Kritische bijdragen over ideologisch gekleurde vormen van westerse culturele antropologie.

Actes d’un colloque qui s’est tenu à Copenhague en 2007, l’ouvrage veut combler un manque : traiter du développement de la dialectique de Platon à Aristote, non pas en se focalisant sur la méthode et l’ontologie, mais en se fondant sur le cadre du débat dialectique. Selon J. Fink (p. 2), la dialectique ici signifie d’abord et avant tout argumentation adressée à un interlocuteur. La pratique de l’argumentation dialectique et son extension dans la forme littéraire du dialogue constituent le cœu...

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain the processes undergone by the producer of an awoval. The conditions of its possibility and its effects on the subjet itself through the effects on those to whom the avowal is addressed. I finally wonder to what extent it may be considered a moral transformation.

Parole et sexualité sont à la fois modes d’expression et actes, avec des dimensions individuelles et plurielles. Leurs lointaines origines biopsychologiques les enracinent dans les fondements inconscients du psychisme humain, d’où elles émergent en constituant et le Moi individuel de la conscience humaine et la perception moins consciente d’une appartenance groupale, base narcissique d’un Nous, dont la résurgence est sensible au sein de tous les ensembles groupaux, familiaux, sociaux, et bien sûr dans la vie conjugale et sexuelle. Une thérapie approfondie (...) en couple impose à l’analyste cette compréhension psychanalytique double, individuelle et duelle, pour saisir l’intrication des deux dimensions dans tous leurs conflits, notamment à travers l’expression sexuelle. (shrink)

Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions (...) émotionnelles sont raisonnables à deux conditions : premièrement, qu’ils contribuent à une vie subjectivement heureuse ; deuxièmement, qu’ils soient moralement justifiés. (shrink)

This paper presents a computational model of the way humans inductively identify and aggregate concepts from the low-level stimuli they are exposed to. Based on the idea that humans tend to select the simplest structures, it implements a dynamic hierarchical chunking mechanism in which the decision whether to create a new chunk is based on an information-theoretic criterion, the Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle. We present theoretical justifications for this approach together with results of an experiment in which participants, exposed (...) to meaningless symbols, have been implicitly encouraged to create high-level concepts by grouping them. Results show that the designed model, called hereafter MDLChunker, makes precise quantitative predictions both on the kind of chunks created by the participants and also on the moment at which these creations occur. They suggest that the simplicity principle used to design MDLChunker is particularly efficient to model chunking mechanisms. The main interest of this model over existing ones is that it does not require any adjustable parameter. (shrink)

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...) deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative responsedependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions. (shrink)

This article considers the origins of alphabetic writing, tracing its probable source to ancient Egypt, southern Levant or the Sinai during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom (17th century BCE). It supports the view that the earliest scripts were acrophonic representations of a West-Semitic language, whose use developed under the rule of the Hyksos in Egypt but was arrested there with the expulsion of this foreign dynasty at the end of the 16th century BCE. The development is then traced through the Levant, (...) with particular attention given to the emergence of cuneiform alphabetic scripts in Ugarit (c. 1300 BCE). This form of writing disappeared with the fall of Ugarit, but linear alphabetic scripts were preserved in a variety of Near-Eastern languages, notably Aramaic and Phoenician. These two languages, by becoming linguae francae respectively of the Syria-northern Mesopotamia and the Anatolia-Eastern Mediterranean regions, brought about the spread of alphabetic writing up until the 8th century BCE. The article concludes by examining the influence of the Phoenician script on Greek, Etruscan and ultimately Latin forms of writing. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...) I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions. (shrink)

Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...) to collapse into the Perception View or any other view according to which emotions are evaluative at the level of content. In the latter case, the Attitudinal View does not stand up to an obvious alternative, namely that emotions can only be assessed with respect to extrinsic norms or conditions of correctness. (shrink)

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Guidé par l’extension de l’usage et des acceptions du signifiant « ex », l’auteur, à partir d’une longue expérience clinique auprès des couples et des familles, met en correspondance des phénomènes psychiques peu conscients des individus, enfants ou parents, et des groupes familiaux qu’ils constituent, avec des transformations sociales ou sociétales modifiant les bases historiques des sentiments d’identité. L’ensemble souligne la fréquence de troubles narcissiques et notamment du sentiment de la constance et de la valeur de soi, essentiel à ce (...) qui fait, au-delà du désir, la dimension « conjugale » du choix amoureux et du choix de type de lien. L’évolution perceptible de la temporalité y joue un grand rôle, déplaçant les identifications vers une adolescence modélisée. S’agit-il d’un ébranlement passager du sentiment identitaire, du renouvellement d’une pluralité de modalités identitaires ou d’une évolution anthropologique? (shrink)

Cultuurfilosofisch essay over onze verhouding tot de natuur.

La publication du Journal du Concile de l’ambassadeur P. Poswick est l’occasion de rappeler quelques questions majeures de Vatican II dans le traitement desquelles trois évêques belges se sont particulièrement illustrés. Ce rapide parcours permet de dépasser les oppositions émises récemment à propos du Concile entre « l’événement et le texte » de même qu’entre « la discontinuité et la continuité ». On constate en effet que le témoignage des acteurs est indispensable pour la compréhension des textes et que les (...) avancées du Concile permettent une meilleure compréhension de la tradition. (shrink)

It is well known that working memory performance changes with age. Two recent computational models of working memory, TBRS* and SOB-CS, developed from young adults WM performances are opposed regarding the postulated causes of forgetting, namely time-based decay and interference for TBRS* and SOB-CS, respectively. In the present study, these models are applied on a set of complex span data produced by young and older adults. As expected, these models are unable to account for the older adult data. An investigation (...) on the effect of the main parameters of these models showed that the poorer performance of older adults does not come from a weaker encoding of item but rather from difficulties during the free time that immediately follows each distractor, as well as from a higher level of confusion between items. These results are discussed with respect to the current theories of working memory and aging. (shrink)

The rise in interdisciplinary scholarship between philosophy and theology has produced a number of critiques of historical biblical criticism (HBC) by philosophers of religion. Some dialogue has resulted, but these critiques have gone largely unnoticed by historical critical scholars. This article argues that two such critiques of HBC, offered by Plantinga and Stump, are undermined by faulty presuppositions on the philosophers' part regarding the nature and value of HBC and misunderstandings of the nature of the ancient texts on which the (...) discipline of HBC focuses. (shrink)

Le présent défi pour l’Église, c’est à la fois celui de la mondialisation et d’un pluralisme religieux croissant, qu’il s’agisse des grandes religions ou des nouvelles religiosités. Mais elle doit affronter aussi un indifférentisme religieux qui peut être l’envers d’un combat passionné pour l’homme. Face à ces défis, il faut tenir compte d’un nouveau paradigme théologique, celui d’un pluralisme religieux de principe qui s’interroge sur la signification de la pluralité des religions à l’intérieur du dessein de Dieu. Ce nouveau paradigme (...) nous invite à instaurer un nouveau rapport à la vérité en théologie. Et c’est en allant jusqu’au bout du paradoxe christologique que l’on peut désigner le christianisme comme une religion essentiellement dialogale. Comme l’œcuménisme, le dialogue interreligieux doit être une dimension de toute la théologie. La théologie des religions tend alors à devenir une théologie interreligieuse qui manifeste la fécondation mutuelle des religions dans notre discours sur Dieu et sur le salut de l’homme. (shrink)

Maurice Blondel’s philosophy has had a decisive influence on the theology of Henri de Lubac, but more than an influence, it goes of an encounter and a dialogue between two great Catholic thinkers. This article proposes, over the course of successive encounters and collaborations between Blondel and Lubac, a presentation of Lubac’s reflection in that it extends Blondel’s critique of extrinsicity to the field of theology. This friendship between Lubac and Blondel testifies to the inherent character of the mystical question (...) to both philosophy and theology. This anchoring signifies the Mystery of Christ at work in the gesture of reason and in the understanding of faith. At the same time, Lubac promotes, in philosophy itself, an intelligence through faith. Friendship has not been an empty word with Lubac who openly defended Maurice Blondel on several occasions, and even after Blondel’s death, when Lubac continued to make the philosopher’s thought known by publishing and annotating a large part of his correspondence. (shrink)

By imitating the high-speed computational behavior of a machine through a consciousness of the future, we suggest a reverse artificial intelligence in an attempt to achieve the computational whole mind emulation of high level thoughts. The methodology, using such reverse artificial intelligence which we run with control on the mind instead of a machine, is disclosed. We then generalize this ability to enable the proposed mind emulation through high-speed mental computation processes. We suggest a set of theoretical and empirical principles (...) and methods for the mind transfer, which leads to an almost unlimited potential for the human beings and society. In this paper, we present the most basic case of experimenting with the inactive behaviors, then a new hypothesis. (shrink)

Nous nous demandons souvent ce que nous aurions interet a faire ou ce que nous devrions faire, ce que les autres peuvent legitimement exiger de nous. Rien ne nous semble plus immediat que cette reflexion sur nos desirs et nos devoirs. Pourtant, des que l'on s'efforce de decrire les processus effectifs qui sont en jeu et les normes de rationalite ou morales qui pesent sur cette reflexion, l'evidence s'evanouit. Comment connaissons-nous nos desirs? Qu'est-ce qui sous-tend nos jugements moraux? Quelle place (...) les demandes de la morale laissent a nos desirs? La reflexion pratique ne nous sert-elle qu'a justifier nos actions a posteriori ou nous permet-elle de guider nos actions? Le present livre s'attache a repondre a ces questions, anciennes pour la plupart, en discutant les recherches recemment menees a leur sujet en philosophie de l'action, en philosophie de l'esprit et en philosophie morale, dans l'esprit de la tradition analytique. (shrink)

L’ambition de ce livre est de présenter les éléments d’une réévaluation de l’aveu. Introduit par une réflexion sur son usage contemporain dans le droit, il croise des approches philosophiques profondément distinctes si ce n’est opposées. La phénoménologie, la psychanalyse et la philosophie analytique sont autant d’éclairages sur ce phénomène multiforme.

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