Understanding natural phenomena is an important aim of science. Since the turn of the millennium the notion of scientific understanding has been a hot topic of debate in the philosophy of science. A bone of contention in this debate is the role of truth and representational accuracy in scientific understanding. So-called factivists and non-factivists disagree about the extent to which the theories and models that are used to achieve understanding must be true or accurate. In this paper we address this (...) issue by examining a case from the practice of synthetic chemistry. We investigate how understanding is obtained in this field by means of an in-depth analysis of the famous synthesis of periplanone B by W. Clark Still. It turns out that highly idealized models—that are representationally inaccurate and sometimes even inconsistent—and qualitative concepts are essential for understanding the synthetic pathway and accordingly for achieving the synthesis. We compare the results of our case study to various factivist and non-factivist accounts of how idealizations may contribute to scientific understanding and conclude that non-factivism offers a more plausible interpretation of the practice of synthetic chemistry. Moreover, our case study supports a central thesis of the non-factivist theory of scientific understanding developed by De Regt, namely that scientific understanding requires intelligibility rather than representational accuracy, and that idealization is one way to enhance intelligibility. (shrink)

A set of axioms implicitly defining the standard, though not instant-based but interval-based, time topology is used as a basis to build a temporal modal logic of events. The whole apparatus contains neither past, present, and future operators nor indexicals, but only B-series relations and modal operators interpreted in the standard way. Determinism and indeterminism are then introduced into the logic of events via corresponding axioms. It is shown that, if determinism and indeterminism are understood in accordance with their core (...) meaning, the way in which they are formally introduced here represents the only right way to do this, given that we restrict ourselves to one real world and make no use of the many real worlds assumption. But then the result is that the very truth conditions for sentences about indeterministic events imply the existence of tensed truths, in spite of the fact that these conditions are formulated (in the indeterministic axiom) in terms of tenseless language. The tenseless theory of time implies determinism, while indeterminism requires the flow of time assumption. (shrink)

A maximal almost disjoint (mad) family $\mathscr{A} \subseteq [\omega]^\omega$ is Cohen-stable if and only if it remains maximal in any Cohen generic extension. Otherwise it is Cohen-unstable. It is shown that a mad family, A, is Cohen-unstable if and only if there is a bijection G from ω to the rationals such that the sets G[A], A ∈A are nowhere dense. An ℵ 0 -mad family, A, is a mad family with the property that given any countable family $\mathscr{B} \subset (...) [\omega]^\omega$ such that each element of B meets infinitely many elements of A in an infinite set there is an element of A meeting each element of B in an infinite set. It is shown that Cohen-stable mad families exist if and only if there exist ℵ 0 -mad families. Either of the conditions b = c or $\mathfrak{a} ) implies that there exist Cohen-stable mad families. Similar results are obtained for splitting families. For example, a splitting family, S, is Cohen-unstable if and only if there is a bijection G from ω to the rationals such that the boundaries of the sets G[S], S ∈S are nowhere dense. Also, Cohen-stable splitting families of cardinality ≤ κ exist if and only if ℵ 0 -splitting families of cardinality ≤ κ exist. (shrink)

A sequence x=xn:nω of elements of a complete Boolean algebra converges to a priori if lim infx=lim supx=b. The sequential topology τs on is the maximal topology on such that x→b implies x→τsb, where →τs denotes the convergence in the space — the a posteriori convergence. These two forms of convergence, as well as the properties of the sequential topology related to forcing, are investigated. So, the a posteriori convergence is described in terms of killing of tall ideals on ω, (...) and it is shown that the a posteriori convergence is equivalent to the a priori convergence iff forcing by does not produce new reals. A property of c.B.a.’s, satisfying -cc -cc and providing an explicit definition of the a posteriori convergence, is isolated. Finally, it is shown that, for an arbitrary c.B.a. , the space is sequentially compact iff the algebra has the property and does not produce independent reals by forcing, and that implies P is the unique sequentially compact c.B.a. in the class of Suslin forcing notions. (shrink)

If κω is a cardinal, a complete Boolean algebra is called κ-dependent if for each sequence bβ: β<κ of elements of there exists a partition of the unity, P, such that each pP extends bβ or bβ′, for κ-many βκ. The connection of this property with cardinal functions, distributivity laws, forcing and collapsing of cardinals is considered.

The game Gls(κ) is played on a complete Boolean algebra B, by two players. White and Black, in κ-many moves (where κ is an infinite cardinal). At the beginning White chooses a non-zero element p ∈ B. In the α-th move White chooses pα ∈ (0.p)p and Black responds choosing iα ∈ {0.1}. White wins the play iff $\bigwedge _{\beta \in \kappa}\bigvee _{\alpha \geq \beta }p_{\alpha}^{i\alpha}=0$ , where $p_{\alpha}^{0}=p_{\alpha}$ and $p_{\alpha}^{1}=p\ p_{\alpha}$ . The corresponding game theoretic properties of c.B.a.'s are (...) investigated. So. Black has a winning strategy (w.s) if κ ≥ π(B) or if B contains a κ -closed dense subset. On the other hand, if White has a w.s., then κ ∈ [h₂(B). π(B)). The existence of w.s. is characterized in a combinatorial way and in terms of forcing. In particular, if 2κ = κ ∈ Reg and forcing by B preserves the regularity of κ, then White has a w.s. iff the power 2κ is collapsed to κ in some extension. It is shown that, under the GCH, for each set S ⊆ Reg there is a c.B.a. B such that White (respectively. Black) has a w.s. for each infinite cardinal κ ∈ S (resp. κ ∉ S). Also it is shown consistent that for each κ ∈ Reg there is a c.B.a. on which the game Gls(κ) is undetermined. (shrink)

A complete Boolean algebra ${\mathbb{B}}$ satisfies property ${(\hbar)}$ iff each sequence x in ${\mathbb{B}}$ has a subsequence y such that the equality lim sup z n = lim sup y n holds for each subsequence z of y. This property, providing an explicit definition of the a posteriori convergence in complete Boolean algebras with the sequential topology and a characterization of sequential compactness of such spaces, is closely related to the cellularity of Boolean algebras. Here we determine the position of (...) property ${(\hbar)}$ with respect to the hierarchy of conditions of the form κ-cc. So, answering a question from Kurilić and Pavlović (Ann Pure Appl Logic 148(1–3):49–62, 2007), we show that ${``\mathfrak{h}{\rm -cc}\Rightarrow (\hbar)"}$ is not a theorem of ZFC and that there is no cardinal ${\mathfrak{k}}$ , definable in ZFC, such that ${``\mathfrak{k} {\rm -cc} \Leftrightarrow (\hbar)"}$ is a theorem of ZFC. Also, we show that the set ${\{ \kappa : {\rm each}\, \kappa{\rm -cc\, c.B.a.\, has}\, (\hbar ) \}}$ is equal to ${[0, \mathfrak{h})}$ or ${[0, {\mathfrak h}]}$ and that both values are consistent, which, with the known equality ${{\{\kappa : {\rm each\, c.B.a.\, having }\, (\hbar )\, {\rm has\, the}\, \kappa {\rm -cc } \} =[{\mathfrak s}, \infty )}}$ completes the picture. (shrink)

If κ is an infinite cardinal, a complete Boolean algebra B is called κ-supported if for each sequence 〈bβ : β αbβ = equation imagemath imageequation imageβ∈Abβ holds. Combinatorial and forcing equivalents of this property are given and compared with the other forcing related properties of Boolean algebras . The set of regular cardinals κ for which B is not κ-supported is investigated.

The concept of cuteness, which can evoke positive emotions in people, is an essential aspect to consider in artificial intelligence design. This study aimed to investigate whether the use of baby schema designed avatars in computer-mediated communication elicits higher positive attitudes than neutral avatars and whether the ethnicity of the cute avatars influences individuals' perceived level of cuteness. 485 participants from Israel and Japan viewed six avatar images, including three baby schema avatars of different visual characteristics and ethnicities (Caucasian, Asian, (...) and Black) and three neutral avatars. Participants rated their attitudes on each avatar, and the results revealed that the baby schema designed avatars were rated cuter, more likable, approachable, and pleasant than the neutral mature avatars. Cultural differences were also evident, as the Caucasian baby schema avatar was rated cuter among Japanese participants, while the Asian and Black baby schema avatars were rated cuter among Israeli respondents. The study findings suggest that cute avatar design can serve as a powerful tool for promoting positive interactions in computer-mediated communication, especially in cultures that highly value cuteness, such as Japan. However, the subjective nature of cuteness is evident as attitudes toward cuteness varied significantly across cultures and individuals. This research highlights the significance of cultural diversity and emphasizes the importance of considering cuteness as a crucial aspect of artificial intelligence design, particularly when creating avatars intended to elicit positive emotions from users. Therefore, designers should be mindful of potential cultural and individual differences in the perception of cuteness while developing avatars for various applications. (shrink)

This paper deals with Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures, as well as his appeal for revival of neo-Aristotelian approaches that imply ordered structure, based on the criticism of Quine’s method that, in his view, implies flat metaphysical structure. However, although we believe that Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures is an interesting and, basically, acceptable view, we will try to show that Schaffer’s arguments are not convincing enough to persuade us to abandon Quine’s method and adopt the Aristotelian metaphysical model. Moreover, (...) when mistakes that Schaffer makes are corrected and Quine’s method is given due attention, we will see that this can enable us a more tenable interpretation of the concepts that Schaffer speaks of (metaphysical structures), but also – as in his case – to draw certain conclusions that go beyond objectives of classification as such. (shrink)

Very often moral disagreements can be resolved by appealing to factual considerations because in these cases the parties to the dispute agree as to which factual considerations are relevant. They agree, that is, with respect to their basic moral standards. Hence, when their disagreement about the non-moral facts is resolved, so is their moral disagreement. But sometimes moral disagreement persists in spite of agreement on factual considerations. When this happens, and when neither party is guilty of illogical thinking, we have (...) a case of moral deadlock. (shrink)

Although Williams’ contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams’ position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of (...) scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed. (shrink)

In this paper we will try to show the differences between Quine’s and Gibson’s interpretation of the naturalized epistemology project. Namely, although Gibson points out that the genetic approach advocated by Quine is the best strategy there is to investigate the relations between evidence and theory, and that externalizing of empiricism that it requires is one of Quine’s major philosophical contributions, we argue that the assumptions on which Gibson’s project is based, apart from the fact that they are in conflict (...) with some strongly held intuitions, would have to be essentially different from Quine’s. In other words, contrary to Quine’s position within which we have the possibility of staying on more moderate, and in our opinion, more plausible behavioristic line of approach, we will try to show that one of the consequences of Gibson’s interpretation is that this possibility is ruled out in Gibson’s case. On the other hand, this should enable us to draw some more radical conclusions about the nature of Quine’s epistemological project. (shrink)

In this paper, we will try to confront Quine’s and Davidson’s holistic position through Davidson’s thesis of the mental as a non-ontological category. In this regard, since Davidson came to this position through the thesis of the mental as a decidedly conceptual category, we will try to show how this approach does not, nevertheless, rule out the possibility of its interpretation in ontological terms. However, in what follows we will draw attention to the fact that the mental can be interpreted (...) so that it proves to be immune to ontologizing in Quine’s sense. This would be the evidence of different ways, which are not necessarily compatible, to argue for Davidson’s central thesis - the thesis about holistic character of the mental - as well as, which is closely related, a certain difference that exists between Davidson’s view of the mental as a conceptual category on the one hand, and a holistic category on the other. (shrink)

This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive (...) inference, this approach should enable us to draw some conclusions related to abduction in general. (shrink)

At the basis of tireless efforts to explain the nature of law lies the question of how judges should decide cases. Therefrom arises a need for a theory that would clarify the role of the courts and, moreover, provide guidance to them on reaching judgments. The history of legal theory abounds with various attempts to offer a generally acceptable answer to the question raised. The fervor of debate and the perpetual dissatisfaction with offered solutions prompted the thought of untamable arbitrariness (...) of judges. In the contemporary debate the significance of argumentation is particularly emphasized as a link of the court procedure which provides reasonableness and therewith justification and persuasiveness of the decision. Before going into the matter, I will indicate in broad strokes which areas of legal theory do argumentation and interpretation belong to. The purpose of setting a conceptual framework is to prevent losing sight of the whole as well as to limit the scope of discourse to a certain section of legal issues. The second part deals with the concept of argumentation in general and some specific features of the argumentation in law. The third part examines the role of legal interpretation and draws a clear distinction between the interpretation as a process and the interpretation as a result. At the end of the discussion I shall put forward a thesis that the interpretation as a process is argumentation, while the interpretation as a result is an argument in the justification of judgment. nema. (shrink)

To model behavioral and neural correlates of language comprehension in naturalistic environments, researchers have turned to broad‐coverage tools from natural‐language processing and machine learning. Where syntactic structure is explicitly modeled, prior work has relied predominantly on context‐free grammars (CFGs), yet such formalisms are not sufficiently expressive for human languages. Combinatory categorial grammars (CCGs) are sufficiently expressive directly compositional models of grammar with flexible constituency that affords incremental interpretation. In this work, we evaluate whether a more expressive CCG provides a better (...) model than a CFG for human neural signals collected with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants listen to an audiobook story. We further test between variants of CCG that differ in how they handle optional adjuncts. These evaluations are carried out against a baseline that includes estimates of next‐word predictability from a transformer neural network language model. Such a comparison reveals unique contributions of CCG structure‐building predominantly in the left posterior temporal lobe: CCG‐derived measures offer a superior fit to neural signals compared to those derived from a CFG. These effects are spatially distinct from bilateral superior temporal effects that are unique to predictability. Neural effects for structure‐building are thus separable from predictability during naturalistic listening, and those effects are best characterized by a grammar whose expressive power is motivated on independent linguistic grounds. (shrink)

This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled “Gödel’s natural deduction,” which presented and made comments about the natural deduction system in Gödel’s unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave at the University of Notre Dame in 1939. In that earlier paper, which was itself a companion to a paper that examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to Gödel and general proof theory, one can find a brief summary of Gödel’s notes for the (...) Notre Dame course. In order to put the earlier paper in proper perspective, a more complete summary of these interesting notes, with comments concerning them, is given here. (shrink)

By and large, contemporary news stories are stories about a particular nation, told to an audience that is seen and addressed in national terms. However, the understanding of the exact ways in which national imagination becomes engrained in the narrative conventions of news reporting is still rather limited, in particular when it comes to audiovisual genres. This article aims to fill a part of this blank by examining the links between national imagination and the narrative conventions of television news. Building (...) on existing debates about different modes of news reporting, the article distinguishes two distinct sets of narrative conventions at work in television news: one typically found in routine reporting, the other characteristic of crisis and celebratory reporting. It is argued that each of these two sets of conventions is tied to a different form of nationalism, and normally arises in a different political climate. Links between national imagination and narrative conventions vary accordingly. To demonstrate this, the article provides a comparative analysis of narrative structures in selected samples of television news bulletins broadcast in the early 1990s in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The concluding section reflects on the external validity of the chosen case study and surveys supportive evidence from four other relevant cases, drawn from the UK and Israel. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is Charles Morris’ semiotic theory that has as one of its major projects the unification of all sciences of signs. However, since the above project has proven to be unsuccessful, we will try to examine here the reasons that led to this. Accordingly, we will argue that to transcend the particularities of individual disciplines that he wanted to unify, Morris had to make certain ontological assumptions, instead of theoretical and methodological ones, that they could share. (...) However, because the 'sign' as an ontological category could in our view only be established if we follow the principles of the pragmatic philosophical tradition, we will try to show that the reasons for this failure should be primarily sought in different effects that consistent application of the pragmatic principles has in each of them (primarily in linguistics and the philosophy of language). On the other hand, this should enable us to draw several important conclusions regarding Morris’ project: namely, that his failure does not have to mean giving up semiotics as a potentially key discipline in approaching some fundamental philosophical problems, but also that it would demand return to the original semiotics developed in Peirce’s works. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 56, Issue 3-4, pp 241 - 271 William of Ockham and John Buridan provide different accounts of the distinction between formal and material consequences. Some consequences – in particular, enthymemes – that Ockham would classify as formal would be classified as material by Buridan. This paper explains this taxonomical discrepancy. It identifies the root of the discrepancy not in a difference between Ockham’s and Buridan’s notions of propositional hylomorphism but rather in Ockham’s endorsement of relational characterizations of (...) consequences. (shrink)

The Industrial Ontologies Foundry (IOF) was formed to create a suite of interoperable ontologies. Ontologies that would serve as a foundation for data and information interoperability in all areas of manufacturing. To ensure that each ontology is developed in a structured and mutually coherent manner, the IOF has committed to the tiered architecture of ontology building based on the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as top level. One of the critical elements of a successful tiered architecture build is the domain mid-level (...) ontologies. However, thus far there has been no mid-level manufacturing ontology that is based on BFO. The IOF has recently released the IOF Core version 1 beta to fill this gap. This paper documents the development process and gives an overview of the current content of the IOF Core. Finally, the paper describes how the IOF Core can be used as the basis for a more domain-specific Supply Chain Ontology. (shrink)

Starting from the generalized concept of syntactically and semantically trivial differences between two formal theories introduced by Arsenijević, we show that two systems of the linear continuum, the Cantorian point-based system and the Aristotelian interval-based system that satisfies Cantor's coherence condition, are only trivially different. So, the 'great struggle' (to use Cantor's phrase) between the two contending parties turns out to be 'much ado about nothing'.

The Destructions of the Modes of Signifying (henceforth: dms) is an anonymous fourteenth-century polemic against modist speculative grammar (grammatica speculativa). Wielding Ockhamist logic and metaphysics, the dms repeatedly attacks the very root of modism: the claim that the grammatical features of language are grounded in the metaphysical properties of the world. I call this the Modist Correspondence Thesis (henceforth: mct). In its most general form, mct says that every mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of (...) being exhibited by a thing. The Emptiness Argument of the dms tries to show that mct fails to accommodate certain special cases, such as privative, fictitious, and divine utterances, like ‘blindness’ (caecitas), ‘chimera’ (chimaera), and ‘deity’ (deitas). The modist Thomas of Erfurt directly addresses the Emptiness Argument, anticipating the anti-modist criticisms present in the dms. In doing so, he points the way to alternative formulations of mct that are immune to those criticisms. (shrink)

The present paper intends to show that computer simulations used in science are akin to fiction. Starting from the problem of defining computer simulation, the paper discusses the uses and disadvantages of simulations in science. Computer simulations have a representational function, but they do not resemble the phenomena that they purport to represent. Computer simulations do not preserve the content of the models, input data, and theories from which they proceed, since the content is modified by computational processes. Because of (...) the complexities of these processes, we cannot control or test the methods used to process the content of computer simulations. Still, simulations may help to explain the behaviour of a possible aspect of the phenomenon under examination. Although their role in doing so may be limited, by conforming to and immersing us in the worldview of science, simulations, thus reinforce the intuitions of the existing body of scientific knowledge, and similarly to the “believable fiction” described by John Woods, provide genuine understanding. (shrink)

Here I reply to a recent exchange between Edgar Danielyan and Brian Garrett regarding Alvin Plantinga’s assessment of Gaunilo’s ‘ideal island’ objection to Anselm’s ontological argument. I argue that an ideal island is conceivable if it’s defined as any island exhibiting an ideal ratio of great-making island properties.

Planar cell polarity, the polarization of cells within the plane of the epithelium, orthogonal to the apical‐basal axis, is essential for a growing list of developmental events, and – over the last 15 years – has evolved from a little‐studied curiosity in Drosophila to the subject of a substantial research enterprise. In that time, it has been recognized that two molecular systems are responsible for polarization of most tissues: Both the “core” Frizzled system and the “global” Fat/Dachsous/Four‐jointed system produce molecular (...) asymmetry within cells, and contribute to morphological polarization. In this review, we discuss recent findings on the molecular mechanism that links “global” directional signals with local coordinated polarity. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the debate between externalism and internalism about mental content presented by Tim Crane in Chapter 4 of his book Elements of Mind. Crane’s sympathies in this debate are with internalism. The paper attempts to show that Crane’s argumentation is not refuting the Twin Earth argument and externalism, and that in its basis it does not differ much from externalism itself Crane’s version of the argument for externalism features two key premises: (1) The content of (...) a thought determines what the thought is about/what it refers to (the Content Determines Reference Principle); and (2) Twins are referring to different things when they use the word “water”. From these, in a few simple steps, Crane’s externalist infers: Therefore, their thoughts are not “in their heads”. Crane suggests denying the Content Determines Reference Principle in the light of indexical thoughts. In the first stage, Crane reduces “content” to “some aspect of content”, although he needs all aspects of content to secure identity of thoughts. However, his view then comes close to something acceptable to externalists. In the second stage, Crane makes content relative to context, but then reference still determines content. (shrink)

What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes not-p—for example, ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is (...) going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever, but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We substantiate this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other. (shrink)

The convergence of computing, sensing, and communication technology will soon permit large-scale deployment of self-driving vehicles. This will in turn permit a radical transformation of traffic control technology. This paper makes a case for the importance of addressing questions of social justice in this transformation, and sketches a preliminary framework for doing so. We explain how new forms of traffic control technology have potential implications for several dimensions of social justice, including safety, sustainability, privacy, efficiency, and equal access. Our central (...) focus is on efficiency and equal access as desiderata for traffic control design. We explain the limitations of conventional traffic control in meeting these desiderata, and sketch a preliminary vision for a next-generation traffic control tailored to address better the demands of social justice. One component of this vision is cooperative, hierarchically distributed self-organization among vehicles. Another component of this vision is a priority system enabling selection of priority levels by the user for each vehicle trip in the network, based on the supporting structure of non-monetary credits. (shrink)