In memoriam José Arrazola Ramírez The logic $\textbf{G}^{\prime}_3$ was introduced by Osorio et al. in 2008; it is a three-valued logic, closely related to the paraconsistent logic $\textbf{CG}^{\prime}_3$ introduced by Osorio et al. in 2014. The logic $\textbf{CG}^{\prime}_3$ is defined in terms of a multi-valued semantics and has the property that each theorem in $\textbf{G}^{\prime}_3$ is a theorem in $\textbf{CG}^{\prime}_3$. Kripke-type semantics has been given to $\textbf{CG}^{\prime}_3$ in two different ways by Borja et al. in 2016. In (...) this work, we continue the study of $\textbf{CG}^{\prime}_3$, obtaining a Hilbert-type axiomatic system and proving a soundness and completeness theorem for this logic. (shrink)

The authors of Beziau and Franceschetto work with logics that have the property of not satisfying any of the formulations of the principle of non contradiction, Béziau and Franceschetto also analyze, among the three-valued logics, which of these logics satisfy this property. They prove that there exist only four of such logics, but only two of them are worthwhile to study. The language of these logics does not consider implication as a connective. However, the enrichment of a language with an (...) implication connective leads us to more interesting systems, therefore we look for one implication for these logics and we study further properties that the logics obtain when this connective is added to these systems. (shrink)

La obra al-D_aji-ra al-saniyya fi- ta�ri-j aldawla al-mari-niyya, que aborda la historia de los Banu- Mari-n, incluye una serie de noticias referentes a otras tierras de la Da-r al-Islam, como Egipto, Siria o al-Andalus. La autoría de la misma no ha sido determinada, por lo que señalaremos las noticias más destacadas sobre este asunto. De la información que ofrece esta obra acerca de al-Andalus, este artículo se centra en el análisis de los fragmentos relativos a los territorios conquistados por Castilla (...) durante el s. XIII, que no había sido aprovechada hasta el momento, y que contribuye a ampliar nuestro conocimiento acerca de este período histórico, muy especialmente por lo que respecta a la suerte que corrieron las poblaciones musulmanas y a la cronología de la conquista. Abordamos las actitudes adoptadas por los dirigentes políticos de al-Andalus y el Magreb, ante el avance de los cristianos, desde la resistencia hasta la conversión, y la importancia que este grupo concedió a las luchas contra los cristianos, que fueron un elemento de legitimación del poder político de los Banu- Mari-n, objetivo destacado del autor de la obra. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 1-8.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

Esta es una investigación cualitativa de tipo exploratorio, que tiene como objetivo examinar las Representaciones sociales acerca de la adopción en parejas sin hijos y con posibilidades de adoptar, para lo cual se aplicará una entrevista semiestructurada a 50 parejas, además de una ficha de caracterización sociodemográfica elaborada para esta investigación. Se concluye que las parejas tienen una representación sesgada de la adopción, y prejuicios respecto a la edad, la salud, la historia de los niños y niñas, que determinan las (...) resistencias y representaciones respecto a la adopción. Asimismo, las parejas anteponen el proyecto de vida personal, la estabilidad económica, dificultades en los procesos adoptivos, y supuestas preferencias por familias extranjeras, como criterios que dan forma a la resistencia a adoptar, aun cuando identifican que la adopción es un proceso necesario en la sociedad que debe ser fortalecido y asumido por más personas. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron's influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron's Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi's first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a (...) disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes' philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron's wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes' relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron's Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron's wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal's view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron's Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion. (shrink)

This paper has two sections. In the first one I examine Pascal's appropriation in La 131 of the Cartesian argument of the deceiver God. Pascal develops a skeptical reading of the argument in order to use it as a premise for his apologetic argument of true religion. In the second section I examine Huet's appropriation of this same Cartesian argument in his Philosophical Treatise on the Weakness of Human Understanding. Based on this work of Huet's and on his margin notes (...) on Pascal's Thoughts, I show that his skeptical reading of the argument is derived from Pascal's, although Huet's and Pascal's goals are distinct: while the latter intends to provide an argument for the Fall of Man, the former intends to show the weakness of reason unassisted by supernatural faith. (shrink)

I present two criticisms: (1) Merge is a model of performance in speech perception experiments but not an ecologically valid model integrating both word recognition and speech perception, and (2) Merge's implementation of the variability of lexical effects must be made more precise or the model is indistinguishable from its alternatives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the (...) Pyrrhonian doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

This article examines the conception of scepticism during the early modern period. It describes how the writings of Pierre Charron and Michel de Montaigne inspired authors to search for a balance between extreme scepticism and what was often described as the dogmatism of the Schools. It discusses the revival of scepticism in the Renaissance and early seventeenth-century philosophy and shows the impact of Cartesian doubt in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century scepticism.

A reconstrução racional do programa de pesquisa do racionalismo clássico sob a perspectiva da abordagem de solução de problemas.

The Gamer's Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer's Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the form of a simulation and its surface content. A (...) greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulation affect subject experience will help us see why only simulations of murder and pedophilia generating virtually real experiences are likely to be seen as wrong. I argue that a simulation’s structural elements powerfully affect how subjects experience simulated content and hence is an important, and previously neglected, variable necessary to dissolve the Gamer's Dilemma. Properly understood, virtually real simulations of murder and pedophilia are both likely to be treated by players as morally wrong. Similarly, virtually unreal murder and pedophilia will be less likely to be judged as wrong. Subject judgments are thus consistent once a simulation’s structural variables are accounted for. The Gamer's Dilemma dissolves as a dilemma once we acknowledge these structural features of simulations and how they affect experience and moral judgment. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on (...) the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls "consequent skepticism about the senses," "antecedent skepticism," and "Academic skepticism." RESUMO Na seção XII da Primeira Investigação, Hume refere-se a duas escolas céticas antigas ao apresentar sua própria visão do ceticismo que, entretanto, depende do ceticismo antigo somente secundária e indiretamente. A compreensão humiana do ceticismo depende principalmente de Descartes e de filósofos pós-cartesianos como Pascal, Huet, Foucher e Bayle que reagiram ceticamente às principais doutrinas cartesianas, mas seguiram uma versão ou outra da dúvida metódica de Descartes. Embora todos estes filósofos sejam relevantes na seção XII, examinarei os tópicos da seção nos quais Descartes parece ser diretamente visado. Após uma seção introdutória sobre as leituras de Julia Annas e Richard Popkin da relação de Hume com, respectivamente, o ceticismo antigo e o moderno, examino o que Hume chama na seção XII da Investigação de "ceticismo consequente sobre os sentidos", "ceticismo antecedente" e "ceticismo acadêmico". (shrink)