Ash’arism, which emerged in the first quarter of the fourth century of Hijra, is a theological sect that has been accepted by the majority of hadith scholars throughout Islamic history. This fact, which has important consequences for the history of hadith, raises the question of the extent to which the hadith scholars belonging to the Ash’arite sect were interested in theology. This is because theology, which is considered an heretical innovation according to the traditional understanding of Ahl al-hadīth, (...) was severely criticised by hadith scholars representing Salafī thought and positioned as the opposite pole of hadith. Accordingly, Ash’arism could not escape from being the target of the anti-theological Ahl al-hadīth. However, this did not prevent the adoption of the Ash’arite sect by hadith scholars and the emergence of a group of Ash’arite hadith scholars who engaged in theology. Thus, from the fourth century of Hijra, Ash’arite theology, like other Islamic sciences, became a natural part of education and teaching activities. Andalusia and the Maghrib, one of the regions where the Ash’arite sect was widespread, provide a favourable ground for determining the place of theology in the scholarly life of the hadith scholars. The famous hadith scholars who lived in this region in the fifth and sixth centuries of Hijra are analysed in this study in terms of their affiliation with Ash’arism and their interest in the science of kalām. By analysing the education and training lives of the hadith scholars subject to the research, the details that highlight their Ash’arite identities were determined. Issues such as how the Ash’arite tradition was inherited by hadith scholars in the Western Islamic region, what roles hadith scholars played in the spread of the Ash’arite sect in this region, which books were most widely used by hadith scholars in the study of kalām, and which methods were used to read and transmit theological texts are clarified within the framework of available data. As a result, it was revealed that in the Western Islamic world of the fifth and sixth centuries of Hijra, the science of kalām was in great demand among the Ash’arite hadith scholars and that important texts of Ash’arite theology remained in circulation among hadith scholars through reading and transmission. (shrink)

Abstract It has been widely accepted that the thought of al?Ghaz?li was broadly in line with the Ash'arite approach to theology, which came to have a dominant role in Islamic thought for the last thousand years. Recently, though, many commentators have argued that this is a misconception, and that there are many instances where Ghaz?li produces arguments and opinions which are not compatible with Ash'arism. It is argued here that these examples do not establish that the general line (...) of Ghaz?li's thought is not Ash'arite. The fact that on occasion he is prepared to use the language of his opponents does not invalidate the Ash'arite basis of his thought. It is quite possible to adhere to a philosophical view about how reality is and at the same time use the language of those who have a different view without committing oneself to that different form of expression. Although the revisionist approach to the interpretation of Ghaz?li is interesting and often perceptive, it does not lead to any necessity to question his adherence to Ash'arite principles in general. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that al Ash'ari was a Theological Determinist whose position on free will and human responsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between two senses of the word 'can' (yastati'u ). I also compare al Ash'ari's position with that of the Mu'tazilite thinker al Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar. I conclude that their positions may not have been so much opposed to each other as merely different. This, I suggest, should invite us to re evaluate the (...) nature and extent of the disagreement between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites on the free will question. (shrink)

Thinking About Almost Everything brings together original thinking on a staggering range of topics across the sciences, arts and humanities, grouped into nine imaginative and sometimes startling thematic categories. Entries on terror, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and climate change are juxtaposed in the 'settlement' section, while 'Presences' brings together plant genetics, race, humans and animals, music theology, and the Willmore Conjecture. The short essays are written in a lively and accessible style, and the book is illustrated with original (...) and challenging images. Thinking About Almost Everything shows how even the most intricate and complex knowledge can enliven public curiosity and spark new thinking on issues either known or yet to be discovered. (shrink)

This article analyses the debate concerning divine attributes in medieval Islamic theology (kalam), more specifically in Mu‘tazilite and in Ash‘arite theology. It further compares their approach with that of medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (d. 1204). In particular it studies the identification of the divine attributes with God’s essence in Mu‘tazilite theology, which flourished in the first half of the 9th century. It discusses the Ash‘arite response that followed, and which consisted in considering God’s attributes as real (...) entities separate from God’s essence. Maimonides, conversant with the tradition of kalam, proposes a solution that does not involve the predication of any attributes that would undermine his oneness. KEY WORDS – Mu‘tazilites. Ash‘arites. Kalam. Maimonides. Divine attributes. Predication. Medieval philosophy. Islamic theology. (shrink)

The science of Kalām aims to prove the existence and attributes of Allah. For this purpose, the theologians adopted a method that turns from the sensible universe to the unseen universe. This method, named as qiyāṣ al-ğāib alā alā al-shāḥid, created a common ground in the discussions with the dissenters. Because the sensible universe is open to human perception in a way that does not allow for denial. From this point of view, the universe, which is defined as "everything other (...) than Allah" in Ashʿarite Kalām, has been discussed in terms of both structure and functioning. Based on the principles determined by the theologians, the universe is said to be composed of substance, accidents and bodies. The said entities are basically constructed in a way that is dependent on each other and on a higher will. Based on this construct, the Ashʿarite tradition preferred to explain the functioning of the universe with the theory of custom. In fact, their basic assumptions about the universe and Allah necessitated this preference. This is because they envision Allah as a fāil al- mukhtār deity with absolute will and power. Everything in the universe, except for the events or situations deemed impossible by the mind, is within His power. In this respect, the universe is described as an area of possibilities. The Ashʿarite tradition, which is based on the nonpermanent nature of accidents, insists that accidents should be recreated at every moment. This basic defense completely reveals the dependence of the universe on Allah. Built on these basic assumptions, the theory of custom uniquely explains the functioning of the universe without imposing any limitations on Allah, who has absolute will and power. This theory, which reflects the Ashʿarite tradition exactly, enables them to explain all theological issues, especially the relationship between Allah and the universe, in a consistent manner. This study aims to examine the basic principles that led the early Ashʿarite tradition to accept the theory of custom by analyzing them under several headings. For this aim, the views of the early Ashʿarite theologians have been identified through a literature review analyzed and interpreted in the context of the matter. (shrink)

There is a close relationship between Ashʿarism and Ḥanbalism since the emergence of Ashʿarism. However, they often conflicted with each other as they approached to religious matters from different perspectives. These conflicts were not only limited to theological discussions but also turned into social conflicts, which occasionally resulted with deaths. First massive events occurred in 429/1038 in Baghdād between Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalities. When Niẓām al-Mulk was appointed as vizier, the conflicts reached a peak. The apparent reason of the conflicts was (...) the theological controversy between these two sects. However, the rise of Ashʿarism, which was usually against Ḥanbalism, was the main reason of the social conflicts. Supports of the Ashʿarite thought by the leading statesmen of the era such as Niẓām al-Mulk and Ayyūbid sultans, and accusations of some Ashʿarite preachers about Ḥanbalities relying on this political support were also among the factors that led to these conflicts. Nevertheless, even if any accusation was not made, it occurred that the members of both sects resorted to violence in case of criticisms about their beliefs. This shows that the most important reason of the conflicts was sectarian fanaticism.Summary: Ashʿarism is the name of the sect that was formed around the ideas of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. It is a continuation of Kullābism in terms of general thought system. Ashʿarism replaced Kullābism by the end of the 5th century of the Hijrah, and started to be called as an independent sect. It spread mostly among the Shāfiʿites and Mālikites in Iraq, Khurāsān, Damascus, Maghreb, and Yemen. When it was arrived to the last quarter of the 5th century, it became the common theological sect of most of Shāfiʿites and Mālikites. Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fūrāk (d. 406/1015), and Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s (d. 418/1027) efforts played an important role in rising of Ashʿarism in this period. In the following periods, contribution of the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) to Ashʿarism was massive by establishing the Niẓāmiyah Colleges to strengthen the Ashʿarites against the Hanafites in Khurāsān and against the Ḥanbalites in Baghdād. The Niẓāmiyah Colleges were donated by Niẓām al-Mulk to Shāfiʿite scholars for the mission of primarily limiting the influence Shīʿī thought. The condition of belonging to Shāfiʿites in waqfiyyah (endowment certificate) of the colleges provided some important advantages for Shāfiʿites and Ashʿarites. On the other hand, the Ayyūbids provided important contributions to Ashʿarites in the regions of Egypt, Damascus and Yemen. They worked for strengthening Ashʿarism during their ruling for two centuries. It was a state policy for the Ayyūbids to support Ashʿarism starting from the founder of the state, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193).This rapid rise of Ashʿarism led to a tense relationship between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites who became the most important representative of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth (people of the traditions of the Prophet) after the period of Miḥnah (period of religious persecution). Undoubtedly, the first respondents of these tense relations were Kullābite scholars. At the beginning of the 4th century of the Hijrah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī became the natural inheritor of the Ḥanbalite reaction to the Kullābites. He conflicted with the Ḥanbalites because of his different approach on the debate regarding creation of the Qur’ān. Ḥanbalite reactions to Imam al-Ashʿarī continued after his death. When he died in Baghdād in 324/935, officials buried him secretly as they worried about Ḥanbalite attacks against his funeral. Hence, after his burial some Ḥanbalites tried to destroy his tomb several times. After Ashʿarī died, the first social events between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites took place in Iṣfahān, one of the most important cities of West Khurāsān, in the end of the 4th century of the Hijrah. The debate started around the question of whether the letters of the Qur’ān were created or uncreated between the Ḥanbalite scholar Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and Ashʿarite scholar Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038). This debate led to prolonged events between the supporters of these scholars. Abū Nuʿaym, saved his life from various attacks and finally he had to leave Iṣfahān.The tense relationships between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the peak in the 5th century of the Hijrah. Many events occurred in Baghdād during this century. The discussion on interpretation of the revealed attributes of Allah turned into conflict between the two sides from time to time. The Ashʿarite scholars accused the Ḥanbalites with tashbih (affirming Allah’s similarity to humanity) and tajseem (anthropomorphism) by pointing at Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’s work titled Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt. The ʿAbbāsid caliphs generally supported the Ḥanbalites in this debate. For example, when al-Qāim bi-Amr Allāh re-published the famous declaration known as the Qādirī Creed in 433/1042, he proclaimed that rejection of the Ḥanbalite approach on the issue of the revealed attributes of Allah would be regarded as a cause of blasphemy. The paper was read in a meeting where several scholars from various sects were present. It was signed firstly by Ashʿarite scholar Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn ʿUmar al-Qazwīnī (d. 442/1051). However, he was one who had criticized Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt in 429/1038, which caused conflicts in society at that time. This shift in his position is remarkable as it shows that the declaration was primarily response to him.In the middle of the 5th century of the Hijrah, Ashʿarite scholar al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071) became a victim of the tension between the Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalites. Khatīb had protection of vizier Ibn al-Muslima and under his protection he lectured on Hadith in the Mansur Mosque. However, after the death of the vizier, he was subjected to harassment of the Ḥanbalites because of some expressions in his work titled Tarīkh Baghdād. So much so that he began to worry about his life, thus he had to leave Baghdād and went to Damascus in 451/1059.The tense relations between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the summit in the period of Niẓām al-Mulk who was the vizier of Seljuk Empire. In fact, some events resulted with deaths. For example, in the events of 469/1076, which lasted years, the Ḥanbalites attacked Ashʿarite scholar Abū Naṣr ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 514/1120) who accused them with tashbeeh and tajseem. As a result, around twenty people died during these events. The gradual rise of the Ashʿarite thought with the support of Niẓām al-Mulk and abusive discourses of some Ashʿarite scholars who relied on this support can be mentioned among the basic reasons of the events at that time.After the death of Niẓām al-Mulk in 485/1092, for a long time there was no serious event between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites. In the middle of the 6th/12th century, the relations started to become tense again in the regions of Egypt, Damascus, and Yemen under the Ayyūbid dynasty. In addition to these places, various events occurred in Khurāsān region, in cities such as Marw. Nevertheless, unlike some previous events, the current tensions were not against a whole sect but only targeted some individual scholars. Moreover, unlike the previous periods, oppressed and victimized people were mostly Ḥanbalite scholars this time. No serious events took place between two sects after this period. Therefore, it can be said that their struggle to dominate society led to the above-mentioned events. (shrink)

One of the major arguments for theological voluntarism offered by the Ash’arites involves the claim that that some of the factors upon which our salvation or condemnation depend are beyond our control. We will call this “the problem of salvific luck.” According to the Ash’arites, the fact that God does save and condemn human beings on the basis of factors beyond their control casts doubt on any non-voluntarist conception of divine justice. A common way to respond to this Ash’arite argument (...) for voluntarism is to eliminate the role of luck in God’s judgments. But this is not the Mu’tazilite way of resisting the argument. The Mu’tazilite, who oppose theological voluntarism, choose a more daunting solution to the problem of salvific luck. They reject the claim that God’s Judgment concerning the eternal destiny of some persons would be unjust if it depended upon factors beyond their control. The paper discusses this solution to the problem of salvific luck. (shrink)

RésuméLe gros de la recherche orientaliste consacrée à la littérature théologique islamique a négligé les idées théologiques Ibāḍī à portée cosmologique, ce qui a conduit à une compréhension incomplète de la théologie islamique et à un manque considérable dans la recherche occidentale. L'omission de ce mouvement important de l'Islam est compréhensible étant donné que les textes Ibāḍī ne sont accessibles, publiés, diffusés et traduits que de façon très partielle. Cette étude vise donc à combler certaines de ces lacunes dans la (...) recherche sur la première théologie islamique. Les objectifs de cet article sont de: 1) caractériser la littérature Ibāḍī classique portant sur la théorie atomiste de la substance et de l'accident; 2) examiner les textes d'auteurs Ibāḍī duiiie/ixesiècle dialoguant et discutant avec d'autres écoles théologiques islamiques, à savoir les Muʿtazilites pré-Bahshamiyya (Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, d. 321/933) et les Ashʿarites (Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, d. 324/936), en lien avec la théorie atomiste de la substance et de l'accident; 3) passer en revue le grand nombre d'opinions soutenues parmi les premiers théologiens Ibāḍī, et examiner les sources et les thèmes spécifiques susceptibles d'avoir influencé cette école de pensée diversifiée. Cet article cherche aussi à identifier des traits communs dans l'approche Ibāḍī durant la période de formation de la théologie islamique, et à explorer les voies grâce auxquelles ces premiers théologiens ont pu avoir accès à des thèmes cosmologiques antérieurs à l'Islam. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss the main approaches of moral epistemology in the major sects of Islamic theology; the Mu’tazilah and Shi‘ite, who formulated rationalistic ethical system between the eighth and tenth centuries, and the Ash‘arites, who developed a voluntaristic system of morality. At first the answer of Mu’tazila and Shi‘ite to the main question of moral epistemology namely the justification of moral beliefs will be discussed and compared with the intuitionism of Western ethics. Secondly the voluntarism of (...) Ash‘arite concerning the moral knowledge will be discussed and rejected. (shrink)

This essay analyzes two contrasting conceptions of ethics set forth in Muslim fundamental theology (kalām), namely, those of the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites of the fourth and fifth centuries a.h. (tenth and eleventh centuries c.e.). After set- ting forth a brief statement on the already well-studied position of the Mu'tazi- lites on human actions, the author devotes the rest of this essay to the less-studied position on human actions of the Ash'arites. Of special interest is his analysis of God's (...) creation (khalq) of actions and man's performance (kasb) of them. (shrink)

The traditional argument of Muslim theologians that aims to verify the claims of a true prophet and distinguish him from an impostor is based on the acceptance of miracles performed in history and testified through an uninterrupted chain of tradition. A second argument that equally involves transmission through tawātur is based on the prophet’s virtuous and impeccable character establishing the trustworthiness of the prophet. These are, for instance, the types of proofs mentioned by the Baghdadian Mu‘tazilī al-Gˇāhiz in his monograph (...) Huˇgaˇg al-nubuwwa. For theologians of the Aš‘arite school this approach to the verification of prophecy posed a problem. According to classical Aš‘arite theology, good is what God commands and bad is what he forbids. If God chooses prophets to reveal knowledge about what is right and what is wrong, and thus also reveal knowledge about how to live a virtuous life, how can those whom the prophets call upon know that the prophets have a virtuous character before they even know the criteria for virtue? Early Aš‘arite theologians indeed accepted that all prophets had a most virtuous character. This fact, however, became apparent only after their message gained acceptance within their community and it cannot be regarded as a viable verification of the claim of a prophet to those he calls upon. Al-Aš‘arī, for instance, is said to have accepted a number of indications that allow humans to distinguish a prophet from ordinary people. He does not mention the claim based on the impeccable moral conduct of prophets. In fact, he stresses that in order to distinguish a true prophet from other people who are close to God, but who have no message to reveal, one should put oneÕs trust only in the occurrence of true prophetic miracles. (shrink)

This chapter explicates a distinctive argument that Avicenna offers for the existence of nature as a causal power in bodies. In doing that, the author shows the argument has two main targets: the Aristotelian tradition on the hand, who thought that the existence of nature, as an intrinsic principle of movement, was self-evident, and the Ash ͑arite occasionalist theological tradition on the other, who were anti-realists about all creaturely efficacious power, locating all efficacy instead in an extrinsic transcendent agent. The (...) argument draws on two key premises: a regularity of events thesis and a version of the principle of sufficient reason. Based on these two premises, Avicenna offers a response to the issue in a way that attempts to preserve something from both traditions. For it allows, with the Ash ͑aris, the causal involvement of a transcendent being in the production of some effect or range of effects from some body; and yet still maintains, against them and with the Aristotelians, that the effect must occur in virtue of some property of that body, where the property in question makes a real causal contribution to the effect’s occurrence. This amounts to a properly Avicennian account. (shrink)

This chapter aims to lay out a map of the diverse epistemological perspectives within the Islamic theological tradition, in the conceptual framework of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. In order achieve that goal, it aims to consider epistemological views in light of their historic context, while at the same time seeking to “translate” those broadly medieval perspectives into contemporary philosophical language. In doing so, the chapter offers a succinct overview of the main epistemic trends within the Islamic theological tradition concerning (...) religious epistemology. The chapter is divided into two main sections designated for discussions of differing accounts found in distinct trends of the tradition, namely the Rationalist and Traditionalist trends. The discussion concerning the Rationalist trend focuses on the philosophical-theologians of the dominant Mu’tazilite, Ash’arite, and Maturidite schools. The section on Islamic Traditionalism focuses on the Atharite scripturalism of Ibn Qudāma, and in particular the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. In order to map out these historic positions in light of contemporary religious epistemology, reference is made to a threefold typology of current views in the literature: (1) theistic evidentialism, (2) reformed epistemology, and (3) fideism. As such, the remainder of the chapter will attempt to outline the different approaches toward religious epistemology in the Islamic theological tradition with this threefold typology in mind. (shrink)

Ijmā is ranked as the third shariah evidence after the Qur’ān and Sunnah in the science of Uṣūl. Shafi was the first one who made Uṣūl which had been known and used by the Islamic scholars, into a written document and who ascertained that Ijmā was the third of the shariah evidences. Kalām is one of the sciences in which Ijmā evidence is used. The scholars of Kalām used this evidence as far as the science of Uṣūl made it possible. (...) They always used it without changing any basics of religious beliefs and acceptances. That the aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been supported with Ijmā which is regarded as one of naqly evidences, played an important role in eliminating suspicions which were tried to be aroused in momins’ mind. In this article, the function and importance of Ijmā evidence, which is one of the primary sources of the science of Uṣūl, in the science of Kalām and Aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been studied.SummaryWhat the Qur’ān demands from us is to emphasize the spirit of unity among ummah and to keep out the factors that could trigger separation and division. Indeed, Allah emphasizes in the following verses in the Qur’ān on the protection of the unitary structure of the ummah: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Āl a-Imrān 3/103) and “And do not be like the ones who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them” (Āl al-Imrān 3/105). Allah has commanded the Ulul ‘Azm Prophets to hold the religion upright and to avoid division. (al-Shūrā 42/13). The command of holding the religion upright and not to be divided in this religion means to certify what needs to be confirmed in the religion of Allah and to obey those that must be obeyed. This is also the proclamation of the principle of religion that all the prophets have consensus over.Ahl al-Sunnah understanding of Islam is identical to the understanding of the Prophet and his companions. For this reason, Ahl al-Sunna is the school that represents the main backbone of Islam. In Ahl al-Sunna, in many subjects, be it usūlî / primary or furū’ī / secondary, there has been ijmā. These ijmās are Sahaba ijmās and deductive ijmās that come from mutakallimūn (theologians) ijtihāds. Therefore, ijmā and ijtihād are closely connected to each other. Ijmā is supported by ijtihād and ijtihād is also the source of ijmā. Thus, the issue is no longer just a pure ijtihād; it turns out to be a degree that gives a solid knowledge after it has risen to some degree just after the nass/texts.Ahl al- Sunnah theologians are talking about two kinds of ijmā. The first is “ijmā taṣdīqī” (approval consensus) which is the consensus based on Sahaba İjmā. These are the ijmās that occur on the principles called ḍaruratal-diniyya (necessities of the religion), and accepted as solid proofs in religion. Issues such as the principles of faith, obligation of prayer and the fasting are the subjects that are determined by the solid/definite ijmā. Such ijmās are valid approvals on existing provisions. These ijmās based on solid nass (verses and hadiths). Such ijmās do not give any new information. The existing information is strengthened by the alliance of Muslims. In these areas, ijtihād cannot be done and Muslims do not need ijtihād on these issues. There is an consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars about the unfaithfulness of the one who denies one or more of the principles which are accepted as the main obligatory principles in Islam. The other is the “deductive ijmā which the ijtihāds have roles over. This kind of ijmās, are formed as a result of mujtahids’ consensus over the same opinion on the issue of theological secondary issues. The issues related to the secondary theological issues which were open to the ijtihāds and the different results obtained on matters are not accepted as the cause of takfīr. However, depending on the subject he/she can be a sinner. Istidlālī/deductive ijmās are not considered as an independent proofs in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, rather a supportive ones and are considered as textual evidences.Since, texts that are accepted as sources give supposed information. In this regard, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars accepted other members of the sect who have in secondary theological issues opposed the ijmā of the salaf / predecessor as Ahl al-Qibla, but named them as Ahl al-Bid’a (innovator in religion) because of their opposition to Salaf’s İjmās. Moreover, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah did not see them appropriate to participate in the Ijmās, which could occur between the generations that come after Sahābas/companions.Not all disputes have been criticized in Islam. It is a blessing for the ummah to claim different opinions on the issues subject to ijtihād. Since the ummah, in this way, will bring new solutions to emerging issues and as a result, Islam will have a mechanism to produce a dynamic solution. This can only be possible through ijtihād. Dispute is to propose different views on a subject. If this view is not in the actual matters that could harm the unity of the Ummah, rather in the case of ijtihādi issues, this conflict could turn to be mercy.The reason why the methodists evaluate the ijmā within the scope of the authorized evidence is that because they think it is essential that the ijmā be based on a proof. From this point of view, the alliances that occurred in mental matters were not considered as ijmā. The theologians always tried to support their claims with nass/textual proofs. When the ijmā is realized, whether known or not, they have stated that there is certainly a religious proof behind it. Because, the provisions that were reached through ijmā, cannot be against the provisions of the Prophet.Many issues in Islamic Belief and Kalām works are supported by the mental and textual evidences as well as by deductive ijmā. However, many of the claims of Ijmās in these works reflect the inter-sect ijmās of the Ahl al-Sunnah. The sects outside the Ahl al-Sunnah were excluded. This attitude is, above all, the aim of ensuring the integrity within the sect, and trying to protect the Ahl al-Sunnah belief. Since the ijmā evidence has a function that prevents all kinds of arbitrary and divisive thoughts and turns the supposed knowledge into the qat’ī/certain one, it raises the provision to the next level just after the nass, rather than merely being a ijtihādi provision. In the case of the forerunner of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Māturīdes and Ash‘arites have not differed in in understanding of ijmā in terms of methodology.Although they have different views on the definition and content of the ijmā, they have a common understanding of alliances of Mujtahids on the same view. The mutakallims (theologians) of Māturīdī and Ash’arī schools have used the proof of ijmā as supportive evidence in the cases related to Kalām. al-Ash’arī not only adopted the proof of ijmā but also used it in practice in. He did not make any distinction in proof of ijmā as practical, theological, methodological or sub-divisional; he used it freely in every field. Māturīdī and Ash’arī scholars decided that the ijmā could occur in religious matters and that there would be evidence when it was formed; In the case of mental issues, they have required the knowledge to be based on solid information. In the case of ijmā in purely mental issues, they have disputed over the issue. While some Ahl al-Sunnah scholars stated that since purely mental matters were certain knowledge and therefore don’t need ijmā, they also ruled that because the mujtahids could get this knowledge from religious texts, therefore ijmā could occur in mental matters as well. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of speculative theology (kalaam) as it developed within the Ash'arite tradition of Islam is its denial of causal power to creatures. Much like Malebranche in the seventeenth century, the Ash'arites saw this denial as a natural extension of monotheism and were led as a result to embrace an occasionalist account of causality. According to their analysis, causal power is identical with creative power, and since God is the sole and sovereign creator, God (...) is the only causal agent. To assert anything else is to compromise monotheism. This position, of course, was in direct opposition to the prevailing accounts of causality within the philosophical tradition of Islam at the time. The philosophers (falaasifa) had by and large taken over accounts of causality from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists and adapted them in accordance with their own set of concerns. In such accounts, while God stands as the first cause, secondary causationis unambiguously affirmed, even if variously understood. Thus, as they offered a sophisticated account of causal action in direct opposition to the occasionalist thesis, thefalaasifa posed something of challenge to the theologians. (shrink)

The issue of power has been addressed as part of human actions, which form the basis of the discussions of destiny in Islamic theology. Various schools of kalām have extensively discussed the issue of power throughout history. The locus of power is also one of the critical concerns that have been emphasized within these discussions. The schools of the Mu'tazila, al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī have put forward different perspectives on whether the locus of power exists or not and where it (...) exists if it does so. Mutazilites are known to be in agreement with the view that te human body is the substrate of power. On the other hand, However, they hold different views, not only on the exact locus of power in the body but also on its type. While some argue that the locus of power in the body is the organs, others claim that it is not the organs. The schools of al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī accept that there is no locus for power and emphasize that power is created by Allah the moment it would initiate action. When these views of the kalām schools are considered within the framework of the data from the modern science of anatomy, it is seen that what modern science has to say on this issue concurs well with the Mu'tazilite view that the locus of power is the body and that it creates the action by managing the organs from a single center. This is because, when considered from the lens of anatomy, what is meant by the schools of kalām with “power” is electrical activity (stimulus) that activates the muscles. Therefore, scientifically considered, for any movement to occur, an electrical activity must first begin in the brain and be transmitted to the muscles via motor nerves. If there were no electrical activity in the brain, the muscles and energy that make up the human movement system would not be active, so movement would hardly take locus. Therefore, the claim made some of the Mu'tazili scholars that the power is in the organs is scientifically not valid. As for the debates on whether the power in different organs is the same or different in terms of its type, the views of the scholars who argue that they are the same genus are apparently correct. This is because the electrical activity, which we accept as power, spreads to the organs after it is formed in the brain. This implies that the power which activates the organs is of the same type. However, it can be said that Mu'tazila’s idea of the constant presence of power in its locus conflicts with modern scientific data. The views of al-Ash'arite and al-Maturidite schools that power is free from being in a constant location are compatible with the findings of recent experiments on brain activities. That is, some experimental studies have indicated that the electrical activity that creates an act occurs in the brain before the act itself and outside the will of the human. In brief, the view of Ash'arite and Maturidite scholars that power is not constantly present in the body and that it is created by Allah each time it is needed is compatible with the creation of power, which we define as electrical activity. (shrink)

Euthanasia is one of the controversial topics in current medical ethics. Among the six well-known types of euthanasia, passive voluntary euthanasia seems to be more plausible in comparison with other types, from the moral point of view.According to the Kantian framework, ethical features come from 'reason'. Maxims are formulated as categorical imperative which has three different versions. Moreover, the second version of categorical imperative which is dubbed 'principle of ends' is associated with human dignity. It follows from this that human (...) dignity has an indisputable role in the Kantian story. On the other hand, there are two main theological schools in Islamic tradition which are called: Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite. Moreover, there are two main Islamic branches: Shiite and Sunni. From the theological point of view, Shiite's theoretical framework is similar to the Mu'tazilite one.According to Shiite and Mu'tazilite perspectives, moral goodness and badness can be discovered by reason, on its own. Accordingly, bioethical judgments can be made based on the very concept of human dignity rather than merely resorting to the Holy Scripture or religious jurisprudential deliberations. As far as PVE is concerned, the majority of Shiite scholars do not recognize a person's right to die voluntarily. Similarly, on the basis of Kantian ethical themes, PVE is immoral, categorically speaking. According to Shiite framework, however, PVE could be moral in some ethical contexts. In other words, in such contexts, the way in which Shiite scholars deal with PVE is more similar to Rossian ethics rather than the Kantian one. (shrink)

Māturīdism is an Ottoman identity and this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire. It maintained its formal existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly (...) in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. The new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. However, even in this period, Māturīdism was remarkably reflected in the muqaddimāt-i arba‘a literature which was directly sponsored by Meḥmed II. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. Shiism and its all other variants were bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. Unfortunately such a refutational approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in the refutation texts against Ṣafawids. This brought to the fore at first the Ḥanafite and then the Māturīdite identity. This paper attempts to analyze this changing emphasis on Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the political and intellectual factors that supported and nourished it. -/- SUMMARY It can be argued that the debates around Ash‘arism and Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the resulting meant more than attempts of the members of the two sides to understand each other and that Māturīdism, particularly from the 16th century onwards, was gradually brought fore as the identity of Ottomans. In fact, this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire; it maintained, in form, its existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. In this period, Ottoman scholars still embraced the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī line in their theological views. Ḫiḍir Beg’s al-Qaṣīda al-Nūniyya, and al-Khayālī’s commentary upon it, and the commentary written by Aḥmad b. Oġuz Dānishmand al-Aḳshahrī on al-I‘timād of Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī were the most noticeable Māturīdite texts from that time. Besides, al-Khayālī’s supercommentary (ḥāshiya) upon the commentary of al-Taftāzānī written on al-‘Aqā’id of Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Nasafī was also of central importance. However, the new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. But, this should not be taken to mean that Māturīdism lost its ground of existence. That the Ash‘arite works produced in this new paradigm were transferred to and fully integrated in the madrasa curriculum was not because they were Ash‘arite texts but because they were the most original and highest achievements of the philosophical theology. These texts that aimed at combining all fields of knowledge on a single platform, despite the Ash‘arism they included, constituted the peak of the Islamic thought of the time. In the preference of these texts, the fact that the Māturīdī tradition generally stood, in course of time, distant to the philosophy and chose to continue the kalām in the classical line also played a role. Māturīdī theologians Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī, partly, but Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a al-Maḥbūbī, to a greater extent, were notable exceptions to this general Māturīdī tendency. These figures were theologically Māturīdite, but their framework of producing discourse was the combination of philosophy and kalām as with their Ash‘arī counterparts. Therefore, Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s criticism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and through him, of against the Ash‘arism in the context of muqaddimāt arba‘a was wholeheartedly supported by the Ottoman ulama. Even it was Meḥmed II who sponsored the debates regarding muqaddimāt arba‘a. The works written by such scholars as Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Kastallī, al-Ṣamṣūnī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-‘Arabī, Mollā ‘Arab al-Anṭākī, Khaṭībzāde, Sa‘dī Chalabī during his and his son Bāyazid II’s reigns were the supercommentaries written upon the related chapter of al-Talwīḥ, al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s al-Tawḍīḥ where the former responded to the criticism of the latter from an Ash‘arī point of view. The Ottoman ulama, in their workswere forced to choose between the two scholars and they mostly supported Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a and Māturīdism. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. The reflex of of identifying oneself through ‘the other’ made, to a certain extent, the theological and philosophical debates regarding faith meaningless, and gradually gave the Ottoman Sunnism a doctrinal and political tone. In such a context, the Ottomans’ paradigm of producing thought in line with the philosophical kalām began to lose its function, and, the focus of scholarhsip shifted; Shiism with its all variants were began to be bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. When the refutation texts composed from the reign of Bāyazid II onward to criticize the Ṣafawids are chronologically analyzed, it is seen that the contents of the texts evolved from criticism of Rāfiḍa to criticism of Sūfism. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in these refutations. So the fatwās issued against Rāfiḍa and Ṣūfīs in malāmatī line in earlier centuries in different contexts for different reasons were employed to criticize the new opponents. This caused two important results: First, such an approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḫalwatīs, Bayrāmīs, Gulshanīs, Baktāshīs and Mawlawīs were the sufi groups influenced by this situation in varying degrees. Second, Sunnism was exposed to the narrowization and centered around the fiqh, particularly Ḥanafī fiqh, in the context of Ḳāḍīzādelīs who were the main adversaries of above mentioned groups. The culture of catechism (‘ilm-i ḥāl) that came to the fore through the efforts of Ḳāḍīzādelīs was a crystallization and was mainly fuelled from this tension. Such a crystallization led the Ṣūfīs, the opponents of Ḳāḍīzādelīs, to a higher level of discourse deemphasizing the Ḥanafī aspect: They underscored the discourse of Ahl al-Sunna and four madhhabs, and mostly turned towards the Shāfiʿī and Ash‘arī traditions to look for support fortheir views. This process during which the emphasis of sharī‘a and tradition began to come to the fore once again paved the way for the zuhd and fiqh-centered religious thought that was maintained from the time of the Seljukids in Anatolia and was influential until Meḥmed II’ reign. Therefore in the Ottomans, particularly starting with the reign of Suleymān I, an intensive emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa was witnessed. Abū Ḥanīfa was at the very center of the debates revolving around zuhd and fiqh which came about in the same period and in which the sharī‘a sensitivity was a determining factor. Al-Māturīdī, whose name was overshadowed for a long time by the name of Abū Ḥanīfa, but who became prominent in the tradition with Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, had to transfer his gains for a period of time to Abū Ḥanīfa. Emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa looks like a rope that when pulled, all the tradition comes with it. When the topics began to be discussed in a manner that would also include the theological context, the contribution of the works ascribed to Abū Ḥanīfa, namely al-Fiqh al-Akbar, al-Waṣiyya and al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta‘allim to the discussions would be limited. For this reason, the need to refer to al-Māturīdī or to the theological formation bearing his name was inevitable. So, the literature on the points of disagreements between the Ash‘arism and the Māturīdism developed both vertically and horizontally in the 18th century and, corollary to that, the debates of free will as a corolloary to that, once again brought Māturīdism to the fore. (shrink)

Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ashʻarism, and Political Sunnism. By Jeffry R. Halverson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Pp. vii + 188. $75.

This article tries to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one of Ash‘arī theologians of the contracting period, showed a Mu‘tazila tendency regarding the ontic value of divine attributes and his successors followed him in this regard. The problem of divine attributes, a heated discussion area of theology, has been interpreted differently by the theological sects over centuries. Mu‘tazila scholars before Abu Hāshim al-Jubbāī regarded those attributes as nominally attributed to God. For the first time, with Abu Hāshim, this relation (...) was approached with a realistic attitude: Although divine attributes are not accepted as particular realities, they are viewed as states/ahwāl, the universal model of kalam atomism. The pre-Gazzālī Ash‘arī theologians, on the other hand, ascribed real existence to divine attributes as particular properties, whether they adopted this universal model or not. According to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the founder of Ashʿarism, which does not include the universal category in any way, the attributes carried by God’s essence consist of particular qualities. al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, who, like Abu Hāshim, made room for universals under the name of states, accepted particular qualities that led to universal attributes in a system compatible with Ashʿarism. Muta’akhkhirūn Ash‘arī theologians, building their thought system within the framework of the particular-universal dichotomy, felt the need to apply the theories of universals and predication to overcome the paradox caused by the famous motto “Attributes are neither Him nor other than Him”. On the basis of universal properties that have a lower degree of existence compared to particular properties, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theory of particular attributes is intended to be associated with Abu Hāshim’s theory of universal (state). In this context, the value of divine attributes discussed on the ontic ground by the mutaqaddimūn theologians was drawn to the epistemic ground in the muta’akhkhirūn period. From the first kalām works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to the last kalām works, he was distant from the ontic value of divine attributes. The statement that the derived word “knower”, which is appropriate for being a predicate in the propositional structure, and the infinitive “knowledge”, which is not appropriate for being a predicate, meet the same purpose, and that divine attributes are considered divine essence are the most important indications of this distance. Reviewing the works of prominent theologians, scholars of the time such as Fakhr al- Dīn al-Rāzī, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, Sa‘d al-dīn al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, and al-Dawānī, this article aims to demonstrate that Abu Hāshim’s view of the divine attributes in the ontic context was welcomed and that the evaluation of divine attributes shifted from particular realities to universal ones in the ontic context. The meaning of “God is knower” proposition according to the pre-Mu‘tazila in the ontic context will be analyzed. Then, its meaning according to Ash‘arite theologians from their framework of universals, will be investigated. (shrink)

A notion that the theologians consider as a physical explanation model while discussing the movement in accordance with their theological views on the comprehension and interpretation of the universe is i‘timād. In conclusion, this notion, which has various meanings in different contexts, has been used to express “the tendency of object in motion, potential energy, pressure or resistance of an object to another object”. Within this framework, including weight-lightness, ascent-descent, impulse-pull etc., many phenomena related to the unidirectional and compulsory movement (...) of objects have been explained. On the other hand, theologians dealt with i‘timād in the context of their own conceptions of the universe, in relation to their understanding of causality while discussing the movements of bodies in the universe and their changes-transformations, and the causality relationship between them. As a result of their discussions, they asked questions about i‘timād and tried to find answers to these questions in the perspective of their own views of the universe. Furthermore, in relation to the theory of i‘timād, Mu‘tazilite scholar Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm al-Nazzâm (d. 231/845) discussed the theory of tafra (leaping) and put forward contrary arguments. One of those who sought answers to the questions discussed in this direction and expressed an opinion on i‘timād is the Ash’arî theologian Abû al-Maâlî al-Juwaynî (d. 478/1085). He discussed i'timād in terms of the accidents of spatial generation and used i'timād as a universal explanatory theory for the phenomena of movement, space, weight and lightness, and directional phenomena such as up and down. From this point of view, he also tried to interpret i'timād with examples from natural phenomena and objects. In doing so, he synthesized i'timād within his own system and presented it as an explanatory element by considering the Ash'arite metaphysical principles through the examples he frequently gave. Thus, he put forward views on whether the movements of objects give rise to i'timād or not, and drew attention to the usage of i'timād in the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarī schools. In this context, he tried to prove with examples whether the Muʿtazilite understanding of iʿtimād overlaps with the Ashʿarī understanding of iʿtimād. On the other hand, al-Juwaynī put forward his proofs in the context of his criticisms of the Muʿtazilites in general and al-Naẓẓām in particular. His criticisms were generally in response to the views of Muʿtazilite scholars on the phenomenon of motion in the context of iʿtimād. In fact, al-Juwaynī criticized the arguments of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916) and Abū Ḥāshim (d. 321/933) in the context of the theory of tawlīd and al-Naẓẓām in the context of the theory of tafra through their arguments. In this direction, the paper concentrates on how Juwaynî stated the examples he put while proving the theory of i‘timād in terms of movement phenomenon and what he comprehended from it. In addition, the paper discusses his criticisms against Nazzâm’s theoretical and experimental arguments he brought in the context of tafra theory while elaborating Juwaynî’s explanation of movement phenomenon. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of speculative theology (kalāam) as it developed within the Ash'arite tradition of Islam is its denial of causal power to creatures. Much like Malebranche in the seventeenth century, the Ash'arites saw this denial as a natural extension of monotheism and were led as a result to embrace an occasionalist account of causality. According to their analysis, causal power is identical with creative power, and since God is the sole and sovereign creator, God (...) is the only causal agent. To assert anything else is to compromise monotheism. This position, of course, was in direct opposition to the prevailing accounts of causality within the philosophical tradition of Islam at the time. The philosophers (falāasifa) had by and large taken over accounts of causality from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists and adapted them in accordance with their own set of concerns. In such accounts, while God stands as the first cause, secondary causation—the causative action of agents other than God—is unambiguously affirmed, even if variously understood. Thus, as they offered a sophisticated account of causal action in direct opposition to the occasionalist thesis, the falāasifa posed something of challenge to the theologians. (shrink)

Centuries after his death, al-Ghazali remains one of the most influential figures of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Although he is best known for his _Incoherence of the Philosophers_, _Moderation in Belief_ is his most profound work of philosophical theology. In it_,_ he offers what scholars consider to be the best defense of the Ash'arite school of Islamic theology that gained acceptance within orthodox Sunni theology in the twelfth century, though he also diverges from Ash'arism with his (...) more rationalist approach to the _Quran_. Together with _The Incoherence of the Philosophers_, _Moderation in Belief_ informs many subsequent theological debates, and its influence extends beyond the Islamic tradition, informing broader questions within Western philosophical and theological thought. The first complete English-language edition of _Moderation in Belief_, this new annotated translation by Aladdin M. Yaqub draws on the most esteemed critical editions of the Arabic texts and offers detailed commentary that analyzes and reconstructs the arguments found in the work’s four treatises. Explanations of the historical and intellectual background of the texts also enable readers with a limited knowledge of classical Arabic to fully explore al-Ghazali and this foundational text for the first time. With the recent resurgence of interest in Islamic philosophy and the conflict between philosophy and religion, this new translation will be a welcome addition to the scholarship. (shrink)

Philosophical Theology in Islam explores the later history of the Ashʿarī school of theology through in-depth studies on its thought, sources, scholarly networks and contexts.

v. 1. Philosophy, theology and mysticism in medieval Islam -- v. 2. Early Islamic theology : the Muʻtazilites and al-Ashʻarī -- v. 3. Classical Islamic theology : the Ashʻarites.

The problem of human freedom have been addressed by al-Mutakallimūn (Islamic theologians) in the context of human acts and discussed from the point of view its relation with the will and other elements. At this point, whether the human has will and power in his own act, the limits of his will and power, the role of human in the act and his responsibilities have prompted to different debates. The theory of tawlīd put forward by Mu‘tazila is very crucial in (...) terms of determining the scope and limits of the freedom of human in acts. Mu‘tazila’s tawlīd theory defenses based on two important reasons. The first is to present the nature and limits of the acts that man did them outside himself. The other is to explain the relationship of human with such acts with regards to moral responsibility. Because both issues are very important in the principle of justice of Mu‘tazila. The effort to put the cause-effect relationship of human with his acts in terms of tawhīd and justice on the rational and moral ground is the reason for emergence of the theory. In this respect, the purpose of this theory which enables establishing a causality relationship between the human act and nature is aimed at the justification of freedom and responsibility between agent (fā‘il) and act.In this study, firstly, the definition of the concept of tawlīd and its meaning area have been presented and tackled the discussions about the agent of indirect acts. And then it has been discoursed upon the criticisms of Ahl al-Sunna about the subject of tawlīd. The subject has been outlined in the context of the intellectual discussion between Ahl al-Sunna and Mu‘tazila which constitute the dominant part of theological dispute tradition. In this respect, the main purpose of the study is to reveal how the limits of indirect actions belonging to human by force of freedom and moral responsibility are drawn and understood.Although they did not have a uniform thought about the topic, Mu‘tazila theologians who accepted semi-determinism in the theory of tawlīd acknowledged the existence of natures in the substances. Those who admitted the reason as a means of the act did not approve this. By accepting the continuity of the accidents in the acts, they twisted together the voluntary acts and the natural acts, and accepted that directly acts were realized through the human will and the other according to the principle of necessity. According to Mu‘tazila, causes are only means. Hence, the act emerging as a result of the means is the act of the agent who used this means to reach the result, not the means. Therefore, man is the agent of engendered acts and responsible for all kinds of acts that arise as a reflection of the will and their consequences. While Ahl al-Sunna has directly associated the action of man and all its consequences with the power of Allah, Mu‘tazila has based these actions on the power of man, which Allah has created in man and has been the source of the acts. Contrary to Mu‘tazila, the continuance of power which are not a constant accident is not possible for a second act from the point of Ahl al-Sunna since they have accepted the idea that the accidents will not be continuous. In this respect, according to Ahl al-Sunna, there is no compulsory relationship between the agent that caused the formation of the acts and the result supervening from them. They did not accept the idea of tawlīd, which its meaning is that accident gives birth to accident, because it would oblige the relationship between cause and effect. Because this relationship, which Mu‘tazila gives the name of tawlīd in human acts, is made up for that Allah has created His laws right after the orientation of human to the cause. In this respect, Ahl al-Sunna thinkers rejected tawlīd because it would mean attributing an act to an inanimate being and require a mandatory relationship between cause and effect in the functioning of the universe. Although the result does not occur with his own act when the person applies to the cause, he is responsible for his act because it is related to the person who did it. Māturīdī tradition did not accept the acts that emerged as a result of tawlīd as the production of man, but they tried to establish a balance by holding the person responsible because he is the reason for the outcome that emerged. As for the Ash‘arites, they avoided giving a real effect of the will and power to the causes by considering that created will and power is only a locus in the emergence of the act. The person has no effect on his act except for directing his will to that act and his behavior which will make the person responsible is based on this will. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the complex relationships between falsafa and kalām. As regards the history of the latter, it has been generally agreed that al-Juwaynī played a decisive role at a moment when Avicennism became intrusive. It is mainly in his al-ʿAqīda al-niẓāmiyya that al-Juwaynī initiated a doctrinal and methodic evolution of Ashʿarism. One necessarily invokes here Ibn Rushd, who, by exposing the dogmas in their literal manifestation in his al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla, actually sought to (...) operate a systematic refutation of the Ashʿarites' theses. It should be noted, however, that, despite his critical distance, Ibn Rushd nonetheless remained attentive to al-Juwaynī's evolutionary study. In this contribution, some aspects of the major issues in kalām will be examined: the existence of God and the argument of takhṣīṣ, His unicity and the argument of mumānaʿa, as well as human agency with the acknowledgement of man's capacity and its role. Albeit limited in scope, the essay attempts to make a more profound evaluation of al-Juwaynī's role at a crucial moment of the history of kalām in its specific development during which the Great Masters have not always been faithful to the classical tenets of their school, but also in its relations with falsafa and its influence on al-Juwaynī, and then and mainly on his disciple al-Ghazālī's theological thought.Le présent travail concerne les rapports complexes qui ont existé entre la falsafa et le kalām. Pour l'histoire propre de ce dernier, l'on s'accorde sur le rôle de premier ordre joué par al-Juwaynī à un moment décisif où l'avicennisme devenait envahissant. C'est surtout dans al-ʿAqīda al-niẓāmiyya qu'il fit évoluer l'ashʿarisme aussi bien dans la doctrine que dans la méthode. Le témoignage d'un faylasūf est ici invoqué. Ibn Rushd, en voulant exposer dans al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla les dogmes dans leur sens manifeste, a cherché à opérer une réfutation systématique des thèses ashʿarites. Ce faisant, il a été attentif au renouvellement opéré par al-Juwaynī. Tout en restant critique à son égard, il a trouvé chez lui un réconfort à sa polémique anti-ashʿarite. Sont évoqués ici certains aspects des questions majeures dans le kalām: l'existence de Dieu avec l'argument de takhṣīṣ, Son unicité avec l'argument de l'empêchement mutuel, et les actes humains avec l'affirmation de la capacité de l'homme et le rôle de celle-ci. Même si le travail présenté ici peut être continué et élargi, il cherche à avoir une appréciation plus exacte du rôle joué par ce grand maître de l'ashʿarisme à travers son petit traité, à une époque jugée cruciale dans l'histoire du kalām selon son développement propre au cours duquel les grands maîtres n'ont pas été toujours fidèles aux doctrines classiques de l'École, mais aussi dans ses rapports avec la falsafa et l'influence de celle-ci sur la pensée théologique d'al-Juwaynī et puis et surtout sur celle de son disciple al-Ghazālī.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.REGARDS D'IBN RUSHD SUR AL-JUWAYNĪ QUESTIONS DE MÉTHODEVolume 22, Issue 2Mokdad Arfa Mensia DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000021Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. 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If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. REGARDS D'IBN RUSHD SUR AL-JUWAYNĪ QUESTIONS DE MÉTHODEVolume 22, Issue 2Mokdad Arfa Mensia DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000021Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yusuf b. Muhammad al-Miklâtî is an Ash’arî scholar who lived between the years 550-626 (1155-1229). He has a work entitled Lubāb al-ʿuqūl fī radd ʿalā al-falāsifa fī ʿilm al-uṣūl to defend the opinions of Ahl al-Sunnah by criticizing philosophical views. Miklātī is one of the most important figures who lived in the Muvahhidī state. He is a professor who contributed to learning of Ash’arī kalām system in the North Africa and Andalusia. But today it has not been demonstrated. Therefore, (...) in this article we looked at some theological views of Miklātī in the context of his criticism of the philosophical views.Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yûsuf b. Muhammad al-Miklātī is an Ash’arī scholar who lived in North Africa and Andalusia between the years 520-626 (1155-1229). He is one of the tutors working at madrasahs of the Muvahhidī state established by Ibn Tumart. Becoming meeting point of Salafī and philosophical understanding is one of the main factors which makes important the period and the region where he lived. Muvahhidīs on the one hand called for the returning to the Book and the Sunnah, and ordered to burn the works of Malikī fuqahā related to the branches (furūʿ) with the reason that they became distant from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. On the other hand, the last great represantatives of Islamic Philosophy, Ibn Tufayl and Averroes wrote their most precious works at Muvahhidî palace.Only extant work of al-Miklâtî is Lubâb al-‘uqûl fî radd ‘alâ al-falâsifa fî ‘ilm al-uṣûl. In Lubâb al-‘uqûl, al-Miklâtî by giving a place to the philosophical opinions about theology, prophethood and the hereafter criticizes the viewpoints of Aristotle, from Periphatetic philosophers al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, from Mu’tazilah Abu Hudhayl al-‘Allaf and Qa’bî. He has benefited from the works of Ash’arî theologians like Baqillanî, al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazzâlî when he make criticism. Especially in the theology section, when he considers some subjects he has followed the method which al-Ghazzalî used in his Tahâfut which was written to criticize the philosophers. However, with the impact of the fuqahâ, who has Salafî understanding, and that of the Islamic philosopher Averroes, the ruler of the region ordered to burn the works of al-Ghazzâlî and notify that whoever has these works will be killed and whose wealth will be seized. In this regard al-Miklâtî’s work has an important contribution to the settlement of Ash’arî theology against Salafî and philosophical opposition.The main reason of the opposition of Salafî understanding towards the science of Kalâm is the claim that Kalâm has been established through outward impacts at a philosophical basement. The main reason of opposition of Averroes towards Kalâm is that Kalâm follows argumentative (jadalî) methods not instead of demonstrative ones (burhânî). This work of al-Miklâtî provides benefits to the establishment of Kalâm with the hands of Muslims and on the Qur’anic base and also has contributed to the development of a demonstrative tradition against philosophical opposition. Because according to him, the purpose of a theologian is to declare the demonstrative proofs which help for the soundness of the religious creed. Principles of the science of Kalâm are introduction, by which a theologian establishes his demonstrative proofs. (shrink)

There have been many developments in the field of science and religion over the past few decades. One such development is referred to as ‘theology of nature’ (ToN), which is the activity of building or revising theological frameworks in light of contemporary scientific developments, e.g., evolution, chaos theory, and quantum mechanics. Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne, and Arthur Peacocke, all of whom are Christian thinkers, are the most well-known advocates of this kind of thinking. However, this discourse has not been (...) examined from an Islamic perspective. Given this gap, in this article, we view this strand of thinking from the Ashʿarī school of thought that is part of the Sunnī Islamic kalām tradition. We first review how ToN manifests in the works of the thinkers mentioned earlier. Following this, we highlight the essential principles in Ashʿarism relevant to God, His interaction with the created world, and science. These are then compared with the ideas of the said thinkers. Two conclusions are reached. First, we demonstrate that atomism, which is generally understood as a long-held position in the Ashʿarī tradition, should not be held as a theological position but rather a philosophical or a scientific one. Second, an important distinction is made between science-informed theology (SIT) and contingency-informed theology (CIT). For Ashʿarīs, a CIT is sufficient for understanding God, but they would find the SIT displayed in ToN problematic. The motivation and methodology of localising or modifying God’s nature or attributes to fit the science of the day would be seen as theologically very costly and a form of scientism. (shrink)

To date, the genre of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal as a document of Islamic argumentation theory remains unclear. Modern scholars paid little attention to this important document preserved in Ibn Fūrak ’s Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī. Scholars disagree on whether the main constituent elements of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal are they theological or philosophical. Based on the terminology, the procedure and the purpose of dialectical questions and answers in al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, I argue that this document borrows its method to juridical dialectics.

The present study seeks to lay out the most basic elements of the ontology of classical Aš‘arite theology. In several cases this requires a careful examination of the traditional and the formal lexicography of certain key expressions. The topics primarily treated are: how they understood “Being/ existence” and “being/existent” and essential natures; the systematic exploitation of the equivocities of certain expressions within a general context in which other than words there are no universals proves to be elegant as well (...) as insightful; the basic categories of primary entities: independant beings and nonindependant beings, created and uncreated, the equivocity of “being/existent” as predicated of contingent entities on the one hand and of God and His attributes on the other, and certain problems that arise because of the rigid application of the system's underlying analytic principles. Nous essayons ici de presenter les éléments fondamentaux de l'ontologie de l'aš‘arisme classique. Pour quelques expressions, il a fallu examiner la lexicographie et ordinaire et technique pour bien comprendre leur emploi et leur signification. Les sujets examinés sont: le sens de “Etre/existence” et de “être/existant” et le concept de réalité essentielle; l'emploi nuancé des équivocités de quelques expressions dans un contexte où les seuls universaux sont des mots, emploi qui se révèle philosophiquement élégant; les catégories fondamentales des êtres: êtres indépendants et êtres non-indépendants, soit créés soit incréés, l'équivocité de “être/existant” dit des êtres contingents d'une part, de Dieu et ses attributs d'autre part, et enfin quelques difficultiés qui résultent de l'application rigide des principes analytiques du système. (shrink)

This study of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī's (d. 631/1233) teachings on creation offers close analysis of all of his extant works of falsafa and kalām. Some of these were not known to previous scholars, yet they bear witness to key facets of the interaction between the historically inimical traditions of Hellenic philosophy and rational theology at this important intellectual moment. Al-Āmidīis seen to grapple with the encounter of two paradigms for the discussion of creation. On the one hand, Ibn Sīnā's (...) metaphysical concept of necessity of existence is the basis of his doctrine of the world's pre-eternal emanation. On the other, for the mutakallimūn, the physical theory of atomism bolsters the view that God created the world from nothing. This study is of interest to scholars of Ibn Sīnā and Ash'arism alike, as it advances our understanding of the ongoing tradition of rational theology in the Islamic world, long past Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's (d. 505/1111) famous attack on the philosophers. (shrink)

At the basis of Ghazali's criticisms of Ash'arite kalam is the thesis that its primary function is the defence of traditional Islamic belief, the 'aqida, against the distortions of heretical innovations (al-bida'). Kalam is not an end in itself and it is error to think that the mere engagement in it constitutes the experientially religious. In the I[hdotu]ya' he maintains in effect that when it is pursued as an end in itself, its dogmas can constitute a veil preventive of (...) the attainment of gnosis (ma'rifa). On the other hand, Ash'arite kalam when not pursued as an end in itself can be an aid in the quest after gnosis. This is implicit in his reference (in Kitab al-Arba'in) to his own major work of Ash'arite kalam, the Iqti[sdotu]ad fi al-i'tiqad, where he states that “it goes deeper in ascertaining [the truth] and is closer to knocking at the doors of gnosis than the official discourse encountered in the books of the mutakallimin.” The I[hdotu]ya' abounds with homilies, guides for the pious, particularly for those seeking mystical knowledge. Ash'arism pervades such homilies. Thus in Kitab al-Tawba, Ghazali formulates, analyzes and defends the concept of human choice in Ash'arite terms. He thus argues that each of the ingredients of this concept - knowledge, power, the decisive will, as well as the ensuing choice - is individually the direct creation of God. Not that the argument for this concept yields experiential knowledge of its meaning within the cosmic scheme of things. For Ghazali such knowledge is only attained through mystical vision. But the Ash'arite argument, when not pursued as an end in itself, can be an aid to the seekers of gnosis. It can bring them closer to knocking at its doors. (shrink)

ASHÉ: Ritual Poetics in African Diasporic is a collection of interdisciplinary essays contributed by international scholars and practitioners. Having distinguished themselves across such disciplines as Anthropology, Art, Music, Literature, Dance, Philosophy, Religion, and Theology and conjoined to construct a defining approach to the study of Aesthetics throughout the African Diaspora with the Humanities at the core, this collection of essays will break new ground in the study of Black Aesthetics. This book will be of great interest to scholars, practitioners, (...) and students interested in tracing African heritage identities throughout the African Diaspora through close examination of a variety of discourses directly connected to expressive elements of cultural production and religious rituals. (shrink)

ASHÉ: Ritual Poetics in African Diasporic is a collection of interdisciplinary essays contributed by international scholars and practitioners. Having distinguished themselves across such disciplines as Anthropology, Art, Music, Literature, Dance, Philosophy, Religion, and Theology and conjoined to construct a defining approach to the study of Aesthetics throughout the African Diaspora with the Humanities at the core, this collection of essays will break new ground in the study of Black Aesthetics. This book will be of great interest to scholars, practitioners, (...) and students interested in tracing African heritage identities throughout the African Diaspora through close examination of a variety of discourses directly connected to expressive elements of cultural production and religious rituals. (shrink)

Lent is not normally thought of as a time for adding to or enriching the church's liturgy with visual art. This essay explores possibilities for using visual art that corresponds to the purpose of the season of Lent as a time for somber reflection and reconciliation.

The encounter of the medieval Muslims with Greek philosophy undeniably shaped the course of their philosophical and theological thought. This encounter led to the complex and contentious issue of ‘philosophy versus theology’. Medieval Muslim thinkers needed to develop a response to the issue of philosophy versus theology. The present article will first highlight the response of the Islamic theologians to their encounter with Greek philosophy in the form of three major trends in medieval Islamic theology: (1) strong (...) opposition to the application of reason and rationalist approach to Islamic doctrines, and strict adherence to the actual text of the Qur’an and the Hadith, (2) the adoption of Greek philosophy, and the application of reason and rationalist approach to explain and defend Islamic religion and (3) acknowledging the significance of reason in exploring the matters related to the natural world but, at the same time, stressing the subordination of reason to revelation. This article will discuss Atharism, Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism as the representatives of the first, second and third trends, respectively. The response of the medieval Islamic theologians to the issue of philosophy versus theology serves as a context in which medieval Muslim philosophers carried out their philosophy–theology debate. The article will proceed to show that some medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, subordinated religion or revelation to philosophy or reason. Other medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, subordinated philosophy to theology. The third group of medieval Islamic philosophers represented by Alfarabi argued for the reconciliation and harmonious co-existence of philosophy and religion. Contribution: This article highlights the response of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers to the issue of philosophy versus theology that was caused by their encounter with Greek philosophy. (shrink)

To date, the genre of al-Ashʿarī’s (d. 936 CE) Adab al-jadal as a document of Islamic argumentation theory remains unclear. Modern scholars paid little attention to this important document preserved in Ibn Fūrak (d. 1015 CE)’s Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī. Scholars disagree on whether the main constituent elements of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal are they theological or philosophical. Based on the terminology, the procedure and the purpose of dialectical questions and answers in al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, I argue that this document borrows its (...) method to juridical dialectics. (shrink)

Concepts such as ashâb al- hadīth and ahl al-hadīth, which have began to be used since the period of the Companions, refer to people who are busy with teaching and learning hadīth and who have the science of rijal and who have authority to speak on all matters related with hadīth topics. The most distinctive feature of these people is that they have tried to understand the hadīth texts according to their opinions as much as possible, without applying them to (...) any comparisons. Besides Shafi'is and Malikis, known for their closeness to their opinions, Ẓāhirīs who have advocated being loyal to the words of hadīths, also have ranked as ashâb al-hadīth. Ahl al-hadīth who have made themselves accepted by the Islamic community, went through a mihna process in the first half of hegira III century. However, the mihna that they experienced at the end of the process have made ahl al-hadīth stronger in the eye of public. Ahl al-hadīth, who have played important role in the development of Islamic sciences, have attracted the attention of the researchers. Within this context, it is important to examine the attitudes towards ahl al- hadīth in the Islamic tradition of thought and to determine their consistency. Therefore, in this study, ashâb hadīth perception of Ẓāhirī scholars, accepted as ashâb al-hadīth, will be discussed. In this study, it was aimed to find out to what extent Ẓāhirī scholars embrace value of ashâb al-hadīth as well as how much they make a claim to the opinions they have put forward in the tradition of Islamic thought. In addition to this, among the aims of our study, we tried to determine whether the Ẓāhirī scholars approach the issues objectively or not. So, the works of Ẓāhirī scholars were investigated with an inductive method, and the information obtained were assessed. As a result of this, that ashâb al-hadīth have been praised in Qur’an verses was adopted by Ẓāhirī scholars, and it was determined that for Zâhirî scholars, to be a member of ashâb al-hadīth was a sign of proud. Although the Ẓāhirī scholars' view of ashâb al-hadīth led them to use the concept of ashâb al-hadīth as an expression of modification, this has not become a generally valid rule. Because it has been seen that many narrators were rejected for different reasons, even though they were from ashâb al-hadīth. In addition, it has been determined that Ẓāhirī scholars frequently use the concept of ashâbü’l-hadīth as a qualifying adjective in the science of rijal. Although they attached great value to ashâb al-hadīth, it was also observed that they criticized them for making mistakes because of their views on the permissibility of acting on weak hadīths, and the fact that a narrator narrates a hadīth by both his teacher and his teacher's teacher makes the hadīth weak. (shrink)

In Intellectual Life in the Ḥijāz before Wahhabism, Naser Dumairieh argues that, as a result of changing global conditions facilitating the movement of scholars and texts, the seventeenth-century Ḥijāz was one of the most important intellectual centers of the Islamic world, acting as a hub between its different parts. Positioning Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (d. 1101/1690) as representative of the intellectual activities of the pre-Wahhabism Ḥijāz, Dumairieh argues that his coherent philosophical system represents a synthesis of several major post-classical traditions of Islamic (...) thought, namely kalām and Akbarian appropriations of Avicennian metaphysics. Al-Kūrānī's work is the culmination of the philosophized Akbarian tradition; with his reconciliation of Ibn ʻArabī's ideas with Ashʻarī theology, Ibn ʻArabī's ideas became Islamic theology. (shrink)