In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:And Thy Neighbor as Thyself:The Elastic Self in the Moral Psychology of John Duns ScotusJoseph Dowd (bio)1. IntroductionAccording to Anselm of Canterbury, God gave human beings two affectiones: the affectio commodi and the affectio iustitiae. For Anselm, these two affectiones are largely equivalent to egoistic motivation and non-egoistic (specifically, moral) motivation: the affectio commodi motivates one to seek one's own advantage (commodum), while the (...) affectio iustitiae motivates one to seek justice (iustitia) for its own sake. Two centuries after Anselm, John Duns Scotus appropriated the terms affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae but made some changes to Anselm's account of the affectiones. Anselm thinks that human beings lost the affectio iustitiae when Adam sinned1 and can regain it only through divine grace,2 but Scotus regards the affectio iustitiae as innate to human beings.3 Also, [End Page 53] Scotus integrates his account of the affectio commodi into the Aristotelian natural teleology commonly accepted at his time, associating the affectio commodi with one's inclination toward one's natural end.4Although Scotus modifies Anselm's account of the affectiones, many interpreters think that he preserves the affectio commodi's association with egoism and the affectio iustitiae's association with non-egoism. I call this interpretation of Scotus's two affectiones "the Standard Reading." On the Standard Reading, the affectio commodi is one's inclination to will things for one's own benefit.5 The Standard Reading's proponents disagree about what exactly the affectio iustitiae is. Some interpret the affectio iustitiae as one's inclination to will or love things because they are good in themselves.6 Others interpret it as one's inclination to love others for their own sake (as opposed to loving them as means to one's own benefit).7 Despite this disagreement, all versions of the Standard Reading agree that the affectio iustitiae enables one to aim at goals other than one's own good.8 [End Page 54]As I argue in this article, some of Scotus's remarks suggest another reading of the two affectiones, one that I call "the Alternative Reading." On this reading, the affectio iustitiae enables one to love both oneself and other beings, and the affectio commodi inclines one to desire things for the benefit of both oneself and other beings that one loves. To be precise, the affectio commodi is an inclination to will what the mind represents as appealing. This inclination, I argue, inclines one to desire what one regards as beneficial to the beings that one loves. Hints of this reading appear in the work of Cruz González-Ayesta,9 but, to my knowledge, no one has drawn special attention to the reading.As I show in this article, both the Standard Reading and the Alternative Reading have textual support, and I regard the support for each as conclusive.10 Therefore, I believe that Scotus accepts both readings. This does not make Scotus inconsistent; I end the article by offering an interpretation that makes both readings true simultaneously. My interpretation is as follows. The affectio commodi is egoistic in that it inclines one to desire what one perceives as beneficial to oneself. The affectio iustitiae is non-egotistic in that it enables one to love a being, whether oneself or something else, for its own sake, as a response to its own objective goodness. But, by loving the being, one comes to see the being's good as part of one's own. Thus, in inclining one to desire things for one's own benefit (as the Standard Reading claims), the affectio commodi inclines one to desire things for the benefit of the beings that one loves (as the Alternative Reading claims) because one perceives their good as part of one's own.To my knowledge, this interpretation of Scotus has not been proposed before. John Hare and Matthew D. Mendham have attributed to Aristotle the view that the self is "elastic": one's own good "stretches" to include the good of one's loved ones. However, they specifically deny that Scotus holds such a view and, in fact, use Aristotle's view as a foil for... (shrink)

As everyone who discusses Scotus's moral theory points out, Scotus recognized two fundamental inclinations in the will: the affectio commodi and the affectio iustitiae. Everyone agrees that these two affectiones play an important role in his moral theory, and there is virtual unanimity about what that role is. I contend that the standard view is misguided, and that it obscures the true character of Scotus's very un-medieval moral theory. I shall begin by laying out the context in (...) which Scotus develops his theory of the two affectiones. The standard interpretation, I shall then argue, fails to appreciate that context; moreover, it can actually be shown to be contrary to Scotus's explicit statements. I shall then argue for my own interpretation of the two affectiones, which assigns to morality a role altogether independent of human flourishing. (shrink)

Abstract Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi ? This identification has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will's dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical (...) case; Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi . Accordingly, it can be concluded that: ( i ) when considering the will in its real condition, both affections belong to the will's free appetite; ( ii ) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; ( iii ) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection. (shrink)

This article is part of a larger project defending a version of divine command theory in ethics. What I am interested in from Scotus is that he combines such a theory with a view that grounds ethics in nature, especially human nature. In order to understand this combination, we need to start with his view of the two affections. Scotus takes from Anselm the idea that humans have in their will two basic affections (or intellectual appetites), what he calls the (...) affection for advantage (affectio commodi) and the affection for justice (affectio justitiae). All acts of the will, on this view, stem from one affection or the other. Behind Anselm is Augustine's insistence, which Scotus alre refers to frequently, that God is to be enjoyed and not used (even though entering into God's love is our greatest happiness), and everything else is to be used and not enjoyed. (shrink)

Este escrito se inscribe dentro de la teoría extática del amor según Duns Escoto, la que está influenciada por la doctrina de San Anselmo respecto de las dos inclinaciones o afectos de la voluntad: la affectio commodi y la affectio iustitiae. El objetivo del mismo es mostrar cómo Juan Duns Escoto logra superar la aparente contradicción que cabe entre tender por naturaleza a Dios y elegir a Dios a partir de la reflexión sobre los dos afectos que (...) conforman la voluntad humana. (shrink)

Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi ? This identifica- tion has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical (...) case; Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi. Accordingly, it can be concluded that: (i ) when considering the will in its real condi- tion, both affections belong to the will’s free appetite; (ii) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; (iii ) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection. (shrink)

In the thought of Duns Scotus, the distinction of active potencies into will and nature takes on a fundamental systematic significance. It distinguishes free and self-determining causality from natural and necessary causality. The purpose of this article is to show to what extent this distinction underlies large parts of Duns Scotus’ moral psychology, ethics, metaphysics and Trinitarian theology.

L'article vise à placer les rapports entre affectio et affectus au centre de l ’unité architectonique de l'Éthique. La définition d’affectus permet de connaître la vraie nature de l'affection, montrant que ce concept ne peut pas signifier un état mais doit désigner une disposition, ou une variation de la puissance. Ainsi le couple affectio/affectus articule toutes les parties de l'Éthique, en régissant non seulement la construction du problème éthique, mais aussi sa solution chez Spinoza.

This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and for us the good life is a life (...) rich enough in knowledge. (shrink)

Pensar na graça de Deus e na liberdade do homem, ao mesmo tempo, tem sido sempre essencial, embora difícil para a reflexão cristã. Anselmo considerou com frequência essa dificuldade, que é semelhante à que nasce do uso da sola ragione numa postura de oração. Na sua obra De Concordia, terceira parte, cap. 11, o Doutor Magnígico constrói uma representação da vontade que assume as exigências máximas da reflexão cristã. Este capítulo distingue três aspectos na vontade: instumentum, aptitudo e usus; a (...) aptitudo é chamada de affectio. No seu De libero arbitrio, Anselmo distinguia, em vez, o instrumento e o uso, sem considerar a affectio. Com um atenção especial à fenomenologia contemporânea, o presente artigo destaca tanto por que o tema da afeição deve ser introduzido quanto o signifcado desta introdução tardia na obra de Anselmo. (shrink)

We provide tools for a concise axiomatization of a broad class of quantifiers in many-valued logic, so-called distribution quantifiers. Although sound and complete axiomatizations for such quantifiers exist, their size renders them virtually useless for practical purposes. We show that for quantifiers based on finite distributive lattices compact axiomatizations can be obtained schematically. This is achieved by providing a link between skolemized signed formulas and filters/ideals in Boolean set lattices. Then lattice theoretic tools such as Birkhoff's representation theorem for finite (...) distributive lattices are used to derive tableau-style axiomatizations of distribution quantifiers. (shrink)

The concept of hexis, in Latin habitus, is of great importance in Aristotle’s ethics. In this paper, I ask the question whether habitus has its place, and which one it is, when the will is said to be free. I examine the doctrines of three thinkers in whose thought the idea of the freedom of the will occupies a crucial place. Firstly, Augustine knows the moral sense of habitus, but does not use it to explain freedom; reading the Categories, he (...) understands that the term “habitus” refers to an accident, and uses this concept to explain modification. Secondly, describing the will, Anselm favours the word affectio, which designates a disposition which is not permanent; indeed, Anselm focuses on the dependence of the rational creature. Finally, Duns Scotus uses the Aristotelian concept of habitus, when he shows how the will, which is a rational power, determines itself freely. Thus, it can be said that Aristotle was a central and unavoidable source for the medieval developments of the concept of habitus and its use in relation with the doctrine of the will. (shrink)

Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger was a Florentine Renaissance humanist who died in 1438 at the age of thirty-three. He took part in one of the most interesting phases of Italian Renaissance humanism and achieved in his short lifetime a modest reputation as a first-rate Greek to Latin translator. Less well known is the fact that he wrote a fair amount of prose works. One of the most interesting of these is a treatise which he composed in the year of (...) his death, entitled De curie commodis, or, On the Benefits of the Curia, a portrait of the papal Curia which is written elegantly, learnedly, earnestly, and angrily. ;The goal of this study is to discuss this dialogue in its intellectual and social contexts; there are three chapters. The first is a general introduction to Lapo's life and work, to the dialogue itself, and to the historiography on the De curie commodis. The second chapter discusses the manner in which Lapo employs the virtues in a Stoicizing fashion as persuasive tools in the environment of Italian humanism. It is argued that his particular treatment of the virtues can serve as a key for interpreting the dialogue as a whole. The third chapter touches both on social historical issues in the De curie commodis and on Lapo's defense or curial wealth. ;There has been no adequate edition of the Latin text, based on a wide enough variety of extant manuscripts, nor has the De curie commodis ever been translated into English . Therefore, a thorough critical edition of the Latin text along with an annotated English translation follows the discussion. ;The treatise has been notoriously difficult to interpret and seems often to prevaricate. The interpretive conclusion of this study is that Lapo wrote as a well-informed but liminal figure in the socio-cultural environment of the papal Curia--as an outsider who desired to become a full-fledged insider. The De curie commodis is not the parting shot of a fed-up hanger-on; it is instead Lapo's last-ditch, highly critical but nonetheless sincere attempt to find a patron who would allow him to join a cultural ambient at which he marvelled but from which he felt himself unjustly excluded. (shrink)

This paper studies the concept of memory as understood in Spinoza’s body of work, focusing mainly on E 2P18. The main features of memory’s functioning are explained across three conceptual axes: affectio, vestigium and concatenation. These shape Spinoza’s own argumentation in the cited proposition and also recall Aristotle’s theory on memory’s function and functioning. The link between both theories helps transversely to elucidate Spinoza’s position regarding the problem of the identity of the individual.

Does organizational governance contribute to academic quality? Two top research universities are observed in-depth: Berkeley and the MIT. Three key factors are listed that help generate consistent and lasting high performance. Priority is allocated to self-evaluation and to the development of talent. Values and norms such as community membership, commitment to the affectio societatis, mutual respect and trust strongly regulate the behaviors of the faculty. Complex inner organizational processes are at work making integration and differentiation compatible. Each of these (...) factors contributes to produce top academic quality in a synergetic way. (shrink)

continent. 2.1 (2012): 2–5 To begin with, as we understand from a remote place like Seoul, there have been two different conceptions of materiality in the Western experimental ?lm history: materiality of cinema and of ?lm. The former has been represented by the practitioners of the so-called the “Expanded Cinema” and the latter by the tradition of the “Hand-made” ?lm. Whereas for the Expanded Cinema, the materiality or the “medium-speci?city” includes not only the ?lm material but also the entire condition (...) and environment in which the cinematic experience is situated (i.e.: screen, projector, audience and theatre); for the Hand-made ?lm, it is the whole ?lmic process prior to the screening in front of the audience (i.e.: hand-processing and optical-printing). The two practices share in the materialist turn that opens up the radical possibilities of aesthetic (and even political) interventions into a process previously considered seamless and transparent. What can be called to attention through the materialist turn includes the aesthetic-institutional process in the projection-spectator relation and the (non-) representational process in ?lm-making. Moreover, these interventions bring their own temporalities back to those processes, and this returning emancipates the temporalities from their subordination to the cinema-as-commodity. Hangjun Lee is a ?lm-based artist whose practice is concerned with Hand-made Film and Experimental Cinema. Given these interests, Lee questions the linkage between materiality and temporality. This was his preoccupation around 2006, the time at which he started to collaborate with Chulki Hong, the noise improviser. The improvisational nature of their audio-visual performances opened means of detouring from the conventional editing techniques. Their collaboration also afforded critical investigations into the performativity of the practices in both the darkroom and the screening room, as well as in the private recording/practicing studio, and public performance spaces for the improvising musician. In fact, it was a kind of common interest shared by both us from the outset. In our collaboration, we avoid sacri?cing/concealing/minimizing one form of performativity (the performative nature and temporality of compositional process) for the sake of the other (i.e. those in improvisational and executional process). In the ?eld of experimental music and sound, this kind of approach has been comprehensively called “cracking” or “hacking”. The concepts are ?nely formulated in the coinage of “Cracked Everyday Electronics” (by Voice Crack) or more generally “Handmade Electronic Music” (by Nicolas Collins). 1 And this was a pure but perhaps necessary coincidence. the original title of the work of our collaboration and, retrospectively, of the set of our working principles at the same time, “The Cracked Share” was named by Lee after Georges Bataille’s masterwork, The Accursed Share , with the substitution of the adjective with “Cracked” as a synonym for ‘reticulated’ in the photographic image. We think the ascetic and subtractive aesthetic turn of the contemporary non-idiomatic improvised (and even somewhat non-improvised) music 2 pushed us further towards more radical dissociation with the empty temporality of commodi?ed audio-visual experience. It can be called the aesthetics of “without,” and exemplars include Yoshihide Otomo’s Turntable Without Records , Sachiko M’s Sampler without Samples . There are also other radical experiments even with the (non-)improvised music without noise and sounds that neatly meet the rules and idioms of the existing/established experimental music. For us, this thread among the experimental music currents weighs in its emphasis on subtractive and dissociational power unique to improvisational action. Surely, the tradition of the Cracked and Handmade improvised music teaches us the crucial lesson that “[m]edia and mediation are never transparent” and that “[m]ediation actively transforms data from one form to another and is never passive.” 3 We couldn’t agree to this statement more. However, without the removal and withdrawal power of improvisation that poses and keeps both subjects (performer and audience) and objects (projector and instrument) in “inferiority,” 4 generalized cracking and hacking practices—or simply “glitch”—in music and visuals would be either sublimated into the mystical and ritualistic forms of “Film Alchemy” and “Noise Music” (to which both of us still strongly feel a belonging but also, more or less, ambivalent sentiments), or else assimilated into the logic of the commodi?ed audio-visual communication. Today in music, this principle of improvisational performativity should be formulated as the dis-organization of sound against the associational de?nition of (electronic) music and it needs to be translated into audio-visual experiences. In other words, cracking practices of free improvisation need not be limited in artistic creativity, in a darkroom, in a studio, or on the stage; the principle of the dis-organization of sound should be the principle of dis-organization (or cracked organization) of audio-visual performance space itself. NOTES 1) Norbert Möslang, “How Does a Bicycle Light Sound?: Cracked Everyday Electronics,” Leonardo Music Journal 14 (2004): 83; Nicolas Collins, Handmade Electronic Music: The Art of Hardware Hacking (New York: Rutledge, 2006). 2) We refer this not to the historical style or genre but rather the idea and practice that ?free improvisation? stands for. On the distinction between idiomatic and non-idiomatic improvisation, see Derek Bailey, Improvisation: Its Nature and Practice in Music (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 1993). On radically politico-histrorical interpretations of free improvisation and noise music from various present viewpoints, see Noise and Capitalism , (eds.) Mattin & Anthony Iles (Arteleku Audiolab, 2009). 3) Caleb Kelly, Cracked Media: The Sound of Malfunction (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), p. 29. 4) I borrow the term from my long-time collaborator, Choi Joonyong. See Ryu Hankil, Hong Chulki & Choi Joonyong, Inferior Sounds (Balloon and Needle, CD, 2011). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hebdomads: Boethius Meets the Neopythagoreans1Sarah Pessin1the thesis of this article is three-fold. First, I suggest, uncontroversially, that Boethius was in many ways influenced by Neopythagorean ideas. Second, I recommend that in light of our appreciation of his Neopythagorean inclinations in at least some of his writings, we understand his esoteric reference to the “hebdomads”—at the outset of his treatise often called by that name—as a reference to something Neopythagorean. (...) This I suggest in light of the fact that, as I will discuss, the “hebdomad” plays an important role within the Neopythagorean literature of Nicomachus of Gerasa, an author with whose writings Boethius was intimately familiar. Lastly, I suggest—following Dillon’s analysis of the Triad and the Hebdomad within Nicomachus’ works—an interpretation of the ‘hebdomad’ within the Neopythagorean corpus which, if correct, would make appropriate Boethius’ reference to it at the outset of a treatise on the nature of God and creation.2In his introductory remarks to the Quomodo Substantiae,2 a short but difficult theological treatise on the nature of goodness and its relation to being (esse), Boethius gives his reader fair warning:... tu ne sis obscuritatibus brevitatis adversus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia turn id habent commodi, quod cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur. [End Page 29]... do not you take objection to obscurities consequent on brevity, which are the sure treasure-house of secret doctrine and have the advantage that they speak only with those who are worthy.3While itself somewhat obscure, this statement seems to suggest that a clear explication of the treatise would involve the clarification of certain notions which Boethius chooses not to clarify, and hence, the uninitiated reader will be met with obscurity.4 Consider this suggested reading especially in light of what immediately follows: After listing nine brief axioms, we are told that: “These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to each point.”5 What is most important to note in support of the claim that Boethius is intentionally obscuring the content of the work which follows, is that he never refers to these obscure axioms again—not in way of explaining them, or even in way of helping the reader use them to elucidate the subject matter which follows, (which is apparently what they are capable of doing). Furthermore, this lack of explanation and expansion on his part appears—as evidenced in the above quote—to be in line with his intended purposes in this treatise. It seems that the “intelligent interpreter” to whom he refers is the reader who is knowledge-able of certain ideas which Boethius prefers not to elaborate upon in this treatise, and who should at least in theory therefore be able to arrive at a full understanding of the arguments which follow.6The veil of obscurity which we seem to meet in the terse nature of the content of the treatise itself, then, also seems apparent in Boethius’ esoteric reference to the “hebdomads” at the outset of the treatise:You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure question in my Hebdomads concerning the manner in which substances are good in virtue of existence without being substantial goods. You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all... But I think over my Hebdomads with myself, and I keep my speculations in my own memory rather than share them with any of those pert and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it [End Page 30] is made amusing.7 Wherefore do not you take objection to obscurities stemming from brevity... 8Boethius’ reference to his “hebdomads” here is perplexing.Looking to the Greek word for ‘seven,’ (‘hepta’), it has been suggested that these ‘hebdomads,’ (lit., ‘groups of seven,’ or simply ‘sevens’), might simply refer to a weekly meeting group (i.e., a ‘seminar’), which Boethius attended, and which provided him the impetus to compose the treatise in question. Others suggest that this ‘group of sevens’ refers to the list of axioms which follows (which some... (shrink)

L’amour conjugal existe au Moyen Âge, la littérature en est un lieu d’expression privilégié. Visible également dans les sources épistolaires ou notariales, il est cependant plus difficile à aborder à travers les archives judiciaires, notamment les procès matrimoniaux ecclésiastiques. L’officialité de Saragosse au xve siècle est par excellence la cour où sont jugés les litiges conjugaux. Les procès consultés offrent un récit récurrent de la relation conflictuelle entre époux et laissent à penser que l’amour n’y a guère sa place. Ce (...) n’est pas totalement vrai. Les affaires d’adultère, les unions clandestines, les demandes de solennisation de mariage ne sont pas toutes déposées ou dénoncées au seul motif de haine et de discorde. Les sentiments sont parfois bien présents, sous-jacents, et attendent seulement d’être lus à travers des actes, des mots précis (amor, affectio, cavalgar, enamorar) ou même des silences. (shrink)

This slender volume is the twentieth member of a series entitled “Toward Ecological Civilization,” organized under the leadership of distinguished process philosopher and process theologian John B. Cobb, Jr. It grew directly from the 10th Whitehead International Conference, held in Claremont, California, in June 2015, and more particularly from a single conference track (out of the more than 80 making up the program) devoted specifically to various kinds of “extraordinary experiences” (especially, parapsychological and transpersonal experiences) that directly challenge the materialist/physicalist (...) worldview which arose in the 17th century and still dominates the contemporary scientific, educational, and cultural mainstream. The central premises of the series as a whole, the 2015 conference, and the present volume are that postmodern civilization faces life-threatening crises rooted in that impoverished physicalist worldview, that we desperately need a more commodious, life-affirming, and ecologically sound alternative to it, and that Whitehead’s metaphysical vision can help take us in the needed direction. Like Stanley Krippner in the book’s brief Foreword, I am strongly sympathetic to these views. (shrink)

Angelology gives Duns Scotus the occasion to test his action theory or to expand on it to accommodate the special case of angelic sin: freedom and determinism; synchronic continency; the will as a “comparative power” (assuming quasi-cognitive functions); the distinction between the two affections of the will (commodi and iustitiae).