André Gombay; XIV*—What You Don't Know Doesn't Hurt You, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 239–250, https://doi.or.

André Gombay; XIV*—What You Don't Know Doesn't Hurt You, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 239–250, https://doi.or.

For many years G. E. Moore asked himself what was wrong with sentences like ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did’, or ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’. He discussed the problem in 1912 in his Ethics , and was still discussing it in 1944 in a paper to the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge—an event we know about from a letter of Wittgenstein that I shall quote in (...) a moment. Throughout these years of pondering, Moore retained a remarkably stable vocabulary for setting out his solution. Briefly, he held this: saying ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did’ is absurd, but not self-contradictory. Not self-contradictory, because ‘it may quite well be true’; yet absurd, because the speaker expressly repudiates, in the second part of the sentence, a belief which he implies by uttering the first part. The panoply of distinctions which subtends this doctrine—sentence v. utterance of sentence, saying v. implying, contradiction v. absurdity—was subjected to keen scrutiny a generation or so ago, and much of it has now passed into philosophical lore as a discussion of ‘Moore's Paradox’. (shrink)

Anglophone philosophers have on the whole overlooked much of the last ten years or so of Descartes' philosophical career. In the period following publication of the Meditations, however, Descartes was extremely active in attempting to develop a comprehensive ethics, rooted in his analysis of human passions. His work in this area grew out of a lengthy correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia and was later systematically presented in the Passions of the Soul. The present volume is the first collection of (...) essays dealing specifically with this aspect of Descartes' thinking. It is thus a valuable contribution to our understanding of the first modern philosopher. Since in the Passions Descartes provides us with the most sophisticated and extended discussion of the composite human being anywhere in his writings, this volume is an indispensable aid to understanding the full scope of Cartesian anthropology. Just what is the nature of the passions? Does Descartes' analysis of the passions undercut his dualism? How do the passions both contribute to our good, and, if we are not careful, prevent us from recognizing it? How can the passions be regulated rationally? How do the passions affect our freedom? These and other questions are addressed in these original and insightful articles, all by leading Descartes scholars. (shrink)

In a famous text Descartes has written this:Whenever the thought of God's supreme power occurs to me, I cannot help feeling that he might easily, if he so wished, make me go wrong even in what I think I see most clearly with my mind's eye. On the other hand, whenever I turn to the matters themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I burst out: ‘let who will deceive me, he can (...) never bring it about that I should be nothing at the time of thinking that I am something, nor that it be true that I never existed if it is true that I exist now; nor even that two and three together make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see manifest contradiction’. (shrink)

1. Legend has it that as Mozart lay dying, a stranger dressed in black entered the room. Without saying word, he walked to the death-bed, removed the manuscript sheets of the Requiem on which the composer had been working until his final hours, and departed. This was not as you might have thought an envoy from beyond—but the servant of a certain Viennese nobleman, Count Walsegg zu Stuppach. The Count was in the habit of commissioning music anonymously, and having it (...) played in his palace as though it were his own. In extremis he was collecting the score for a forthcoming soirée. (shrink)

A bold and insightful departure from related texts, _Descartes_ goes beyond the categorical associations placed on the philosopher’s ideas, and explores the subtleties of his beliefs. An elegant, compelling and insightful introduction to Descartes' life and work. Discusses a broad range of his most scrutinized philosophical thought, including his contributions to logic, philosophy of the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion. Explores the subtleties of Descartes' seemingly contradictory beliefs. Addresses themes left unexamined in other (...) works on Descartes. (shrink)

In a famous text Descartes has written this:Whenever the thought of God's supreme power occurs to me, I cannot help feeling that he might easily, if he so wished, make me go wrong even in what I think I see most clearly with my mind's eye. On the other hand, whenever I turn to the matters themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I burst out: ‘let who will deceive me, he can (...) never bring it about that I should be nothing at the time of thinking that I am something, nor that it be true that I never existed if it is true that I exist now; nor even that two and three together make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see manifest contradiction’. (shrink)

1. Legend has it that as Mozart lay dying, a stranger dressed in black entered the room. Without saying word, he walked to the death-bed, removed the manuscript sheets of the Requiem on which the composer had been working until his final hours, and departed. This was not as you might have thought an envoy from beyond—but the servant of a certain Viennese nobleman, Count Walsegg zu Stuppach. The Count was in the habit of commissioning music anonymously, and having it (...) played in his palace as though it were his own. In extremis he was collecting the score for a forthcoming soirée. (shrink)

A bold and insightful departure from related texts, _Descartes_ goes beyond the categorical associations placed on the philosopher’s ideas, and explores the subtleties of his beliefs. An elegant, compelling and insightful introduction to Descartes' life and work. Discusses a broad range of his most scrutinized philosophical thought, including his contributions to logic, philosophy of the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion. Explores the subtleties of Descartes' seemingly contradictory beliefs. Addresses themes left unexamined in other (...) works on Descartes. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents preface.

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents preface.

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents preface.

McCall's argument has two stages. In the first, the hypothesis that someone has both perfect memory and perfect foreknowledge is shown to generate an infinite regress, and this is taken to establish the absurdity of that hypothesis; in the second, this absurdity is made the basis of a proof that time is asymmetrical.

For all his insistence that the mind has no parts, Descartes often describes inner mental conflicts, sometimes his own: ambivalence, fixation to childhood prejudice, are for him fixtures of human life. "Sigmund Descartes?" examines this aspect of his thought.

Writers on Descartes are apt to mention one dramatic event of his life—a dream he had in November 1619 in which the “Spirit of Truth” opened up for him “the treasures of all the sciences.” We know of the dream not from the published Descartes, though he perhaps alluded to it in the passage of the Discourse where he speaks of having spent a day alone “in a stove”; no, our textual source is his early biographer Adrien Baillet, writing seventy (...) years after the event. Why do commentators fasten on that episode? I take it they find the paradox alluring—a stern rationalist set on his life-course by an oneiric revelation. (shrink)

Andre Gombay gives a penetrating, accurate account of the functioning of duress as a defence in current Canadian law, and puts forward an intelligent and very appealing suggestion as to how the law on duress might be reformed. As part of the underpinnings for his reform proposals, he attempts to unravel the elements of justification and excuse that intertwine in duress and provides his analysis of how duress is distinguishable from other excuses or defences. I agree with him that (...) the present working conception of duress in law falls far short of its appropriate moral potential as a defence, and I wish in these comments to support his proposals for reform. However, I think his arguments regarding the nature of duress, and its bearing on our responsibility for what we do under duress, are less persuasive, and it is here that I will begin. (shrink)

The disagreement between André Gombay and Storrs McCall can be summed up in terms of the distinction between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference. This distinction is actually used by Professor McCall in his paper. Thus, it would seem that both speakers agree that a person acting under duress cannot exercise liberty of spontaneity—he does not act according to his wishes. However, Gombay also claims, at least according to McCall, that liberty of indifference is also lacking in (...) cases of duress—persons under duress have no other choice than to obey when threatened. McCall takes an opposite view. He thinks that the only genuine cases of compulsion belong either to various types of physical coercion or to a certain number of pathologies of the mind. (shrink)

The objective of the article is twofold: to advance an interpretation of Descartes’ position on the problem of explaining how deduction from universal propositions to their particular instances can be both legitimate and useful for discovery of truth; and to argue that his position is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of logic. In Descartes’ view. the problem in question is that syllogistic deductions from universal propositions to their particular instances is circular and hence useless as a means for discovery (...) of truth. Descartes’ solution to the problem is to claim that noncircular, useful deduction from the universal to the particular must first be based on deduction from particular truths to particular truths. I examine previous interpretations of Cartesian deduction given by E.M. Curley, Bernard Williams, and Andre Gombay. None of these interpretations fit with all of Descartes’ criticisms of syllogistic deduction and his characterization of useful and legitimate deduction (such as the cogito). I argue that the key to a correct interpretation is Descartes’ claim that implicit knowledge of universal propositions plays a crucial role in useful and legitimate deduction, and I explain how we may cash in his talk of implicit knowledge through Ryle’s notion of knowing how. Having set out a fuller explication of Descartes’ theory of deduction, I argue that it is consistent with the way people actually reason, that it helps us with problems in the philosophy of logic that have been raised by John Stuart Mill, Hilary Putnam, and Michael Dummett. (shrink)

The objective of the article is twofold: to advance an interpretation of Descartes’ position on the problem of explaining how deduction from universal propositions to their particular instances can be both legitimate and useful for discovery of truth; and to argue that his position is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of logic. In Descartes’ view. the problem in question is that syllogistic deductions from universal propositions to their particular instances is circular and hence useless as a means for discovery (...) of truth. Descartes’ solution to the problem is to claim that noncircular, useful deduction from the universal to the particular must first be based on deduction from particular truths to particular truths. I examine previous interpretations of Cartesian deduction given by E.M. Curley, Bernard Williams, and Andre Gombay. None of these interpretations fit with all of Descartes’ criticisms of syllogistic deduction and his characterization of useful and legitimate deduction (such as the cogito). I argue that the key to a correct interpretation is Descartes’ claim that implicit knowledge of universal propositions plays a crucial role in useful and legitimate deduction, and I explain how we may cash in his talk of implicit knowledge through Ryle’s notion of knowing how. Having set out a fuller explication of Descartes’ theory of deduction, I argue that it is consistent with the way people actually reason, that it helps us with problems in the philosophy of logic that have been raised by John Stuart Mill, Hilary Putnam, and Michael Dummett. (shrink)

Hans Herzberger as a philosopher and logician has shown deep interest both in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and in the topic of the inexpressible and the ineffable. In the fall of 1982, he taught at the University of Toronto, together with André Gombay, a course on Frege's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and foundations of arithmetic. Again, in the fall of 1986, he taught a seminar on the philosophy of language that dealt with 'the limits of discursive symbolism in (...) several domains of human experience.' The course description continues by saying: 'Special attention will be given to the paradoxes underlying various doctrines of the inexpressible and the tensions inherent in those paradoxes. Some doctrines of .. (shrink)

A stranger runs out of a bank while I am sitting at the wheel of my car waiting for the lights to change; he jumps in beside me, points a gun at me, and says, “Drive me to St. Bruno.” This is Andre Gombay's example, from his excellent paper on duress. The question that interests Gombay and me is: Could I refrain from doing what the gunman asks?

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. (...) His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)