Sentence comprehension involves maintaining and continuously integrating linguistic information and, thus, makes demands on working memory. Past research has demonstrated that semantic WM, but not phonological WM, is critical for integrating word meanings across some distance and resolving semantic interference in sentence comprehension. Here, we examined the relation between phonological and semantic WM and the comprehension of center-embedded relative clause sentences, often argued to make heavy demands on WM. Additionally, we examined the relation between phonological and semantic WM and the (...) comprehension of transitive and dative active and passive sentences, which may also draw on WM resources depending on the number of propositions that must be maintained and the difficulty of processing passive clauses. In a large sample of individuals with aphasia, we assessed whether comprehension performance on more complex vs. simpler active-passive or embedded relative clause sentences would be predicted by semantic but not phonological WM when controlling for single word comprehension. For performance on the active-passive comprehension task, we found that semantic WM, but not phonological WM, predicted comprehension of dative sentences when controlling for comprehension of transitive sentences. We also found that phonological WM, but not semantic WM, predicted mean comprehension for reversible active-passive sentences when controlling for trials with lexical distractors. On the relative clause comprehension task, consistent with prior results, we found that semantic WM, but not phonological WM, predicted comprehension of object relative clause sentences and relative clause sentences with a passive construction. However, both phonological WM and semantic WM predicted mean comprehension across all relative clause types for reversible trials when controlling for trials with lexical distractors. While we found evidence of semantic WM’s role in comprehension, we also observed unpredicted relations between phonological WM and comprehension in some conditions. Post-hoc analyses provided preliminary evidence that phonological WM maintains a backup phonological representation of the sentence that may be accessed when sentence comprehension processing is less efficient. Future work should investigate possible roles that phonological WM may play across sentence types. (shrink)

Between 15 and 60% of patients are considered ?difficult? by their treating physicians. Patient psychiatric pathology is the conventional explanation for why patients are deemed ?difficult.? But the prevalence of the problem suggests the possibility of a less pathological cause. I argue that the phenomenon can be better explained as a response to problematic interactions related to health care delivery. If there are grounds to reconceive the ?difficult? patient as reacting to the perception of ill treatment, then there is an (...) ethical obligation to address this perception of harm. Resolution of such conflicts currently lies with the provider and patient. But the ethical stakes place these conflicts into the province of the ethics consult service. As the resource for addressing ethical dilemmas, there is a moral mandate to offer assistance in the resolution of these ethically charged conflicts that is no less pressing than the more familiar terrain of clinical ethics consultation. (shrink)

Many clinical ethics services issue recommendations about ethical controversies that arise in patient care. Their role is configured to be arbiters of moral permissibility, rendering verdicts on which option of those available constitute the morally superior course of action. They produce moral judgements on questions, such as: Should dialysis be started or foregone? Should life-sustaining care be withdrawn or continued? Is it permissible for the clinician to refuse a course of treatment desired by a particular patient or family? But decisions (...) in such cases presume a type of expertise that ethics consultants do not plausibly possess: i.e., the insight to know whose values – which ethical priorities – should trump in situations that are morally ambiguous and normatively contested. This is especially worrisome against the backdrop of the values-pluralism that exists in diverse, heterogeneous societies. This kind of authoritative response to moral uncertainty teeters on hubris, and can have a profoundly negative impact on the lives touched by these decisions. This chapter will argue that the moral arrogance that stems from a conviction of expertise is one of the gravest dangers of contemporary clinical ethics consultation. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultations are sometimes deemed complete at the moment when the consultants make a recommendation. In CECs that involve actual ethical conflict, this view of a consult's endpoint runs the risk of overemphasizing the conflict's resolution at the expense of the consult's process, which can have deleterious effects on the various parties in the conflict. This overly narrow focus on reaching a decision or recommendation in consults that involve profound moral disagreement can result in two types of adverse, lingering (...) sequelae: moral distress or negative moral emotions. The problem, succinctly named, is that such consults have insufficient “closure” for patients, families, and providers. To promote closure, and avoid the ills of moral distress and the moral emotions, I argue that CECs need to prioritize assisted conversation between the different stakeholders in these conflicts, what is often referred to as “bioethics mediation.”. (shrink)

Long used as a tool for medical compliance and adhering to treatment plans, behavior contracts have made their way into the in-patient healthcare setting as a way to manage the “difficult” patient and family. The use of this tool is even being adopted by healthcare ethics consultants (HECs) in US hospitals as part of their work in navigating conflict at the bedside. Anecdotal evidence of their increasing popularity among clinical ethicists, for example, can be found at professional bioethics meetings and (...) conversations and idea-sharing among practitioners on HEC social media. While there are a handful of papers gesturing toward a bioethical critique of behavior contracts of various types, the use of behavior contracts in the context of interpersonal conflict has not been vetted by bioethicists to determine their ethical legitimacy or efficacy. In this paper, we highlight a set of ethical concerns that we believe must be addressed before continuing or widespread implementation of behavior contracts to manage the “difficult” patient or family. (shrink)

Responding to Max Weber’s modern diagnosis of nature, science, and medicine as disenchanted, this article aims to reenvision nature and medicine with a sense of enchantment drawing from the Christian themes of creation, Christology, suffering, and redemption. By reenvisioning nature as enchanted with these theological themes, the vocation of medicine might be revitalized in terms of suffering presence, healing care, and works of mercy toward the neighbor in need.

As groups around the country begin to craft standards for clinical ethics consultations, one focus of that work is the proper procedure for conducting ethics consults. From a recent empirical look into the workings of ethics consult services (ECSs), one worrisome finding is that some ECSs rely on a committee vote when making a recommendation. This article examines the practice of voting and its moral standing as a procedural strategy for arriving at a clinical ethics recommendation. I focus here on (...) the type of clinical ethics conflicts that are most likely to lead an ECS to vote, namely, conflicts involving ethical uncertainty—or, in the Greek, aporia. I argue that in cases of aporia, voting on an ethics conflict is not a morally justifiable procedure. Then on the same grounds that I use to show that voting is ethically problematic, I raise broader concerns about the common practice of making recommendations by other procedures. In contrast to the standard approach of adjudicating between moral claims, I argue that ECSs can best resolve aporetic conflict through the process of clinical ethics mediation. (shrink)

Internationally, there is an on-going dialogue about how to professionalize ethics consultation services . Despite these efforts, one aspect of ECS-competence that has received scant attention is the liability of failing to adequately capture all of the relevant moral considerations in an ethics conflict. This failure carries a high price for the least powerful stakeholders in the dispute. When an ECS does not possess a sophisticated dexterity at translating what stakeholders say in a conflict into ethical concepts or principles, it (...) runs the risk of naming one side's claims as morally legitimate and decrying the other's as merely self-serving. The result of this failure is that one side in a dispute is granted significantly more moral weight and authority than the other. The remedy to this problem is that ECSs learn how to expand the diagnostic moral lens they employ in clinical ethics conflicts. (shrink)

Proficient listening has been viewed as a critical skill in HEC (healthcare ethics consultation) from the inception of the practice, and it is included in the field’s set of core competencies that practitioners need to master to become a certified healthcare ethics consultant (HEC-C). Despite its centrality to the work of HEC, practitioners and trainees receive little or no formal training in the craft of listening, and there are few available resources that ethics consultants and trainees can access to enhance (...) their listening skills. This dearth of training in the skill of listening belies the enormous challenge of listening proficiently. Although many clinical ethics researchers refer to the need for “active listening” in HEC, the term is employed without description or instruction. In this article, I argue that a more helpful depiction of the requisite skill is conveyed by the term “diagnostic listening.” After describing the strategy of diagnostic listening, I introduce a novel technique for honing the listening skills needed for HEC: the ADEPT Model. The ADEPT Model is a tool that can begin to fill the training gap for this important skill. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 8, Page 10-11, August 2012.

In their systematic review of the work of the ASBH Core Competencies Update Task Force, Anita Tarzian and ASBH Core Competencies Update Task Force (2013) write, “The ethics facilitation approach do...

This paper maintains that, for all his ethical interests, his philosophical and theological essays, political treatises and linguistic studies, Dante was primarily a poet; a poet who, moreover, believed that poetry could change the world, and that the Comedy must be read, first, as a poem. This is not a trivial point, because the Comedy remains a text that is endlessly fascinating to philosophers and theologians as well as moralists who read it for its philosophy, theology and ethics and who (...) sometimes fail to see that a poet's imagination, even one as egregiously rational as Dante's, is synthetic rather than analytic. This paper offers an examination of the moral universe of the Comedy, paying particular attention to his presentation of the virtues. It endeavours to show how Dante's entry into the moral universe is by way of beauty through the operation of love, and considers how, for Dante, the inevitability of beauty, when properly understood, opens out on to truth and goodness, which, in turn, fold back upon beauty as the Beatific Vision is reached. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Too Expensive to Treat? Finitude, Tragedy, and the Neonatal ICU by Charles C. CamosyAutumn Alcott RidenourReview of Too Expensive to Treat? Finitude, Tragedy, and the Neonatal ICU CHARLES C. CAMOSY Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010. 208 pp. $18.00In Too Expensive to Treat? Charles Camosy makes an important contribution to bioethics and Christian ethics by making the case for the need to consider social factors when treating imperiled newborns. (...) Arguing for both the full moral status of newborns and Roman Catholic social teaching’s emphasis on the just allocation of resources, Camosy calls the medical community, bioethicists, and [End Page 209] Christian ethicists to account for current practices that disproportionately favor exorbitant costs for imperiled infants over other even more basic medical needs within the US health care system. Written before the adoption of the Affordable Care Act under the Obama administration, Camosy’s argument has only increased in significance given the national need to prioritize resources in view of the government’s expansion of health care coverage.Born within twenty-two to twenty-four weeks of gestation and weighing between 500 and 850 grams, some imperiled infants absorb hundreds of thousands of dollars in short-term care that may extend into millions of dollars given long-term costs (146, 171–93). Recognizing the tragic reality in which “we have virtually unlimited health care needs” coupled with “limited health care resources,” Camosy contends that current Medicaid funds that privilege the NICU (neonatal intensive care unit) should be reevaluated (1–3). In an effort to temper the “autonomous,” patient-driven principle with “justice,” Camosy poses a challenging philosophical, theological, and practical proposal for what he identifies as the “gray area” of the NICU.Maintaining a twofold commitment to human dignity that values the moral worth of the infant, on the one hand, and the common good that privileges a preferential option for the poor, on the other, Camosy develops his argument in four major steps. First, he validates the moral status of newborn infants and rejects social quality of life models that dismiss their intrinsic status as “persons.” Second, he dismisses arguments that emphasize personal dignity at the expense of considering the social quality of life, pointing out that such arguments disregard Catholic social teaching’s emphasis on the link between relational anthropology and human personhood (100). Third, he contends that “weak” social quality of life models that privilege the patient or individual over social considerations do not take seriously either Catholic social teaching’s emphasis on the common good or the potentially overwhelming economic and practical burdens they might place on families and society as a whole. Finally, Camosy presents a constructive proposal for limiting NICU resources that seeks to counter a culture of overtreatment that idolizes technology and is at the mercy of an unrestrained free market (162). Emphasizing the need for a just allocation of resources, he supports withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in some cases, thus foreseeing the possible death of some infants. Although he does not accept the direct killing of these infants, he does maintain that Catholic social teaching would allow for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment based on certain criteria.Camosy raises a host of important considerations relevant to decisions about imperiled infants. Yet a few questions remain. First, from a Christian point of view, does he not fall into a kind of soft utilitarianism, even though he himself desires to avoid the pitfalls of utilitarianism? Second, how might Camosy envision Christian practices that care for “exposed” infants left without life-sustaining treatment? Finally, what about the difficult emotions that accompany [End Page 210] the death of an infant or child? Do certain kinds of grief complicate our rationing choices that appear to pit the old against the young? While perhaps unanswerable, these questions merit further discussion.Autumn Alcott RidenourMerrimack CollegeCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Mediators utilize a wide range of skills in the process of facilitating dialogue and resolving conflicts. Among the most useful techniques for clinical ethics consultants (CECs)—and surely the least discussed—are those employed in acrimonious, hostile conversations between stakeholders. In the context of clinical ethics disputes or other bedside conflicts, good mediation skills can reverse the negative interactions that have prevented the creation of workable treatment plans or ethical consensus. This essay lays out the central framework mediators use in distinguishing positions (...) from interests and describes a set of strategies for managing contentious ethics consultations or working with “difficult” patients, families, or patient-careprovider interactions. (shrink)

Articulating the public's widespread unease about animal biotechnology has not been easy, and the first attempts have not been able to provide an effective tool for navigating the moral permissibility of this research. Because these moral intuitions have been difficult to cash out, they have been belittled as representing nothing more than fear or confusion. But there are sound philosophical reasons supporting the public's opposition to animal biotechnology and these arguments justify a default position of resistance I call the Presumption (...) of Restraint . The Presumption of Restraint constitutes a justificatory process that sets out the criteria for permitting or rejecting individual biotechnology projects. This Presumption of Restraint can be overridden by compelling arguments that speak to a project's moral and scientific merit. This strategy creates a middle-of-the-road stance that can embrace particular projects, while rejecting others. The Presumption of Restraint can also serve as a model for assessing moral permissibility in other areas of technological innovation. (shrink)

While Simone de Beauvoir's inaugural reflection in The Coming of Age depicting the aging experience as one of social marginalization and lament seemingly endures, a surprising source for offering hope to aging persons may be found in the theology of Karl Barth in congruence with W. H. Vanstone. This essay reconsiders the meaning of aging within a Christological interpretation that not only values the various life stages along with intergenerational relationships but also offers meaning for the embodiment of active and (...) passive agency during the aging stage of life. (shrink)

There were several worrisome results in the long-awaited studies on clinical ethics consultation by Fox et al, but one of the most sobering was the self-assessments made by ECSs (Ethics Consult Ser...

The Quality Attestation Presidential Task Force's recent proposal for “quality attestation” (QA) of clinical ethics consultants was advanced on the premise that, “[g]iven the importance of clinical ethics consultation, the people doing it should be asked to show that they do it well.” To this end, the task force attempted to develop “a standardized system for proactively assessing the knowledge, skills, and practice of clinical ethicists.” But can this proposed method deliver? If the proposed QA process is flawed, it will (...) label clinical ethicists as qualified to do clinical ethics consultations (CECs) when they are not. The result will be the creation of a new, likely intractable, problem of CEC “false positives:” consultants who have passed QA without actually possessing the requisite knowledge and skills to perform CECs.To avoid the risk of false positives, the QAPTF needs to conduct a rigorous analysis of the skills that the QA process will be positioned to judge and those that are simply beyond the scope of its current metrics. Rather than “attesting” to overall CEC “quality,” QA needs to be precise about the skill inventory it can confirm yet honest about the skills it has no basis to assess. I will argue here that QA has strong prospects for accurately assessing consultants’ competence in ethical analysis but very weak prospects for determining competence in two other skills listed as essential by the QAPTF: value‐neutrality and conflict resolution. (shrink)

Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.

Health care providers (HCPs) are routinely placed into morally challenging situations that have the potential to cause moral distress. This is especially true for HCPs working in the military, whether they are on deployment outside their typical contexts of practice such as in disaster relief (e.g., Haiti and the Ebola missions in West Africa), or in more typically military settings such as peace keeping or armed conflicts (e.g., Afghanistan, Syria). Moral distress refers to “painful feelings and/or psychological disequilibrium” (Nilsson, Sjöberg, (...) Kallenberg, & Larsson, 2011, p. 50) that occur when an individual is aware of a morally appropriate action in a moral dilemma but obstruction prevents them from carrying it out, or when in a situation where they must choose between upholding equally treasured but conflicting moral values. Similarly, moral distress can occur when faced with a ‘tragic choice’ where all available courses of action require something of moral significance to be given up, such as surgical triage in a mass casualty event (Hunt, Sinding, & Schwartz, 2012). In the literature, moral distress has been connected to negative psychological effects and even stress related mental health issues including compassion fatigue, burnout, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Owen & Wanzer, 2014; Gustafsson, Eriksson, Strandberg, & Norberg, 2010; Litz, et al., 2009). (shrink)

This paper offers an introduction to the philosophy and science of embodied learning, conceived as both the stabilizing and expansionary process that sustains order and novelty within learners’ worlds enacted through observing and describing. Embodied learning acknowledges stability and change as the purposeful conjoined characteristics that sustain learners. It is, in many respects, a composite theory that represents work from various disciplines. This ‘naturalized epistemology’ ( ) conceives a world of fact inevitably imbued with the values that our own structural (...) histories guarantee us observers, whether acknowledged or not within our reflective awareness. These values, however, are not simple sets of preferences, for they are constituted in our individual learning histories that, for good or bad, influence the course of future learning. This conservational element of our condition is only half the story, however. The more radical aspect resides in the expansionary capacity of embodied observers to change, to enact worlds that are not pre‐given ( ) but, rather, brought forth by learners as observers and describers. Furthermore, embodied learning seeks a grounding for understanding in the often‐unexplored epistemological terrain between positivist absolutism or its mirrored polar opposite, postmodern nihilism. Its epistemological stance derives from its ontology, which is grounded in the profound obviousness that ‘everything said is said by someone’ (, p. 27). (shrink)

Clinicians at quaternary centers see part of their mission as providing hope when others cannot. They tend to see sicker patients with more complex disease processes. Part of this mission is offering longshot treatment modalities that are unlikely to achieve their stated goal, but conceivably could. When patients embark on such a treatment plan, it may fail. Often treatment toward an initial goal continues beyond the point at which such a goal is feasible. We explore the progression of care from (...) longshot to fantasy using two pediatric cases. This progression may be differentiated into four distinct stages of care related to the potential of achieving the initial goals of care. Physicians are often ill prepared for the progression of treatments from a longshot hope to an unfeasible and, therefore, typically unjustified intervention. We present a structured approach to guide clinicians at referral institutions where these situations may be common. The transition of care from “longshot” to “fantasy” is an inherent part of quaternary care for the sickest of patients that has been underexplored. Physicians are often poorly equipped to approach that transition. We advocate this approach to the shift from longshot to fantasy with the belief that such a structured method will have multiple benefits, including: reduced suffering for the patient; decreased emotional burden on patient and family; decreased provider moral distress; increased likelihood of seeking high quality palliative care earlier; and provision of honest and straightforward information to patients and their families. (shrink)

One area of bioethics education with direct impact on the lives of patients, families, and providers is the training of clinical ethics consultants who practice in hospital‐based settings. There is a universal call for increased skills and knowledge among practicing consultants, broad recognition that many are woefully undertrained, and a clear consensus that CECs must avoid an “authoritarian approach” to consultation—an approach, that is, in which the consultant imposes his or her values, ethical priorities, or religious convictions on the stakeholders (...) in an ethics conflict. Yet little work has been done on how to teach CECs not to impose their values in an ethics consultation, or even on the dimensions of this problem. In this essay, I propose a tool for bioethical instruction that targets this question: how can CECs be taught a nonauthoritarian mode of ethical analysis and consultation that can avert the problem of values imposition? (shrink)

A brief poll of my scientific colleagues confirmed that, to a person, they regard addiction as a disease, whereas most non-science acquaintances consider it to be a failure of willpower. Reconciliation of these polarized views seems difficult and rather than finding a middle path, such as suggested by Foddy and Savulescu. I am an entrenched supporter of the view that addiction can be a disease. I first should declare my position as a card-carrying biologist, holding the view that behavior emanates (...) from the brain and, accordingly, that behavior and emotions result from brain function. This brain function also produces addiction and related behaviors, whereas Foddy and Savulescu seem to credit humans with a greater capacity to choose than biological evidence suggests. The second problem relates to definitions of disease: I argue that there are at least three ways addiction might be considered a disease. 1.? ? ? Addiction is a disease because it results in pathology. For example, hypertension is a disease. Hypertension per se does not cause dysfunction, but leads to pathologically definable conditions such as stroke and myocardial infarction. Smoking, like hypertension, can result in pathologies such as emphysema and cancer. The problem is not smoking per se, or even addiction to nicotine, rather it is the consequent diseases caused by tobacco. Nevertheless, if hypertension is a disease, so is smoking. The question of “choosing‘ to persist with smoking has no bearing on whether it is disease. Whether a person chooses to care for their hypertension or ignore it does not alter the fact that they have hypertension; it is still a disease and it will still harm them. Whether addiction affects the capacity to choose is not relevant because it does not alter the fact that smoking causes pathology and hence is a disease. 2.? ? ? Foddy and Savulescu argue that addiction leaves no tell-tale pathology to set it aside from. (shrink)

Introduction: Religious experience in modernity : faith itself as the "unknown God" -- Fides qua creditur : the Enlightenment mind and the theology of the heart -- Within the bounds of reason alone : the subjective justification of religious belief in the thought of Immanuel Kant -- Schleiermacher's "higher order Pietism" : subjectivity and Protestant liberal thought -- Søren Kierkegaard and the paradox of faith : subjectivity in Christian existentialism -- Subjectivity and religious belief in Anglo-American revivalism : Jonathan Edwards (...) and John Wesley -- Subjectivity and religious belief in Anglo-American revivalism : George Whitefield and Charles G. Finney. (shrink)

Much evidence suggests that semantic characteristics of a message (e.g., the extent to which the message evokes thoughts of spatial or motor properties) and social characteristics of a speaking situation (e.g., whether there is a listener who can see the speaker) both influence how much speakers gesture. However, the Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework (Hostetter & Alibali, ) predicts that these effects should not be independent but should interact such that the effect of visibility is lessened when a message (...) evokes strong thoughts of action. This study tested this claim by comparing the gesture rates produced by speakers as they described 24 nouns that vary in how strongly they evoke thoughts of action. Further, half of the words were described with visibility between speaker and listener blocked. The results demonstrated a significant interaction as predicted by the GSA framework. (shrink)

Malpractice insurance rates have created a crisis in American medicine. Rates are rising and reimbursements are not keeping pace. In response, physicians in the states hardest hit by this crisis are feeling compelled to take political action, and the current action of choice seems to be physician strikes. While the malpractice insurance crisis is acknowledged to be severe, does it justify the extreme action of a physician walkout? Should physicians engage in this type of collective action, and what are the (...) costs to patients and the profession when such action is taken? I will offer three related arguments against physician strikes that constitute a prima facie prohibition against such action: first, strikes are intended to cause harm to patients; second, strikes are an affront to the physician-patient relationship; and, third, strikes risk decreasing the public's respect for the medical profession. As with any prima facie obligation, there are justifying conditions that may override the moral prohibition, but I will argue that the current malpractice crisis does not rise to the level of such a justifying condition. While the malpractice crisis demands and justifies a political response on the part of the nation's physicians, strikes and slow-downs are not an ethically justified means to the legitimate end of controlling insurance costs. (shrink)

Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.

Speakers often use gesture to demonstrate how to perform actions—for example, they might show how to open the top of a jar by making a twisting motion above the jar. Yet it is unclear whether listeners learn as much from seeing such gestures as they learn from seeing actions that physically change the position of objects (i.e., actually opening the jar). Here, we examined participants' implicit and explicit understanding about a series of movements that demonstrated how to move a set (...) of objects. The movements were either shown with actions that physically relocated each object or with gestures that represented the relocation without touching the objects. Further, the end location that was indicated for each object covaried with whether the object was grasped with one or two hands. We found that memory for the end location of each object was better after seeing the physical relocation of the objects, that is, after seeing action, than after seeing gesture, regardless of whether speech was absent (Experiment 1) or present (Experiment 2). However, gesture and action built similar implicit understanding of how a particular handgrasp corresponded with a particular end location. Although gestures miss the benefit of showing the end state of objects that have been acted upon, the data show that gestures are as good as action in building knowledge of how to perform an action. (shrink)

Professional mediators have long possessed a skill set that is uniquely suited to facilitation of difficult conversations between and among individuals in emotionally charged situations. This skill set has increasingly been recognized as invaluable to the work of clinical ethics consultants as they navigate conflicts involving families, surrogates, and providers. Given widespread acknowledgment that communication difficulties lie at the root of many clinical ethics conflicts, mediation offers techniques to enhance communication between conflicting parties. This special section of The Journal of (...) Clinical Ethics focuses on core aspects of the mediation process designed for effective management of clinical conflict emanating from communication breakdowns, highly charged value conflicts, and instances of perceived disrespect. (shrink)

I contend that influential, computational theories have failed to relate the subjective and information processing dimensions of imagery. Hampson and Morris′s account of the phenomenology of imagery is evaluated, and I reject the proposal that the sensuous quality of images is reducible to the specificity of corresponding representations. A selective literature review suggests necessary information processing conditions for sensuous objects-for-awareness to emerge, and these conditions inform development of a theory explicating conscious perception and sensuous imagery in terms of a self-regulating (...) cognitive system employing a verification procedure to control resource allocation. Functions of sensuous imagery are discussed. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 62-63.

(2013). De-Escalating Conflict: Mediation and the “Difficult” Patient. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 11-12. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2013.768855.