Eugenio Bulygin is a distinguished representative of legal science and legal philosophy as they are known on the European continent - no accident, given the role of the civil law tradition in his home country, Argentina. Over the past half-century, Bulygin has engaged virtually all major legal philosophers in the English-speaking countries, including H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Joseph Raz. Bulygin's essays, several written together with his eminent colleague and close friend Carlos E. Alchourrón, reflect the genre (...) familiar from Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, and Georg Henrik von Wright's Norm and Action. Bulygin's wide-ranging interests include most of the topics found under the rubric of analytical jurisprudence - interpretation and judicial reasoning, validity and efficacy of law, legal positivism and the problem of normativity, completeness and consistency of the legal system, the nature of legal norms, and the role of deontic logic in the law. The reader will take delight in the often agreeably unorthodox character of Bulygin's views and in his hard-hitting arguments in defence of them. He challenges the received opinion on gaps in the law, on legal efficacy, on permissory norms, and on the criteria for legal validity. Bulygin's essays have been wellnigh inaccessible in the past, appearing in specialized journals, often in Spanish or German. They are now available for the first time in an English-language collection. (shrink)

Norms conferring public or private powers, i.e., the competence to issue other norms, play a very important rôle in law. But there is no agreement among legal philosophers about the nature of such norms. There are two main groups of theories, those that regard them as a kind of norms of conduct (either commands or permissions) and those that regard them as non-reducible to other types of norms. I try to show that reductionist theories are not quite acceptable; neither the (...) command-variety (Kelsen, Alf Ross inOn Law and Justice), nor the permission-variety (von Wright, Kanger, Lindahl) provide a satisfactory account of competence norms.Among the authors who maintain that competence norms are different from (and hence not reducible to) norms of conduct are Hart, Ross inDirectives and Norms, and Searle. Ross and Searle distinguish between regulative and constitutive rules as two radically different kinds of rules and classify competence norms among constitutive rules. This distinction runs parallel to von Wright's distinction between rules that are prescriptions and determinative rules. While the first regulate actions (by commanding, prohibiting, or permitting them), determinative rules define certain concepts. To view competence norms as (partial) definitions of certain legal concepts (like those of legislator, judge, etc.) seems to open interesting perspectives and to shed light on at least one aspect of these elusive norms. (shrink)

Este trabajo es una crítica a la distinción entre lagunas de conocimiento y reconocimiento. En Normative Systems, Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que estas indeterminaciones en la aplicación del derecho son problemas diferentes. Según AB, las lagunas de conocimiento surgen por nuestro deficiente conocimiento de las circunstancias del caso, pero las lagunas de reconocimiento se producen por la vaguedad del lenguaje. Para resolver las lagunas de conocimiento, los juristas usan presunciones y para resolver las lagunas de reconocimiento es preciso redefinir (...) los conceptos. Sin embargo, AB no ofrecen una reconstrucción específica de la vaguedad y ello afecta al análisis de esos tipos de lagunas. En particular, AB creen que la vaguedad es un problema epistémico y, por ello, un sistema completo puede ofrecer una respuesta correcta para cada caso individual aun cuando no podamos conocer esa solución. Pero, cuando se asume que la vaguedad es un problema epistémico, entonces no existen mayores razones para distinguir entre lagunas de conocimiento y lagunas de reconocimiento. This paper analyzes the distinction between gaps of knowledge and gaps of recognition. In Normative Systems, Alchourrón and Bulygin claim that both indeterminacies are different problems that arise in the application of general norms to individual cases. Where through ignorance of certain properties of the facts, we cannot determine whether an individual case belongs to a generic case, we speak of gap of knowledge. On the contrary, gaps of recognitions are caused by the semantic indeterminacy of the concepts which define a generic case. In order to solve gaps of knowledge, jurists use legal presumptions, but the solution of a gap of knowledge requires the redefinition of a certain concept. However, AB believe that vagueness is only an epistemic problem. For this reason, they conclude that a complete normative system resolves every possible individual case even though we can still find epistemic indeterminacies. However, this paper shows that if vagueness is characterized as an epistemic problem, there will be no relevant reason for stressing the distinction between gaps of recognition and gaps of knowledge. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los aspectos más destacados de la polémica entre Juan Carlos Bayón y Eugenio Bulygin acerca de las lagunas jurídicas, el principio de prohibición y el alcance de la discreción judicial. En esta disputa, Bulygin defiende cuatro tesis centrales, enunciadas en Normative Systems : una cuidadosa distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas es esencial para resolver el problema de las lagunas jurídicas, la versión débil del principio de prohibición no sirve para mostrar que no existen lagunas, (...) la versión fuerte del principio de prohibición es verdadera solo cuando el sistema es completo, y en casos de lagunas jurídicas, los jueces tienen discreción para resolver estas situaciones. Sin embargo, Bayón señala que el problema no es la falta de distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas sino el desacuerdo acerca de cuándo una solución jurídica es concluyente. La diferencia entre soluciones prima facie y concluyente es esencial porque en ciertas situaciones, el derecho no da una respuesta pero tampoco deja espacio para la discrecionalidad judicial. Según Bayón, en estos casos el principio de prohibición "todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido" juega un papel fundamental. Este trabajo muestra que los argumentos de Bayón son insuficientes para rechazar las tesis clásicas defendidas por Bulygin. In this paper I analyze the most relevant aspects of the controversy between Juan Carlos Bayón and Eugenio Bulygin about the existence of legal gaps, the so called "principle of prohibition" and the scope of judicial discretion. In this debate, Bulygin defends four classical theses advanced in his wellknown book, Normative Systems : a careful distinction between norms and norm propositions is actually needed in order to solve the problem of legal gaps, the analytical truth of the weak version of the principle of prohibition cannot guarantee the completeness of legal systems, the strong version of the principle of prohibition is true only if legal systems are complete, and judges have discretion in cases of legal gaps. However, Bayón claims that the problem is not the lack of distinction between norms and norm proposition but rather the identification of conclusive legal solutions. Conclusive legal solutions must be distinguished from the prima facie solutions provided by explicitly enacted norms. According to Bayón, the difference between conclusive and prima facie solutions is essential in legally irrelevant cases; in such cases the principle of prohibition plays an essential role because it entails the rejection of judicial discretion. In this paper I claim that the arguments advanced by Bayón fail to provide a sound ground for discarding the classical theses defended by Bulygin. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analizan los conceptos de laguna axiológica y de derrotabilidad desde el punto de vista de una teoría "realista" de interpretación. En base a algunos ejemplos se intenta mostrar que ambos conceptos aparecen como resultado de la interpretación de los textos jurídicos. Tanto las lagunas axiológicas, como la derrotabilidad no son propiedades objetivas de sistemas jurídicos, porque dependen de las valoraciones de los intérpretes y la acción de interpretar no es conocer el derecho, sino contribuir a hacerlo. (...) The analysis of the concepts of axiological gaps and of defeasibility from the point of view of a "realistic" theory of interpretation shows -by means of several examples- that both concepts are the result of interpretation of legal texts. Axiological gaps and defeasibility are not objective properties of legal systems, because they depend essentially on valuations of the interpreters and interpretation is not cognition of law, but participation in making law. (shrink)

This article discusses C. E. Alchourrdn and E. Bulygin's ideas regarding the distinction between strong permission and weak permission. The author takes for granted that the distinction between the two terms should be placed at the level of the assertive metalanguage about norms. But the symbolizations and the definitions of strong and weak permissions offered by Alchourrdn and Bulygin, as well as their thesis concerning the relations between the two concepts are challenged.

This article discusses C. E. Alchourrdn and E. Bulygin's ideas regarding the distinction between strong permission and weak permission. The author takes for granted that the distinction between the two terms should be placed at the level of the assertive metalanguage about norms. But the symbolizations and the definitions of strong and weak permissions offered by Alchourrdn and Bulygin, as well as their thesis concerning the relations between the two concepts are challenged.

Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que el derecho positivo, además de normas, contiene definiciones, que ponen de manifiesto un aparato conceptual a través del cual pensamos la realidad. A partir de esta afirmación argumentaré que hay un aspecto del derecho al que la teoría jurídica no ha prestado la atención que merece: la red de conceptos o categorías a través de la cual el derecho piensa, estructura, esquematiza o imagina la realidad. Sobre la base de una visión pluralista, sostengo que (...) el derecho moderno contiene una red conceptual singular, diferente a la construida por la ciencia y a la que está implícita en la vida cotidiana, aun cuando pueda receptar aspectos de una y otra. Dicho en el léxico de Quine, el derecho incluye criterios propios de objetivación e individuación, es decir, una ontología propia. En ese camino propongo algunas distinciones generales que pueden ser útiles para la descripción del derecho: definiciones expresas e implícitas por un lado; aparatos conceptuales derivados y aparatos conceptuales singulares del derecho, por el otro. La argumentación revela asimismo la relevancia y singularidad de categorías jurídicas muy básicas, como las de persona y cosa. (shrink)

Bobbio, N. Hacia una teoría funcional del derecho.--Bulygin, E. Sobre la regla de reconocimiento.--Gargaglione de Yaryura Tobías, E.L. El conocimiento y su validación.--Gómez, A.C. Acerca de la vinculación de la regla de reconocimiento con las restantes reglas secundarias.--Grün, E. y Farrel, M.D. Problemas de verificación en el derecho. Guibourg, R.A. La nulidad y su definición.--Klug, U. Consideraciones sobre las definiciones semánticas en derecho.--Miró Quesada, F. Sobre el derecho justo.--Nino, C.S. El concepto de validez y el problema del conflicto entre (...) normas de diferente jerarquía en la teoría pura del derecho.--Raggio, A.R. La refexión.--Ross, A. La finalidad del castigo.--Soler, S. La idea de "bien común."--Spolansky, N.E. El castigo del acto anterior al hecho prohibido.--Vernengo, R.J. Norma jurídica y esquema referencial.--Wright, G.H. von. Reencuentro con la lógica deóntica. (shrink)

A comparison is made between the criterion of choice of E-admissibility I proposed in Levi, 1974 and elaborated in Levi, 1980 and 1986, and the ideas about norms elaborated by Alchourrón and Bulygin with an emphasis on the fact that choice cannot always be evaluated in terms of binary comparisons as the distinction between second worst and not second worst illustrates. Se establece una comparación entre el criterio de E-admisibilidad propuesto en Levi,1974 y elaborado en Levi,1980 y 1986 y (...) las ideas sobre normas elaboradas por Alchourrón y Bulygin enfatizando el hecho de que una elección no puede siempre ser evaluada en términos de comparaciones binarias como lo ilustra la distinción entre "second worst" y "not second worst". (shrink)

En esta contribución intentaré mostrar que el criterio lex superior derogat legi inferiori conduce a una consecuencia que, al menos en lo que conozco, no ha sido todavía advertida. Si las normas de la máxima jerarquía de un sistema jurídico, verbigracia, normas constitucionales constituyen un conjunto consistente, entonces necesariamente el sistema jurídico es consistente. Dicho de otra manera, lex superior preserva necesariamente la consistencia. Si las normas del nivel más alto son miembros de un conjunto consistente, los niveles inferiores de (...) la jerarquía no podrían admitir normas contradictorias con las superiores. Más aún, habida cuenta que de una contradicción se sigue cualquier norma, en virtud del principio lógico ex falso quodlibet, de dos normas contradictorias que pertenecen a algún nivel inferior se derivan algunas normas en contradicción con normas del nivel superior; así normas contradictorias no podrían ser admitidas en los niveles inferiores. In this contribution, I shall intend to show that the criterion lex superior derogat legi inferiori has a consequence which, as far as I know, has not been noted yet: if the higherlevel norms in a legal system, i.e. constitutional norms, configure a consistent set, then necessarily the legal system is consistent. Lex superior preserves necessarily the consistency, as it were. If higher-level norms are members of a consistent set, then the lower-levels could admit no norm in contradiction with the higher-level norms. Moreover, given that from a contradiction follows anything, in virtue of the logical principle ex falso quodlibet, from two contradictory lower-level norms follow some norms in contradiction with norms of the higher-level, thus contradictory norms could never be admit in the lower-levels. (shrink)

This article traces disagreements about the genetic effects of low-dose radiation exposure as waged by James Neel, a central figure in radiation studies of Japanese populations after World War II, and Yuri Dubrova, who analyzed the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. In a 1996 article in Nature, Dubrova reported a statistically significant increase in the minisatellite DNA mutation rate in the children of parents who received a high dose of radiation from the Chernobyl accident, contradicting studies that found no (...) significant inherited genetic effects among offspring of Japanese A-bomb survivors. Neel’s subsequent defense of his large-scale longitudinal studies of the genetic effects of ionizing radiation consolidated current scientific understandings of low-dose ionizing radiation. The article seeks to explain how the Hiroshima/nagasaki data remain hegemonic in radiation studies, contextualizing the debate with attention to the perceived inferiority of Soviet genetic science during the Cold War. (shrink)

This research explores the contextual approach within Christian-Jewish religious education, addressing a notable gap in existing literature and offering fresh insights into the application of the Contextual Teaching and Learning (CTL) model within Christian contexts. Through a qualitative literature study employing a three-step methodology, including an in-depth analysis of Deuteronomy 11:19–20, this study reveals that this biblical text provides both educational guidance and theological significance, serving as a foundational support for the CTL model in Christian-Jewish religious education. The integration of (...) digital media into biblical sources holds promise for future research, while the central challenge lies in harmonising life experiences and empirical phenomena with biblical reflections to seamlessly integrate inquiry processes and pedagogical phases, with potential avenues for further exploration in scripture models endorsing CTL. This research provides valuable insights for educators, parents and policymakers in Indonesia and beyond, advancing educational research in contextualised teaching models within religious education.Contribution: This article demonstrates that the CTL model in the digital era has the potential to revolutionise religious education and profoundly impact learners, making it a significant scientific contribution in the context of Christian-Jewish religious education. (shrink)

With disparate rates of morbidity and mortality among minoritized communities, COVID-19 illuminated the need for equity-informed practices in public health. Pacia et al posit FQHCs as entities that addressed inequity when others failed. This commentary further situates how FQHCs address the public health crisis of institutional racism and related health inequities every day and presents a FQHC-led Ethics and Equity Framework and Workflow Checklist to guide ethical and equitable engagement with FQHCs.

Carta escrita por Gilda de Mello e Souza, remetida ao colega Oswaldo Porchat, que se encontrava em Berkeley, quando a ditadura civil-militar brasileira, recrudescida desde a implantação, em agosto de 1968, do AI-5, representava uma verdadeira ameaça a estudantes e docentes da Universidade de São Paulo, especialmente se lhe fizessem qualquer tipo de oposição. Porchat trocou uma sequência de cartas com Gilda nessa época, nas quais relata sua desilusão com a Faculdade de Filosofia, e com os acontecimentos políticos no Brasil. (...) Ao mesmo tempo, confessa estar encantado com a descoberta de novos elementos da Lógica, e com a atmosfera mais amena dos Estados Unidos. Porchat sabe que Gilda enfrenta momentos difíceis, tendo de assumir a Presidência do curso em meio à tentativa do reitor Miguel Reale de submetê-lo a um interventor. Enfrentando a dúvida sobre se valeria a pena retornar ao Brasil naquele momento, Porchat escreve à amiga. A carta a seguir expressa, dentro do que era possível na época, quando as correspondências eram vigiadas, o parecer de Gilda sobre as indagações do amigo, sobre os rumos da ditadura, e sobre o que ela pensava de sua própria atitude de resistência naquele contexto. A carta original, assim como a sequência de correspondências da qual faz parte, está depositada no Fundo Gilda de Mello e Souza, no Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros (IEB/USP). Agradeço à família de Gilda, especialmente a Ana Luisa Escorel e a Laura Escorel, pela disponibilização desse documento para a presente publicação. (shrink)

In this case report, we describe a woman with advancing dementia who still retained decisional capacity and was able to clearly articulate her request for deactivation of her implanted cardiac pacemaker—a scenario that would result in her death. In this case, the patient had the autonomy to make her decision, but clinicians at an outside hospital refused to deactivate her pacemaker even though they were in unanimous agreement that the patient had capacity to make this decision, citing personal discomfort and (...) a belief that her decision seemed out of proportion to her suffering. We evaluated her at our hospital, found her to have decision-making capacity, and deactivated her pacer resulting in her death about 9 days later. While some clinicians may be comfortable discussing patient preferences for device deactivation in patients who are imminently dying, we can find no reports in the literature of requests for device deactivation from patients with terminal diagnoses who are not imminently dying. (shrink)

Este ensaio pretende levantar as seguintes questões: 1. de que modo é possível reconstituir o sentido de moral segundo um amor-próprio cujo conteúdo é dado menos por um isolamento ou negaçáo do outro do que por um trabalho pessoal sobre si mesmo, em vista de um êthos , de uma ética? 2. em que medida o valor da moral hoje em dia pode ser deslocado da lei universal para uma atitude de diferença, da normalidade do comportamento para o cultivo de (...) si e, por fim, da verdade sobre o sujeito para uma subjetivaçáo ascética que náo exige a prerrogativa de uma identidade, mas a transformaçáo de si na relaçáo consigo e com os outros? Tais questões sáo levantadas a partir de Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault e Fernando Savater. Palavras-chave: Amor-próprio, Estética da existência, Ética, Identidade. (shrink)

REVISTA EDUCAÇÃO E FILOSOFIA é uma publicação semestral do Departamento de Pedagogia da Universidade Federal de Uberlândia. Este número é o primeiro fruto de um sonho antigo e de um inconformismo com a falta de um veículo como este, entre nós. Pretendemos incentivar e divulgar trabalhos de natureza interdisciplinar nas áreas de Educação e Filosofia. Mas, se a Revista vier a ter uma linha preferencial — e isto depende muito mais dos nossos colaboradores, que da direção — essa linha não (...) será exclusiva nem excludente, pois a Revista estará aberta às mais diversas correntes de pensamento, não se fechando, pois, com quaisquer grupos. Isto é consequência de nossa visão de Universidade como lugar onde se deve estimular a heterogeneidade de tendências e o debate. Entendemos que uma filosofia que propugne posições dogmáticas inviabiliza o debate sobre seus próprios pressupostos, deixando de ser filosofia para tornar-se mera ideologia. Ademais, a discussão de questões de princípio tem razão de ser e há momentos em que apenas ela pode contribuir para a superação de impasses de ordem teórica ou prática, sobretudo nas ciências sociais; somente uma abordagem crítica — o que equivale a dizer: sem preconceitos — pode contribuir para os debates de questões fundamentais tanto para a filosofia, quanto para a educação, ou ainda quanto para uma filosofia de educação. A REVISTA EDUCAÇÃO E FILOSOFIA deve representar um fórum de permanentes debates aberto a todo educador, todo pensador e, sobretudo, a todo pensador-educador. Propomo-nos a acolher e divulgar contribuições que sintetizem os resultados de investigações empíricas e teóricas e de projetos práticos, preferencialmente, mas não exclusivamente, desenvolvidos na região do Triângulo Mineiro. Dentro do princípio de que o caráter objetivo e preciso do conhecimento científico não é incompatível com os conformismos diante das injustiças de toda ordem, pretendemos, ainda, ser um estímulo aos balanços críticos. A REVISTA EDUCAÇÃO E FILOSOFIA é a soma do que temos e somos, mas será um veículo para atingirmos aquilo que queremos ser e ter. Deverá abrir caminho para a reflexão filosófica, a reflexão sobre educação, a reflexão sobre o ensino da filosofia e possibilitará o diálogo com os pensadores e educadores presentes e pretéritos visando à construção do futuro. Nós não teríamos sido justos se olvidássemos o empenho da professora Carmelita Vieira dos Santos, chefe do Departamento de Pedagogia para que, diante de tantos cortes de recursos, fossem mantidos aqueles destinados à revista. Nossos agradecimentos também à professora Marly Bernardes de Araújo, diretora do Centro de Ciências Humanas e Artes. Ao Conselho do Departamento de Pedagogia, nossa gratidão por ter acolhido a Revista. (shrink)

O objetivo deste texto é explorar aproximações e divergências no pensamento de Paulo Freire e Ivan Illich na forma como eles vêem a relação entre educação e transformação social. Acredita-se que a retomada da polêmica Freire e Illich sobre o problema educação e transformação social pode contribuir para melhor compreender e esclarecer a verdadeira natureza desse problema, já clássico na história da educação moderna.

El propósito de este texto es ofrecer una visión general de la relación entre nación e historia en los debates que se generaron por parte de los historiadores y otros intelectuales de las ciencias sociales a finales del siglo XIX y durante gran parte del siglo XX. La reflexión central que se plantea consiste entonces en estudiar y mostrar cómo al mismo tiempo que las naciones modernas eran objeto de un proceso de redefinición política, en el escenario intelectual de las (...) ciencias sociales, y en particular de los historiadores, fueron apareciendo también un conjunto de debates y obras que intentaban problematizar y someter a consideración las relaciones que pretendían establecerse entre la nación y la historia como un elemento que las justificaba. (shrink)