Explanatory roles for minimal content

Noûs 53 (3):513-539 (2019)

Abstract

A standard objection to so-called ‘minimal semantics’ is that minimal contents are explanatorily redundant as they play no role in an adequate account of linguistic communication. This paper argues that this standard objection is mistaken. Furthermore, I argue that seeing why the objection is mistaken sheds light both on how we should draw the classic Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, and how we should think about the key philosophical notion of assertion. Specifically, it reveals that these ideas are best understood primarily in socio-linguistic terms.

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Emma Borg
University of Reading

References found in this work

Minimal Semantics.Emma Borg - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.

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Citations of this work

The Dynamics of Loose Talk.Sam Carter - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):171-198.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sneaky Assertions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):188-218.
Fictions That Purport to Tell the Truth.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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