Although the promyelocytic leukemia (PML) protein is renowned for regulating a wide range of cellular processes and as an essential component of PML nuclear bodies (PML‐NBs), the mechanisms through which it exerts its broad physiological impact are far from fully elucidated. Here, we review recent studies supporting an emerging view that PML's pleiotropic effects derive, at least partially, from its role in regulating histone H3.3 chromatin assembly, a critical epigenetic mechanism. These studies suggest that PML maintains heterochromatin organization by restraining (...) H3.3 incorporation. Examination of PML's contribution to H3.3 chromatin assembly in the context of the cell cycle and PML‐NB assembly suggests that PML represses heterochromatic H3.3 deposition during S phase and that transcription and SUMOylation regulate PML's recruitment to heterochromatin. Elucidating PML’ s contributions to H3.3‐mediated epigenetic regulation will provide insight into PML's expansive influence on cellular physiology and open new avenues for studying oncogenesis linked to PML malfunction. (shrink)

Randomized controlled trials are often considered the gold standard for estimating causal effect, but they may lack external validity when the population eligible to the RCT is substantially different from the target population. Having at hand a sample of the target population of interest allows us to generalize the causal effect. Identifying the treatment effect in the target population requires covariates to capture all treatment effect modifiers that are shifted between the two sets. Standard estimators then use either weighting, outcome (...) modeling, or combine the two in doubly robust approaches. However, such covariates are often not available in both sets. In this article, after proving L 1 {L}^{1} -consistency of these three estimators, we compute the expected bias induced by a missing covariate, assuming a Gaussian distribution, a continuous outcome, and a semi-parametric model. Under this setting, we perform a sensitivity analysis for each missing covariate pattern and compute the sign of the expected bias. We also show that there is no gain in linearly imputing a partially unobserved covariate. Finally, we study the substitution of a missing covariate by a proxy. We illustrate all these results on simulations, as well as semi-synthetic benchmarks using data from the Tennessee student/teacher achievement ratio, and a real-world example from critical care medicine. (shrink)

This paper builds on the critique that Renaud Filleule addresses in this issue to radical ecological economics – known also as socio-ecological economics (SEE) – and more specifically to the works of one of his most famous representatives, Clive Spash. Filleule builds his critique from Austrian economics. I adopt a broader perspective. Indeed, although Austrian economics identifies key caveats of SEE, one may challenge its whole scientific substance on more general grounds. True, Clive Spash’s works are keen on putting forth (...) methodological arguments to institute SEE not only as a scientific theory but also as the major paradigm in ecological economics. However, such arguments are unconvincing, amounting to activism-in-disguise of science, as reflected in Spash’s semantic ambiguity, his misconception of social science and overstated claims and pointless ordering of scientific knowledge. Moreover, Spash’s critique of economic growth is not only empirically wrong – as correctly noticed by Filleule – but also conceptually irrelevant. This is because defective theories necessarily lead to wrong or insignificant statements. (shrink)

The necessity of epistemological theorisation for management science is questionable. However, epistemology can be useful if the following distinction between three kinds of epistemology, usually overlooked, is taken into account: epistemology as a structured academic discipline, epistemology as an intellectual exercise produced outside academic epistemology, and finally the epistemology specific to each researcher. When this distinction is not made, epistemology can become counterproductive and impede scientific work.

How can we make businesspeople more concerned about the truth of the information they spread or allow to circulate? In this age of ‘fake news’, ‘business bullshit’ and ‘post-truth,’ the issue is of the utmost importance, especially for business trustworthiness in the internet economy. The issue is related to a kind of epistemic responsibility, that consists in accounting for one’s own epistemic wrongdoings, such as making a third party believe something false. Despite growing interest in epistemic misbehavior in the literature (...) of business ethics, the question of epistemic responsibility has been neglected. The aim of this paper is therefore to address this gap, by proposing a notion of epistemic responsibility for business, that may help regulate undesirable epistemic behavior, such as the spreading of false information. To define this notion of epistemic responsibility, I have introduced the concept of epistemic fault. Being epistemically responsible consists in being disposed to account for alleged epistemic faults. This notion of epistemic fault relies on a theoretical framework which combines a typology of eight ‘epistemic values’, a normative stance regarding these values, and a dispositional approach to epistemic virtues and vices. I use this theoretical framework to integrate the various accounts of epistemic virtues and vices found in the literature into a single explanatory scheme. Combined with the notion of epistemic responsibility itself, such an integrative framework should facilitate the practical application of an operational epistemic ethics in business, i.e., the development of virtuous epistemic practices. (shrink)

RésuméÀ plusieurs reprises et poursuivant des buts distincts, Ibn al-Haytham a déterminé les variations d'une fonction bien connue aujourd'hui. Le contexte de ces applications révèle certaines caractéristiques de la pensée mathématique et physique de ce savant. Une étude précise de ses démonstrations mathématiques de monotonie suggère combien il a pu approcher d'un concept élaboré du continu.

RésuméNous avons tenté de restituer ici les mathématiques qui président aux théories planétaires exposées par l'astronome syrien Ibn al-Šāṭir dans son ouvrage Nihāyat al-Sūl. Dans la lignée des astronomes de l’école de Marāgha, en composant des mouvements de rotation à vitesse angulaire constante, Ibn al-Šāṭir atteint deux objectifs. Non seulement il élimine tout recours aux excentriques et aux points équants; mais il décrit aussi longitudes et latitudes planétaires par une méthode unique, sans adjoindre aucun orbe en sus des orbes nécessaires (...) à la description des seuls mouvements en longitude. Une meilleure compréhension des rotations comme transformations spatiales lui permet cette grande économie de moyens. Dans notre commentaire, nous prenons pour exemple la planète Vénus dont les latitudes posent un problème intéressant. C'est aussi l'occasion d'offrir l’édition critique d'un chapitre de la Nihāyat al-Sūl consacré aux mouvements en latitude de Mercure et Vénus. (shrink)

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue discussing the usefulness of philosophy in managerial practice. We present the papers included in this special issue and identify keynote directions for further research. The initial intention of the call for papers was to promote this topic on research agendas by offering a platform for discussing if, why, and how philosophy can complement and enhance management practice. Now that this special issue has been published, we see a broader significance: the (...) arguments explored here are a starting point for more in-depth studies of the connections that can occur between specific philosophical concepts, theories, methods on the one hand, and concrete managerial practices on the other. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the philosophical sources of some of the criticisms made in the second half of the 20th century to the practices and the main assumptions of historiography. In particular, the influence of the writings by Nietzsche dedicated to European Historicism on the renewed concept of history which is imposed in the twentieth century from the thought of Heidegger and Foucault. The divergent concepts of historical time and existential temporality, as well as those of (...) narrative unity and continuity of historical events, are the concepts that mainly fall under the critical scrutiny of these thinkers. Archaeological investigations that Foucault devotes to institutions and procedures of the European past are mentioned as examples of the critical review of traditional historiography. (shrink)

Social entrepreneurship is a precarious activity that must always strike a delicate balance between commercial principles and social concerns. There is no shortage of discussion concerning the possible solutions that could help to maintain this balance, and social entrepreneurs are striving to reconcile conflicting aims on a daily basis, but the economic roots of this precariousness remain. Based on an analysis of these root causes, we propose a new radical approach to this precariousness, “radical” in the etymological sense of the (...) term “root”. We start by identifying what determines the dilemma that lies at the heart of the precariousness of social entrepreneurship in present-day economic institutions. This enables us to identify the institutional conditions that might allow us to overcome it. The first condition is linked to the conservation of money in individual trade, which might be alleviated. To determine the second condition, we introduce the notion of the endogeneity of the institutional solutions to the dilemma. The lesser the involvement of the actors concerned by its formulation, the less endogenous is the solution. On this basis, we suggest institutional reforms that could prompt entrepreneurs to organize themselves in support of the actions of the most socially oriented entrepreneurs, thus safeguarding their sustainability. (shrink)

abstract G. A. Cohen argues that egalitarians should compensate for expensive tastes or for the fact that they are expensive. Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, regards most expensive tastes as unworthy of compensation — only if a person disidentifies with his own such tastes (i.e. wishes he did not have them) is compensation appropriate. Dworkinians appeal, inter alia, to the so‐called ‘first‐person’ or ‘continuity’ test. According to the continuity test, an appropriate standard of interpersonal comparison reflects people's own assessment of their (...) relative standing: Person A can only legitimately demand compensation from person B if he regards himself as worse off, all things considered, than B. The typical bearer of expensive tastes does not regard herself as being worse off than others with less expensive tastes. Hence, in the typical case, pace Cohen, compensation for expensive tastes is inappropriate. The article scrutinizes this rationale for not compensating for expensive tastes. Especially, we try to bolster the continuity test by relating it to Dworkin's distinction between integrated and detached values, pointing out that an argument for the continuity test can be built on the assumption that equality has integrated value. In brief, the point is that a metric of equality should be assessed, partly, in virtue of its consequences for related ideals. One of these is the kind of justificatory community promoted by the continuity test. We defend this view against an objection to the effect that equality is a detached value. We conclude that the continuity test constitutes a strong foothold for the resourcist egalitarian reluctance to compensate people for their expensive tastes. (shrink)

Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that (...) specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent that depends consistently on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not on the exercise of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights. (shrink)

Les sciences de gestion ne sont pas dans la science, mais dans le désir de faire science, le désir d’une science fantasmée. Cela apparaît dans leur obsession pathologique pour une « méthode scientifique » chimérique. Rien ne doit dépasser, tout doit être propre et lisse, alors que c’est l’approximation qui est au cœur du travail scientifique. Les sciences de gestion ratent ainsi quelque chose de fondamental dans la démarche scientifique en état incapable de saisir son imperfection. Comme les sciences médiévales, (...) elles sont au contraire habitées par une mystique de la perfection. Il n’est pas possible de s’en extraire individuellement. Mais une philosophie des sciences de gestion pourrait aider à collectivement sortir de cet état. (shrink)

In the second half of the nineteenth century, France was the main site of the controversy around the so-called eoliths, supposedly human-made tools of Tertiary Europe. In contrast to the more common situation where scientists have to make sure that an object stabilized in a laboratory is not an artifact of the lab but a natural object, in the eoliths debates the opposite was the case. The eolith proponents tried to render plausible the object's artificial, that is human, origin. In (...) their case, the objects would only be of scientific interest if they were artifacts not geofacts (naturally flaked stones). The paper ties in with existing literature on the French eoliths movement and investigates the successive eoliths debates in Britain. In Bruno Latour's terms, eoliths as archaeological evidence for Tertiary Man in Europe could gain in reality through a successful enlisting of the collaboration of human and non-human actors such as scientists, theories, publications, taxonomies, technologies, institutions, etc. Indeed, networks were established among scientists, preferably of powerful institutions, the 'tools' were integrated or denied a place in existing taxonomies of prehistoric artifacts, experiments were carried out to demonstrate their chance or designed origin, and their convergence or incompatibility with a certain theoretical framework was discussed. Arguments often revolved around questions of negative evidence, since both proponents and opponents of eoliths as tools were aware of the fact that the eoliths' strongest tie to reality would be evidence of the toolmakers themselves. Several known hominid fossils, among them those of doubtful age, were thus proposed as Tertiary shapers of the 'tools'. These hypothetical 'Englishmen' and their supposed artifacts were enmeshed in particular theories of human evolution, marked as they were by the racism and nationalism widespread at the time. (shrink)

Résumé C’est en faisant la nature que nous la connaissons et, en vivant, nous lui donnons forme. La nature n’est pas quelque chose d’extérieur. L’écologie n’est pas une science, c’est un mouvement social et politique.

We describe a model-theoretic approach to ordinal analysis via the finite combinatorial notion of an α-large set of natural numbers. In contrast to syntactic approaches that use cut elimination, this approach involves constructing finite sets of numbers with combinatorial properties that, in nonstandard instances, give rise to models of the theory being analyzed. This method is applied to obtain ordinal analyses of a number of interesting subsystems of first- and second-order arithmetic.

Nietzsche no perdió la ocasión de menospreciar a Mill como el típico inglés de mentalidad pasiva, en cambio los intérpretes actuales de Nietzsche son cautelosos en este aspecto, pues el filósofo alemán leyó muy minuciosamente a Mill, en particular su obra Sobre la libertad. Cuando él propicia que Zaratustra hable acerca de «el más frío de todos los monstruos fríos», lo hace con una promesa de futuro: «Allí, donde el Estado acaba, ahí comienza el ser humano que no es superfluo (...) […]. Allí, donde el Estado acaba, — ¡miradme de este modo hacia allá hermanos míos! ¿No los veis, al arcoíris y los puentes del suprahumano?». El presente trabajo establece una comparativa entre la visión de Dios y del Estado en la época moderna y la reflexión que hace Friedrich Nietzsche en Así habló Zaratustra acerca del Estado como algo monstruoso. Para este propósito se utilizarán respectivamente pasajes de la obra de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arthur Schonpenhauer, Friedrich Leopold Stolberg, Karl Marx, Max Sterner, Wilhelm von Humboldt y John Stuart Mill. (shrink)

Cet article offre une vue d’ensemble sur les Éléments pour la généalogie de la morale de Nietzsche. La genèse de l’œuvre est d’abord présentée, puis les sources que Nietzsche a exploitées pour ses réflexions sont examinées. Cet examen des sources est suivi d’une analyse de la conception, de la structure et du contenu de l’« écrit polémique » de Nietzsche. Les sections du livre sont présentées et commentées dans leur succession.

RésuméDans l’Almageste, Ptolémée a proposé le concept du mouvement d'enroulement pour expliquer notamment les latitudes planétaires. Ibn al-Haytham a rédigé un traité intitulé Fī ḥarakat al-iltifāf, « Surle mouvement d'enroulement ». Un anonyme a écrit une critique de ce traité. Les deux mémoires sont perdus; mais heureusement a survécu la réponse d'Ibn al-Haytham, intitulée Fī ḥall šukūk ḥarakat al-iltifāf, « La résolution des doutes sur le mouvement d'enroulement ». Il y rappelle le modèle élaboré et en détaille encore l'explication. Nous (...) donnons ici édition critique, traduction et commentaire de cette réponse, ainsi qu'une édition et traduction de passages apparentés des Hypothèses planétaires de Ptolémée et de la Nihāyat al-idrāk de Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī. (shrink)

What does morality require of individuals in their dating and sex life? In this article I challenge recent outlines of antidiscrimination duties in the dating sphere and present a plausible alternative: the deliberative duty. This duty avoids the risks and limitations of earlier outlines: it is time-sensitive regarding the malleability of intimate preferences, it avoids being too demanding on the duty-bearer and minimizes the risk of generating mere dutiful attraction behavior towards right-holders. In addition, it is better suited for universal (...) action guidance in the dating sphere than earlier outlines of individual antidiscrimination duties. (shrink)