In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 249 larger sections of the work will be translated-preferably not from the Latin, but from the Arabic original. JOSEPHL. B~u Columbia University Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. by John P. Rowan. (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. Pp. xxiii + 955.2 vols., boxed, $25.00.) Generally speaking, the two Summae of St. Thomas, long available in English translation, contain all that (...) is most personal and most profound in his philosophical thought. Nonetheless, it is quite impossible to get a fully adequate conception of St. Thomas' place in the history of western thought from a consideration of his theological writings alone. Hence, by translating St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle into English, Professor J. P. Rowan has provided the non-Latin reading student of the history of philosophy an invaluable service. For it is in his r61e as Aristotelian commentator that we see St. Thomas creating for the Schoolmen a version of Aristotle which served to render the Stagirite's thought into terms which became fundamental to the philosophical defense of Christianity. Further, by keeping in mind the fully-developed notions of St. Thomas on the existence of God and the nature of being as these are given us to understand in the Summae, the reader becomes better enabled, by a critical reading of Thomas' Commentary, to grasp the sense in which the Saint's theological writings are said by his enthusiasts to represent a "completing" and "perfecting" of Aristotle's thought. Professor Rowan's translation is based upon the Turin, 1950, edition of R. M. Spiazzi. This edition is itself fundamentally the older edition of M. R. Cathala, containing but few emendations. Although the translator was obliged to check Spiazzi occasionally against the Parma and Viv6s editions of Thomas' Opera Omnia, the usefulness of such consultation was, as Professor Rowan himself states, "limited inasmuch as both the editions of Viv~s and that of Cathala use Parma as their basic text" (p. vii). Further, since the edition from which he worked was not critical, Professor Rowan found it necessary in some instances to himself emend the reading of the Spiazzi text. However, where such alterations were made, and where indeed they were not obviously required, Professor Rowan indicated his iustification for the change in a footnote. It is unfortunate that no critical edition of Thomas' work was available to his translator; still, although a final evaluation of his emendations must, of course, attend the future appearance of a critical edition of Thomas' work, so far as we were able to judge, Professor Rowan's 250 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY changes were in all instances quite reasonable and well ]ustified. Professor Rowan has wisely included a translation of that version of the Aristotelian text upon which St. Thomas (in all probability) based his commentary. As this Latin version frequently departs from such currently available English translations as those of W. D. Ross, H. Tredennik, and others which are based upon Greek sources, a good deal of confusion as to Thomas' actual point of departure would have been introduced had this inclusion not been made. The general value and utility of Professor Rowan's work is further increased by his footnoted indications of the more important variations obtaining between the Greek text (as given in Bekker), and the Latin version employed by St. Thomas. For the reader who wishes to compare the Latin version, the Greek text, and the English translations, Professor Rowan has provided the standard Bekker reference numbers at the beginning of each of Thomas' Lectiones. To further simplify the whole matter of reference and cross-reference, Professor Rowan has used the letter C, followed by a numeral, to designate sections of Thomas' Commentary. These sections are the same as those established originally by Cathala. Numbers not preceded by C designate the appropriate sections of the Latin version of Aristotle's text, and correspond with those given by Spiazzi in his revision of the Cathala edition. Thus, as example, in such a reference as (241:C345), the first number designates the section of the version of Aristotle employed by St. Thomas, and the second, the section of St. Thomas... (shrink)

In my article, “Why Psychology Hasn’t Kept Its Promises” , I argued that psychology hasn’t become the science its practitioners had hoped because psychologists continue to focus on mentalistic constructs and they adhere to a methodology that emphasizes statistical inference over experimental analysis. I concluded that in order to better keep their promise of a psychological science, psychologists should return to studying the relationship between observed behavior and its context with the type of experimental analysis that characterizes the other experimental (...) sciences. In his reply, Lana suggests that there may be aspects of human social and verbal behavior that are so complex that we may not be able to carry out a solid experimental analysis, thus limiting what we can discover about our own nature. Lana concludes that the methodologies needed to understand these more complex social relationships are hermeneutic and historical rather than experimental in nature. I concur with Lana both that an experimental analysis of much of human behavior may not be possible and that psychologists must, therefore, rely on complementary descriptive, interpretive, and historical analyses. I argue, however, that the interpretive language and the historical hindsight must be based on a foundation of basic principles derived from the systematic experimental analysis of behavior. (shrink)

This essay posits that psychology’s general lack of respect as a science stems from two related problems: the continued focus on conceptually vague mentalistic constructs and the adherence to a methodology that emphasizes statistical inference over experimental analysis. The lack of a thoroughgoing experimental analysis has so far prevented psychologists from discovering a set of foundational principles thus inhibiting them from being able to predict and control individual behavior. Psychologists can remake their conceptual and methodological foundations by focusing on the (...) relationship between observed behavior and its context and by adopting methods of experimentation that would aid in the discovery of orderly functional relationships. This knowledge could be used to more parsimoniously explain complex behavior, including cognitive phenomena, and to more effectively solve practical problems. (shrink)

"The professional memoir of Henry Burroughs--former president of the White House Press Photographers Association, chairman of the Senate Standing Committee for Photographers, and "shooter" for the Associated Press for thirty-three years--whose career docu.

For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; (...) happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most god-like things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike... (shrink)

Hegel introduced the Phenomenology of Mind as a work on the problem of knowledge. In the first chapter, entitled “Sense Certainty, or the This and Meaning,” he concluded that knowledge cannot consist of an immediate awareness of particulars ). The tradition discusses sense certainty in terms of this failure of immediate knowledge without, however, specifically addressing the problem of reference. Yet reference is distinct from knowledge in the sense that while there can be no knowledge of objects without reference, there (...) may be reference without knowledge. If that is the case, then the failure of immediate knowledge does not entitle us to conclude anything about the success or failure of reference. It is not surprising, then, that a few scholars have begun to examine sense certainty primarily as a thesis about reference. (shrink)