The idea that remembering involves an engram, becoming stable and permanent via consolidation, has guided the neuroscience of memory since its inception. The shift to thinking of memory as continuo...

This article focuses on two indices from Geschlecht III session XIII: (1) an apparently insignificant reference to Stiegler and (2) the recourse to the concept of the engram as a trope of other grammatological figures that are more frequent in Derrida's work. By interweaving these indexes together, the article suggests that Derrida's text can be read as a noteworthy stage in his ongoing dialogue with Bernard Stiegler surrounding the question posed by human evolution to any accounts of the history (...) of life. Along this path, the article inscribes Derrida's (en-)grammatological history of life within the line of thought that goes from Richard Semon's engram theory to Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka's contemporary re-elaboration of this theory. In doing so, it argues that, although for Stiegler Derrida's grammatology aligns with biological reductionism, the latter may provide the theoretical framework for current evolutionary accounts of life as plasticity. (shrink)

The discovery of the engram, the physical substrate of memory, is a central challenge for the sciences of memory. Following the application of optogenetics to the neurobiological study of memory, scientists and philosophers claim that the engram has been found. In this paper, I evaluate the implications of applying optogenetic tools to the localization of the engram. I argue that conceptions of engram localization need to be revised to be made consistent with optogenetic studies of the (...) engram. I distinguish between challenges to vehicle and content localization. First, I consider the silent engram hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, optogenetic studies indicate that synaptic efficacy, the traditional engram-bearing vehicle, is important merely for retrieval. I argue that this interpretation rests upon a misunderstanding of accessibility. Second, I argue that optogenetic-based strategies and findings conflict with preservationist and constructivist views on memory storage. There is an enduring trace, but stored content may change over time and experience, resulting in doubt about what constitutes a single engram. (shrink)

Optogenetics makes possible the control of neural activity with light. In this article, I explore how the development of this experimental tool has brought about methodological and theoretical advances in the neurobiological study of memory. I begin with Semon’s distinction between the engram and the ecphory, explaining how these concepts present a methodological challenge to investigating memory. Optogenetics provides a way to intervene into the engram without the ecphory that, in turn, opens up new means for testing theories (...) of memory error. I focus on a series of experiments where optogenetics is used to study false memory and forgetting. (shrink)

The recent emergence of reprogramming technologies to convert brain cell types or epigenetically alter neurons and neural progenitors in vivo and in situ hold significant promises in brain repair and neuronal aging reversal. However, given the significant epigenetic and transcriptomic changes to components of the existing neuronal cells and network, we question if these reprogramming technology might inadvertently alter or erase memory engrams, conceivably resulting in changes in narrative identity or personality. We suggest that the nature of these alterations might (...) be less predictable compared to memory and personality changes known to be associated with diseases, drugs or brain stimulation therapies. While research in applying reprogramming technologies to neurological ailments and aging should continue, more targeted analyses should be put in place in animal experiments to gauge the severity and degree of memory alterations, and appropriate risk and benefit analyses should be conducted before these technologies move into human trials. (shrink)

This paper consists of two parts. In Part I, an attempt to get around certain well-known criticisms of the trace theory of memory is discussed. Part II consists of an account of the so-called "logical" notion of a memory trace. Trace theories are sometimes thought to be empirical hypotheses about the functioning of memory. That this is not the case, that trace theories are in fact philosophical theories, is shown, I believe, in the arguments which follow. If this is so, (...) one may well wonder about psychologists' insistence that any empirical theory of memory must involve the postulation of traces (or trace-like entities: engrams, schemata, etc.). (shrink)

The (dis)continuism debate in the philosophy and cognitive science of memory concerns whether remembering is continuous with episodic future thought and episodic counterfactual thought in being a form of constructive imagining. I argue that settling that dispute will hinge on whether the memory traces (or “engrams”) that support remembering impose arational, perception-like constraints that are too strong for remembering to constitute a kind of constructive imagining. In exploring that question, I articulate two conceptions of memory traces—the replay theory and the (...) prop theory—that return conflicting answers to whether remembering is constructive imagining. The prop theory’s vision of traces is suggestive of continuism, while the replay theory’s is a natural fit for discontinuism. Which view of traces is in fact correct remains undetermined by current empirical work. Nevertheless, it may already be possible to reach a compromise in the (dis)continuism debate, through the development of a conciliatory continuist causal theory. This view—only outlined here—accepts the continuism-friendly prop theory of traces, while still requiring that genuine remembering fulfills an appropriate causation condition, as required by the kinds of causal theories of remembering typically favored by discontinuists. (shrink)

Neuroscientists are searching for the engram within the conceptual framework established by John Locke's theory of mind. This framework was elaborated before the development of information theory, before the development of information processing machines and the science of computation, before the discovery that molecules carry hereditary information, before the discovery of the codon code and the molecular machinery for editing the messages written in this code and translating it into transcription factors that mark abstract features of organic structure such (...) as anterior and distal. The search for the engram needs to abandon Locke's conceptual framework and work within a framework informed by these developments. The engram is the medium by which information extracted from past experience is transmitted to the computations that inform future behavior. The information-conveying symbols in the engram are rapidly generated in the course of computations, which implies that they are molecules. (shrink)

From _atavistic_ to _folie a deux_, from _engram_ to _Weltschmerz_ and _Seashore test_, this edition of _The Concise Dictionary of Psychology_ contains more than 1,300 references to words, phrases and eminent pioneers in psychology. Updated to take account of recent developments, each definition is clear, instructive and concise. A lean and efficient source of information, written in a straightforward and readable manner, this book will be an indispensable reference tool for students of psychology, for professionals and for people in the (...) health and caring professions. (shrink)

The problem of biological memory led Russell to propose the existence of mnemic causation, a mechanism by which past experience influences current thought directly, that is, without the need for a material intermediary in the form of a neural "memory trace." Russell appears to have been inspired by German biologist Richard Semon's concept of mnemic homophony, which conveys memory to consciousness on the basis of similarity between current and past circumstances. Semon, however, in no way denied a role for stable (...) neural structures or "engrams" in the memory process. In contrast to Russell, contemporary biologist Rupert Sheldrake provides a viable theory of memory by remaining true to Semon's original idea and expanding it beyond personal memory to the collective memory of species, encompassing not only mental but developmental memory. (shrink)

Long‐term modification of synaptic strength is thought to be the basic mechanism underlying the activity‐dependent refinement of neural circuits and the formation of memories engrammed on them. Studies ranging from cell culture preparations to humans subjects indicate that the decision of whether a synapse will undergo strengthening or weakening critically depends on the temporal order of presynaptic and postsynaptic activity. At many synapses, potentiation will be induced only when the presynaptic neuron fires an action potential within milliseconds before the postsynaptic (...) neuron fires, whereas weakening will occur when it is the postsynaptic neuron that fires first. Such processes might be important for the remodeling of neural circuits by activity during development and for network functions such as sequence learning and prediction. Ultimately, this synaptic property might also be fundamental for the cognitive process by which we structure our experience through cause and effect relations. BioEssays 24:212–222, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.; DOI 10.1002/bies.10060. (shrink)

Consolidation of long-term memory is a highly and precisely regulated multistep process. The transcription regulator cAMP response element-binding protein (CREB) plays a key role in initiating memory consolidation. With time processing, first the cofactors are changed and, secondly, CREB gets dispensable. This ultimately changes the expressed gene program to genes required to maintain the memory. Regulation of memory consolidation also requires epigenetic mechanisms and control at the RNA level. At the neuronal circuit level, oscillation in the activity of CREB and (...) downstream factor define engram cells. Together the combination of all regulation mechanisms allows correct memory processing while keeping the process dynamic and flexible to adjust to different contexts. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/BhSCSmorpEc. (shrink)

Based on theoretical considerations of Aurell (1979) and Block (1995), we argue that object recognition awareness is distinct from purely sensory awareness and that the former is mediated by neuronal activities in areas that are separate and distinct from cortical sensory areas. We propose that two of the principal functions of neuronal activities in sensory cortex, which are to provide sensory awareness and to effect the computations that are necessary for object recognition, are dissociated. We provide examples of how this (...) dissociation might be achieved and argue that the components of the neuronal activities which carry the computations do not directly enter the awareness of the subject. The results of these computations are sparse representations (i.e., vector or distributed codes) which are activated by the presentation of particular sensory objects and are essentially engrams for the recognition of objects. These final representations occur in the highest order areas of sensory cortex; in the visual analyzer, the areas include the anterior part of the inferior temporal cortex and the perirhinal cortex. We propose, based on lesion and connectional data, that the two areas in which activities provide recognition awareness are the temporopolar cortex and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Activities in the temporopolar cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the remote past (consolidated object recognition), and those in the medial orbitofrontal cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the recent past. The activation of the sparse representation for a particular sensory object in turn activates neurons in one or both of these regions of cortex, and it is the activities of these neurons that provide the awareness of recognition of the object in question. The neural circuitry involved in the activation of these representations is discussed. (shrink)

Introduction to sensory psychology, by C. Mueller.--Some reflections on brain and mind, by R. Brain.--In search of the engram, by K. Lashly.--Cerebral organization and behavior, by R. W. Sperry.--Relations between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs, by E. von Holst.--Effects of the Gestalt revolution, by J. E. Hochberg.--Seeing in depth, by R. L. Gregory.--The stimulus variables for visual depth perception, by J. J. Gibson.--The elaboration of the universe, by J. Piaget.--Visual perception approached by the method of stabilized (...) images, by R. M. Pritchard, W. Heron, and D. O. Hebb.--Philosophy as rigorous science, by E. Husserl.--The "sensation" as a unit of experience, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--The phenomenology of perception: perceptual implications, by A. Gurwitsch.--The expression of thinking, by E. W. Straus.--The concept of group and the theory of perception, by E. Cassirer.--Norm and pathology of I-world relations, by E. W. Straus.--The metaphysical in man, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--Cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions, by M. H. Segall, D. T. Campbell, and M. J. Herskovits.--The interpretive cortex, by W. Penfield.--Recovery from early blindness: a case study, by R. L. Gregory and J. G. Wallace.--Visual disturbances after perceptual isolation, by W. Heron, B. K. Doane, and T. H. Scott. (shrink)

After defining various aspects of memory, this paper has sought to outline the phenomenology of memory developed by Erwin Straus and his effort to refute the trace or engram theory of memory storage. We found Straus proposing some major insights : that human experience has its own structure of lived time, that this experience transcends the realm of physical events, and that the suchness of past experiences is preserved, and can be reactivated, in lived time. Straus's approach repudiates the (...) conventional reductionistic wisdom about memory. That wisdom has some powerful support, both ideological and experimental. However, other evidence taken from physiological, neurological, clinical and psychological observations lends weight to Straus's views. The final answer is not in, but it seems plausible that Straus was on the right track toward a framework for human memory. We concluded with a brief broadening out of the Straus framework into the whole realm of lived time or temporality. (shrink)

The very idea of a retinal pattern-sensation that can be impressed on the neural tissue of the brain is a misconception, for the neural pattern never even existed in the retinal mosaic. There can be no anatomical engram in the brain if there was no anatomical image in the retina. The retina jerks about. It has a rapid tremor. It even has a gap in it (the blind spot). It is a scintillation, not an image. An engram impressed (...) on the brain would have to be divided into two changing parts in the two halves of the brain, which is impossible. The whole idea stems from the persistent myth that there has to be something in the brain that is visible, and from Johannes Mueller's assumption that the nerves telegraph messages to the brain. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a wealth of studies investigating how memories are allocated in the hippocampus. Some of those studies showed that it is possible to manipulate the identity of neurons recruited to represent a given memory without affecting the memory's behavioral expression. Those findings raised questions about how the hippocampus represents memories, with some researchers arguing that hippocampal neurons do not represent fixed stimuli. Herein, an alternative hypothesis is argued. Neurons in high‐order brain regions can be tuned (...) to multiple dimensions, forming complex, abstract representations. It is argued that such complex receptive fields allow those neurons to show some flexibility in their responses while still representing relatively fixed sets of stimuli. Moreover, it is pointed out that changes induced by artificial manipulation of cell assemblies are not completely redundant—the observed behavioral redundancy does not imply cognitive redundancy, as different, but similar, memories may induce the same behavior. (shrink)

The notion of affective memory was first introduced by Théodule Ribot (1894), giving rise to a debate about its existence at the beginning of the 20th century. Although Vernon Lee did not directly take part in this discussion, she conceptualized this notion in a quite precise way, mainly in her book Music and Its Lovers (1932), clarifying the sometimes obscure formulations made by previous authors. In this short encyclopedic entry, I present Lee's characterization of affective memory.

У статті розглядається специфіка віровчення та основних методів культової та позакультової діяльності прихильників однієї з найвідоміших нетрадиційних синкретичних релігій - саєнтології. Культова практика саєнтологів носить допоміжний характер, а головним для них є надання різноманітних платних послуг. Саєнтологи підтримують соціальні програми: антинаркотичні, антиалкогольні, захист прав людини та ін. Соціальні програми адептів Церкви саєнтології є переважно прикриттям для виконання їхніх місіонерських завдань.

The advent of cinema brought with it a different kind of image montage, to which Warburg’s iconological project was strangely oblivious. Are we meant to believe, then, that the cinema does not produce icons? Is iconology destined to be only a science of classical culture, or can it also evolve to integrate into its own study new forms of kinematic art? We would like to ask the question of organogenesis of iconology here, that is to say, the invention of an (...) iconological science for temporal objects by means of appropriate instruments for this new medium. The instrument is both conceived as a means of acting upon the real, and as a means of activating noetic capacities. The aim of our study will be to first outline the iconographic and iconological consequences stemming from animation and flux that have governed images since the birth of cinema, precipitating a crisis in classical iconology. Secondly, through the analysis of the noetic function of animated GIFs (Graphics Interchange Format) in digital streams, we will introduce the notion of ‘temporal gesture’ – as a tertiarized retentional technology, which can be reused for imagining an iconology of temporal suspension and insistence. This will be presented in the third part of this work to reflect on an iconological device for temporal objects by the grammatization and the engramming of ‘temporal gesture’, as an art of delay and repetition. This thinking will be based on the video artwork produced in collaboration with Gregory Dassié titled Iconologie pour objet temporel. (shrink)

The advent of cinema brought with it a different kind of image montage, to which Warburg’s iconological project was strangely oblivious. Are we meant to believe, then, that the cinema does not produce icons? Is iconology destined to be only a science of classical culture, or can it also evolve to integrate into its own study new forms of kinematic art? We would like to ask the question of organogenesis of iconology here, that is to say, the invention of an (...) iconological science for temporal objects by means of appropriate instruments for this new medium. The instrument is both conceived as a means of acting upon the real, and as a means of activating noetic capacities. The aim of our study will be to first outline the iconographic and iconological consequences stemming from animation and flux that have governed images since the birth of cinema, precipitating a crisis in classical iconology. Secondly, through the analysis of the noetic function of animated GIFs in digital streams, we will introduce the notion of ‘temporal gesture’ – as a tertiarized retentional technology, which can be reused for imagining an iconology of temporal suspension and insistence. This will be presented in the third part of this work to reflect on an iconological device for temporal objects by the grammatization and the engramming of ‘temporal gesture’, as an art of delay and repetition. This thinking will be based on the video artwork produced in collaboration with Gregory Dassié titled Iconologie pour objet temporel. (shrink)

Jean-Pierre Changeux's Neuronal Man attempts to define mental activity, that is thought, with respect to the neurophysiology of the brain.*Since antiquity, the historical account of these problems has undergone the examination of classical notions: what is a mental image, a concept, a representation? Changeux, who accepts these traditional points of departure, as well as the notion of signification, aims to clarify the physical, neurophysiological counterparts of these notions, in order to arrive at less simplistic terms: image de memoire “memory image,” (...) later - objet mental “mental object,” and still later - objet de mémoire “memory object.” Behind these terms lies transition to neurophysiology, with the notion of engram, and finally with the notion of trace, a notion which is precise but very general, since the substantive reality of these traces, their anatomy and physiology in the brain has yet to be determined. (shrink)