The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...) However, the “state of war” ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist. (shrink)

In the modern debate in metaethics and moral psychology, moral rationalism is often presented as a view that cannot account for the intimate relation between moral behaviour on one hand and feelings, emotions, or desires on the other. Although there is no lack of references to the classic rationalists of the 18th century in the relevant discussions, the works of these writers are rarely ever examined detail. Yet, as the debate in Kant scholarship between “intellectualists” and “affectivists” impressively shows, a (...) more thorough analysis of what the classic rationalists actually have to say about moral motivation is suited to cast serious doubts on the idea that moral rationalism must crucially neglect the affective–conative side of human psychology. The aim of this paper is to analyse the conceptions of moral motivation that were embraced by Kant's rationalist predecessors—Clarke, Wolff, Burnet, Balguy, and Price—which have not attracted a similar amount of attention by specialists so far. The claim I will defend is that none of those early rationalists actually embraces the motivational thesis that is often taken to be characteristic of moral rationalism, a thesis I shall refer to as strong rationalism about (moral) motivation. (shrink)

Much in contemporary metaethics revolves around the two positions known as ‘motivational internalism’ and the ‘Humean theory of motivation’. The importance of these positions is mostly due to their role in what is considered to be the most powerful argument for metaethical non-cognitivism: the so-called ‘motivation argument’. In my paper, I want to argue that widely accepted renditions of the MA, such as the rendition recently forwarded by Russ Shafer-Landau, are flawed in two senses. First, they fail to sufficiently distinguish (...) between conceptual claims and empirical psychological claims, thereby somewhat obscuring the status of the argument and its conclusion. Secondly, they start from definitions of motivational internalism that are, in crucial respects, too strong. Motivational internalism is usually formulated as the claim that moral judgements necessarily motivate; as I want to argue, however, the claim that moral judgements potentially motivate is all the motivational internalism a noncognitivist defender of the MA is ever going to need. (shrink)

The paper critically discusses the deontological interpretation of Hobbesian contractual obligation which has been advocated by commentators such as Brian Barry, D. D. Raphael and Bernd Ludwig. According to this interpretation, the obligation to comply with contracts and covenants is fundamentally different from the obligation to observe the laws of nature. While the latter is taken to be a prudential obligation that is logically dependent upon the individual aim of self-preservation, the former is viewed as an absolute or unconditional moral (...) obligation that solely follows from the fact that the individual has bound himself to the performance or omission of certain actions. As can be shown, the deontological interpretation suffers from inherent problems and does not provide an appropriate interpretation of the Hobbesian texts. In particular, it can be demonstrated that the attempt to use Hobbes's concept of 'freedom as deliberation' in order to explain how obligations arise from contractual agreements faces serious difficulties. (shrink)

This paper discusses the juridical interpretation of Hobbes’s state of nature argument, which has been defended by commentators such as Georg Geismann, Dieter Hüning or Peter Schröder. According to the juridical interpretation, the primary reason why the Hobbesian state of nature needs to be abandoned is not that everybody’s self-preservation is constantly threatened. It is that, due to the universal right to all things, the jural order of the state of nature includes some kind of logical contradiction. The purpose of (...) the paper is to show that the juridical interpretation does not do justice to Hobbes’s actual argument and that it starts from a false presupposition: being a Hohfeldian ‘liberty-right’, the right to all things can consistently be granted to all individuals at the same time. (shrink)

The eighteenth century debate between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists has seen a striking renaissance in the past decades, not least because of research into the nature of moral judgement conducted by empirical scientists such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. A claim that is often made in the current discussion is that the evidence made available by such empirical investigations refutes rationalist conceptions of moral judgement and vindicates the views of Hume or other moral sentimentalists. For example, Jesse (...) Prinz and Hanno Sauer have recently argued that the available data demonstrates that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgement and that the best or the only way to make sense of these findings is to conclude that moral judgements are constituted by emotions. The aim of this paper is to thoroughly examine this argument and the underlying empirical evidence and to show that there is currently no compelling evidence for the truth of either the necessity or the sufficiency thesis and that, even if both theses were true, they would fail to provide a sound basis for a plausible sentimentalist constitution claim. (shrink)

As narrativas sobre mulheres, mesmo dentro dos estudos feministas, podem ser entendidas como normativas e colonizadoras, especialmente quando se dão a partir de um olhar ocidental sobre as mulheres do terceiro mundo. A partir da análise do pensamento da autora indiana Chandra Talpade Mohanty, este artigo busca relacionar seu discurso com exemplos de mulheres fotógrafas que buscaram desconstruir essa estrutura hierárquica do olhar, como Claudia Andujar, Graciela Iturbide, Nair Benedicto e Susan Meiselas, além das reflexões da artista interdisciplinar Grada Kilomba, (...) em diálogo com outros autores do campo da imagem. A fotografia pode ser considerada, assim, uma ferramenta de escrita de novas narrativas de resistência.Palavras-chave: Feminismo. Fotografia. Mulheres fotógrafas. AbstractNarratives about women, even within feminist studies, can be understood as normative and colonizing, especially when they are done from a western perspective on third world women. Based on the analysis of the thought of Indian author Chandra Talpade Mohanty, this article seeks to relate her discourse to examples of female photographers who sought to deconstruct this hierarchical structure of the gaze, such as Claudia Andujar, Graciela Iturbide, Nair Benedicto and Susan Meiselas, in addition to the reflections of the interdisciplinary artist Grada Kilomba, in dialogue with other authors in the field of image. Photography can thus be considered a tool for writing new narratives of resistance.Keywords: Feminism. Photography. Women photographers. (shrink)

Die Theorie des Thomas Hobbes hat in der Vergangenheit stark abweichende Deutungen erfahren und Anlass zu zahlreichen lang anhaltenden Debatten geliefert. Die Diskussion hat jedoch allgemein darunter gelitten, dass Hobbes' Schriften von der berwiegenden Anzahl der Interpreten wie ein in sich zusammenh ngender Textkorpus behandelt und die Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Werken nicht hinreichend gew rdigt worden sind. In besonderem Ma e trifft das auf die Naturzustandstheorie zu, die im Zentrum der Hobbes'schen Argumentation steht und in gro em Ma f (...) r die Entstehung und das Fortdauern der genannten Debatten verantwortlich zu machen ist. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die verschiedenen Fassungen der Naturzustandstheorie endlich einer umfassenden vergleichenden Analyse zu unterziehen, und zwar unter konsequenter Einbeziehung des gerade in der deutschen Hobbes-Forschung kaum beachteten Textes des lateinischen Leviathan. Wie sich eindrucksvoll zeigt, vermag der eingehende Vergleich der Schriften nicht nur einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verst ndnis von Hobbes' philosophischer Entwicklung und zur Bestimmung des Stellenwertes des lateinischen Leviathan zu leisten. Er liefert auch einen wichtigen Beitrag zur kritischen Bewertung der vorliegenden Hobbes-Interpretationen und zur Aufl sung einiger zentraler Debatten. (shrink)

: The aim of this paper is to analyse the status of Locke’s state of nature and to examine whether the distinction between different theoretical perspectives can help to resolve the apparent contradictions between Locke’s ‘peaceful’ and his ‘warlike’ description of the natural state, a claim that has been made by commentators such as R. Ashcraft, J. Dunn and H. Aarsleff. Though, it is argued, distinguishing different state of nature accounts in Locke is essential for an appropriate understanding of Locke’s (...) argument, the attempt to thereby free Locke of the charge of inconsistency fails. The reason is that the ‘peaceful’ and the ‘warlike’ description are equally part of Locke’s anthropological analysis. They can, therefore, not be reconciled by distinguishing between a ‘moral’ account of the state of nature on the one hand and an empirical account on the other. (shrink)

Surveys the books, essays, and reviews by and about Ernst Casirer, together with an extensive introduction describing his career and his reception among twentieth-century philosophers, historians, and critics. The emphasis of the volume is literary. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

From the contents:0K. Eggers / A. Stollberg: Vorwort? Antike und Mittelalter? M. Nanni: Musikalische Energeia? 17. bis 19. Jahrhundert? I. Mai Groote:?ut energiam habeat Musica?: Vorstellungen vom Zusammenwirken von Text, Rhythmus und Musik im 17. Jahrhundert? L. Holtmeier: La mécanique des doigts? Energie und Körperlichkeit in der französischen Musiktheorie? A. Stollberg: Schwunglinien und Wellenkurven. Zur Theorie der Melodik im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert? M. Schneider: Tugend-Energie. Charakterkraft und Erzählform in Wielands Agathon und Schlegels Lucinde? B. Specht: Die?geheimere Werkstätte (...) des Physikers?. Naturdynamik und Fragmentästhetik bei Johann Wilhelm Ritter? C. Torra-Mattenklott: Die energetische Wirkung der Künste bei E. T. A. Hoffmann? N. Noeske: Dämonische Energien zwischen Arzt und Patientin: Virtuosität als magnetisches Fluidum 20. und 21. Jahrhundert? E. Neswald: Thermodynamik als Weltanschauung um 1900. (shrink)

One important trend in the debate over expressivism and cognitivism is the emergence of ‘hybrid’ or ‘ecumenical’ theories. According to such theories, moral sentences express both beliefs, as cognitivism has it, and desire-like states, as expressivism has it. One may wonder, though, whether the hybrid move is as novel as its advocates seem to take it to be—or whether it simply leads us back to the conceptions of early expressivists, such as Charles Stevenson or Richard Hare. Michael Ridge has recently (...) argued that we ought not to see Hare as a hybrid expressivist because Hare’s approach allows for moral sentences that do not express any descriptive beliefs at all. Yet, Ridge’s reading has been challenged by John Eriksson, who even goes as far as to claim that modern hybrid expressivists should follow in Hare’s footsteps because it is Hare’s framework that actually provides a solution to the so-called ‘Frege-Geach problem’. In the present paper, I first want to show that we can defend Eriksson’s reading with regard to the official version of Hare’s theory. I will, secondly, argue that, in line with what we may take to be Ridge’s critical perspective on Hare, this official version faces serious difficulties, resulting from the possibility of unknown speaker standards. Thirdly, I will demonstrate that a modern reconstruction of Hare in terms of what I will refer to as ‘de dicto beliefs’, though in principle possible, will not allow us to solve the ‘Frege-Geach problem’. (shrink)

Expressivism has been dominating much of the metaethical debate of the past three decades. The aim of this book is to address a number of questions that have been neglected in the previous discussion.These primarily concern the psychological commitments and the methodological status of expressivism as well as important differences and similarities between the approaches of the 'classic' expressivists Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn und Gibbard.

Es gibt keine Gesellschaft, die nicht von der modernen Wissenschaft und ihren Folgen betroffen wäre. Es besteht auch keine ernsthafte Hoffnung, dass sich die weltweiten Herausforderungen wie Klima, Ungleichheit oder Migration ohne wissenschaftliche Forschung und Reflexion bewältigen ließen. Jede Gesellschaft und jede Regierung sind daher auf die Wissenschaft angewiesen. Für Demokratien stellt sich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Politik und Wissenschaft allerdings noch einmal in besonderer Weise, erscheint die Wissenschaft dort doch als etwas, das alle angeht und über das (...) deswegen öffentlich verhandelt werden muss. Der Band 'Öffentliche Vernunft? Die Wissenschaft in der Demokratie' widmet sich der Frage, mit welchen Schwierigkeiten sich die Idealvorstellung eines öffentlichen und vernunftgeleiteten Diskurses über die Relevanz wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse in modernen Demokratien konfrontiert sieht. Anhand so unterschiedlicher Fragestellungen wie den Problemen wissenschaftlicher Politikberatung, dem Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und medialer Öffentlichkeit, den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer citizen science und der Rolle von Ethik und Politik in der Universität eröffnen die versammelten Beiträge neue Perspektiven auf das komplexe Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Politik und medialer und nicht-medialer Öffentlichkeit. (shrink)