Our findings contribute to the advancement of ethical leadership literature by articulating a novel antecedent as well as its boundary condition. (shrink)

This article tracks Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an emergent organizational process that places the employee at its center. Predominantly, research on CSR tends to focus on external pressures and outcomes leading to a neglect of CSR as a dynamic and developing process that relies on the involvement of the employee as a major stakeholder in its co-creation and implementation. Utilizing case study data drawn from a study of a large multinational energy company, we explore how management relies on employees' (...) interaction with CSR as the process of initiation → implementation → maturation develops. Employee involvement grows from a minor element in the CSR initiation stage to a vital contributory factor in CSR's success in the later stages of the process. The article offers new insights into a processual and interactional approach to CSR that accounts for the actions of different actors involved at each stage. Most unusually, it also recognizes the dual impact this has on broader issues concerning the management and involvement of employees through CSR actions, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of not only external stakeholders but internal too. (shrink)

Many philosophers have challenged the ideal of value-free science on the grounds that social or moral values are relevant to inferential thresholds. But given this view, how precisely and to what extent should scientists adjust their inferential thresholds in light of nonepistemic values? We suggest that signal detection theory provides a useful framework for addressing this question. Moreover, this approach opens up further avenues for philosophical inquiry and has important implications for philosophical debates concerning inductive risk. For example, the signal (...) detection theory framework entails that considerations of inductive risk and inferential-threshold placement cannot be conducted in isolation from base-rate information. (shrink)

This paper presents a new interpretation of Frege's context principle on which it applies primarily to singular terms for abstract objects but not necessarily to singular terms for ordinary objects.

What mechanism implements the mutual exclusivity bias to map novel labels to objects without names? Prominent theoretical accounts of mutual exclusivity (e.g., Markman, 1989, 1990) propose that infants are guided by their knowledge of object names. However, the mutual exclusivity constraint could be implemented via monitoring of object novelty (see Merriman, Marazita, & Jarvis, 1995). We sought to discriminate between these contrasting explanations across two preferential looking experiments with 22-month-olds. In Experiment 1, infants viewed three objects: one name-known, two name-unknown. (...) Of the two name-unknown objects, one was novel, and the other had been previously familiarized. The infants responded to hearing a novel label by increasing attention only to the novel, name-unknown object. In a second experiment in which the name-known object was absent, a novel label increased infants’ attention to a novel object beyond baseline preference for novelty. The experiments provide clear evidence for a novelty-based mechanism. However, differences in the time course of disambiguation across experiments suggest that novelty processing may be influenced by contextual factors. (shrink)