Notre science ne saurait être qu’inachevable et infondable. Qu’implique cette situation du discours scientifique selon Pascal? Et quelles significations, existentielles et épistémologiques, accorder au recours inévitable à la « nature »? En quoi la nature est-elle en nous relais du discours?

La notion d’expérience transcendantale correspond dans l’œuvre de Husserl à une reprise radicalement nouvelle du projet classique d’une philosophie première, autre terme employé pour désigner la métaphysique en tant que recherche sur le sens de l’être et sur les principes premiers de sa connaissance. Une telle notion correspond très précisément à ce que Husserl appelle la réflexion phénoménologique transcendantale. Dans ses Méditations cartésiennes, il en livre à la fois le projet et la signi...

DRACO.WOLFANDDOTCOM.INFO is an interactive proto-videogame installation that immerses users, personified as abstract dragons in a cathartic, stochastic, full-body immersive videogame experience, in cyberspace. The work attempts to playfully shift user consciousness towards non-human embodiment, by real-time 3D meshing the data from the human body into a mirrored abstract, ill-defined dragonic 3D shape. It gifts humans with special virtual powers, such as flying and cusping fireballs, as they fight for their progression in the game-space and facing annihilation, through invisible, interactional camera-based (...) technologies which will be exposed in this paper. Inside the piece’s virtual world, users play as endangered dragons in the XXIst century populated by companies, websites and humanoids eager to stop the mythological beasts. The dragons progress in the game-space by inflicting damage upon the city’s landscape. The stochastic game-space ascends in difficulty as the levels progress, slowly changing the joystick’s response into faster speeds and generating larger city-scapes, inducing the game’s ultimate goal of a cathartic ilinxian state of disruption and otherness in human perception. (shrink)

Within the context of exploring new electronic arts' aesthetic regions and unexampled connections between generative art, games and mythology, my practical artistic research was led to focus on labyrinthine structures as exquisite legendary spatial gaming devices and as possible pathways to gain deeper humane insights, resulting into discoveries of original methods of labyrinth formation by means other than human. Labyrinths and mazes are inextricable paths, human made millennial structures that provide spatial challenges often connected with feedback, compression, entanglement and hyper (...) complexification of goal oriented displacement. They are perhaps the most ancient example of structure for spatial and serious games. Novel methods for labyrinth creation ‐ non-human methods ‐ are introduced and exemplified through artistic constructs. These new methods utilize non-human bioelectronic techniques and are initially grouped into three distinct sub-categories: the 'open' method, the 'mathematical flower' method, the 'animal' method. Four case examples of artistic non-human labyrinths resorting to the introduced novel methods are explored: k. video games (2007, 2010), Wolfanddotcom video game (2017), 8-bit Maze Gardens vegetable paintings (2018‐present), Ant Ennae Labyrinths bio-electronic apparatus (2019‐present). (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

A questão dos letramentos e da inovação demonstram-se fundamentais em períodos históricos como o atual, onde as práticas de ensino-aprendizagem tornam-se cada vez mais complexas, que requerem novas abordagens teóricas para compreendermos possibilidades alternativas de ensino. Tendo estas questões em mente, este artigo visa indicar relações possíveis entre o antifundacionismo, o pensamento de Paul Feyerabend e os letramentos científicos. Em um primeiro momento indicaremos questões relativas ao antifundacionismo, e em seguida verificaremos como tal questão se efetiva no pensamento de Feyerabend. (...) Finalizaremos avaliando como esta abordagem pode fundamentar novas práticas educacionais. (shrink)

André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity is a detailed, well-written presentation and defense of one attempt to solve many of the recently much discussed puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects. It is engaging not only for Gallois’s ingenious attempt to defend his view that objects can be “occasionally identical”—identical at one time but not another —but for his discussion throughout of the puzzles and of alternative solutions. Gallois does a fine job of keeping the motivations for a position, whether (...) his own or others’, in view while working out details and responding to objections. Even where one disagrees, there is excellent food for thought and discussion here. (shrink)

My topic is extraterrestrial intelligence. Following current conventions, I use the abbreviation ‘ETI’ to stand for three related concepts: the abstract idea of extraterrestrial intelligence, individuals who are both extraterrestrial and intelligent, and the hypothesis that there are ETIs. SETI is the search for ETIs, and CETI is the attempt to communicate with ETIs. In this paper, I will try to answer the two most basic questions in extraterrestrial studies. First, what is the status of the ETI hypothesis? In the (...) light of what we know, how likely is it that there are ETIs? Secondly, what is the value of pursuing SETI? Are the expected epistemic and pragmatic payoffs sufficient to warrant an extensive search? The first, substantive question is discussed in Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4. The second, ‘program evaluation’ question is the subject of Section 5 and Section 6. But first we'll take a brief look at some of the early history of the topic. (shrink)

Judith Andre examines the issue of the scope of the market. She offers a framework for thinking about the issue of blocked exchanges that draws upon concepts of ownership, alienation, and the impact of the market on exchanges, interactions, and market participants. She shows where Michael Walzer's notion of dominance fits into her wider taxonomy of the limits of the market.

To overcome the ‘expectation gap’ the auditor has to encourage the auditee to enter into a dialogue. The author is Professor of Accounting and Auditing at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Vice‐President of the American Accounting Association.

Mit seiner Theorie der vernünftigen Übereinkunft liefert André Olbrich die Grundlegung eines Kriteriums für moralische Urteile über richtig und falsch: Im Anschluss an klassische und moderne Vertragstheoretiker wird die Akzeptanz eines Urteils durch die Betroffenen zum obersten Rechtfertigungsmaßstab erhoben. Das vertragstheoretische Denken wird weiterentwickelt und konsequent als umfassende normative Theorie ausformuliert. Die Leserinnen und Leser erfahren, von welchem Standpunkt aus sich die Regeln unseres sozialen Miteinanders einer Kritik unterziehen lassen und auf welchen moralischen Grundlagen Recht und Politik aufbauen.

Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth.

What do Jerry Fodor and Bas van Fraassen, the archetypical scientific realist and his antirealist shadow, have in common? They’re both defenders of the theory-observation distinction. It isn’t surprising that a realist and an antirealist should agree about something; but it is curious that van Fraassen’s and Fodor’s defenses of the theory-observation distinction play diametrically opposite roles in their philosophical agendas. Van Fraassen needs it to support his antirealism; Fodor wants it in support of his realism. Van Fraassen needs the (...) distinction in order to protect antirealism from the charge of incoherence. Antirealists wish to ascribe a more exalted status to the observational import of a theory than to its nonobservational claims. Van Fraassen’s version of the antirealist thesis is that belief in observational claims is rationally warranted under some logically and nomologically possible conditions, whereas belief in theoretical claims is never warranted. This identifies the species of antirealism at issue as epistemic antirealism. This position would be a nonstarter if the observational import couldn’t be distinguished from the rest. And, in fact, denying the coherence of the theory-observation distinction has been a popular realist gambit in the debate about scientific realism. (shrink)

In March 2010, Professor Tom Devine, widely acknowledged as the leading academic historian of Scotland, presented a plenary lecture for the Royal Society of Edinburgh's yearly symposium, "Connections between Scotland and Slavery." Publicly advertised as a reply to the question "Did Slavery Make Scotland Great?" Devine's talk was eagerly anticipated by the group of international scholars gathered at the University of Edinburgh. His answer, however, may have been more controversial than the audience anticipated. Devine said that the economic transformation of (...) eighteenth-century Scotland was a direct result of capital produced by slave labor, disproportionately financed and largely managed by Scots. The notion that... (shrink)

Trata-se de capítulo de um livro sobre a noção de "substância" na história da filosofia e contém uma discussão sobre a noção ordinária de "corpo" do ponto de vista da filosofia analítica.

What do Jerry Fodor and Bas van Fraassen, the archetypical scientific realist and his antirealist shadow, have in common? They’re both defenders of the theory-observation distinction. It isn’t surprising that a realist and an antirealist should agree about something; but it is curious that van Fraassen’s and Fodor’s defenses of the theory-observation distinction play diametrically opposite roles in their philosophical agendas. Van Fraassen needs it to support his antirealism; Fodor wants it in support of his realism. Van Fraassen needs the (...) distinction in order to protect antirealism from the charge of incoherence. Antirealists wish to ascribe a more exalted status to the observational import of a theory than to its nonobservational claims. Van Fraassen’s version of the antirealist thesis is that belief in observational claims is rationally warranted under some logically and nomologically possible conditions, whereas belief in theoretical claims is never warranted. This identifies the species of antirealism at issue as epistemic antirealism. This position would be a nonstarter if the observational import couldn’t be distinguished from the rest. And, in fact, denying the coherence of the theory-observation distinction has been a popular realist gambit in the debate about scientific realism. (shrink)

Despite its title and stated objectives this edited volume does not provide a broad and inclusive survey of post-apartheid South African historiographical developments. Its main topic is the unexpected demise in the post-apartheid context of the radical or revisionist approach that had invigorated and transformed the humanities and social studies during the 1970s and 1980s. In the context of the anti-apartheid struggle the radical historians had developed a plausible model of praxis for progressive scholarship, yet in the new post-apartheid democratic (...) South Africa radical historical scholarship itself encountered a crisis of survival. This should not be confused with a general “crisis” of historical scholarship in South Africa, as some of the uneven contributions to this volume contend, as that remains an active and diversely productive field due also to substantial contributions by historians not based in South Africa. If the dramatic and ironic fate of radical historical scholarship in the context of the transition to a post-apartheid democracy is the volume's primary topic, then it unfortunately fails to provide serious and sustained critical reflection on the origins and possible explanations for that crisis. A marked feature of the accounts of “history making” provided in this volume is the radical historians' lack of self-reflexivity and the scant interest shown in the underlying history of their own intellectual trajectories. (shrink)