A groundbreaking, deeply personal, magnum opus on madness and philosophy from a psychotic patient turned philosopher.

How can we study bounded rationality? We answer this question by proposing rational task analysis —a systematic approach that prevents experimental researchers from drawing premature conclusions regarding the rationality of agents. RTA is a methodology and perspective that is anchored in the notion of bounded rationality and aids in the unbiased interpretation of results and the design of more conclusive experimental paradigms. RTA focuses on concrete tasks as the primary interface between agents and environments and requires explicating essential task elements, (...) specifying rational norms, and bracketing the range of possible performance, before contrasting various benchmarks with actual performance. After describing RTA’s core components we illustrate its use in three case studies that examine human memory updating, multitasking behavior, and melioration. We discuss RTA’s characteristic elements and limitations by comparing it to related approaches. We conclude that RTA provides a useful tool to render the study of bounded rationality more transparent and less prone to theoretical confusion. (shrink)

This work employs Husserl's concept of responsibility as a guiding clue for the clarification of the self-understanding of phenomenology as a `rigorous science'. Originally an appeal for radical accountability and ultimate foundation in the field of philosophical theory, Husserl's concept of responsibility culminated finally in a philosophy of human self-renewal. This philosophical telos of ultimate self-responsibility, which was also fuelled by a striving towards cultural reform, was realised for Husserl in a transcendental field of transparent self-evidence, linguistic univocity and transhistorical (...) ideality. With reference to J. Derrida's reading of Husserl, the author shows, that the elements singled out as those for which phenomenology cannot assume responsibility - exteriority, passivity and contingency - are not only delivered over to the interminable process of being worked upon, but remain rather constitutive for the endeavour of phenomenologising itself. This becomes manifest in the inevitable linguisticality of phenomenology, its `secondary enworlding', as it is conceived in E. Fink's project of the VIth Cartesian Meditation. In the context of this linguisticality it is the explosive power of the metaphor, which vouches for the openness, that fulfils the mission of phenomenology to carry in its innermost nature responsibility for a space of transgression. (shrink)

Hansjörg Hohr; Illusion—How Friedrich Schiller Can Cast Light on Bildung, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 36, Issue 3, 16 December 2002, Pages 487–50.

Hansjörg Hohr; Illusion—How Friedrich Schiller Can Cast Light on Bildung, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 36, Issue 3, 16 December 2002, Pages 487–50.

To analyze the task of mental arithmetic with external representations in different number systems we model algorithms for addition and multiplication with Arabic and Roman numerals. This demonstrates that Roman numerals are not only informationally equivalent to Arabic ones but also computationally similar—a claim that is widely disputed. An analysis of our models' elementary processing steps reveals intricate tradeoffs between problem representation, algorithm, and interactive resources. Our simulations allow for a more nuanced view of the received wisdom on Roman numerals. (...) While symbolic computation with Roman numerals requires fewer internal resources than with Arabic ones, the large number of needed symbols inflates the number of external processing steps. (shrink)

The concept of experience by John Dewey revisited: conceiving, feeling and “enliving”. Dewey takes a few steps towards a differentiation of the concept of experience, such as the distinction between primary and secondary experience, or between ordinary (partial, raw, primitive) experience and complete, aesthetic experience. However, he does not provide a systematic elaboration of these distinctions. In the present text, a differentiation of Dewey’s concept of experience is proposed in terms of feeling, “enliving” (a neologism proposed in this paper) and (...) conceiving. Feeling refers to the basic mode of experience where action, emotion, cognition and communication constitute an original unity. Enliving, aesthetic experience, constitutes the lifeworld, as a person-in-world experience. Even though enliving is holistic and relational, a certain distance emerges between action, emotion and cognition which allows contemplation and choice. Conceiving, on the other hand, refers to the isolating and abstracting understanding of the world with even greater distance between action, emotion and cognition. Such a differentiation provides a clearer understanding of the scope of education. It avoids the risks of regressive tendencies in the concept of experience, and it helps to include conceiving within the realm of experience. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the relation between philosophy and madness. It is often assumed that madness has to be suppressed, excluded, or conquered before a philosophically sensible text, logical argument, or world of meaning can appear. I argue, instead, that a certain concept of madness, when grafted on phenomenological psychiatry and philosophical mysticism, is intrinsically related to the project of philosophy. With the help of experiences of madness as presented in psychiatry and articulated in mad autobiographical reports, including my (...) own, I will show that philosophy and madness are in closer connection than is commonly assumed. In the introduction, I refer to some superficial... (shrink)

In this text, features of fiction are discussed as to their ability for handling cultural diversity in cosmopolitan education. The argument is developed in two steps. First, the biblical story about the construction of the the tower of Babel is analyzed and discussed with respect to what is says about diversity and how it says it. In a second step, aspects of art are gathered from various sources, Aristotle, Cassirer, Gadamer, Langer, Kant, Rorty, in order to define the communicative possibilieties (...) of art with respect to cosmopolitan education. (shrink)

This study focuses on the question of how Muslim chaplains can, through their interventions, exert an influence on the situation of refugees, characterised by vulnerability and loss of home. Based on definitions in social work and anthropology studies, home can be conceptualised as a key anthropological need, comprised of spatial, temporal, relational and spiritual dimensions. Referring to an empirical study on asylum chaplaincy in Switzerland, this study analyses how five Muslim chaplains accompany refugees, how their styles of chaplaincy differ in (...) practice and what effects their interventions have. These empirical results are then brought into conversation with a theoretical framework, to explore the connections between counselling and vulnerability. While it could be argued that referring to the vulnerable situation of refugees reinforces an image of passivity, the co-construction of a home represents a collaborative effort and empowers refugees by mobilising both forces and resources. Chaplains, in particular, can contribute to the relational and spiritual dimensions of home. For refugees, articulating their religious concerns and working together with Muslim chaplains, means they can address the limits of the existing asylum system and demand recognition of cultural diversity. (shrink)

This paper investigates the effects of relative position and proxemics in the engagement process involved in Human-Robot collaboration. We evaluate the differences between two experimental placement conditions for an autonomous robot in a collaborative task with a user across two different types of robot behaviours. The study evaluated placement and behaviour types around a touch table with 80 participants by measuring gaze, smiling behaviour, distance from the task, and finally electrodermal activity. Results suggest an overall user preference and higher engagement (...) rates with the helpful robot in the frontal position. We discuss how behaviours and position of the robot relative to a user may affect user engagement and collaboration, in particular when the robot aims to provide help via socio-emotional bonding. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and relate to these experiential alterations. (...) This study aimed to investigate the nature of delusional reality experience, and its subjective apprehension, in individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis. METHODS: In this qualitative phenomenological study, we recruited individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis from two psychiatric-hospital services in Belgium using homogenous sampling. Criteria for participation were having undergone at least one psychotic episode with occurring delusional symptoms, present at least 1 year before participation, on the basis of clinical notes assessed by the attending psychiatrist; a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis, ascertained through clinical interview by the attending psychiatrist upon admission; being aged between 18 years and 65 years; and having the capacity to give informed consent. Exclusion criteria included worries concerning capacity to consent and risk of distress caused by participation. We did phenomenologically driven semi-structured interviews with the participants to explore the nature of delusional reality experience and their subjective valuation of these experiences. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis, a qualitative method tailored to the in-depth exploration of participants’ first-person perspective, to analyse their accounts. FINDINGS: Between March 2, 2020, and Sept 30, 2020, 18 adults participated in the interview study. The findings suggest that delusions are often embedded in wide-ranging alterations of basic reality experience, involving quasi-ineffable atmospheric and ontological qualities that undermine participants’ sense of the world as unambiguously real, fully present, and shared with others. We also found that delusional reality experience can differ from standard reality in various ways, across multiple dimensions, and that participants are often implicitly or explicitly aware of the distinction between delusional and standard reality. Delusional experience can have an enduring value and meaning that is not fully captured by a strictly medical perspective. INTERPRETATION: Increased awareness and recognition of the distinctive nature of delusional reality experience, in both clinical and research settings, can improve diagnostic accuracy, explanatory models, and therapeutic support for individuals with delusions whose lived realities are not always evident from an everyday perspective. FUNDING: FWO Flanders. TRANSLATION: For the Dutch translation of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section. (shrink)

Cognition is both empowered and limited by representations. The matrix lens model explicates tasks that are based on frequency counts, conditional probabilities, and binary contingencies in a general fashion. Based on a structural analysis of such tasks, the model links several problems and semantic domains and provides a new perspective on representational accounts of cognition that recognizes representational isomorphs as opportunities, rather than as problems. The shared structural construct of a 2 × 2 matrix supports a set of generic tasks (...) and semantic mappings that provide a unifying framework for understanding problems and defining scientific measures. Our model's key explanatory mechanism is the adoption of particular perspectives on a 2 × 2 matrix that categorizes the frequency counts of cases by some condition, treatment, risk, or outcome factor. By the selective steps of filtering, framing, and focusing on specific aspects, the measures used in various semantic domains negotiate distinct trade-offs between abstraction and specialization. As a consequence, the transparent communication of such measures must explicate the perspectives encapsulated in their derivation. To demonstrate the explanatory scope of our model, we use it to clarify theoretical debates on biases and facilitation effects in Bayesian reasoning and to integrate the scientific measures from various semantic domains within a unifying framework. A better understanding of problem structures, representational transparency, and the role of perspectives in the scientific process yields both theoretical insights and practical applications. (shrink)

This paper investigates the effects of relative position and proxemics in the engagement process involved in Human-Robot collaboration. We evaluate the differences between two experimental placement conditions for an autonomous robot in a collaborative task with a user across two different types of robot behaviours. The study evaluated placement and behaviour types around a touch table with 80 participants by measuring gaze, smiling behaviour, distance from the task, and finally electrodermal activity. Results suggest an overall user preference and higher engagement (...) rates with the helpful robot in the frontal position. We discuss how behaviours and position of the robot relative to a user may affect user engagement and collaboration, in particular when the robot aims to provide help via socio-emotional bonding. (shrink)

A robot's decision to harm a person is sometimes considered to be the ultimate proof of it gaining a human‐like mind. Here, we contrasted predictions about attribution of mental capacities from moral typecasting theory, with the denial of agency from dehumanization literature. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated mind perception for intentionally and accidentally harmful robotic agents based on text and image vignettes. Experiment 3 disambiguated agent intention (malevolent and benevolent), and additionally varied the type of agent (robotic and human) using (...) short computer‐generated animations. Harmful robotic agents were consistently imbued with mental states to a lower degree than benevolent agents, supporting the dehumanization account. Further results revealed that a human moral patient appeared to suffer less when depicted with a robotic agent than with another human. The findings suggest that future robots may become subject to human‐like dehumanization mechanisms, which challenges the established beliefs about anthropomorphism in the domain of moral interactions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How to Reason Beyond Reason? Toward a Philosophical Understanding of MadnessWouter Kusters, PhD (bio)To analyze the situation of madness on the ground, we need a grounded perspective, close to the situation at hand. The closer we come to the subject under scrutiny, the clearer its outlines, fine-grained details, and its dynamics, and the better we reach an explanation and understanding. The closer the approach, however, the higher the chances (...) are of becoming myopic and losing the connections with broader—or higher—perspectives: the view from above. It has been due to philosophical and historical approaches from above to the practices of philosophically inspired psychiatry that we may gain new insights into what is going on on the ground—and underground. This article by Garson provides such a view that may lead to a change in perspective, a new way to draw boundaries on the ground, to discover similarities and dissimilarities through space and time, without thereby losing the lived connection to the problematic ground.Garson proposes to replace a binary opposition of madness (in the sense of sick or insane) versus sanity (in the sense of healthy), with a triad of concepts, sanity, madness, and idiocy, taken from the work of philosophers of psychiatry avant la lettre in the early modern times, Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth. This triad is to be understood in terms of reason, where idiocy consists of the diminishment of some aspects of reason, while madness would be characterized by a perversion of reason. By examining how this perversion—or more neutrally said, this change—of reason was conceived by the four thinkers, Garson sheds a new light on research and theory within the philosophy of madness and the philosophy of psychiatry today. He examines the question of “how is it that the mad person “has” reason, but is still not reasonable?” with the help of the four authors mentioned above (of which I discuss three).In answering this question, Garson refers specifically to my work as an example of “exactly the kind of ontology we need for rethinking madness in a positive manner—not necessarily ‘positive’ in the sense of good, helpful, or ennobling, but in the sense of going beyond a mere lack, absence, or failure.” I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment, [End Page 317] and Garson’s proposal of this tripartite schema is helpful and valuable for thinking through how we can further nourish a positive view of madness, especially with reference to Mad Pride.Locke and HeinrothGarson discusses some fragments from Locke and concludes that according to Locke “the mad person, in contrast to the idiot, possesses reason by virtue of possessing an intact inferential capacity. What ultimately makes them mad, and not reasonable, is that their premises are flawed by the unhinged power of association.” So, with Locke the capacity for inferential logic is not disturbed, and in that sense reason is intact. The unreasonable behavior would be due, according to Locke, to an unbridled increase in imagination and associations, which are taken for reality. Instead of reason the capacity to align imagination and reality is afflicted. When we translate this Lockean view into contemporary terms, we could say that it is not their cognition, their way of processing stimuli that is problematic, but their being overwhelmed by impressions or stimuli. This is akin to “bottom-up” theories: Something is wrong with perception or experience, and ‘higher’ capacities of cognition and reasoning remain intact. Reason may seem ‘perverted,’ but at a closer look, this is a result of their being victim to anomalous experience, too many stimuli or too strong imaginations.Heinroth also explicitly distinguishes madness from idiocy, that is, from a diminishment of mental capacities. Instead, he considers madness as a reaction to what Garson calls “a reality that is too awful to bear.” Madness is then “a wholesome desire of nature to cure a perversion through another perversion.” Again, madness is then not in itself a diminishment of reason, but an attempt to cure something that went wrong, in a way that is also only seemingly wrong (perverted reason). Madness then is again within reason, but this core of intact reason is... (shrink)

Within The Doctrine of Right in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant deals with the social institution of household, the Domestic Society, next to Property Right and Contract Right as part of the Private Right. The juridical problem to solve is the question to what extent human beings can be entitled to dispose persons as a “belonging” at all. This problem of Reification insistently arises with regard to the relation of partners in a marriage: According to Kant, Sexuality as a consumption (...) by which human beings make use of themselves as of things is reconcilable with the dignity of humanity only under the condition of marriage. By marrying, persons acquire one another reciprocally, so that they aren't in an external relation to one another any more. However, in contrast to this strict juridical reciprocity of the sexes in a marriage there is no corresponding equality concerning the regime of the household. Hence, with his anthropology of the sexes Kant unintentionally implements teleological patterns of argumentation into the Right of pure practical reason. (shrink)

Rousseaus politisches Denken bewegt sich in beiden Bereichen der klassischen Politik: in denen von Haus und Staat, von Privatem und Öffentlichem. Der liberalen Opposition von Individuum und Staat setzt Rousseau ein Modell der politischen Einheit entgegen, das durch die Vermittlungsinstanzen von Geschlechter- und Familienordnung gewährleistet ist. Mit dem erstmals ausformulierten Ideal einer empfindsamen Beziehungskultur wird ein Modell bürgerlicher Lebenskultur propagiert, das sich gleichermaßen auf die häuslich-intime Privatsphäre wie auf die Dimension republikanischer Öffentlichkeit erstreckt und das Rousseaus nachhaltige Deutungsmacht für das (...) moderne bürgerliche Selbstverständnis erweist. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, I will examine the question why it is so difficult to understand madness. First, I will examine what the third-person approach of psychosis or madness has to offer, and where its limitations lie with respect to its proper understanding. Next I will examine if and how the first-person perspective on madness contributes to our understanding. I will demonstrate that there is a stalemate between third- and first-person perspectives, which on the one hand hinders a free sight (...) on madness, but which is on the other hand exemplary of the problem that is presented by madness. This turns out to be a paradox that haunts both the concept and experience of madness itself, as well as those who try to understand it. In the fourth section, I will unpack some of the operations of the paradox as it is found both in philosophy and madness, both by their producers as by their consumers. In the fifth section, I will tentatively sketch (im)possibilities of escaping paradoxes. (shrink)

Nowadays, consumer ethics represents a relevant field of review. There have been some attempts to conduct literature reviews; however, these have been few and incomplete. For this reason, this paper follows two main objectives: (1) to develop a performance analysis to measure the impact/perceptibility of academic production on consumer ethics (most cited authors, journals and themes) and (2) to visually present the scientific structure by themes of research in consumer ethics as well as its evolution along time. Using SciMAT software, (...) a comprehensive thematic review is discussed. 568 scientific papers (2569 keywords and 8642 citations) were retrieved from the Web of Science from 1995 to 2021 (May). Our results show three main periods with two main research themes (consumer and corporate social responsibility), which remain relevant themes at the time. Also, some new themes that promote ethical consumption have gained weight or appear over time, some of which are linked to the marketing field (such as experiences, satisfaction, attitudes or privacy among others). (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 57 Heft: 4 Seiten: 447-463.

The least common subsumer of a set of concept descriptions is the most specific concept description that subsumes all of the concept descriptions in the given set. By computing the lcs, commonalities between concept descriptions can be made explicit. This is an important inference task useful in several applications, including, for instance, the bottom-up construction of description logic knowledge bases. Previous work on the lcs has concentrated on description logics that either allow for number restrictions or for existential restrictions. Many (...) applications, however, require to combine these constructors. In this work, we present an algorithm for computing the lcs in the description logic ALEN which comprises both constructors—number and existential restrictions—as well as concept conjunction, primitive negation, and value restrictions. To prove correctness of our lcs algorithm, we develop a structural characterization of subsumption in ALEN. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Der folgende Beitrag handelt vom Rückgriff auf den Körper an der Grenze und will einige der besonderen Problematiken skizzieren, die sich durch eine kontrollpolitisch begründete Ontologie des Körpers und seine weitere Verarbeitung als datenbankgestützte Identität im Kontext der europäischen Migrationspolitik ergeben. Er will damit einen Beitrag zur Politisierung der konstitutiven Instabilität einer verkörperten Identität leisten, d. h. einer Identität und vor allem auch eines Körpers, wie sie – gewissermaßen gegen das somatische Identitätskriterium, demgemäß „wir“ unser Körper „sind“ – von (...) Feminist*innen wie etwa Elizabeth Grosz oder Niamh Stephenson und Dimitris Papadopoulos und, für den Bereich der Surveillance Studies, etwa von Kirstie Ball postuliert wurde. Im ersten Teil des Textes greifen wir drei Fälle auf. Sie haben sich infolge der Flüchtlingsbewegungen nach Europa ab 2015 ereignet und sind ihrerseits – wie wir zeigen werden, ganz und gar nicht rational begründet – zu Skandalen beschworen und anschließend als Argumente angeführt worden, um sowohl für die gesellschaftliche und politische Akzeptanz als auch für die Zweckmäßigkeit einer zunehmenden Daten-Interoperabilität und einer Ausweitung der Geltungsbereiche zu werben, wie sie sich anhand der EURODAC-Novellierung erkennen lassen, die sich gegenwärtig vollzieht. Im zweiten Teil fassen wir den EURODAC-Recast zusammen – und skizzieren damit eine neue Entwicklungsphase der soziotechnischen Assemblage, durch die in den europäischen Entwicklungs- und Forschungseinrichtungen der biometrischen Identifikation und der Kontrolle der Mobilität eine verkörperte Identität der Migration produziert wird. (shrink)