(2010). Restricting CPR to Patients Who Provide Informed Consent Will Not Permit Physicians to Unilaterally Refuse Requested CPR. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 82-83.

This paper examines the historical rise of both cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the do-not-resuscitate order and the wisdom of their continuing status in U.S. hospital practice and policy. The practice of universal presumed consent to CPR and the resulting DNR policy are the products of a particular time and were responses to particular problems. In order to keep the excesses of technology in check, the DNR policies emerged as a response to the in-hospital universal presumed consent to CPR. We live with (...) this historical concretion, which seems to perpetuate a false culture that the patient's wishes must be followed. The authors are critical of the current U.S. climate, where CPR and DNR are viewed as two among a panoply of patient choices, and point to UK practice as an alternative. They conclude that physicians in the United States should radically rethink approaches to CPR and DNR. (shrink)

Trust is essential in human relationships including those within healthcare. Recent studies have raised concerns about patients’ declining levels of trust. This article will explore the role of trust in decision-making about cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). In this research thirty-three senior doctors, junior doctors and division 1 nurses were interviewed about how decisions are made about providing CPR. Analysis of these interviews identified lack of trust as one cause for poor understanding of treatment decisions and lack of acceptance of medical judgement. (...) Two key implications emerged from the analysis. First, before embarking on a discussion about CPR it is essential to establish trust between the doctor and the patient/family. Secondly, it is essential that the CPR discussion itself does not undermine trust and cause harm to the patient. (shrink)

Traditionally clinicians have determined their patients' resuscitation status without consultation. This has been condemned as morally indefensible in cases where not for resuscitation (NFR) orders are based on quality of life considerations and when the patient's true wishes are not known. Such instances would encompass most resuscitation decisions in elderly patients. Having previously involved patients in CPR decision-making, we chose formally to explore the reasons behind the choices made. Although the patients were not upset, and readily decided at the time (...) of initial consultation, on later analysing the decision-making we found poor understanding of the procedure, poor recall of information given and in some cases evidence of harm. This may be attributed to impaired decision-making capacity of elderly hospitalised patients as previously shown, or to the discomfort precipitated by having to contemplate the apparent immediacy of cardiac arrest by these patients. We propose that subscribing to autonomy as a general principle needs to be balanced against particular cases where distress may be caused by, or result in, diminished competence and limited autonomy. (shrink)

Many patients believe that cardiopulmonary resuscitation is more likely to be successful than it really is in clinical practice. Even when working with accurate information, some nevertheless remain resolute in demanding maximal treatment. They maintain that even if survival after cardiac arrest with CPR is extremely low, the fact remains that it is still greater than the probability of survival after cardiac arrest without CPR. Without realising it, this line of reasoning is strikingly similar to Pascal’s Wager, a Renaissance-era argument (...) for accepting the proposition for God’s existence. But while the original argument is quite logical—if not universally compelling—the modern variant makes several erroneous assumptions. The authors here present a case of a patient who unwittingly appeals to Pascal’s Wager to explain his request for maximal treatment, in order to highlight the crucial divergences from the original Wager. In understanding the faulty assumptions inherent in the application of Pascal’s Wager to code status decisions—and identifying the underlying motivations which the Wager serves to confirm—providers can better ensure that the true values and preferences of patients are upheld. (shrink)

Rosoff and Schneiderman's essay “Irrational Exuberance: Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation as Fetish” (2017) raises an issue first posed by the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan...

We describe the case of an eighty‐four‐year‐old man with disseminated lung cancer who had been receiving palliative care in the hospital and was found by nursing staff unresponsive, with clinically obvious signs of death, including rigor mortis. Because there was no documentation to the contrary, the nurses commenced cardiopulmonary resuscitation and called a code blue, resulting in resuscitative efforts that continued for around twenty minutes. In discussion with the hospital ethicist, senior nurses justified these actions, mainly citing disciplinary and medicolegal (...) concerns. We argue that moral harms arise from CPR performed on a corpse and that legal concerns about failing to perform it are unfounded. We contend that such efforts are an unintended consequence of managerialist policies mandating do‐not‐resuscitate orders and advance care plans and of defensive practices that can value the interests of institutions and practitioners over those of patients. Health management teaching should include managerialism and its pitfalls, while clinician training should prioritize ethical reasoning and legal knowledge over defensive practice. (shrink)

Outcomes from cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) remain distressingly poor. Overuse of CPR is attributable to unrealistic expectations, unintended consequences of existing policies and failure to honour patient refusal of CPR. We analyzed the CPR outcomes literature using the bioethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice and developed a proposal for selective use of CPR. Beneficence supports use of CPR when most effective. Non-maleficence argues against performing CPR when the outcomes are harmful or usage inappropriate. Additionally, policies which usurp good clinical (...) judgment and moral responsibility, thereby contributing to inappropriate CPR usage, should be considered maleficent. Autonomy restricts CPR use when refused but cannot create a right to CPR. Justice requires that we define which medical interventions contribute sufficiently to health and happiness that they should be made universally available. This ordering is necessary whether one believes in the utilitarian standard or wishes medical care to be universally available on fairness grounds. Low-yield CPR fails justice criteria. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be performed when justified by the extensive outcomes literature; not performed when not desired by the patient or not indicated; and performed infrequently when relatively contraindicated. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 11, Page 20-21, November 2011.

This article addresses whether cardiopulmonary resuscitation and sustained physiological support should ever be permitted in individuals who are diagnosed as brain dead and who had held previously expressed moral or religious objections to the currently accepted criteria for such a determination. It contrasts how requests for care would normally be treated in cases involving a brain-dead individual with previously expressed wishes to donate and a similarly diagnosed individual with previously expressed beliefs that did not conform to a brain-based conception of (...) death. The paper first focuses narrowly on requests for CPR and then expands its scope to address extended physiological support. It describes how refusing the brain-dead non-donor's requests for either CPR or extended support would represent enduring harm to the antemortem or previously autonomous individual by negating their beliefs and self-identity. The paper subsequently discusses potential implications of policy that would allow greater accommodations to those with conscientious objections to currently accepted brain-based death criteria, such as for cost, insurance, higher brain formulations and bedside communication. The conclusion is that granting wider latitude to personal conceptions around the definition of death, rather than forcing a contested definition on those with valid moral and religious objections, would benefit both individuals and society. (shrink)

Questions related to end-of-life decision making are common in clinical ethics and may be exceedingly difficult. Chief among these are the provision of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and do-not-resuscitate orders (DNRs). To better address such questions, clarity is needed on the values of medical ethics that underlie CPR and the relevant moral framework for making treatment decisions. An informed consent model is insufficient to provide justification for CPR. Instead, ethical justification for CPR rests on the rule of rescue and on substituted (...) interest judgments. Patients’ known wishes and values are relevant, particularly in protecting them from unwanted CPR. Clinicians should rescue patients with the means at their disposal, as a prima facie moral imperative, unless there are compelling reasons to refrain. We present a moral framework for making decisions regarding CPR and DNR. (shrink)

The modern debate on whether—and why—physicians and hospitals can refuse patient or family demands for treatment on grounds of “futility” will be reaching its 20th anniversary this year (Blackhall, 1987). The early debate focused on the use of CPR, for good historical and clinical reasons, and CPR probably remains the primary target of hospital policy. But the reach of the arguments over futility extends well beyond this context, most vividly illustrated by the case of Helga Wanglie and the many commentaries (...) it spawned (Brody, 1998; Schneiderman, 1998; Trotter, 1999). There seems no obvious reason in principle that questions about futility cannot be raised about virtually any form of treatment that patients or families might demand, including such things as chemotherapy for cancer (Tomlinson, 2001). Still, we might fairly ask what new dimensions and complexities the futility question acquires when it moves onto decisions about treatments other than CPR. This is what I would like to do in this essay. I will use dialysis as the case in point, although I hope to extract lessons from the dialysis example that will be pertinent to other forms of life-sustaining treatment, like ventilators. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate factors associated with seriously ill patients’ preferences for their family and physicians making resuscitation decisions on their behalf. Using SUPPORT II data, the study revealed that, among 362 seriously ill patients who were experiencing pain, 277 (77%) answered that they would want their family and physicians to make resuscitation decisions for them instead of their own wishes being followed if they were to lose decision-making capacity. Even after controlling for other variables, patients (...) who preferred the option of undergoing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in the future were twice as likely, and those who had had ventilator treatment were four-fifths less likely, to rely on their family and physicians than those who did not want CPR (odds ratio (OR)-2.28; 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.18-4.38) or those who had not received ventilator treatment (OR-0.23; 95% CI 0.06-0.90). Psychological variables (anxiety, quality of life, and depression), symptomatic variables (severity of pain and activities of daily living) and the existence of surrogates were not significantly associated with patients’ preferences for having their family and physicians make resuscitation decisions for them. Age was not a significant factor for predicting the decision-making role after controlling for other variables. (shrink)

Since the last generation medical ethics has seen a remarkable shift from benign medical paternalism to patient rights and autonomy. Whereas once it might have been acceptable for doctors to decide, largely on their own, what was in the best interests of their patients, today senior health professionals are expected to make decisions jointly both with patients or their carers and with other health professionals. Patient autonomy and justice, and not simply beneficence, are usually thought to be crucial to medical (...) ethics today.Although I strongly support this shift in medical ethics, I believe it is important to recognise that it has some cost to medical professionals, to patients and even at times to the National Health Service . Medical paternalism, when it was genuinely benign, did have some benefits both for doctors and for their patients. Yet precisely because most of us are no longer prepared to be at the receiving end of such paternalism, these particular benefits are now largely lost to us.The new joint statement, Decisions Relating to Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation,1 illustrates this point well. At the outset it admits that “health professionals are aware that decisions about attempting resuscitation raise very sensitive and potentially distressing issues for the patient and people emotionally close to the patient”. It was because of these sensitive and potentially distressing issues that it was once thought acceptable to make do not attempt resuscitation orders without consulting either patients or their families and with the knowledge that the latter would probably never discover that such orders had ever been made. Now, however, health workers are warned frankly that they “should remember …. (shrink)

Each time patients and their families are asked to make a decision about resuscitation, they are also asked to engage the political, social, and cultural concerns that have shaped its history. That history is exemplified in the career of Claude S. Beck, arguably the most influential researcher and teacher of resuscitation in the twentieth century. Careful review of Beck’s work discloses that the development and popularization of the techniques of resuscitation proceeded through a multiplication of definitions of death. CPR consequently (...) remains unique among medical treatments, because it is indicated precisely when a person dies, depending always on how each event of death becomes defined practically by patients, families, and medical professionals present at the time. It is therefore as an occasion to manage a surplus of definitions of death, and not as an occasion to determine the physiological efficacy of resuscitation, that one should approach analysis of contemporary challenges in decision-making about resuscitation. (shrink)

(2010). Leave Current System of Universal CPR and Patient Request of DNR Orders in Place. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 80-81.

Here we present the personal perspectives of two authors on the important and unfortunately frequent scenario of ambulance clinicians facing a deceased individual and family members who do not wish them to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation. We examine the professional guidance and the protection provided to clinicians, which is not matched by guidance to protect family members. We look at the legal framework in which these scenarios are taking place, and the ethical issues which are presented. We consider the interaction between (...) ethics, clinical practice and the law, and offer suggested changes to policy and guidance which we believe will protect ambulance clinicians, relatives and the patient. (shrink)