In diesem Aufsatz wird das Verh?ltnis zwischen den Begriffen Gelassenheit und???????, von Heidegger als?Auseinandersetzung??bersetzt und aufgefasst, untersucht. Der Betrachtung liegt dabei die Frage zu Grunde, ob der sp?te Heidegger sich mit den Begriffen Gestell und Gelassenheit?berhaupt noch im Sinne grundlegender Gestalten der menschlichen Lebensweise auseinandersetzt, so wie er es in den 30er Jahren tat und behauptete. Weitergehend wird die Beziehung des Begriffs der Gleichf?rmigkeit, verstanden als eine Folge der technischen Herrschaft?ber die Erde, zu C. Schmitts Begriff der Neutralisierung (...) als eine der Konsequenzen der zunehmenden Technisierung hergestellt und diskutiert. (shrink)

La notoria importancia que Eckhart da al desapego de las cosas (Gelassenheit) podría sugerir que el místico alemán desdeña la vida activa. Inversamente, Eckhart entiende que el desasimiento respecto de las creaturas es perfectamente compatible con la acción e incluso interpreta, de un modo opuesto a..

Angesichts von Zweifel und Verzweiflung, von Furcht und Angst - jeweils verstanden als existentielle Grundbefindlichkeiten des Menschen - werden Haltungen gelingenden Lebens gesucht. Die Ethik bietet Tugenden als Wege zu einer gelingenden Lebensfuhrung an. Die Beitrager dieses Buches suchen nach Entwurfen, die die Verbindung des Tugendgedankens mit dem naturlichen Glucksverlangen des Menschen zu ermoglichen helfen und erortern, welche Bedeutung dabei Mut, Gelassenheit und Weisheit zukommt. Dabei werden ideengeschichtliche Entwurfe in heutigen Problemkontexten auf ihre Gultigkeit hin gepruft. Mit Beitragen von (...) Martin Ebner, Markus Enders, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Stephan Herzberg, Hubert Irsigler, Margit Kopper, Matthias Kossler, Jean-Luc Marion, Peter Reifenberg, Ralf Rothenbusch, Gerd Theissen, Klaus Viertbauer und Gunther Wenz. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz wird das Verhältnis zwischen den Begriffen Gelassenheit und πόλεμοσ, von Heidegger als „Auseinanderset- zung“ übersetzt und aufgefasst, untersucht. Der Betrachtung liegt dabei die Frage zu Grunde, ob der späte Heidegger sich mit den Begriffen Gestell und Gelassenheit überhaupt noch im Sinne grundlegender Gestalten der mensch- lichen Lebensweise auseinandersetzt, so wie er es in den 30er Jahren tat und behauptete. Weitergehend wird die Beziehung des Begriffs der Gleichförmig- keit, verstanden als eine Folge der technischen Herrschaft über (...) die Erde, zu C. Schmitts Begriff der Neutralisierung als eine der Konsequenzen der zu- nehmenden Technisierung hergestellt und diskutiert. (shrink)

Apartándose de la interpretación humanista /metafísica, la comprensión originaria de la estética, la ética y la lógica que expone Heidegger lleva consigo un nuevo humanismo centrado en torno a la idea de Gelassenheit. Pero Gelassenheit, núcleo del habitar poético del hombre, es también la esencia de la experiencia artística originaria que es verdaderamente una poética de la receptividad del ser, es decir, una experiencia ética y ontológica originaria.

: The article explores the topic of Gelassenheit in Heidegger, through the lense of the ambiguous role of Christian mysticism in general and Eckhart in particular in and for his thinking. In an analysis of how mysticism appears in his early lectures on religion, it explains why he is critical of this concept and of how it is commonly understood. It also gives reasons for why we too should be cautious in using it to describe his position in his (...) later writings where he explicitly reconnects to themes and concepts from Eckhart. The text provides a critical rehearsal of Eckhart's understanding of both “Abgeschiedenheit” and "Gelassenheit" and how Heidegger relates to it both in his early lectures and in his later essays. Ultimately it outlines a phenomenological understanding of what is commonly referred to as a “mystical” comportment more along the lines of a heightened openness and awareness, in Heidegger’s words as a “releasement toward things and an openness to the secret”. Thus, instead of seeing Heidegger’s later writings as a sort of crypto-mysticism, the text seeks to show how his critical appropriation of Eckhart explicitly points beyond a standard dichotomy between the rational and the mystical, in an effort to develop a comportment of thinking than can respond to the demand of modern technological predicament. (shrink)

Separating from the humanistic/metaphysical interpretation, Heidegger’s original view of Aesthetics, Ethics and Logic, contains a new humanism centred in the idea of Gelassenheit. But Gelassenheit, the nucleus of poetic dwelling of man, is also the essence of the original artistic experience, that is in fact a poetic of the receptivity of being, in other words, an ethical and ontological original experience.

This is the first of a series of commentaries on the works of the latest Heidegger; all of Heidegger's works published by Neske of Pfullingen since 1954 will be presented and interpreted in the series. The expository plan announced in the editor's preface calls for three-part commentaries, with the first part summarizing the work in question, the second presenting glosses of lines or paragraphs as required by their respective importance, and the third giving philological exegesis of texts also as required (...) in the judgment of the editors. The interpretative inspiration is generally traditional, with more emphasis given to themes with echoes in medieval and modern rationalism and in Italian and French ontologism. The editors adopt Heidegger's characteristic attitude in his latter period, his relinquishing of all objective or subjective idealistic presuppositions. Ontology thus becomes the unveiling of the conditions of possibility of Dasein's speech as truth-making. In Being and Time these conditions of possibility were given in the fundamental ontology and reached their existential expression in resolve. In Gelassenheit Dasein has become a mere instrumentality for the ultimate sense of Being to come to pass. The conditions of possibility of the new Dasein are well understood and highlighted by Landolt. Their existential expression is a new temporal tension within the Dasein, that of Warten or attending. If resolve was the modal intentionality of authentic Dasein, attending is the modal intentionality of poetic symbolic Dasein. Landolt does not seem to have been sufficiently critical of the reflective character of this new intentionality. Can it adequately ground essence, fact and freedom? The techniques of this commentary often depart from hermeneutical respect for the text.--A. M. (shrink)

In his recently published Donner le temps II, Derrida raises, but does not develop, the possibility that Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit (‘releasement’, ‘letting-be’) might escape the economic confines of exchange, debt, and repayment and therefore qualify as a pure gift. In this paper, I explore this possibility, explaining that Gelassenheit would have to be understood, first, not primarily as a human comportment but at the level of being itself, second, beyond appropriation, and third, as ‘without why’. If Heidegger's (...) focus on appropriation in ‘Time and Being’ remains entangled in the economy of exchange (as Derrida insinuates in the final session of Donner le temps II), Heidegger's anarchic treatment of ‘letting’ ( laisser, Lassen) in the final session of his 1969 seminar in Le Thor opens instead onto a ‘pure giving’ ( pur donner, reines Geben). (shrink)

This dissertation shows how the problem of the will is at the very heart of Heidegger's thought---not only explicitly in his post-turn critique of the technological "will to will" and in his intimations of Nicht-Wollen or Gelassenheit---but in the twistings and turnings of the development of his thought-path as a whole. ;In Chapter 1, in the course of laying out the interpretive terms of the investigation, I also begin with a consideration of the "debate" between the two great 19th (...) century philosophers of the will: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Chapter 2 interprets the problem of the will in Being and Time as the "unsaid" problematic which the early Heidegger is working through and around. Chapter 3 deals with the turbulent turning through an embrace of the will---most infamously in his call for self-assertion and sacrifice to the Nazi state---in the transitional period of the 1930's. ;Chapters 4 and 6 examine many of the major themes of the later Heidegger's thought in light of this problematic---the former explicating his critique of the rise of the will through the history of metaphysics which culminates in the extreme epoch of the technological will to will, and the latter interpreting his many compelling intimations of non-willing ways of dwelling, letting things be, poetic creation, and thoughtful co-respondence to Being. Chapter 5 considers the complexities of the transition from the will to non-willing, focussing in particular on the enigmatic question of how to "will non-willing." ;Chapter 7 doubles back to turn the light of Heidegger's critique of the will back on those moments or aspects of his later thought which retain "residues of will." Chapter 8 then attempts to carry forward a critical appreciation for Heidegger's---and now our own---way of maintaining the problem of the will and the possibility of non-willing. (shrink)

Der Artikel versucht, die vielfältige und komplexe Beziehung von Heideggers Denken zu Schellings Philosophie zu untersuchen und so genau wie möglich zu bestimmen. Von der anfänglichen Faszination für Schellings zentrale Schrift über die Freiheit, in der er bedeutende Analogien zu seinen eigenen Versuchen findet, die Endlichkeit der Freiheit und damit des Seins selbst nachzuweisen, wird sich Heidegger im weiteren Entwicklung seines Denkens von Schelling immer mehr und immer schärfer distanzieren, indem er ihm vorwirft, die Metaphysik nicht zu überwinden, sondern innerhalb (...) ihres Horizontes zu bleiben, wenn auch auf eine bemerkenswerte und in jeder Hinsicht respektable Weise. Die Angemessenheit dieses Urteils wird im Artikel durch einen kritischen Vergleich und eingehende Begriffsanalyse von Schellings Konzeption von Willen, Liebe, Ekstase und Indifferenz einerseits und Heideggers Auffassung von Bösem, Willen zum Willen, Kehre und Gelassenheit andererseits in Frage gestellt und allseitig überprüft. Als Ergebnis der Untersuchung kommt die sachliche Verwandtschaft dieser zentralen Konzepte der Spätphilosophie des einen und des anderen Denkers ans Licht, die viel größer ist als Heidegger bereit war, es zu sehen, zu akzeptieren und für die letzten Zwecke des eigenen Denkens zu verwenden. (shrink)

The problem of the will has long been viewed as central to Heidegger's later thought. In the first book to focus on this problem, Bret W. Davis clarifies key issues from the philosopher's later period--particularly his critique of the culmination of the history of metaphysics in the technological "will to will" and the possibility of Gelassenheit or "releasement" from this willful way of being in the world--but also shows that the question of will is at the very heart of (...) Heidegger's thinking, a pivotal issue in his path from Being and Time (1926) to "Time and Being" (1962). Moreover, the book demonstrates why popular critical interpretations of Heidegger's relation to the will are untenable, how his so-called "turn" is not a simple "turnaround" from voluntarism to passivism. Davis explains why the later Heidegger's key notions of "non-willing" and " Gelassenheit " do not imply a mere abandonment of human action; rather, they are signposts in a search for an other way of being, a "higher activity" beyond the horizon of the will. While elucidating this search, his work also provides a critical look at the ambiguities, tensions, and inconsistencies of Heidegger's project, and does so in a way that allows us to follow the inner logic of the philosopher's struggles. As meticulous as it is bold, this comprehensive reinterpretation will change the way we think about Heidegger's politics and about the thrust of his philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz rekonstruiert die Entwicklung von Ralph Waldo Emersons Denken als Teil einer philosophischen Lebenskunst, deren mehrfache Anpassung und Veränderung sich jeweils als Reaktion auf einschneidende Verlusterfahrungen verstehen lässt. Der Tod seiner ersten Ehefrau Ellen Tucker sowie das plötzliche Dahinscheiden seines Sohnes Waldo sind nicht nur biographisch-existenziell prägend, sondern diese Ereignisse markieren zugleich bedeutende Wendepunkte innerhalb von Emersons philosophischem Schaffen. Von der christlich-protestantischen Tradition einer Selbstkultivierung nach Maßgabe einer imitatio christi über die Zurückweisung epistemischer und metaphysischer Gewissheitsansprüche und eine experimentierfreudige (...) pragmatische Weltanschauung führt der gedankliche Weg Emersons schließlich zu einer intensiven Beschäftigung mit der tragischen Dimension einer Welt ohne Gewissheiten und Sinngarantien. Am Ende dieser Entwicklung steht die Einsicht in die Flüchtigkeit und Vergänglichkeit alles Seienden, die sich mit einer Haltung lebensbejahender und heiterer Gelassenheit verbindet. (shrink)

This paper explores the selective uptake of Martin Heidegger’s work in critical philosophy of race and in black studies. While scholars have drawn from Heidegger’s thinking on technology to offer accounts of the technological production of race in general and of blackness in particular, few have engaged with Heidegger’s response to technology: his discussions of Gelassenheit or “releasement.” This paper analyzes this avoidance of Gelassenheit, arguing that its interpretation as passivity points to broader anxieties about the need to (...) act that are symptomatic of Heidegger’s account of technology itself. These anxieties lead to a potentially damaging tacit prioritization of action at the expense of thought, and a reduction of black people to their value as actors or workers, even among thinkers like Saidiya Hartman who valorize a resistant waywardness. (shrink)

According to the author, Heidegger's understanding of the metaphysical roots of modern technology also indicates a way out of its life-threatening grip. Technik und Gelassenheit is an attempt to clear that alternative path according to and after Heidegger. Unaware of the extent of "die ökologische Katastrophe wie das atomäre Inferno," Heidegger was too generous to metaphysics and unable to hope that technology itself would be part of the turn from metaphysics. Schirmacher aims to cultivate that very hope, taking up (...) where Heidegger left off, by developing a notion of the unity of Technik and Gelassenheit. (shrink)

The current breakdown in the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world is evident in the crisis of anthropogenic climate change. This critical situation has prompted intellectuals to think through a proper name for our contemporary era. Some opt for the “Anthropocene,” the era of humans, which highlights the uniquely human role in planetary destruction. Others prefer the “Capitalocene” to emphasize capitalism’s role in the crisis. Still others argue that our era is marked by an age of (...) information, which the author labels the “Pliroforicene” since pliroforia roughly means “information” in ancient Greek. Having discussed the pros and cons of these labels, the author discusses conscious rebellions against the Capitalocene and the Pliroforicene through the lenses of the work of sociologist Erik Olin Wright and philosopher Richard Polt. The author then argues that Martin Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit, which is defined as a comportment towards beings in which one is open to the ways in which they reveal themselves as they are rather than subsuming them into one’s own interests, may prove to play a crucial role in our contemporary era, regardless of what we call it since it allows us to respect the integrity of things. (shrink)

Heidegger’s understanding of technology advances a conceptual critique of what he calls “the enframing” (Gestell), the epistemological and ontological presuppositions underlying technology. Reconstructing the central argument of Country Path Conversation (1945), the chapter focuses the positive contrast to “the enframing” Heidegger finds in the idea of Gelassenheit (“releasement”): releasement defines a form of life marked by an intellectual independence from technology achieved through a specific form of thinking. Drawing from Haugeland, section 1 establishes “enabling” as genuine sense of the (...) German verb lassen (to let); in contrast to the form of thinking determinative of technology, which Heidegger describes as imposing, the “released” and genuine form of human thinking is an enabling thinking. In sections 2 and 3, I reconstruct the reductio ad absurdum Heidegger uses to distance this form of thinking from forms of transcendental philosophy embracing (mediational) representationalism. In section 4, I highlight the (ontic) correlate of such thinking, namely the individual things (Dinge) manifest outside the horizon of understanding presupposed by technology. Not based on or anticipating any positive ontology, I argue that “enabling” thinking is ontologically non-committal. Section 5 contrasts this understanding of Gelassenheit with views advanced by Dreyfus, Rojcewicz, Belu, and Feenberg. (shrink)