Noûs 53 (3):513-539 (2019)
AbstractA standard objection to so-called ‘minimal semantics’ is that minimal contents are explanatorily redundant as they play no role in an adequate account of linguistic communication. This paper argues that this standard objection is mistaken. Furthermore, I argue that seeing why the objection is mistaken sheds light both on how we should draw the classic Gricean distinction between saying and implicating, and how we should think about the key philosophical notion of assertion. Specifically, it reveals that these ideas are best understood primarily in socio-linguistic terms.
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References found in this work
Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication.Robyn Carston - 2002 - Oxford: Blackwell.
Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.
Citations of this work
Speaker's Reference, Semantic Reference, Sneaky Reference.Eliot Michaelson - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
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