Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to know why I am justified in holding a moral belief. In a typical case, I will respond by citing a further moral belief that justifies it. A regress arises because, in order for this further belief to justify anything, it too must be justified. According to a traditional position in moral epistemology, moral foundationalism, the regress comes to an end with some moral beliefs. Moral foundationalism is an (...) attractive position because it promises to answer the regress problem. However, it inherits the burden of explaining why some moral beliefs have a particular privileged epistemic position – that is, why these beliefs are justified without requiring inferential support from other beliefs. The standard answer to this question is to insist that some moral beliefs have as their content propositions that are self-evident.A common way of resisting moral foundationalism is to argue from the fact of moral disagreement to the claim that no moral proposition is self-evident. I argue that while a simple version of this argument fails, this argument can be developed in such a way that it poses serious difficulties for moral foundationalism. I develop this argument by drawing on recent work in epistemology on the nature of our epistemic burdens in the face of peer disagreement. I then suggest that even if this argument does show that moral foundationalism fails, it need not have skeptical implications so long as coherentism remains a viable option in moral epistemology. Finally, I claim that this argument has implications for normative ethics. Namely, it rules out a position advocated by Peter Singer in his early work and indirectly supports the method of reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

The author presents Gernot Böhme’s median mode of being theory, which attempts to find an anthropological middle ground between the rational and the irrational, the spiritual and the corporeal and the active and passive in human experience. Böhme’s reflections on the median mode of being are normative in character and linked to the concept of “sovereign man,” which he strongly defends and whose main characteristics Hoffmann outlines in the first part of the essay. Among others, Hoffmann argues against Böhme’s excessive (...) emphasis on the controlling/restrictive functions of awareness at the cost of those functions which serve to protect and stimulate life, his non-distinction between the distance to a cognized object and its intellectual instrumentalisation, and his rather one-sided tendency to seek the sources of European rationalism in the Socra-tean tradition. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Michael Thompson (2006) argues that there is a problem about justice that holds for Aristotlean, Humean, and Kantian views of ethics. To see his problem, consider the normative judgment that “X wronged Y by killing her.” Thompson thinks that Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian views can show why Xdid something wrong by killing Y but they cannot show that X wronged Y, at least not without taking on intolerable moral, metaphysical, or epistemological commitments. I argue that the (...) Kantian can solve this problem without taking on any intolerable commitments, given the way that duties are derived from thecategorical imperative. (shrink)

Since learning emerges from a circuit mediating behavior it is unrealistic to require LTP to be a sufficient explanation of it; however, LTP is a necessary component of some learning circuits. The properties of that component bear a closer formal relationship to the acquisition of associative strength than to the modulation of attention.

The field of modern logic is too extensive to be worked through by open cast mining. To open it up, we need to sink shafts and construct adits. This is the method of most text books: a systematic exposition of a number of main topics, supplemented by exercises to teach skill in the appurtenant techniques, lays a secure foundation for subsequent dis cussion of selected questions. Compared with this, the present treatment is more like a network of exploratory drillings to (...) show that it would be worthwhile to start mining operations, or to work the existing shafts and adits, as the case may be. Within this metaphor we may also describe the inherent weakness of this conception: once a cavity is pierced, the duct's capacity will in general not be sufficient to carry away the discovered riches. But whether we are concerned with a new or an already worked mine - at any rate, the experience should stimulate us into either reviving an existing system of shafts or even, in particularly fortunate cases, designing a new ap proach. (shrink)

Se presenta una experiencia musical desarrollada con una muestra total de ciento noventa participantes entre los dos y los tres años de edad. El objetivo consiste en facilitar la discriminación de dos parámetros musicales: duración e intensidad, mediante varias sesiones musicales desarrolladas con metodología constructivista y conexionista. Se adapta el Test de aptitudes musicales de Seashore para la etapa de infantil. La incorporación de estas metodologías ha resultado muy positiva, observando evolución en la identificación de los estímulos proporcionados. Se contempló (...) la procedencia familiar y la asistencia a actividades musicales pudiendo resultar condicionantes por la exposición a la escucha musical. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag stellt die Zeitlichkeit des Bewusstseins und ihre Folgeprobleme in einer neuen Perspektive vor, die sich aus der Verknüpfung der empirischen Theorie selbstreferentieller Systeme mit der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls ergibt. -/- .

We investigate two formalizations of Optimality Theory, a successful paradigm in linguistics.We first give an order-theoretic counterpart for the data and processinvolved in candidate evaluation.Basically, we represent each constraint as a function that assigns every candidate a degree of violation.As for the second formalization, we define (after Samek-Lodovici and Prince) constraints as operations that select the best candidates out of a set of candidates.We prove that these two formalizations are equivalent (accordingly, there is no loss of generality with using violation (...) marks and dispensing with them is only apparent).Importantly, we show that the second formalization is equivalent with a class of operations over sets of formulas in a given logical language.As a result, we prove that Optimality Theory can be characterized by certain cumulative logics.So, applying Optimality Theory is shown to be reasoning by the rules of cumulative logics. (shrink)