This paper attempts to nudge the reader in the direction of an enlightened account of democratic choice, a sense of reflective choice which undermines our present support of discriminatory sectarian doctrine. I use Gutmann’s and Altman’s views as prologues to my own, though they might well reject my conclusions about discriminatory religion. I contrast my view with Macedo’s, Gray’s, Larmore’s, Rosenblum’s, and Galston’s.My argument utilizes common sense and relatively uncontroversial metaphysical principles to make it more difficult to dismiss as being (...) on an ontic par with the discriminatory doctrines which it challenges. I argue that discriminatory religion might be allowed to continue to be practiced and expressed by those who would pay their own way, much as with hate groups generally, but I view our continued public subsidization of it as a failure to recognize it for what it is. (shrink)

This paper attempts to nudge the reader in the direction of an enlightened account of democratic choice, a sense of reflective choice which undermines our present support of discriminatory sectarian doctrine. I use Gutmann’s and Altman’s views as prologues to my own, though they might well reject my conclusions about discriminatory religion. I contrast my view with Macedo’s, Gray’s, Larmore’s, Rosenblum’s, and Galston’s.My argument utilizes common sense and relatively uncontroversial metaphysical principles to make it more difficult to dismiss as being (...) on an ontic par with the discriminatory doctrines which it challenges. I argue that discriminatory religion might be allowed to continue to be practiced and expressed by those who would pay their own way, much as with hate groups generally, but I view our continued public subsidization of it as a failure to recognize it for what it is. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 501 the practical problems of daily life by providing an explanation for misfortune and a source of guidance in times of uncertainty. There were also attempts to use it for divination and supernatural healing" (p. 151). Along these same lines, one should also cite a number of articles by Natalie Zemon Davis and, above all, the work of Robert Mandl 'ou. 17 To conclude these remarks, (...) I must stress once again that Cassirer's program, in its pure form, is not only impossible for any but the mystic to follow; it is fundamentally anti~ historical. Peter Gay himself, a great admirer of Cassker, and a historian who has a penchant for such neo--idealist hocus-pocus, has tended to follow Cassirer's dictum in his interpretation of the Enlightenment as a whole (to his grid, one is tempted to add).TM Earlier, in Voltaire's Politics (1959), Gay had made a most convincing case for a radically different approach, which he calls "the social history of ideas." Instead of "searching for a dynamic center of thought," "a single point of view," of which each pamphlet, poem or tale was but another facet, Gay presented Voltaire's works as responses to specific situatiom--a series of positions which, if not discrete, were at least sufficientlydiverse as to be incomprehensible without intimate knowledge of the peculiar circumstances of each. I am not suggestinghere that the historian of philosophy abandon his traditional m6tier in a mad search for more fashionable methods. There will always be a need for insightful, penetrating analyses of individual thinkers, and probing essays into internal consistencies or contradictions. Febvre readily conceded that the historian concerned only with "placing" Descartes in his century has not thereby come to grips with Cartesianism. But abstract analysis cannot safelybe divorced from its natural collateral disciplines. It is time to stop studying philosophical ideas as if they were statements propounded in a void. If we neglect the rhetorical situation of philosophy, if we forget the particular audience to which an idea was addressed, we run the risk of forgetting what it is we mean by an idea in the first place. ALeaev SOMA~ Par/~ COMPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS Alfred Soman doses his article with the modest statement, "I am not suggesting here that the historian of philosophy abandon his traditional metier in a mad search for more fashionable methods. There will always be a need for insightful, penetrating analyses of 1T N. Z. Davis, "The Reasons of Misrule: Youth Groups and Charivaris in Sixteenth-Century France.,"Past and Present, No. 50 (February, 1971), 41-75; "The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France," ibid., No. 59 (May, 1973), 51-91. Mandrou's recent Des humaniatea au.r hommea de science: XVI 9 et XVIIe si~cles (1973) is by far the most coherent and systematic synthesisof the new historiography of ideas for this period. Specialistswill of course findroom to quarrel over some of the details;but as an initial outline and as a program for future research, the virtues of Mandrou's book are, I think, indisputable. is E.g., P. Gay, The Enlightenment, an Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York, 1966-1969). Gay's s~lmmaryremarks on Charron (I, 303) are so typical of his verbal sleights of hand that I cannot resist the following quotation: "While Charron was not a philosophe before his time---he was a priest and a theologian---the values he celebrates, in open dcfcren~ to his Romans, are the v~u of tl~ Eallghtc~m~nt." 502 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY individual thinkers, and probing essays into internal consistencies or contradictions.''t Yet what else might his intent be when he tacks on to a critique of an article explicitly designed as a textual analysis of De la Sagesse a glowing!audation of the new trends in the social history of ideas. The second half of his article is in fact an attack on many of the textual studies that fill this journal. The new trends in historiography that have so greatly affected eighteenth-century studies do indeed look most promising,2 hut in our concern for the social milieu in which... (shrink)

The present study collected a larger set of three-dimensional data on human crania from the Kofun period (as well as from previous periods, i.e., the Jomon and Yayoi periods) in the Japanese archipelago (AD 250 to around 700) than previous studies. Three-dimensional geometric morphometrics were employed to investigate human migration patterns in finer-grained phases. These results are consistent with those of previous studies, although some new patterns were discovered. These patterns were interpreted in terms of demic diffusion, archaeological findings, and (...) historical evidence. In particular, the present results suggest the presence of a gradual geological cline throughout the Kofun period, although the middle period did not display such a cline. This discrepancy might reflect social changes in the middle Kofun period, such as the construction of keyhole-shaped mounds in the peripheral regions. The present study implies that a broader investigation with a larger sample of human crania is essential to elucidating macro-level cultural evolutionary processes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 509 covered and interpreted. Depending on their interests and their theories of causation, historians may have any variety of single-facetcd or multi-faceted interpretations. Social history of ideas is one variety. Practitioners of each of the above willnotice omissions of subdivisions and may differ with my definition of their field. Such a reaction would further indicate that indeed there is a plethora of approaches. Such abundance is (...) needed to meet the spectrum of concerns of historically-minded scholars. In each approach the focus is different; an idea, a general topic, the transmission of ideas, a discipline, a specific social environment, an intellectual community, the spirit of an era, a whole society and culture, an event, the life and times of a writer. Ideas do in fact have meaning and function along this full spectrum of contexts. A methodology is chosen which will throw light on a particular kind of context; some of the best scholarship results from the utilization by one individual of complementary methodologies. Fortunately, to compensate for the limitations of individual scholars, we have other scholars! The tensions between the horiz0ntalists and verticalists and between the externalists and intemalists are healthy tensions. Only through communicationamong scholars utilizing differentmethodologies and through attempts by individual scholars to approach their subject from several perspectives can we hope to gain a multi-faceted comprehension of man's past. MARYANNE CLINE HOROWITZ Occidental College DESCARTES' INCONSISTENCY: A REPLY* In my paper, "Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency,''1 I point out that Descartes claims on one occasion that he could have a faculty which is unknown to him (Claim A), but on a second occasion, within the same Meditation, claims the contrary (Claim B). I then try to show that nothing which Descartes achieves or says between A and B justifies this volte face on his part, and subsequently conclude that he is inconsistent in Meditation III, and that this inconsistency is in fact essential to his argument. Professors Brewster and Humphrey have raised objections to my view that Descartes is inconsistent.2 Here I wish to reply to these objections because I think they fail, though sometimesin quite subtle ways, and because I believe I can in this way clarity my earlier contentions. Brewster and Humphrey, as I understand them, have raised three major objections to my paper. These objections, in the order in which I shall take them up, are: I. That I do not have a prima facie case for my claim that Descartes is inconsistent, for * I wish to thank my colleague, Professor Jonathan Robinson, and Professor Donald Livingston of Northern Illinois University for their helpful comments on a draft of this reply. i "Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency," Journal of the History of Philosophy, VI, 3 (July, 1968), 244-256. 2 Leonard E. Brewster, "How to Know Enough about Unknown Faculties," Journal o! the History of Philosophy, XII, 3 (July, 1974), 366--371, and Ted B. Humphrey, "How Descartes Avoids the Hidden Faculties Trap," ibid., 371-377. 510 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Claim A can be demonstrated to be false, and hence Descartes is justified in maldng Claim B. (Brewster)8 Ii. That I fail to note that Claim A is made in a limited context, namely, a discussion of the origin of only those ideas which are adventitious, while Claim B is made in a signilicantly different context, and hence the two claims are not inconsistent. (Humphrey) III. That I have failed to see that for Descartes Jacultiesare always dependent modes of substances, and hence that no faculty could have a power exceeding the substance of which it is a mode, which is to say that I have missed a crucial metaphysical distinction which accounts for the apparent differences in the two claims, and permits both to be made without inconsistency. (Humphrey) I. Professor Brewster argues that I do not have a prima fade case for the claim that Descartes is inconsistent. The "pivotal issue," he suggests, "is whether the possibility of the unknown faculty invalidates Descartes' first proof for the existence of God." He then suggests that this proof consists of three premises: (1) "Descartes' assertion that he possesses an... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions METHODOLOGY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: THE CASE OF PIERRE CHARRON Affanities, influences, borrowings, innovations, traditions, consistency--these are some of the key concepts of the time-honored and probably still dominant approach to the history of ideas. Scholars who seek to understand and interpret the philosophy and literature of the past in these terms tend to pay little attention to the social and institutional factors which constituted (...) the working conditions under which the ideas were conceived, articulated and disseminated; and it is precisely on those grounds that the traditional school has been increasingly challenged, over the past several decades, by historians (myself among others) who are convinced that, apart from their social context, the ideas themselves are virtually incomprehensible. A recent article on Pierre Charron by Maryanne Cline Horowitz may serve to illustrate some of the questions raised by these differences in method. At the close of her article, Horowitz explains the assumptions upon which she has conducted her investigation. Citing Peter Gay's interpretation of Ernst Cassirer, she affirms that "the critic begins the process of understanding a philosopher's work by searching for a dynamic center of thought. He must regard doctrines not as a series of discrete positions but as facets of a single point of view. The critic's equipment must therefore include the gift of empathy: he must sympathetically enter--indeed, relive---the thinker's world of ideas.''1 Following her own insight into the spirit of De la sagesse, and supporting it, of course, with a display of textual evidence, Horowitz argues that Richard Popkin was wrong to lay exclusive stress upon Charron's rejection of Aristotelian epistemology from the perspective of Pyrrhonian scepticism. "I think," she says, "that Charron's De la sagesse is based primarily on Stoic, rather than Sceptic principles." Although I agree in general with the main thrust of Popkin's thesis, I too have been critical of his failure to give sufficient weight to the neo-Stoic dements of Charron's thought. Hence it is not this conclusion to which I take exception.2 Charron has, from the very beginning, been found to have said a great many things and been subjected to a wide variety of interpretations. Horowitz emphasizes "the seeds of virtue and knowledge [as] the dynamic center of De la sagesse"--a view which may appear perfectly plausible to some readers. But it can never compel widespread conviction, for the simple reason that it is impossible for a twentieth-century critic to enter--unaided--into a world of ideas now part of a remote past. A book written nearly four centuries ago is not immediately perspicuous. Before trying on our neo-idealist wings and taking flight into the empyrean of late Renaissance moral treatises, we would do well to explore as many as possible of the following questions: Just who was our author? For whom did he write? Who x p. Gay, Introduction to E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington, 1963), p. 22, cited by M. C. Horowitz, "Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom," Journal o! the History of Philosophy, IX, 4 (October, 1971), 457. 2 A. Soman, "Pierre Charron: A Revaluation," BibliothOque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXII (January, 1970), 57 n. 3. [495] 496 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in fact did read him? and how did his readers react? And what did our author think of their reactions.'?s Horowitz does not, apparently, give high priority to such questions. For rhetorical purposes, she readily agrees with Eugene Rice that "Pierre Charron's De la sagesse is the most important Renaissance treatise on wisdom." (Important to whom? and from what point of view? The criteria are not at all clear.) She assumes that Charron's epistemology was consistent, and that the second edition of 1604 represents a clarification of, or advance over, the first edition of 1601. (There is no historical evidence for making either assumption.) And she does not seem to entertain the possibility that Popkin could still be right about the impact of Charron's Pyrrhonian scepticism on the libertins Jrudits, although Charron may never in fact have been a Pyrrhonian sceptic.4 These are... (shrink)

Summary This paper investigates the nature of creativity in language and linguistics. Following Sampson (2016), it distinguishes between F-creativity (which roughly equals linguistic productivity) and E-creativity (which leads to new and unexpected innovations). These two notions of creativity are discussed on the basis of examples from three different domains: snow cloning, mismatch/coercion, and aberration. It is shown that pure E-creativity may only be found in the case of aberration. Both snow cloning and mismatch/coercion are examples for F-creativity, but to varying (...) degrees. As a consequence, it is suggested that in practice, F- and E-creativity actually form a cline, rather than a dichotomy. (shrink)

Parmi les 'but de l'homme' (puruṣārtha) qui orientent la vie humaine dans le monde indien, le dharma occupe une position très élevée, au-dessus de 'l'intérêt' (artha) et du 'désir' (kāma), respectivement la sphère du pouvoir (politique, économique, social) et celle de l'amour (y compris les passions et les plaisirs de la vie). Enfin, le dharma englobe le quatrième et ultime but de l'homme, la 'délivrance' (moksa). Le caractère normatif du dharma fixe la place de chacun dans la société, par l'exercice (...) de son devoir spécifique. Mais il ne se décline pas moins selon les dispositions individuelles de chacun, et l'action de l'homme en est la véritable mesure. Par-delà la littérature du dharma, le volume réunit des enquêtes sur cette notion 'en contexte,' de la poésie védique à la grammaire, de l'épopée au théâtre, des traditions religieuses et philosophiques--les premières Écoles bouddhiques, la Mīmāmsā, le tantrisme--à la médecine classique (Āyurveda) et jusqu'à la jurisprudence indienne moderne (du XVIIe au XIXe siècle) avec deux éclairages inédits sur le dharma des femmes. Une telle approche tend à restituer la complexité de quelques visages du dharma ainsi recomposés, non pas 'tel ou tel' aspect mais pour chaque cas le 'tout' d'un système à plusieurs facettes, à l'appui d'une histoire singulière dont les auteurs s'attachent à montrer points forts et limites, situations ambiguës, paradoxes et contradictions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper is about a general methodology for pattern transformation. Patterns are network representations of the relations among structures and functions within an organism. Transformation refers to any realistic or abstract transformation relevant to biology, e.g. ontogeny, evolution and phenotypic clines. The main aim of the paper is a methodology for analyzing the range of effects on a pattern due to perturbing one or more of its structures and/or functions (transformation morphology). Concepts relevant to such an analysis of pattern transformation (...) are reviewed and several new ones introduced: pattern unit; direct and indirect functional demands; compatibility and trade-off; integrating, adding and decoupling; functional effectiveness; spatial, profile and other architectonic constraints; domains of structure-function relations; goal and process adaptability; multiple pathways. The paper is written from the the perspective of architectonic morphology, viz. functional morphology focusing on the relation between anatomical coherence and the compatibility of functions. The advantages and disadvantages of inductive and deductive approaches are discussed. (shrink)

Growing concern has been expressed that we have entered a “post-truth” era in which each of us willfully believes whatever we choose, aided and abetted by alternative and social media that spin alternative realities for boutique consumption. A prime example of the belief in alternative realities is said to be acceptance of “conspiracy theories”—a term that is often used as a pejorative to indict claims of conspiracy that are so obviously absurd that only the unhinged could believe them. The epistemological (...) standard often involved in this indictment, however—the standard of “obvious” falsity—invites subjectivity in its application, because what is obviously false to one person can be common sense to another. This is not just a truism; considerable research suggests that people’s political beliefs, in general, and their acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories in particular, tends in large part to be determined by partisan, ideological, and other priors. (shrink)

Il est indéniable que les féministes théorisent, et que leurs théorisations participent à transformer le monde. Mais peut-on--et doit-on--qualifier cette activité théorique? Bien que les théories féministes partagent une visée politique émancipatrice, chercher à définir ce que signifie théoriser en féministe, c'est prendre le risque de masquer la pluralité des situations et des concepts. Dès lors, comment prendre en charge la diversité des contextes qui se trouvent derrière les connaissances? Ne doit-on pas interroger ce que cette question--à la portée pourtant (...) éminemment épistémologique--révèle des frontières du féminisme lui-même? Comment aborder un phénomène qui est tout à la fois un engagement, une identité, une revendication, un outil? Le féminisme se décline au pluriel et se trouve dans une tension permanente, parce qu'il se confronte à des conflits qu'on préfère généralement ignorer, parce qu'il est sujet à des interprétations multiples et, partant, parce qu'il s'élabore par mouvements successifs quoique continus. Suffit-il alors de se revendiquer du féminisme, entendu comme identité politique aussi bien que comme outil scientifique, pour produire un mouvement ou une théorie féministes? Théoriser en féministe, c'est non seulement déclarer son appartenance à une communauté, mais c'est aussi chercher une forme de radicalité pour lutter contre la violence du système, qu'il soit social, politique ou philosophique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The title of this paper reflects the fact truthmaking is quite frequently considered to be expressive of realism. What this means, exactly, will become clearer in the course of our discussion, but since we are interested in Armstrong’s work on truthmaking in particular, it is natural to start from a brief discussion of how truthmaking and realism appear to be associated in his work. In this paper, special attention is given to the supposed link between truthmaking and realism, but it (...) is argued that this link should not be taken too seriously, as truthmaking turns out to be, to a large extent, ontologically neutral. Some consequences of this are studied. (shrink)

It is now possible to have a child without sexual intercourse. The history of this apparently new statement has been breefly synthetised.The new perspectives open ethical problems for the scientific community and a new social context for single women.

The main aim of this paper is to introduce the logics of evidence and truth $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ together with sound, complete, and decidable six-valued deterministic semantics for them. These logics extend the logics $$LET_{K}$$ and $$LET_{F}^-$$ with rules of propagation of classicality, which are inferences that express how the classicality operator $${\circ }$$ is transmitted from less complex to more complex sentences, and vice-versa. The six-valued semantics here proposed extends the 4 values of Belnap-Dunn logic with 2 more values (...) that intend to represent (positive and negative) reliable information. A six-valued non-deterministic semantics for $$LET_{K}$$ is obtained by means of Nmatrices based on swap structures, and the six-valued semantics for $$LET_{K}^+$$ is then obtained by imposing restrictions on the semantics of $$LET_{K}$$. These restrictions correspond exactly to the rules of propagation of classicality that extend $$LET_{K}$$. The logic $$LET_{F}^+$$ is obtained as the implication-free fragment of $$LET_{K}^+$$. We also show that the 6 values of $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ define a lattice structure that extends the lattice L4 defined by the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic with the 2 additional values mentioned above, intuitively interpreted as positive and negative reliable information. Finally, we also show that $$LET_{K}^+$$ is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable and that its implication-free fragment $$LET_{F}^+$$ coincides with the degree-preserving logic of the involutive Stone algebras. (shrink)

Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior.

Between 1873 and 1876, Felix Klein published a series of papers that he later placed under the rubric anschauliche Geometrie in the second volume of his collected works (1922). The present study attempts not only to follow the course of this work, but also to place it in a larger historical context. Methodologically, Klein’s approach had roots in Poncelet’s principle of continuity, though the more immediate influences on him came from his teachers, Plücker and Clebsch. In the 1860s, Clebsch reworked (...) some of the central ideas in Riemann’s theory of Abelian functions to obtain complicated results for systems of algebraic curves, most published earlier by Hesse and Steiner. These findings played a major role in enumerative geometry, whereas Plücker’s work had a strongly qualitative character that imbued Klein’s early studies. A leitmotif in these works can be seen in the interplay between real curves and surfaces as reflected by their transformational properties. During the early 1870s, Klein and Zeuthen began to explore the possibility of deriving all possible forms for real cubic surfaces as well as quartic curves. They did so using continuity methods reminiscent of Poncelet’s earlier approach. Both authors also relied on visual arguments, which Klein would later advance under the banner of intuitive geometry (anschauliche Geometrie). (shrink)

The thought that empathy plays an important role in moral motivation is almost a platitude of contemporary folk psychology. Parallel themes were mooted in German moral philosophy and aesthetics in the 1700s, and versions of the empathy construct remained prominent in continental accounts of moral motivation through the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. This chapter elucidates the Empathic Motivation Hypothesis (EMH) and sets out some of the conceptual and empirical challenges it faces. It distinguishes empathic concern from other dimensions (...) of empathy (e.g., resonance, attunement, distress, and non-empathic concern) and examines the merits of EMH as a developmental thesis, focusing on evidence from psychopathology and attachment theory. (shrink)

Discusses the rationality of the Christian religion and examines the philosophical arguments for the existence of God.

The main scientific problems of chemical bonding were solved half a century ago, but adequate philosophical understanding of chemical combination is yet to be achieved. Chemists routinely use important terms ("element," "atom," "molecule," "substance") with more than one meaning. This can lead to misunderstandings. Eliminativists claim that what seems to be a baseball breaking a window is merely the action of "atoms, acting in concert." They argue that statues, baseballs, and similar macroscopic things "do not exist." When macroscopic objects like (...) baseballs move, exceedingly large numbers (1025) of microscopic components coordinate their activities. Understanding how this happens requires attention to the interactions that link parts into larger units. Eliminativists say that everything that truly exists has causal relationships in addition to those of its components—"nonredundant causality." This paper holds that if a number of entities interact in such a way that the effect of that collection on test objects is different than it would have been in the absence of the interaction, then identification of that collection as a single composite agent is warranted, for purposes to which that difference is relevant. Ordinary "chemical substances" (both elementary materials such as dihydrogen and compounds such as water) fulfill this version of the requirement of nonredundant causality. Other sorts of chemical coherences, including chemical dissipative structures (e.g., flames), also fulfill that criterion. All these types of coherences qualify as "substances" (as that term is used in philosophy) even though they are not all "chemical substances.". (shrink)

This original and lively book explores Greek ideas about health and disease and their influence on Greek thought. Fundamental issues such as causation and responsibility, purification and pollution, mind-body relations and gender differences, authority and the expert and who can challenge them, reality and appearances, good government, happiness, and good and evil themselves are deeply implicated. Using the evidence not just from Greek medical theory and practice but also from epic, lyric, tragedy, historiography, philosophy, and religion, G. E. R. Lloyd (...) offers the first comprehensive account of the influence of Greek thought about health and disease on the Greek imagination. (shrink)