Cauchy's sum theorem is a prototype of what is today a basic result on the convergence of a series of functions in undergraduate analysis. We seek to interpret Cauchy’s proof, and discuss the related epistemological questions involved in comparing distinct interpretive paradigms. Cauchy’s proof is often interpreted in the modern framework of a Weierstrassian paradigm. We analyze Cauchy’s proof closely and show that it finds closer proxies in a different modern framework.

The quantum probability flux of a particle integrated over time and a distant surface gives the probability for the particle crossing that surface at some time. We prove the free fluxacross-surfaces theorem, which was conjectured by Combes, Newton and Shtokhamer [1], and which relates the integrated quantum flux to the usual quantum mechanical formula for the cross section. The integrated quantum flux is equal to the probability of outward crossings of surfaces by Bohmian trajectories in the scattering regime.

This research is motivated by the program of Reverse Mathematics. We investigate basic part of complex analysis within some weak subsystems of second order arithmetic, in order to determine what kind of set existence axioms are needed to prove theorems of basic analysis. We are especially concerned with Cauchy’s integral theorem. We show that a weak version of Cauchy’s integral theorem is proved in RCAo. Using this, we can prove that holomorphic functions are analytic (...) in RCAo. On the other hand, we show that a full version of Cauchy’s integral theorem cannot be proved in RCAo but is equivalent to weak König’s lemma over RCAo. (shrink)

In his note [5] Hausner states a simple combinatorial principle, namely: $$(H)\left\{ {\begin{array}{*{20}c} {if f is a function a non - empty finite set \sigma into itself, p a} \\ {prime, f^p = i_\sigma and \sigma _0 the set of fixed points of f, then } \\ {\left| \sigma \right| \equiv \left| {\sigma _0 } \right|(mod p).} \\\end{array}} \right.$$ .He then shows how this principle can be used to prove:Fermat's little theorem,Cauchy's theorem for finite groups,Lucas' theorem for (...) binomial numbers.Letε=(0,1, ...),ℱ 1−1 the family of all one-to-one functions from a subset ofε intoε andℳ 1−1 the family of all p.r. (i.e., partial recursive) one-to-one functions from a subset ofε intoε. A subsetα of ε is finite, ifα is not equivalent to a proper subset under a function inℱ 1−1. The setα is calledisolated, if it is not equivalent to a proper subset under a function inℳ 1−1. An isolated set can also be defined as a subset ofε which has no infinite r.e. (i.e., recursively enumerable) subset. While every finite set is isolated, there are $c = 2^{\aleph _0 }$ infinite sets which are isolated; these sets are calledimmune. It is the purpose of this paper to generalize (H) to a principle (H*) for isolated sets and to show how (H*) can be used to prove generalizations of Fermat's little theorem and Cauchy's theorem for finite groups. We have been unable to generalize Lucas' theorem in a similar manner. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to prove tha analytic completeness theorem for a logic LAs with two integral operators in the singular case. The case of absolute continuity was proved in [4]. MSC: 03B48, 03C70.

Hoover [2] proved a completeness theorem for the logic L[MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A]. The aim of this paper is to prove a similar completeness theorem with respect to product measurable biprobability models for a logic Lmath image with two integral operators. We prove: If T is a ∑1 definable theory on [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A] and consistent with the axioms of Lmath image, then there is an analytic absolutely continuous biprobability model in which every sentence in T (...) is satified. (shrink)

Gleason-type theorems derive the density operator and the Born rule formalism of quantum theory from the measurement postulate, by considering additive functions which assign probabilities to measurement outcomes. Additivity is also the defining property of solutions to Cauchy’s functional equation. This observation suggests an alternative proof of the strongest known Gleason-type theorem, based on techniques used to solve functional equations.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, mathematical analysis underwent a transition from a predominantly formula-centred practice to a more concept-centred one. Central to this development was the reorientation of analysis originating in Augustin-Louis Cauchy's (1789–1857) treatment of infinite series in his Cours d’analyse. In this work, Cauchy set out to rigorize analysis, thereby critically examining and reproving central analytical results. One of Cauchy's first and most ardent followers was the Norwegian Niels Henrik Abel (1802–1829) who vowed to shed (...) some light on the vast darkness in analysis.This paper investigates some important aspects of Abel's contribution to the reorientation in analysis. In particular, it stresses the role for critical revision in the process of rigorization. By critically examining past practice, the new practice sought to explain the relative success of the previous—now outdated—approach. This is illustrated by discussing a number of issues related to Abel's new proof of the binomial theorem (1826) including his reactions to the exception that he encountered to one of the central theorems of Cauchy's theory.Following this discussion, the formation of new concepts as the result of critical revisions is illustrated by analysing the early history of the concept of absolute convergence. Thereby, it is shown how a new concept was distilled, investigated, put to use and eventually superseded. (shrink)

Legal scholarship exploring the nature of evidence and the process of juridical proof has had a complex relationship with formal modeling. As evident in so many fields of knowledge, algorithmic approaches to evidence have the theoretical potential to increase the accuracy of fact finding, a tremendously important goal of the legal system. The hope that knowledge could be formalized within the evidentiary realm generated a spate of articles attempting to put probability theory to this purpose. This literature was both insightful (...) and frustrating. Much light was shed on the legal system, but it also quickly became evident that the tools of probability theory were in many ways ill-constructed for the task. Fundamental incompatibilities between the structure of legal decision making and the extant formal tools were identified, and it became evident that many of the purported explanations of legal phenomena were internally inconsistent. As a consequence, interest in this type of formal modeling declined, and attention was directed toward different kinds of explanations of the phenomena. Perhaps under the influence of a recent trend toward various types of formal modeling in legal scholarship, a recent burst of articles, rather than attempting to explain the macro structure of trials, which was the previous object of interest, attempts to quantify the probative value of various items of evidence in ways consistent with the formal features of various probability theories, and then to study decision making from that perspective. For example, the value of evidence is often purported to be its likelihood ratio, that is, the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given a hypothesis (e.g., the defendant did it) divided by the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given the negation of the hypothesis (the defendant didn't do it). Alternatively, the value of evidence is purported (more contextually) to be the information gain it provides, defined as the increase in probability it provides for a hypothesis above the probability of the hypothesis based on the other available evidence. Both conceptions then assume that all of the various probability assessments conform or ought to conform to the dictates of Bayes' theorem (that maintains consistency among such assessments); empirical studies are then done testing the extent to which this is so and proposing how the law can increase the probability that it is so. The general criticisms of using Bayes' theorem as a formal model of juridical proof are well known and were integral to the last wave of interest in formal modeling of the evidentiary process. This paper thus for the most part puts aside that more general issue, and focuses specifically on mathematical modeling of the value of particular items of evidence. The paper demonstrates that formal modeling has only limited value in explaining the value of legal evidence, much more limited than those constructing and discussing the models assume, and thus that the conclusions they draw about the value of evidence are unwarranted. This is done through a discussion of four recent examples that attempt to quantify evidence relating to, respectively, carpet fibers, infidelity, DNA random-match evidence, and character evidence used to impeach a witness. This article thus makes two contributions. First, and most importantly, it is another demonstration of the complex relationship between algorithmic tools and legal decision making. Second, at a minimum it points out serious pitfalls for analytical or empirical studies of juridical proof. (shrink)

The authors would like to make the corrections to the original article described below.

This book excavates the rhetorical devices that Nietzsche habitually uses and explains how they constitute a distinctive form of philosophical argumentation. Through a sustained analysis of Nietzsche’s rhetorical style, stratagems, and didactic aims in two of his early works (‘On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense’ and Daybreak) and two of his later works (Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight of the Idols), the book assesses the extent to which Nietzsche's substantial rhetorical arsenal undermines the philosophical claims he is (...) seeking to advance. The four case studies also bring to the fore some of the less palatable aspects of Nietzsche’s thought such as racial-stereotyping, the essentialising of a so-called slave mentality, and the ranking of human beings based on a highly idiosyncratic and prejudiced view of what qualifies as noble and ignoble. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Down by Law (Jarmusch, 1986) is about how the encounter with otherness renews freedom and American identity. I first develop the idea of renewal through otherness by way of a discussion of Levinas' philosophy of freedom and Arendt's notion natality, contrasting it with the idea of negative liberty, which I explicate through a discussion of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, and Tocqueville. Next, I show how negative liberty is engrained in the idea of America through a (...) discussion of the formative American motifs of the road and the prison, which play structuring roles in Down by Law . I then try to show how the immigrant character of Bob (Roberto Benigni) is an other who liberates the American characters of Jack (John Lurie) and Zack (Tom Waits), who are existentially 'imprisoned' by their negative liberty. (shrink)

It is common in accounts of the secularization of Western thought to make reference to the name of Nietzsche. Nietzsche is undeniably a critic of religion, but he is equally a critic of the secular. It is for this reason that I propose thinking about Nietzsche’s philosophy as postsecular. This term is one that has evolved over the last couple decades in response to the so-called “return of the religious” in society, social theory, and philosophy and suggests that secularity and (...) religiosity are not antithetical and therefore that we must move beyond the forms of thinking that would regard them as such. First, I focus on his concepts of will to power, interpretation, perspectivism, and history, and sketch how they are all interrelated and how these ground his interpretation of religion. Based on this view, I show, second, that while religion is, for Nietzsche, a historical perspective, it is also, for him, part of the historical genealogy of secularity. This point leads to my final one on the relationship between secularity and religion in Nietzsche’s thought, where I argue that, on his own terms, Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity is a hyper-Christianity, even while rejecting facets of Christianity. (shrink)

Internal global symmetries exist for the free non-relativistic Schrodinger particle, whose associated Noether charges---the space integrals of the wavefunction and the wavefunction multiplied by the spatial coordinate---are exhibited. Analogous symmetries in classical electromagnetism are also demonstrated.

In recent continental philosophy of religion there has been significant attention paid to the Abrahamic doctrines of creation ex nihilo and divine omnipotence, especially by deconstructive thinkers such as Derrida, Caputo, and Keller. For these thinkers, the doctrine represents a form of agency that does violence to various forms of alterity. While broadly supportive of their fundamental philosophical and ethico-political views, especially about the primordiality of alterity, I differ from them in that I argue that creation ex nihilo articulates the (...) very structure of the alterity they are concerned with. The essay proceeds through a reading of Derrida’s representation of the doctrine and a “deconstruction” of his view by means of a reading of Augustine and Anselm. (shrink)

Using Kierkegaard’s birthday as my starting point, my essay contends that in order to celebrate Kierkegaard’s birth we have to bring him into our present age, which task involves understanding how his thought is related to modernity. I first explain how, from Kierkegaard’s point of view, any celebration risks being mere celebrity and nostalgia, and discuss the conception of temporality that Kierkegaard identifies as undergirding both concepts. To counteract the temporality of celebrity and nostalgia, I next argue that we must (...) begin with the fact of Kierkegaard’s death and absence from our present age and establish, through an “unconditioned relation to the unconditioned,” a relationship of contemporaneity with him. Regarding Kierkegaard as a contemporary requires understanding his relationship to modernity and the present age and thus requires a critique of his own critique of modernity. I conclude by acknowledging the problems and questions regarding the relationship between religion and secularism, for Kierkegaard and for ourselves, which result from situating Kierkegaard in modernity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Otherwise than Laïcité? Toward an Agonistic Secularism in LevinasMark Cauchi (bio)Levinas and SecularismAlong with the so-called “return of the religious” in contemporary Western philosophy and politics, there has been a renewed effort in recent years to rethink secularism, the political doctrine of the separation of religion and politics.1 It would not be difficult to show that Emmanuel Levinas has been a substantial force in the resurgence of interest in (...) religion among philosophers, but his impact on thinking about secularism is less evident. Part of the reason for this uncertainty, and part of the reason it is not taken up by scholars, is doubtless the fact that Levinas’s conception of secularism is difficult to discern.2 Although he often discusses religion, politics, and even their relationship, he rarely addresses the question of secularism directly. He certainly uses the term laïcité, and, especially in Difficult Freedom, often discusses both the place of Judaism in secular society and what he calls the “Christian atmosphere” of modernity, but he never articulates, either here or elsewhere, a complete account of the concept.In addition to the paucity of Levinas’s writings on secularism, a further difficulty is that what Levinas does say about secularism can often seem contradictory and unclear. Consider, for example, his view [End Page 187] of the most basic issue of secularism: the separation of church and state. Is such a separation wholly compatible with Levinas’s thinking? On the one hand, Levinas is unambiguous about his endorsement of the separation. He writes in “How Is Judaism Possible?” (1959) that the separation “is the citadel that protects us [French Jews] against injustice,” and therefore that “we must beware of tampering with it.” And yet, as he will immediately add, the “luminous and incontestable formula” separating church and state must be given “its best content,” as if in its common understanding it does not possess its best meaning (DF 245). This specific double move, where he simultaneously endorses and criticizes the separation of church and state, is indicative of Levinas’s more general attitude from the 1950s onward toward the whole of the standard liberal conception of secularism.What I mean by the latter conception will be fleshed out in the following sections, but it can be defined now, in a preliminary fashion, as the entire liberal enterprise of creating a culturally neutral state and public sphere for the sake of protecting the rights and liberties of the individual citizen. Because the individual citizen is defined as possessing the right to, or liberty of, thought, expression, and association—all of which together, in effect, produce freedom of religion, whether explicitly proclaimed or not—the state and public sphere must be constituted in particular ways to guarantee these liberties; in particular, they must be culturally neutralized so that any citizen, from whichever cultural background, can participate in public institutions without bias and thus without the violation of their liberties. Such neutralization is achieved by the reciprocal move wherein participants in these institutions—that is to say, individual citizens—are not allowed to bring their cultural frameworks with them into the constitutions and operations of these institutions, leading to the so-called privatization of religion.Because Levinas criticizes this model of secularism while seeming to endorse some notion of it, what I would like to do in this essay is to determine what is precisely Levinas’s criticism of secularism and, in addition, what a “Levinasian secularism” might be. My central contention will be that the latter (Levinasian secularism) is not equivalent [End Page 188] to the former (his stated views about secularism). The reason for this discrepancy is that Levinas critiques standard liberal secularism on the basis of his more general philosophy of ethical alterity, but then reinstates liberal secularism (or an unspecified version of it) as the best way to protect institutionally ethical alterity. This double movement raises the question, how can ethical alterity at once be consistent and inconsistent with liberal secularism? The question is naturally related to the much-discussed one about the relation of ethics and politics in Levinas’s thinking. Levinas’s approach to the latter relation is consistently... (shrink)

La fondation d'une revue comme Dialogue s'accompagne de crainte et d'espoir. Crainte de ne pouvoir la faire vivre et progresser, crainte « inavouée » que la production philosophique ne soit pas à la hauteur de l'opinion que nous avons de nous-mêmes ou de ce que le monde extérieur attend de nous… Espoir cependant de consolider les structures d'une Association canadienne de philosophie à peine naissante, chancelante, mais vivant déjà d'un idéal exigeant et dont la revue porte le nom.

Introduction -- Nietzsche's ascetic morality -- The Kanitan rational will and the tyranny of self-overcoming -- Hegel's 'labour of the negative' and the Lacerations of self-negation -- The bitter cup of pur love : Feuerbach and Zarathustra -- Conclusion.

We investigate the provability or nonprovability of certain ordinary mathematical theorems within certain weak subsystems of second order arithmetic. Specifically, we consider the Cauchy/Peano existence theorem for solutions of ordinary differential equations, in the context of the formal system RCA 0 whose principal axioms are ▵ 0 1 comprehension and Σ 0 1 induction. Our main result is that, over RCA 0 , the Cauchy/Peano Theorem is provably equivalent to weak Konig's lemma, i.e. the statement that every infinite (...) {0, 1}-tree has a path. We also show that, over RCA 0 , the Ascoli lemma is provably equivalent to arithmetical comprehension, as is Osgood's theorem on the existence of maximum solutions. At the end of the paper we digress to relate our results to degrees of unsolvability and to computable analysis. (shrink)

This manuscript investigates fixed point of single-valued Hardy-Roger’s type F -contraction globally as well as locally in a convex b -metric space. The paper, using generalized Mann’s iteration, iterates fixed point of the abovementioned contraction; however, the third axiom of the F -contraction is removed, and thus the mapping F is relaxed. An important approach used in the article is, though a subset closed ball of a complete convex b -metric space is not necessarily complete, the convergence of the Cauchy (...) sequence is confirmed in the subset closed ball. The results further lead us to some important corollaries, and examples are produced in support of our main theorems. The paper most importantly presents application of our results in finding solution to the integral equations. (shrink)

We give a new account of Björling’s contribution to uniform convergence in connection with Cauchy’s theorem on the continuity of an infinite series. Moreover, we give a complete translation from Swedish into English of Björling’s 1846 proof of the theorem. Our intention is also to discuss Björling’s convergence conditions in view of Grattan-Guinness’ distinction between history and heritage. In connection to Björling’s convergence theory we discuss the interpretation of Cauchy’s infinitesimals.

The Dirac δ function has solid roots in nineteenth century work in Fourier analysis and singular integrals by Cauchy and others, anticipating Dirac’s discovery by over a century, and illuminating the nature of Cauchy’s infinitesimals and his infinitesimal definition of δ.

This paper critically engages Philip Mirowki's essay, "The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of science." It argues that although the cold war context of anti-democratic elitism best suited for making decisions about engaging in nuclear war may seem to be politically and ideologically motivated, in fact we need to carefully consider the arguments underlying the new rational choice based political philosophies of the post-WWII era typified by Arrow's impossibility theorem. A distrust (...) of democratic decision-making principles may be developed by social scientists whose leanings may be toward the left or right side of the spectrum of political practices. (shrink)

The central limit theorem has been found to apply to random vectors in complex Hilbert space. This amounts to sufficient reason to study the complex–valued Gaussian, looking for relevance to quantum mechanics. Here we show that the Gaussian, with all terms fully complex, acting as a propagator, leads to Schrödinger’s non-relativistic equation including scalar and vector potentials, assuming only that the norm is conserved. No physical laws need to be postulated a priori. It thereby presents as a process of (...) irregular motion analogous to the real random walk but executed under the rules of the complex number system. There is a standard view that Schrödinger’s equation is deterministic, whereas wavefunction “collapse” is probabilistic —we have now a demonstrated linkage to the central limit theorem, indicating a stochastic picture at the foundation of Schrödinger’s equation itself. It may be an example of Wheeler’s “It from bit” with “No underlying law”. Reasons for the primary role of \ are open to discussion. The present derivation is compared with recent reconstructions of the quantum formalism, which have the aim of rationalizing its obscurities. (shrink)

The energy-momentum tensor for a particular matter component summarises its local energy-momentum distribution in terms of densities and current densities. We re-investigate under what conditions these local distributions can be integrated to meaningful global quantities. This leads us directly to a classic theorem by Max von Laue concerning integrals of components of the energy-momentum tensor, whose statement and proof we recall. In the first half of this paper we do this within the realm of Special Relativity and in the (...) traditional mathematical language using components with respect to affine charts, thereby focusing on the intended physical content and interpretation. In the second half we show how to do all this in a proper differential-geometric fashion and on arbitrary space-time manifolds, this time focusing on the group-theoretic and geometric hypotheses underlying these results. Based on this we give a proper geometric statement and proof of Laue's theorem, which is shown to generalise from Minkowski space to space-times with significantly less symmetries. This result, which seems to be new, not only generalises but also clarifies the geometric content and hypotheses of Laue's theorem. A series of three appendices lists our conventions and notation and summarises some of the conceptual and mathematical background needed in the main text. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a conceptual analysis of Weinberg's proof of the spin-statistics theorem by comparing it with Pauli's original proof and with the subsequent textbook tradition, which typically resorts to the dichotomy positive energy for half-integral spin particles/microcausality for integral-spin particles. In contrast to this tradition, Weinberg's proof does not directly invoke the positivity of the energy, but derives the theorem from the single relativistic requirement of microcausality. This seemingly innocuous difference (...) marks an important change in the conceptual basis of quantum physics. Its historical, theoretical, and conceptual roots are here reconstructed. The link between Weinberg's proof and Pauli's original is highlighted: Weinberg's proof turns out to do justice to Pauli's anti-Dirac lines of thought. The work of Furry and Oppenheimer is also surveyed as a “third way” between the textbook tradition established by Pauli and Weinberg's approach. (shrink)

In this response to Jeff Pflug’s review of my dissertation Michael Polanyi’s Integrative Philosophy, I note that Pflug focused on my discussion of possible extension of Polanyi’s epistemology; he has also taken my statements on scientific truth out of context. In addition, he ignored the four major elements of the dissertation, thereby not giving the reader a “map” to the meaning and the rationale of the work – an intellectual biography of Polanyi.

In this paper, we introduce the notion of S ∗ p -partial metric spaces which is a generalization of S-metric spaces and partial-metric spaces. Also, we give some of the topological properties that are important in knowing the convergence of the sequences and Cauchy sequence. Finally, we study a new common fixed point theorems in this spaces.

Many religious people are alarmed about features of the current age - violence in the media, a pervasive hedonism, a marginalization of religion, and widespread abortion. These concerns influence politics, but just as there should be a separation between church and state, so should there be a balance between religious commitments and secular arguments calling for social reforms. Robert Audi offers a principle of secular rationale, which does not exclude religious grounds for action but which rules out restricting freedom except (...) on grounds that any rational citizen would accept. The book describes the essential commitments of free democracy, explains how religious and secular moral considerations can be integrated to facilitate co-operation in a world of religious pluralism, and proposes ideals of civic virtue that express the mutual respect on which democracy depends. Audi offers a balanced and sophisticated treatment of the relations between religion and politics in a modern, secular society. (shrink)

The covariant and relativistic generalization of the Helmholtz integral vorticity theorems and Thomson's circulation theorem are derived.

One of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard often expressed himself through pseudonyms and disguises. Taken from his personal writings, these private reflections reveal the development of his own thought and personality, from his time as a young student to the deep later internal conflict that formed the basis for his masterpiece of duality Either/Or and beyond. Expressing his beliefs with a freedom not seen in works he published during his lifetime, Kierkegaard here rejects for the first (...) time his father's conventional Christianity and forges the revolutionary idea of the "leap of faith" required for true religious belief. A combination of theoretical argument, vivid natural description and sharply honed wit, the Papers and Journals reveal to the full the passionate integrity of his lifelong efforts "to find a truth which is truth for me." For more than seventy years, Penguin has been the leading publisher of classic literature in the English-speaking world. With more than 1,700 titles, Penguin Classics represents a global bookshelf of the best works throughout history and across genres and disciplines. Readers trust the series to provide authoritative texts enhanced by introductions and notes by distinguished scholars and contemporary authors, as well as up-to-date translations by award-winning translators. (shrink)

In this response to Jeff Pflug’s review of my dissertation Michael Polanyi’s Integrative Philosophy, I note that Pflug focused on my discussion of possible extension of Polanyi’s epistemology; he has also taken my statements on scientific truth out of context. In addition, he ignored the four major elements of the dissertation, thereby not giving the reader a “map” to the meaning and the rationale of the work – an intellectual biography of Polanyi.

This book discusses how rational choice theory grew out of RAND's work for the US Air Force. It concentrates on the work of William J. Riker, Kenneth J. Arrow, James M. Buchanan, Russel Hardin, and John Rawls. It argues that within the context of the US Cold War with its intensive anti-communist and anti-collectivist sentiment, the foundations of capitalist democracy were grounded in the hyper individualist theory of non-cooperative games.

A layman's guide to the mechanics of Gödel's proof together with a lucid discussion of the issues which it raises. Includes an essay discussing the significance of Gödel's work in the light of Wittgenstein's criticisms.

Any great new theoretical framework has an epistemological and an ontological aspect to its philosophy as well as an axiological one, and one needs to understand all three aspects in order to grasp the deep aspiration and idea of the theoretical framework. Presently, there is a widespread effort to understand C. S. Peirce's (1837–1914) pragmaticistic semeiotics, and to develop it by integrating the results of modern science and evolutionary thinking; first, producing a biosemiotics and, second, by integrating it with the (...) progress in cybernetics, information science, and system theory to create a cybersemiotics. In this paper, we focus on the understanding of the evolution of the universe that Peirce produced as an alternative to the mechanistic view underlying classical physics and try to place man in an evolving universe as a creative, aesthetical agent. It is true that modern non-equilibrium physics has made a modern foundation for a profound physical understanding of the basic evolutionary processes in the universe. But science still has not produced a theory that can explain how the creativity of the universe could produce signification, interpretation, and first-person consciousness. To this end, Peirce's thoughts on agapastic evolution coupled with the aesthetically influence of the growth of ideas and reasonableness on man could make a contribution. (shrink)

Determinist thought with its sui generis view on life, nature and being as a whole is a point of view that could be observed in many different cultures and beliefs. It was thanks to Greek thought that it ceased to be a cultural element and transformed into a systematic cosmology. Schools such as Leucippos, then Democritos and Stoa attempted to integrate the determinist philosophy into ontology and cosmology. In the course of time, physics and metaphysics-based determinism approaches were introduced, and (...) a wide spectrum has emerged from genetics to behaviorism, from culture to psychology, from atomism to divinity. Determinism, whether physical or metaphysical origin, ignores freedom of will and deny agency competence over human behavior. Due to this feature, it is opposed by ethical theories, legal philosophies and religions. When the arguments for determinism are possible to disprove logically and philosophically, this is not so easy when the claims base themselves on scientific base. As the logical consequence of this novel fact, it is important to question the epistemological value of scientific knowledge and critically analyze the data of experiments and clinical studies in terms of methodology when answering any hypothesis such as neuro-biological, neuro-psychological, or neuro-theological argumentations. On the other hand, it is necessary to reach alternative experiments on the same subject or to show that it is possible to interpret them in different ways, as in the example of the Libet experiment. The neurobiological determinism based on biological reductionism, emerged as the result of ignoring the ontological difference of the mind, equating the mind with the brain, or defining mentality as an epiphenomenon of the brain. The main divergence stems from the acceptance of materialist philosophy. Paradigms that reduce existence only to matter do not take the metaphysical possibilities into account. In this case, although the problems called qualia or subjective experience stand there unresolved, the claim is preserved. Although many new developments such as the discovery of the entropy law, the big bang theory, and quantum physics have shaken the materialist philosophy, modern science resists an epistemological revision. However, with the current epistemology, it does not seem possible to grasp both the universe and the being as a whole. This is the most important reason why every attempt to understand the nature and spiritual side of human beings fails despite numerous experiments on the brain. However, the human brain is an organ that seems sophisticated and its secrets cannot be easily solved. Since there is not enough information about the brain, there is not enough evidence to claim that the brain, and therefore the mind, are part of the deterministic universe. Increasing brain researches since the last quarter of the twentieth century has revealed that genes, neurons and particularly brain chemistry claim much greater role than expected in human behavior. These results have been instrumentalized by some researchers for a radical claim that free will is an illusion, while by others it has led to the acceptance of will as less important over actions than was thought. Both ideas adopted a model of biological determinism in which freedom of will was ignored. Hypotheses based on controversial interpretations of various experiments raised concerns about religious, moral, and legal responsibility. Although man cannot be thought of as a non-free being from the point of view of common sense, the smog screen over the truth would not be lifted unless the scientific data in question had a correct interpretation. At first glance, it seems unreasonable to discuss universal determinism in the quantum universe. Nevertheless, the claim that strong causality prevails in the material world, including consciousness, remains in place. Therefore, firstly criticizing determinism and then examining biological determinism will help to fix the conceptual framework. This article aims to explain why genetics and neurobiology, while acknowledging their importance in the realization of behavior, can’t completely abolish moral agency. Some hypotheses attribute consciousness and free will to the physico-shimic structure of the brain, the random activity of neurons, or the ability to automatically transform inputs into outputs with the advantage of genetic information. This is the most sensitive and important point of being human; it attacks free will. Paradoxically, while global civilization of our time promises infinite freedom to human beings the science of the same age tries to prove that it is not free. (shrink)