The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70 (2009)
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Abstract

I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal)

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10.1007/s11572-008-9065-2

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Douglas Husak
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Punishing Intentions and Neurointerventions.David Birks & Alena Buyx - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (3):133-143.
Defending double effect.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Ratio 24 (4):384-401.
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Willfully Blind for Good Reason.Deborah Hellman - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):301-316.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.

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