Hilbert's plan for understanding the concept of infinity required the elimination of non‐finitist machinery from proofs of finitist assertions. The failure of the original plan leads to a hierarchy of progressively less elementary, but still constructive methods instead of finitist ones . A mathematical proof of this failure requires a definition of « finitist ».—The paper sketches the three principal methods for the syntactic analysis of non‐constructive mathematics, the resulting consistency proofs and constructive interpretations, modelled on Herbrand's theorem, and (...) their mathematical and logical consequences. A characterization of finitist proofs is sketched. A remark on the completeness of the predicate calculus concludes the paper. Throughout open problems and alternative approaches are emphasized.ZusammenfassungHilbert sah das Verstehen des Begriffs des Unendlichen in der Eliminierung nichtfiniter Methoden aus Beweisen finiter Sätze. Das Versagen dieses Unternehmens führt zu einer Hierarchic progressiv weniger elementarer, aber noch konstruktiver Methoden, statt der finiten . Ein Unmöglichkeitsbeweis des ursprünglichen Planes setzt eine Definition von « finit » voraus.—Die drei wichtigsten Methoden der syntaktischen Analyse nichtkonstruktiver mathematischer Theorien, die daraus gewonnenen Widerspruchsfreiheitsbeweise and konstruktiven Interpretationen and deren mathematische and logische Anwendungen werden besprochen. Eine Prazisierung des Begriffs « finit » wird skizziert. Eine Bemerkung zur Vollstandigkeit des engeren Funktionenkalküls beschliesst die Abhandlung.—Oflene Fragen and komplementare Fragestellungen werden betont. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to show that a weak version of Hilbert's metamathematics is compatible with Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems by employing only what are clearly natural prov‐ ability predicates. Defining first “T proves the consistency of a theory S indirectly in one step”, we subsequently prove “PA proves its own consistency indirectly in one step” and sketch the proof for “If S is a recursively enumerable extension of , S proves its own consistency indirectly in one step”. The (...) formalizations of the metatheoretical consistency assertions that occur in these theorems are clearly the natural ones. We conclude the paper with reflections on indirect consistency proofs and soundness proofs. (shrink)

It is shown that David Hilbert's formalistic approach to axiomaticis accompanied by a certain pragmatism that is compatible with aphilosophical, or, so to say, external foundation of mathematics.Hilbert's foundational programme can thus be seen as areconciliation of Pragmatism and Apriorism. This interpretation iselaborated by discussing two recent positions in the philosophy ofmathematics which are or can be related to Hilbert's axiomaticalprogramme and his formalism. In a first step it is argued that thepragmatism of Hilbert's axiomatic (...) contradicts the opinion thatHilbert style axiomatical systems are closed systems, a reproachposed by Carlo Cellucci. In the second section the question isdiscussed whether Hilbert's pragmatism in foundational issuescomes close to an a-philosophical ``naturalism in mathematics'' assuggested by Penelope Maddy. The answer is ``no'', because forHilbert philosophy had its specific tasks in the general projectto found mathematics. This is illuminated in the concludingsection giving further evidence for Hilbert's foundationalapriorism by discussing his ``axiom of the existence of mind'' andrelating it to the ``one and only axiom'' of the German algebraistof logic, Ernst Schröder, postulating the inherence of signs onthe paper. (shrink)

In the 1920s, Ackermann and von Neumann, in pursuit of Hilbert's programme, were working on consistency proofs for arithmetical systems. One proposed method of giving such proofs is Hilbert's epsilon-substitution method. There was, however, a second approach which was not reflected in the publications of the Hilbert school in the 1920s, and which is a direct precursor of Hilbert's first epsilon theorem and a certain "general consistency result" due to Bernays. An analysis of the form of (...) this so-called "failed proof" sheds further light on an interpretation of Hilbert's programme as an instrumentalist enterprise with the aim of showing that whenever a "real" proposition can be proved by ?ideal? means, it can also be proved by "real", finitary means. (shrink)

Colour has often been supposed to be a subjective property, a property to be analysed orretly in terms of the phenomenological aspects of human expereince. In contrast with subjectivism, an objectivist analysis of color takes color to be a property objects possess in themselves, independently of the character of human perceptual expereince. David Hilbert defends a form of objectivism that identifies color with a physical property of surfaces - their spectral reflectance. This analysis of color is shown to provide a (...) more adequate account of the features of human color vision than its subjectivist rivals. The author's account of colro also recognises that the human perceptual system provides a limited and idiosyncratic picture of the world. These limitations are shown to be consistent with a realist account of colour and to provide the necessary tools for giving an analysis of common sense knowledge of color phenomena. (shrink)

§30. Significance of Desargues's theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 CHAPTER VI. PASCAL'S THEOREM. §31. ...

Larry Hardin has been the most steadfast and influential critic of physicalist theories of color over the last 20 years. In their modern form these theories originated with the work of Smart and Armstrong in the 1960s and 1970s1 and Hardin appropriately concentrated on their views in his initial critique of physicalism.2 In his most recent contribution to this project3 he attacks Michael Tye’s recent attempts to defend and extend color physicalism.4 Like Byrne and Hilbert5, Tye identifies color with the (...) reflecting properties of objects (“reflectance physicalism”). Specifically, the determinate and determinable colors are identified with types of reflectances. (Setting some complications aside, the reflectance of an object is the proportion of light that it reflects at each wavelength in the visible spectrum.) These reflectance types are, in the terminology of Hilbert, anthropocentric—in the terminology of Lewis6, they are not very “natural”. (shrink)

Color-vision defects constitute a spectrum of disorders with varying degrees and types of departure from normal human color vision. One form of color-vision defect is dichromacy; by mixing together only two lights, the dichromat can match any light, unlike normal trichromatic humans, who need to mix three. In a philosophical context, our titular question may be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken at face value as a question about visible properties of external objects, and second, it may (...) be interpreted as the more intangible question of “what it’s like” to be color-blind. (shrink)

In order to derive functionalism from Durkheim and Weber, Parsons had to openly break with some twenty of their theoretical assertions. Express rejections of classical themes lie at the foundation of functionalist sociology. This very foundation is what came unglued by Garfinkel's empirical studies of Parsonian social dynamics. In correcting the inadequacies of functionalism, many of the themes rejected by Parsons have been inadvertently resurrected and developed by ethnomethodologists, albeit in altered form. This is not to say that Garfinkel and (...) classical theorists are saying the same things but rather to point out some historical continuities that have gone largely unrecognized. To recognize these thematic continuities is to gather an improved radical vision of society and social practices. Such perspective also provides new understanding of how and why functionalist theory would arise in the first place, namely as an instance of Weberian rationalization and Durkheimian anomieprevention ritual. (shrink)

C. Lloyd Morgan is mostly known for Morgan’s canon, still a popular and frequently quoted principle in comparative psychology and ethology. There has been a fair amount of debate on the canon’s interpretation, function, and value regarding the research on animal minds, usually referring to it as an isolated principle. In this paper we rather shed light on Morgan’s overall scientific program and his vision for comparative psychology. We argue that within his program Morgan identified crucial conceptual, ontological, and methodical (...) issues, that are still fundamental to the current research on animal minds. This also highlights a new aspect of his role as one of the “founding fathers” of modern comparative psychology. In order to understand Morgan’s program, we briefly outline the historical context in which he began his work on a science of comparative psychology. We will then emphasize to what extent his taxonomy of psychological capacities, the development of his metaphysics for a comparative psychology, and his newly introduced interdisciplinary procedures justify Morgan’s distinctive approach to still rather sensitive issues. In doing so, we aim to provide a more comprehensive picture of Morgan’s methodological signature and we contend that a proper understanding of his canon can only be gained by taking it as part of this program. We finally understand his most renown considerations as part of his struggle to ascertain the limits and possibilities of the discipline he contributed to set up, and thus emphasize the need to keep the discussion going, notably on the accessibility of other minds than one’s own and on the limits of one’s research perspectives. (shrink)

Herschel's experiments on radiant heat are analysed to see how he understood the role of experiment and how he handled potential difficulties in measurement. He believed that experiments could answer essential questions about nature and was willing to change his mind in light of evidence. Potential problems with data did not shake his confidence in the results of his experiments. Herschel's critic, Leslie, had even less patience with experimental results that did not fit his theory. His harsh condemnations of Herschel's (...) work could not be empirically substantiated, but they pointed to problems of which Herschel was aware. Although the theories of both men about radiant heat have subsequently been abandoned, attempts to address their concerns and differences contributed to the development of the electromagnetic spectrum. The unification of radiant heat and light through the spectrum came about after better instruments made it possible to account for the rival claims of earlier experimenters. (shrink)

Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual contact with (...) objects and properties with the equally evident fact that there is no phenomenological signal separating error and truth. “The obscure object of hallucination” offers a subtle and plausible solution to this problem and one that solves the problem generally, not just in the special case of hallucination. Johnston’s objective is to offer a theory of perception that meets two constraints: (1) that it provide an explanation of the possibility of delusive and veridical sensings that are indistinguishable from the first-person perspective and (2) that it count as form of direct realism where this is taken to involve acquaintance with the objects of perception. Johnston uses the first constraint to rule out disjunctivism. The second constraint is used to rule out conjunctivism, which as Johnston uses the term, includes most of the widely adopted philosophical theories of perception. Johnston also develops his own sophisticated and interesting theory of perception. In what follows, I will discuss the relation of Johnston’s theory to conjunctivism, examine one of his anti-conjunctivist arguments and finally compare Johnston’s theory with some other versions of direct realism. These topics constitute a very incomplete selection of the important issues discussed in this rich and interesting paper. I will also not disagree, in any fundamental way, with any of the central theses of Johnston’s discussion.. (shrink)

The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties are secondary qualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors are secondary qualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind of secondary quality theory is viciously circular, we discuss (...) three main lines of argument for the secondary quality theory. The first is inspired by an intuitively compelling picture of perception articulated by Reid; the second is that the secondary quality theory is a conceptual truth; the third line of argument is presented in Johnston’s influential paper ‘How to speak of the colors’. We conclude that all these arguments fail, and that the secondary quality theory is unmotivated. Keywords: color, secondary quality, disposition, vision, perception.. (shrink)

Weber's discussion of bureaucracy is generally taken as descriptive of organized social structure within a rational-legal society. This is understandable; yet elsewhere in Weber's sociology he cautions against precisely this kind of analysis. His counsel against reification, his emphasis upon subjective ideas standing behind social action, his characterization of "society" as subjective orientation to legitimacy, his discussion of organization and social relationships as probabilities of behavior in accordance with subjective belief in their existence, and his tendency to describe the wide (...) range of world views within the vocabularies of those who subscribe to them-all mitigate against viewing his description of bureaucratic standardization as Weber's own world view, much less as his sociology. Rather the discussion can be understood as a description of bureaucracy from within the bureaucratic setting and as a set of ideas subjectively held to as a basis of legitimacy, ideas whose truth value are largely irrelevant for Weberian analysis. This qualification of bureaucracy as a mentality supplements the more widely acknowledged ideal-type qualification and provides a basis for increased Weberian insight. Such insight dovetails with post-functionalist sociological theory, explains the origins and consequences of functionalist theory, and provides new understandings of recent findings in empirically based research. Moreover, it helps to focus current research away from bureaucracy as an existent entity and toward a phenomenon Weber identifies as the central process of Western civilization: the rationalization (bureaucratization) of human behavior, a process both unfulfillable and unstoppable. (shrink)

This paper critically examines color relationalism and color relativism, two theories of color that are allegedly supported by variation in normal human color vision. We mostly discuss color relationalism, defended at length in Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real, and argue that the theory has insuperable problems.

Deeply original, inspiring to some, abhorrent to others, George Berkeley’s philosophy of immaterialism is still influential three hundred years after the publication of his most widely read book, _Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. _Berkeley published the _Dialogues _because of the unenthusiastic reception of his _Principles of Human Knowledge _in 1710._ _He hoped the use of the_ _dialogue format would win a more favorable hearing, but unfortunately for Berkeley, the response was every bit as scathing as the reception of his (...) previous work. In recent decades, Berkeley’s work has been recognized as an excellent introduction to the English philosophy of the eighteenth century, and to philosophy in general. This edition of the dialogues is accessibly organized by David Hilbert and John Perry. (shrink)

The 18th century philosopher and Anglican bishop, George Berkeley, is chiefly known to posterity for advocating the radical thesis that there is no unthinking stuff in the world. According to Berkeley, bar stools, kegs, mugs and the all paraphernalia of ordinary life (plus everything else) are merely ideas and have no existence outside the mind of those seated on the stools, tapping the kegs, and drinking from the mugs. What is less well-known is that Berkeley devoted much of his energy (...) in later life to promoting the use of a concoction he called tar-water for the treatment of a wide variety of health ailments. Fortunately, Berkeley thought that many of the same virtues were found in some beers. It may seem paradoxical that one and the same man could both claim that beer only exists as an idea in the minds of those consuming it and that it could cure all known afflictions. Berkeley's resolution of this paradox will be explored and it will be seen that it is possible to both appreciate and benefit from beer even if it is only an idea. (shrink)

What is color? Of course, examples of colorful objects are not hard to come by (Fig. 1 provides numerous examples), so the question itself is slightly puzzling, suggesting that some confusion needs to be cleared up or ignorance enlightened. But how could anyone (who isn’t blind or Fig. 1 Atoms Inside Balloons totally lacking in color vision) possibly be confused about what color is? After all, if we learn anything about the world merely by looking at it, it’s the colors (...) of the things we see. How could we do this if we were confused about or ignorant of the nature of color? We might be confused.. (shrink)

Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.

Hilbert's programme is shown to have been inspired in part by what we can call Kronecker's programme in the foundations of an arithmetic theory of algebraic quantities.While finitism stays within the bounds of intuitive finite arithmetic, metamathematics goes beyond in the hope of recovering classical logic. The leap into the transfinite proved to be hazardous, not only from the perspective of Gödel's results, but also from a Kroneckerian point of view.

A possible relevant meaning of Hilbert’s program is the following one: “give a constructive semantic for classical mathematics”. More precisely, give a systematic interpretation of classical abstract proofs about abstract objects, as constructive proofs about constructive versions of these objects.If this program is fulfilled we are able “at the end of the tale” to extract constructive proofs of concrete results from classical abstract proofs of these results.Dynamical algebraic structures or geometric theories seem to be a good tool for doing this (...) job. In this setting, classical abstract objects are interpreted through incomplete concrete specifications of these objects.The structure of axioms in geometric theories gives rise in a natural way to distributive lattices and pointfree topological spaces. Abstract objects correspond to classical points of these pointfree spaces.We shall insist on the Zariski spectrum of distributive lattices and commutative rings and give a constructive interpretation of the Krull dimension.We underline the fact that many abstract objects in classical mathematics can be viewed as points of spectral spaces corresponding to distributive lattices whose definition is concrete and natural.Two important facts are to be stressed.First, abstract proofs about points of these pointfree spaces can very often be reread as constructive proofs about constructible subsets of these spaces.Second, function spaces on these pointfree spaces are often explicitly used in elegant abstract theories. The structure of these function spaces is fully constructive: indeed by the compactness theorem, “all is finite”. The constructive rereading of the abstract proofs is in this setting is nothing but the simple constatation that abstract proofs use correctly axioms.RésuméUne manière pertinente de revisiter le Programme de Hilbert serait la suivante: « donner une sémantique constructive pour les mathématiques classiques ». Plus précisément donner une interprétation systématique des preuves classiques abstraites au sujet des objets abstraits, en terme de preuves constructives au sujet de contreparties constructives de ces objets abstraits.Si ce programme est rempli, nous sommes capables « à la fin de l’histoire » d’extraire des preuves constructives de résultats concrets à partir des preuves classiques abstraites de ces résultats.Les structures algébriques dynamiques, ou ce qui revient à peu près au même les théories géométriques, semblent être un bon outil pour réaliser ce travail. Dans cette optique, les objets abstraits des mathématiques classiques sont remplacés par des spécifications incomplètes mais concrètes de ces mêmes objets.La structure des théories géométriques donne naissance de manière naturelle à des treillis distributifs et à des espaces topologiques sans points. Les objets abstraits utilisés par les mathématiques classiques correspondent aux points classiques de ces espaces sans points.Dans cet article, nous illustrerons ce phénomène principalement avec le spectre de Zariski des treillis distributifs et celui des anneaux commutatifs, en indiquant notamment un équivalent constructif de la notion de dimension de Krull.Nous insistons sur le caractère extrêmement général de l’interpétation des objets abstraits idéaux des mathématiques classiques comme des points d’espaces spectraux associés à des treillis distributifs qui sont définis de façon naturelle et concrète.Souligons deux faits d’expérience importants.Tout d’abord, les preuves abstraites au sujet des points de ces espaces sans points peuvent en général être relues comme des preuves concernant les parties constructibles de ces espaces.Enfin, les espaces de fonctions continues sur ces espaces sans points sont souvent utilisés dans d’élégantes théories abstraites. Ces espaces de fonctions sont bien définis constructivement. Cela tient au « théorème de compacité » qui nous dit que dans le cadre en question « tout est fini ». La relecture constructive des preuves abstraites n’est alors rien d’autre que la constatation que les axiomes géométriques sont utilisés de manière correcte. (shrink)

Computability theory concerns information with a causal–typically algorithmic–structure. As such, it provides a schematic analysis of many naturally occurring situations. Emil Post was the first to focus on the close relationship between information, coded as real numbers, and its algorithmic infrastructure. Having characterised the close connection between the quantifier type of a real and the Turing jump operation, he looked for more subtle ways in which information entails a particular causal context. Specifically, he wanted to find simple relations on reals (...) which produced richness of local computability-theoretic structure. To this extent, he was not just interested in causal structure as an abstraction, but in the way in which this structure emerges in natural contexts. Post’s programme was the genesis of a more far reaching research project. In this article we will firstly review the history of Post’s programme, and look at two interesting developments of Post’s approach. The first of these developments concerns the extension of the core programme, initially restricted to the Turing structure of the computably enumerable sets of natural numbers, to the Ershov hierarchy of sets. The second looks at how new types of information coming from the recent growth of research into randomness, and the revealing of unexpected new computability-theoretic infrastructure. We will conclude by viewing Post’s programme from a more general perspective. We will look at how algorithmic structure does not just emerge mathematically from information, but how that emergent structure can model the emergence of very basic aspects of the real world. (shrink)

Computability theory concerns information with a causal–typically algorithmic–structure. As such, it provides a schematic analysis of many naturally occurring situations. Emil Post was the first to focus on the close relationship between information, coded as real numbers, and its algorithmic infrastructure. Having characterised the close connection between the quantifier type of a real and the Turing jump operation, he looked for more subtle ways in which information entails a particular causal context. Specifically, he wanted to find simple relations on reals (...) which produced richness of local computability-theoretic structure. To this extent, he was not just interested in causal structure as an abstraction, but in the way in which this structure emerges in natural contexts. Post’s programme was the genesis of a more far reaching research project. In this article we will firstly review the history of Post’s programme, and look at two interesting developments of Post’s approach. The first of these developments concerns the extension of the core programme, initially restricted to the Turing structure of the computably enumerable sets of natural numbers, to the Ershov hierarchy of sets. The second looks at how new types of information coming from the recent growth of research into randomness, and the revealing of unexpected new computability-theoretic infrastructure. We will conclude by viewing Post’s programme from a more general perspective. We will look at how algorithmic structure does not just emerge mathematically from information, but how that emergent structure can model the emergence of very basic aspects of the real world. (shrink)

The most frequent criticism of the target article is the lack of clear separability of human speech data relative to neuroethological data. A rationalization for this difference was sought in the tinkered nature of such new adaptations as human speech. Basic theoretical premises were defended, and new data were presented to support a claim that speakers maintain a low-noise relationship between F2 transition onset and offset frequencies for stops in pre-vocalic positions through articulatory choices. It remains a viable and testable (...) hypothesis that the phenomenon described by the locus equation is a functional adaptation of production mechanisms to processing preferences of the auditory system. (shrink)

Les recherches de Zermelo sur la théorie des ensembles et les fon­dements des mathématiques se divisent en deux périodes : de 1901 à 1910 et de 1927 à 1935. Elles s’effectuent en même temps que les deux projets de recherche sur les fondements des mathématiques de David Hilbert et de ses collaborateurs à Göttingen ; durant la première période, Hilbert élaborait son premier programme d’axiomatisation, auquel Zermelo souscrivait totalement. La seconde période correspond au développement du programme formaliste de (...) Hilbert que Zermelo rejette en raison de son caractère finitiste. son travail est à cette époque dirigé contre Hilbert. (shrink)

In the present paper we empirically investigate the psychometric properties of some of the most famous statistical and logical cognitive illusions from the “heuristics and biases” research program by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who nearly 50 years ago introduced fascinating brain teasers such as the famous Linda problem, the Wason card selection task, and so-called Bayesian reasoning problems (e.g., the mammography task). In the meantime, a great number of articles has been published that empirically examine single cognitive illusions, theoretically (...) explaining people’s faulty thinking, or proposing and experimentally implementing measures to foster insight and to make these problems accessible to the human mind. Yet these problems have thus far usually been empirically analyzed on an individual-item level only (e.g., by experimentally comparing participants’ performance on various versions of one of these problems). In this paper, by contrast, we examine these illusions as a group and look at the ability to solve them as a psychological construct. Based on an sample ofN= 2,643 Luxembourgian school students of age 16–18 we investigate the internal psychometric structure of these illusions (i.e., Are they substantially correlated? Do they form a reflexive or a formative construct?), their connection to related constructs (e.g., Are they distinguishable from intelligence or mathematical competence in a confirmatory factor analysis?), and the question of which of a person’s abilities can predict the correct solution of these brain teasers (by means of a regression analysis). (shrink)

This paper gives a survey of David Hilbert's (1862–1943) changing attitudes towards logic. The logical theory of the Göttingen mathematician is presented as intimately linked to his studies on the foundation of mathematics. Hilbert developed his logical theory in three stages: (1) in his early axiomatic programme until 1903 Hilbert proposed to use the traditional theory of logical inferences to prove the consistency of his set of axioms for arithmetic. (2) After the publication of the logical and set-theoretical (...) paradoxes by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell it was due to Hilbert and his closest collaborator Ernst Zermelo that mathematical logic became one of the topics taught in courses for Göttingen mathematics students. The axiomatization of logic and set-theory became part of the axiomatic programme, and they tried to create their own consistent logical calculi as tools for proving consistency of axiomatic systems. (3) In his struggle with intuitionism, represented by L. E. J. Brouwer and his advocate Hermann Weyl, Hilbert, assisted by Paul Bemays, created the distinction between proper mathematics and meta-mathematics, the latter using only finite means. He considerably revised the logical calculus of thePrincipia Mathematica of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell by introducing the ε-axiom which should serve for avoiding infinite operations in logic. (shrink)

Les recherches de Zermelo sur la théorie des ensembles et les fon­dements des mathématiques se divisent en deux périodes : de 1901 à 1910 et de 1927 à 1935. Elles s’effectuent en même temps que les deux projets de recherche sur les fondements des mathématiques de David Hilbert et de ses collaborateurs à Göttingen ; durant la première période, Hilbert élaborait son premier programme d’axiomatisation, auquel Zermelo souscrivait totalement. La seconde période correspond au développement du programme formaliste de (...) Hilbert que Zermelo rejette en raison de son caractère finitiste. son travail est à cette époque dirigé contre Hilbert. (shrink)

Background: The Self-Regulation of Eating Behavior Questionnaire is an economical way of assessing an individual's self-regulatory abilities regarding eating behavior. Such scales are needed in the German population; therefore, the purpose of the present study was the translation and validation of a German version of the SREBQ.Method: First, we conducted a pilot study after the translation procedure. Second, we assessed the final scale in a representative sample of the German population and its underlying factor structure. Further, we tested for measurement (...) invariance and evaluated the SREBQ's associations with related scales to explore convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, we considered differences in SREBQ based on sociodemographic variables and provided derived reference scores.Results: Factor analysis revealed deficiencies in the original model. Thus, we shortened the scale based on statistical considerations and the adapted version showed improved fit in Confirmatory Factor Analysis and reliability. We also found evidence for partial strict invariance, which means the measure is equivalent for the tested groups of age and gender. Item and scale psychometric properties of the shortened version were satisfactory. In terms of diagnostic validity, it was shown that individuals with higher body mass index have worse self-regulation of eating behavior than those with lower.Conclusion: In sum, the SREBQ evidenced good validity and reliability and is suitable for application in medical, psychological, and nutritional research. (shrink)

The goal of this study was to determine whether it is possible to teach children with serious decoding problems four text comprehension strategies in listening contexts. The subjects were 9-11 year old students from special schools for children with learning disabilities. All the students were very poor at decoding; half of the group were also poor listeners, whereas the other half consisted of normal listeners. The experimental children were trained in strategies of clarifying, questioning, summarising and predicting through a combination (...) of reciprocal teaching and direct instruction. The results indicated significant programme effects on a strategic listening comprehension test. A transfer effect on general listening comprehension and general reading comprehension tests was not found. The poor listeners within the experimental group did not perform better than the normal listeners. (shrink)