This is a book symposium on Steffen Borge’s The Philosophy of Football. It has contributions from William Morgan, Murray Smith and Brian Weatherson with replies from Borge.

Both patients and clinicians frequently report problems around communicating and assessing pain. Patients express dissatisfaction with their doctors and doctors often find exchanges with chronic pain patients difficult and frustrating. This chapter thus asks how we could improve pain communication and thereby enhance outcomes for chronic pain patients. We argue that improving matters will require a better appreciation of the complex meaning of pain terms and of the variability and flexibility in how individuals think about pain. We start by examining (...) the various accounts of the meaning of pain terms that have been suggested within philosophy and suggest that, while each of the accounts captures something important about our use of pain terms, none is completely satisfactory. We propose that pain terms should be viewed as communicating complex meanings, which may change across different communicative contexts, and this in turn suggests that we should view our ordinary thought about pain as similarly complex. We then sketch what a view taking seriously this variability in meaning and thought might look like, which we call the “polyeidic” view. According to this view, individuals tacitly occupy divergent stances across a range of different dimensions of pain, with one agent, for instance, thinking of pain in a much more “bodycentric” kind of way, while another thinks of pain in a much more "mindcentric” way. The polyeidic view attempts to expand the multidimensionality recognised in, e.g., biopsychosocial models in two directions: first, it holds that the standard triumvirate— dividing sensory/cognitive/affective factors— needs to be enriched in order to capture important distinctions within the social and psychological dimensions. Second, the polyeidic view attempts to explain (at least in part) why modulation of experience by these social and psychological factors is possible in the first place. It does so by arguing that because the folk concept of pain is complex, different weightings of the different parts of the concept can modulate pain experience in a variety of ways. Finally, we argue that adopting a polyeidic approach to the meaning of pain would have a range of measurable clinical outcomes. (shrink)

A prevailing conceptualization of values in organizations regards values as preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Accordingly, values are pursued through prescriptions, actions of implementation and evaluation, based on the presumption that values inform actions. Thus, holding the ‘right’ values leads to desired practice. However, this is a problematic stance, suppressing the fact that correlation between value and action is highly questioned. The article claims that proliferation of values in organizations is more plausible and influential turning the process (...) around, utilizing the ideas of sensemaking, tacit knowledge and virtue in a critical reflection-upon-action model, engaging organizational members as co-researchers of their own value constructions in context. (shrink)

In this paper, I am going to present a condensed version of my theory of what sport is from my book The Philosophy of Football. In that work, I took my starting point in Bernard Suits’ celebrated,...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in also, because, (...) after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

Med hjemmel i de lovfestede spesielle god skikk-reglene har flere yrker utformet yrkesetiske regler med en lovmessig forankring. Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i fem yrker og gir en juridisk analyse av god revisorskikk, god advokatskikk, god regnskapsføringsskikk, god meglerskikk og god landmålerskikk. Formålet er å sammenligne den rettslige betydningen av disse SGS-reglene. De sammenlignes ut fra hjemmelsgrunnlaget og hvilken bransjeorganisasjon som har utformet de yrkesetiske reglene, autorisasjonsordning og en hypotese om at de yrkesetiske reglene inneholder følgende elementer: profesjonsansvar, integritet, objektivitet, (...) taushetsplikt og kompetansekrav.Sammenligningen viser at lovfestede SGS-regler har ført til at de aktuelle bransjeorganisasjonene har tatt ansvar for å utforme de yrkesetiske reglene. Når det gjelder autorisasjonsordningen, har Finanstilsynet ansvaret for autorisasjonene til revisorer, regnskapsførere og eiendomsmeglere. For advokater har Tilsynsrådet for advokatvirksomhet ansvaret for å føre tilsyn med advokatbevillingene, mens landmålerne ikke er underlagt en autorisasjonsordning.Analysen viser at en finner de fem elementene både i god revisorskikk, god advokatskikk, god regnskapsføringsskikk og god landmålerskikk. God meglerskikk er derimot svært forskjellig fra de andre yrkesetiske reglene. Samlet viser analysene at de yrkesetiske reglene har en viss rettslig betydning, selv om den varierer.Nøkkelord: lovfestede god skikk-regler, yrkesetiske reglerEnglish summary: The significance of ethical rules based on legislated rules for Code of ConductIn accordance with statutory authority rules for Code of conduct, several professions have designed ethical rules with a legal foundation. This article is based on a legal analysis of CoC for auditors, lawyers, accountants, real estate agents and for land surveyors. The purpose of the article is to compare the legal significance of these rules for the CoC. The various rules for CoC are compared in terms of their legal basis, the professional organisation which has designed the professional ethical rules and the system of authorisation. The rules for CoC are also compared in a hypothesis about five elements. The hypothesis is that the ethical rules contain the following elements: professionalism, integrity, objectivity, confidentiality and competency.The comparison shows that legislated rules for CoC have enabled the relevant professional organisations to take responsibility for designing professional ethical rules. In the case of system of authorisation, the «Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway» is responsible for authorising auditors, accountants and real estate agents. For lawyers the «Supervisory Council For Legal Practice» is responsible for supervising their authorisation, whereas land surveyors are not subject to an authorisation system – either public or professional.The analysis shows that one can find all five elements in the CoC for auditors, lawyers, accountants, and land surveyors. The CoC for real estate agents, however, is different from the other ethical rules. Overall, the analysis shows that the ethical rules have a certain legal significance, although it varies. (shrink)

Jorge Luis Borges is working for decades now on the execution of the nightmare. Perhaps his most celebrated instance is "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius ". It would take much work to sift the fabricated references in Borges' works from the ones deliberately misread from the over-emphasis on an author's casual remark, etc.

Minimal Semantics asks what a theory of literal linguistic meaning is for - if you were to be given a working theory of meaning for a language right now, what would you be able to do with it? Emma Borg sets out to defend a formal approach to semantic theorising from a relatively new type of opponent - advocates of what she call 'dual pragmatics'. According to dual pragmatists, rich pragmatic processes play two distinct roles in linguistic comprehension: as well (...) as operating in a post-semantic capacity to determine the implicatures of an utterance, they also operate prior to the determination of truth-conditional content for a sentence. That is to say, they have an integral role to play within what is usually thought of as the semantic realm. Borg believes dual pragmatic accounts constitute the strongest contemporary challenge to standard formal approaches to semantics since they challenge the formal theorist to show not merely that there is some role for formal processes on route to determination of semantic content, but that such processes are sufficient for determining content. Minimal Semantics provides a detailed examination of this school of thought, introducing readers who are unfamiliar with the topic to key ideas like relevance theory and contextualism, and looking in detail at where these accounts diverge from the formal approach. Borg's defence of formal semantics has two main parts: first, she argues that the formal approach is most naturally compatible with an important and well-grounded psychological theory, namely the Fodorian modular picture of the mind. Then she argues that the main arguments adduced by dual pragmatists against formal semantics - concerning apparent contextual intrusions into semantic content - can in fact be countered by a formal theory. The defence holds, however, only if we are sensitive to the proper conditions of success for a semantic theory. Specifically, we should reject a range of onerous constraints on semantic theorizing (e.g., that it answer epistemic or metaphysical questions, or that it explain our communicative skills) and instead adopt a quite minimal picture of semantics. (shrink)

Cultuursociologisch essay over de postchristelijke manieren waarop mensen lijden compenseren.

Vardanyan’s Theorems [36, 37] state that $\mathsf {QPL}(\mathsf {PA})$ —the quantified provability logic of Peano Arithmetic—is $\Pi ^0_2$ complete, and in particular that this already holds when the language is restricted to a single unary predicate. Moreover, Visser and de Jonge [38] generalized this result to conclude that it is impossible to computably axiomatize the quantified provability logic of a wide class of theories. However, the proof of this fact cannot be performed in a strictly positive signature. The system $\mathsf (...) {QRC_1}$ was previously introduced by the authors [1] as a candidate first-order provability logic. Here we generalize the previously available Kripke soundness and completeness proofs, obtaining constant domain completeness. Then we show that $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ is indeed complete with respect to arithmetical semantics. This is achieved via a Solovay-type construction applied to constant domain Kripke models. As corollaries, we see that $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ is the strictly positive fragment of $\mathsf {QGL}$ and a fragment of $\mathsf {QPL}(\mathsf {PA})$. (shrink)

The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way. Heidegger’s phenomenology of Befindlichkeit and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before Being and Time, and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the affectiones in Augustine, the notion of Befindlichkeit sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological levei of Grundstimmungen (...) (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual Stimmungen. Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a Wovor, a Worum and the full-fledged exercise (Vollzug) of such and such affective understanding. In Being and Time this analysis is dedicated to fear, in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the Beiträge (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking. (shrink)

Emma Borg examines the relation between semantics and pragmatics, and assesses recent answers to fundamental questions of how and where to draw the divide between the two. She argues for a minimal account of the interrelation between them--a 'minimal semantics'--which holds that only rule-governed appeals to context can influence semantic content.

I argue that, against what is commonly believed, Spinoza’s use of the relation of constitution to characterize the relation between attributes and the essence of a substance does not indicate that, for him, there must be a numerical identity between each attribute and the essence constituted by that attribute. To do this, I follow a twofold strategy. First, I contend that the claim that because in Spinoza’s time constitution was understood as a one- to-one relation is mistaken: the main logicians (...) of Spinoza’s time, all Cartesian philosophers, believe that the constitution of an essence can be a many-to-one relation. I show that Spinoza can both accept that constitution is a many-one relation and share Descartes’ understanding of this relation. Second, I defend the claim that Spinoza’s use of constitution in the Ethics is consistent with these logicians’ account of constitution. In particular, I focus on Spinoza’s inclusion of the intellect in the definition of attribute and his definition of God. (shrink)

Big Data and Artificial Intelligence have a symbiotic relationship. Artificial Intelligence needs to be trained on Big Data to be accurate, and Big Data's value is largely realized through its use by Artificial Intelligence. As a result, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence practices are tightly intertwined in real life settings, as are their impacts on society. Unethical uses of Artificial Intelligence are therefore a Big Data problem, at least to some degree. Efforts to address this problem have been dominated by (...) the documentation of Ethical Artificial Intelligence principles and the creation of technical tools that address specific aspects of those principles. However, there is mounting evidence that Ethical Artificial Intelligence principles and technical tools have little impact on the Artificial Intelligence that is created in practice, sometimes in very public ways. The goal of this commentary is to highlight four interconnected areas society can invest in to close this Ethical Artificial Intelligence publication-to-practice gap, maximizing the positive impact Artificial Intelligence and Big Data have on society. For Ethical Artificial Intelligence to become a reality, I argue that these areas need to be addressed holistically in a way that acknowledges their interdependencies. Progress will require iteration, compromise, and transdisciplinary collaboration, but the result of our investments will be the realization of Artificial Intelligence's and Big Data's tremendous potential for social good, in practice rather than in just our hopes and aspirations. (shrink)

We develop a process-based framework, articulating the escalation of difference between “private” self and “public” display as an alternative trajectory in the pursuit of authenticity to alignment and compromise. A parsimonious model presents an endogenous dynamic of binary choice that generates momentum toward polarization. The model is illustrated in the context of “black” metal – a branch of heavy metal music that appeared in Norway in the early 1990s, notorious for its involvement in criminal activities. Using fanzine data, we construct (...) a narrative of how a process of escalation led to innovation and transgression through self-selection and exclusion. The analysis addresses two related theoretical problems – what motivates actors to challenge normative scripts and “burn the bridges” to social acceptance, and why such challenges may prove more effective in achieving recognition than compromise. Examples from politics, culture and sports reinforce the importance of these problems. (shrink)

This paper seeks to understand Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of the time experience in Sein und Zeit, from the formal point of view of the Care-structure, and in the Seminars of Zollikon, where time is described as world-time in its fullness. Aimed is to show that the early anthropological reception of his major work of 1927 by some of his pupils, like Löwith, who detected similarities with Psychoanalysis, is somehow strengthed by Heidegger himself later on, as he comes with Medard Boss (...) to develop Daseynsanalysis as a metaonlogical understanding of humans life in health and pathology. Illness as privation of health will be seen as the failure of inauthentic existence. And the full, ecstatical experience of time will be shown as the proper or authentic one, being-in-the-world as well as within the psychoanalytical session and interpretation. (shrink)

Heidegger’ s Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriff offers what could be called a phenomenology of Phenomenology itself, that is: an investigation of its history. The husserlian discovery of the “categorial intuition” appears as the second moment of this history, after Brentano’s “intentionality” and before Heidegger’s own discovery of the “original sense of the a priori”, which constitutes the third moment. Our paper seeks to understand this sequence as a way to answer the leading question of how it may be possible (...) that “to be a intentional object can have any relationship with the being itself”. Or, to put it in another formulation: how is intentionality itself ontologically possible? (shrink)

‘Quiet’ and ‘Disquiet’ are terms which express ways of accounting for time-experience, besides being equally open for a rendering as emotional states. Starting from three existential moods – stress, boredom, and the joy of the present moment – this inquiry aims to put into evidence the structuring features of our existential experience of time itself, both in the daily exercise of our being-in-the-world, and at the level of our being or not being in possession of oneself in such exercise and (...) in its potentially pathological derivates. In this context, which finds its theoretical roots in the Heideggerian analysis of the being-in, quiet and disquiet reveal their paradoxical character in terms of the mutual belonging and tension each of them, respectively, presupposes. At the same time, and with such a basis, we will find the way of understanding ‘quiet’ as a correlate of time as a ‘duration’. (shrink)

This article takes as its point of departure Hannah Arendt’s discussion of public happiness, contextualising it within her thoughts on politics, democracy and revolution. It draws on Arendt’s discussion of how the expression “pursuit of happiness” has historically shifted from a public understanding of happiness into an increasingly privatised one. The article engages with Arendt’s account of public happiness in order to reanimate her radical democratic critique of how representative politics reduces the scope of political action and participation; and how (...) the notion of happiness in a neoliberal era can only be interpreted in economistic and subjectivist terms. Furthermore, the article turns to examine how recent works in contemporary political thought, namely, those by Adriana Cavarero and Judith Butler, extend and transform the stakes of Arendt’s account of public happiness. On one hand, Cavarero’s notion of surging democracy is considered as an account of radical politics that keeps alive the Arendtian concern with public happiness by contextualising it within contemporary political struggles and social movements. On the other hand, Butler problematises Arendt’s discussion of politics for its neglect of precarity; however, this article argues that Butler’s work on assembly extends Arendt’s by highlighting possibilities of resistance, radical democracy and even public happiness amid experiences of loss and grief. Although prima facie it might appear that happiness and precarity are opposed to each other, this article points towards contemporary political practices, such as those of Ni Una Menos, that are critically reanimating public happiness through the intertwining of affective registers that range from joy to grief. (shrink)

In his quest to let language speak, Heidegger explored thoroughly the possibilities of meaning of factical language, in its phenomenological and poietic dimensions. He thereby came to characterize Being and Time as a way, a path which must be followed until it ends. He later understood it as a wandering and, finally, as a dead end (Holzweg). The idea of the walker, in conversation with himself, accompanies this entire journey. The present essay seeks to uncover the main moments of Heidegger’s (...) retrospective and self-interpreting way, based on recent publications of the Gesamtausgabe (in particular GA 82 and 70.1), which he himself wanted to see, generally speaking, as the edition of his Wege, nicht Werke. (shrink)

This paper aims to propose an invitation to look at the kind of childhood we have been constructing from the practices of Special Education, in articulation with the practices of Early Childhood Education. It problematizes the discursive webs formed in this articulation, considering the way that Special Education teachers working with Early Childhood in public schools regard childhood. Such discussions have derived from the uneasiness of thinking about how we have been producing childhood, given the policy of expanding mandatory attendance (...) to four-year-old children. The analytical exercise, inspired by the discourse analysis proposed by Michel Foucault, has enabled us to question the production of subjects, truths and realities in the “confessions” of the interviewed teachers, in which we have identified two ways of thinking about and producing childhood: captured childhood, which is produced through the operationalization of normalization practices by Special Education, determined by the will to knowledge and the will to power over childhood; and childhood as heterotopy, produced as a powerful movement of resistance and denaturalization of normalizing practices – childhood regarded from other places, as an infinite, multiple, non-nameable, ever undetermined becoming, as an invitation to thought: what can we do in the encounter with childhood? (shrink)

A critical review of four recent works that reflect current conflicts and tensions among feminists regarding new reproductive technologies: In Search of Parenthood by Judith Lasker and Susan Borg; Ethics and Human Reproduction by Christine Overall; Made to Order, Patricia Spallone and Deborah Steinberg, eds. and Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine, Michelle Stanworth, ed. Their positions are evaluated against the background of growing feminist dialogue about the future of reproduction and the bearing of reproductive innovations on such related issues (...) as racism, sexuality, motherhood and abortion. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el presente trabajo analizo críticamente dos estrategias empleadas para esclarecer la naturaleza modal de las estructuras tal como son concebidas por el realismo estructural óntico en su versión eliminativista: los patrones reales de Ladyman y Ross y las leyes y simetrías de French. Ofrezco argumentos para mostrar que ambas resultan incapaces de brindar una caracterización de las estructuras como entidades inherentemente modales. Ese resultado impone serias dificultades al proyecto de presentar el REO como una posición realista acerca del (...) mundo físico. ABSTACT In this article, I carry out a critical analysis of two strategies employed to clarify the modal nature of structures as conceived by the eliminativist version of Ontic Structural Realism : the real patterns of Ladyman and Ross and French's laws and symmetries. I provide arguments to show that neither of them is capable of coming up with a characterization of structures as inherently modal structures. This result poses serious difficulties for the project of presenting OSR as a realist position regarding the physical world. (shrink)

An introduction to formal semantic theories and dual pragmatic accounts. The chapter gives an initial examination of the distinct challenges posed by advocates of dual pragmatic accounts and the precise nature of the debate between the two approaches. The chapter also looks at the notion of logical form deployed by both kinds of semantic theory.

This chapter looks at a currently very popular argument for dual pragmatic theories, turning on so-called ‘unarticulated constituents’ or ‘hidden indexicals’. These are elements that do not figure at the syntactic level but are supposedly required to arrive at the truth-conditions of many natural language sentences. The precise form of this argument is explored and three different versions enumerated. However I argue that in none of its forms is this argument against formal semantics compelling.

An introduction to the notion of modularity of mind and an argument as to why only formal semantic theories are compatible with the claim that semantic comprehension is the product of a modular system. This chapter also looks at some initial challenges to formal semantics stemming from the apparent place of pragmatic reasoning in our grasp of meaning. These include arguments concerning the nature of speech acts, the analysis of implicatures, word learning, and ambiguity.

This chapter spells out the precise claims of minimal semantics and the role it accords to context in semantic theorizing. It also recapitulates the claims made with respect to the modularity of linguistic understanding, arguing that grasp of literal linguistic meaning is a properly modular process while grasp of what is said by a speaker is a non-modular process. Finally, some relevant questions that are not addressed in detail in the book are raised.

Looks at a classic problem for formal theories of meaning, stemming from the existence of expressions whose meaning depends, in part, on the context in which they are produced. I argue that formal accounts can accommodate such expressions without admitting rich contextual features to the semantic realm.

The present article introduces and describes an innovative educational approach to learning processes, the Imagineering collaborative methodology. The methodology has been developed as a part of the learning curriculum for the Imagineering masters course. The theoretical and practical framework is explained, offering some illustrations in order to demonstrate the possibilities and implications of embracing such an approach in an educational environment. This article proposes a systemic, collaborative, and relational view on education that avoids reductive and disjunctive learning processes, inviting students (...) to be designers of their learning, preparing them to deal professionally with the demands of the twenty-first century, more aligned with a radically changing landscape in today's society. (shrink)

A standard objection to so-called ‘minimal semantics’ (Borg 2004, 2012, Cappelen and Lepore 2005) is that minimal contents are explanatorily redundant as they play no role in an adequate account of linguistic communication (those making this objection include Levinson 2000, Carston 2002, Recanati 2004). This paper argues that this standard objection is mistaken. Furthermore, I argue that seeing why the objection is mistaken sheds light both on how we should draw the classic Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, and how (...) we should think about the key philosophical notion of assertion. Specifically, it reveals that these ideas are best understood primarily in socio-linguistic terms (resting on the degree of liability a speaker is held to have for linguistically conveyed content). (shrink)

O RECONHECIMENTO DA FAMÍLIA ANAPARENTAL COMO ENTIDADE FAMILIAR ESTÁVEL E SUA CONSEQUENTE LEGITIMIDADE PARA PLEITEAR ADOÇÃO, À LUZ DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DO STF.