Astavakragita (The Song of the Self Supreme) contains the Sanskrit text of Astavakragita (both in Nagari and Roman script), its English translation, Exegesis and Glossarial Index. It presents in twenty chapters the substance of Astavakra`s teaching in respect of the Cosmic Self in the form of his dialogue with Janaka, the seer-king of Videha. The teaching is based on the Upanisadic creed of Absolute monism (Advaitavada) that identifies the Self with the non-dual Ultimate Reality. But the contribution of Astavakra is (...) also immense, for he has introduced the element of emotional experience or the mystical feeling as the means for realizing the non-dual nature of the Self. Written in a lucid style and dealing systematically with the subject matter, the book will hold a unique position among the contemplative classics of the world. (shrink)

In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience because of lack of persons, I (...) shall focus on problems that arise because of its allegiance to momentariness and explore some responses on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers. I address two challenges to the Buddhist view in this paper. The first, which I will call the “Phenomenological Challenge”, primarily concerns the temporal properties of what is represented in conscious experience. The second, which I will call the “Metaphysical Challenge”, concerns the temporal properties of conscious representation itself. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to define the tendencies of elaboration of ethical problems in early medieval exegetical texts - treatises of post-canonical Abhidharma. Ethics as a specific philosophical discipline concerning morals was not specifically developed because of cosmological character of Buddhist philosophy. Explication of the ethical discourse presented in treatises of eminent early medieval Indian Buddhist exegetics Vasubandhu, Asaṅga and Yaśomitra showed that specific for ethics questions on the highest good, sense of human life, the nature and (...) sources of morals, freedom of will etc. were solved in post-canonical period. According to the religious doctrine they interpreted the highest good as the benefit of liberation from the fetches of suffering. The Buddha’s moral instructions known as prātimokṣa is aimed at the attainment of the highest good. Therefore the essence of morality has nothing to do with saṃsāra, and human society forming and perishing in cosmic cycles cannot be the source of moral norms. According to historiosophical myth, human beings get the first instructions on righteous behavior in deep antiquity from charismatic Universal ruler coming to the world as the forerunner of the Buddha. He explains ontological contrariness of the good and the evil but is not the Teacher of the truth. Freedom of will cannot manifest itself spontaneously in a human being attached affectively to saṃsāra. Such an individual falsely takes his ignorant self-will for the freedom of will. Hearing the sermons of salvific teaching is the condition for the rising of free will impulse. (shrink)

Drawing on decades of experience, a psychotherapist and Zen practitioner makes the Abhidharma--the original psychological system of Buddhism--accessible to a general audience for the first time. The Abhidharma, one of the three major text collections of the original Buddhist canon, explores the critical juncture of Buddhist thought and the therapeutic aspects of the religion and meditation. It frames the psychological system of Buddhism, explaining the workings of reality and the nature of the human mind. Composed of (...) detailed matrixes and lists that outline the interaction of consciousness and reality, The Abhidharma explores the essence of perception and experience, and the reasons and methods behind mindfulness and meditation. Because of its complexity, the Abhidharma has traditionally been reserved only for academic or monastic study; now, for the first time, clinical psychologist Beth Jacobs makes this dynamic, important text and its teachings available to general readers, using practical explanation, personal stories, and vivid examples to gently untangle the technical aspects of the Abhidharma. Jacobs’ work illuminates this classic of Buddhist thought, highlighting the ways it can broaden and deepen our experience of the human psyche and offering profound insights into spiritual practice. (shrink)

Review of Westerhoff, J.. The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In Text, History, and Philosophy. Abhidharma Across Buddhist Scholastic Traditions, the development of the Abhidharma genre in South and East Asia from the life time of the historical Buddha to the tenth century CE is discussed.

It has been argued that the use of the concept of ākāra—a mental “form,” “appearance” or “aspect”—in Buddhist epistemological analysis or pramāṇa exhibits continuities with earlier Buddhist thinking about mental processes, in particular in Abhidharma. A detailed inquiry into uses of the term ākāra in pertinent contexts in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya brings to light different semantic nuances and functions of this term. The characteristic use of ākāra in Buddhist epistemological discourse turns out to be continuous with only some of the (...) nuances it has in Abhidharma. Moreover, ākāra becomes associated with novel explanatory functions in Buddhist pramāṇa. These discoveries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the reuse of terms and concepts, ideas and arguments in Buddhist philosophy, and to the often subtle adaptations and transformations that formed an integral part of its history. (shrink)

"This is a translation of Frauwallner's Abhidharmastudien.

The doctrine of the “absence of the self” ( anātman ), which is the basis of the ontology of Buddhist schools of all possible orientations, in its application to practical activity implies the existence of such an organizing structure of cognition, which in its essence differs both from the orthodox systems of Indian thought ( āstika ) and from the correlationist ideas of modern transcendental epistemology. The research presents the abhidharma as a genre of Buddhist literature and a discipline (...) of Buddhist system of knowledge (Abhidharma) serves as a cognitive model producing such an image of the world from which the problem of “Self” ( ātman ) is eliminated. Such “elimination” does not mean the destruction of the “I” (ego, personality) at all, but proposes to consider it as an “assemblage”, a composition or autonomous wholeness composed of heterogeneous elements of different natures, each of which in turn is an “assemblage”, the relations between and within the individual “assemblages” being external relations. At the center of the research is the question: is it possible (or how is it possible) to have a strategy of cognition that would not assume as its basis the dichotomy “cognizing subject - cognizable world”, but would have as its goal the transcendence of phenomenal existence. It is argued that Abhidharma/abhidharma is a description of elements shaping the structure of which could be regarded just as such a cognitive strategy. The paper is based on the author’s experience of translating Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (4th century) and a large commentary on it, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, attributed to Sthiramāti (6th century). (shrink)

Exposition of Abhidharma, Buddhist philosophy.

This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.

Abhidharma Buddhist philosophy presents a version of what is now often called “panprotopsychism.” The most pressing group of problems for the Abhidharma panprotopsychism, like all other panpsychist views, is what Seager calls “the combination problem.” There are at least three versions of the problem: the subject-combination problem; the quality-combination problem; and the structure-combination problem. I begin with the Abhidharma Buddhist version of panprotopsychism and its account of conscious experience. The main focus of this paper is to show (...) that Abhidharma panprotopsychist account of conscious experience solves the quality-combination problem. In the last and closing Section, I look at other versions of the combination problem, primarily the subject-combination problem and the structural problem and provide a sketch of the Abhidharma Buddhist response to these. (shrink)

The distinction between "the two truths" was initially developed to resolve seeming contradictions in the Buddha's teachings.1 The Buddha teaches that persons should act compassionately, that persons will be reincarnated, and that persons do not exist. The first two lessons seem inconsistent with the third. Consistency could be restored by distinguishing kinds of truth: the first and second lessons are conventionally true, but it is conventionally but not ultimately true that persons exist.2In addition to this semantic distinction, there is an (...) ontological distinction between modes of being that also promises to restore consistency. As many note, "the two truths" is a distinction between entities at least as much as... (shrink)

Early Buddhist Metaphysics provides a philosophical account of the major doctrinal shift in the history of early Theravada tradition in India: the transition from the earliest stratum of Buddhist thought to the systematic and allegedly scholastic philosophy of the Pali Abhidhamma movement. Entwining comparative philosophy and Buddhology, the author probes the Abhidhamma's metaphysical transition in terms of the Aristotelian tradition and vis-à-vis modern philosophy, exploits Western philosophical literature from Plato to contemporary texts in the fields of philosophy of mind and (...) cultural criticism. (shrink)

Development of Buddhist thought in India; 1. The Buddha’s suffering; 2. Practice and theory of no-self; 3. Kleśas and compassion; 4. The second Buddha’s greater vehicle; 5. Karmic questions; 6. Irresponsible selves, responsible non-selves; 7. The third turning: Yogācāra; 8. The long sixth to seventh century: epistemology as ethics; I. Perception and conception: the changing face ofultimate reality; II. Evaluating reasons: Naiyāyikas and Diṅnāga. III. Madhyamaka response to Yogācāra IV. Percepts and concepts: Apoha 1 ; V. Efficacy: Apoha 2 ; (...) VI. The path of the Bodhisattva; Epilogue; Background information; Appendix 1: The languages of Buddhism; Appendix 2: Intellectual context; Appendix 3: The Abhidharma. (shrink)

Abstract:There is debate about the ontological status of conventional entities in Abhidharma thought. Buddhist texts often draw a distinction between two different kinds of entities, ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat), but are often unclear about what the distinction entails. The debate about whether past and future dharmas are ultimately real reveals that Sam.ghabhadra and Vasubandhu—two prominent Abhidharma philosophers—fundamentally disagree about whether reality consists in one or many modes of being. Saṃghabhadra's Sarvāstivāda position is best (...) understood as the ontologically pluralist view that a dharma can enjoy three distinct but equally fundamental temporal modes of being. Vasubandhu's position is that reality is univocal, that everything is real in the same sense. Because Saṃghabhadra is a pluralist and Vasubandhu is not, Saṃghabhadra affirms the reality of conventional entities whereas Vasubandhu does not. (shrink)

This is an endeavour by an international team of scholars to present the contents of Indian Philosophical texts to a wider public than has hitherto been possible. It will provide a definitive summary of current knowledge about each of the systems of classical Indian Philosophy. Each volume will consist of an extended analytical essay together with summaries of every extant work of the system.Volume I. Bibliography (2Pts.) (3rd rev. Ed.): This volume indicates the scope of the project and provides a (...) list of sources which will be surveyed in the subsequent volumes, as well as provides a guide to secondary literature for further study of Indian Philosophy. Volume II. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya Vaisesika up to Gangesa (Part One). The volume provides a detailed resume of current knowledge about the classical Indian Philosophical System of Nyaya-Vaisesika in its earlier stages.Volume III. Advaita Vedanta (Part One): This volume summarizes all that we know of early Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara`s pupils. Volume IV. Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy traces the history of the system from its beginnings in the third or fourth century B.C. up through the twentieth century. Volume V. The Philosophy of Grammarians: This Volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies is devoted to the Philosophy of the Grammarians.Volume VI. Indian Philosophical Analysis Nyaya-Vaisesika from Gangesa to Raghunatha Siromani: The present volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies takes up the history of Nyaya-Vaisesika where Volume Two left off, in the 14th century. Volume VII. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.: The present volume undertakes to summarize the gist of these philosophical teachings, termed Abhidharma, from the first texts that developed after the Buddha up to and including the mammoth text called Mahavibhasa, generated from a convention held in the first or second century A.D.Other Volumes in Preparation: Yoga Philosophy, Samkhya Philosophy, Grammarian Philosophy, Jaina Philosophy, Kashmir Saiva Philosophy, Dvaita Vedanta, Abhidharma Philosophy, Madhyamika Philosophy, Yogacara Philosophy, Buddhist Logicians. (shrink)

Originally published in 1962. This book discusses and interprets the main themes of Buddhist thought in India and is divided into three parts: Archaic Buddhism: Tacit assumptions, the problem of "original Buddhism", the three marks and the perverted views, the five cardinal virtues, the cultivation of the social emotions, Dharma and dharmas, Skandhas, sense-fields and elements. The Sthaviras: the eighteen schools, doctrinal disputes, the unconditioned and the process of salvation, some Abhidharma problems. The Mahayana: doctrines common to (...) all Mahayanists, the Madhyamikas, the Yogacarins, Buddhist logic, the Tantras. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers draw a distinction between two kinds of entities: ultimately real entities and conventionally real entities. Among Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers, who accept the fundamental existence of ultimately real entities, there is a debate over the existential status of conventionally real entities. The most prevalent interpretation of the general Abhidharma position is an anti-realist one: conventionally real entities do not exist. Here, however, I will argue that there is at least one Abhidharma philosopher who is not an (...) anti-realist about conventionally real entities. Saṅghabhadra, a fifth-century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher belonging to the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda tradition of Abhidharma Buddhism, offers an account of conventionally real entities that takes them to be real. According to him, conventional entities exist, although in a derivative and degenerate way—a way that is supervenient on and grounded in what is ultimately real. Saṅghabhadra’s view substantiates, in his specific case, Kris McDaniel’s argument that Abhidharma accounts of conventional reality are profitably interpreted as the view that conventional entities exist but enjoy a mode of being that is distinct from the fundamental mode of being enjoyed by ultimately real entities. In what follows, I will argue that the pluralist framework that McDaniel lays out for understanding the mode of being that non-fundamental entities enjoy fits well with and makes the most sense of, the account of conventional entities offered by Saṅghabhadra. (shrink)

A critical review of Mark Siderits's arguments in support of a compatibilist Buddhist theory of free will based on early Abhidharma reductionism and the two-truths distinction between conventional and ultimate truths or reality, which theory he terms 'paleo-compatibilism'. The Buddhist two-truths doctrine is basically analogous to Sellers' distinction between the manifest and scientific images, in which case the argument is that determinism is a claim about ultimate reality, whereas personhood and agency are about conventional reality, both discourse domains are (...) semantically insulated, and thus there cannot be any issue of the incompatibility. (shrink)

Fragmente des Dharmaskandha - Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit. Ed. Siglinde Dietz. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 3.Folge, 142. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1984. 104pp, 14 plates. DM 64.

The aim of this paper is to assess the relation between causation and the notion of emptiness described in Buddhist philosophy. While the Madhyamaka school argues that some entity’s being caused implies its being empty, some contemporary authors have argued that there is a ‘Humean’ regularity account of causation that can both be understood as a plausible model of the earlier Buddhist Abhidharma account of causation and also block the Madhyamaka inference from causation to emptiness. After describing the (...) class='Hi'>Abhidharma account of causation, the ‘Humean’ regularity account and the Madhyamaka argument from causation to emptiness, we assess some ways in which this argument may be developed, with particular focus on the ‘ladder of causation’ and on the Madhyamaka account of time. The debate about the relation between causation and emptiness, it appears, is a facet of a more comprehensive metaphysical debate between a (moderate) foundationalism and a thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism. (shrink)

In Tibetan monasteries depictions of eight Indian Buddhist philosophers collectively referred to as the “six ornaments and two supreme ones” are often found. These “six ornaments” are Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti. These paintings are usually grouped around a central representation of Buddha Śākyamuni. This iconographic set gives a straightforward way of dividing Indian Buddhist philosophical thought into four intellectual streams: Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and what is often referred to as the epistemological‐logical school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. (...) Each of these four schools constitutes a philosophical system of considerable complexity dealing with questions in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of logic and language, ethics, and so forth. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self ( anātman ) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of (...) mind and cognitive science. I argue that human beings, as dynamic systems, are characterized by a high degree of self-organizing autonomy. Therefore, human beings are not reducible to the more basic mental and physical events that constitute them. I critically examine Francisco Varela’s enactivist account of the self as virtual and his use of Buddhist ideas in support of this view. I argue, in contrast, that while the self is emergent and constructed, it is not merely virtual. Finally I sketch a Buddhist-enactivist account of the self. I argue for a non-reductionist view of the self as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process—what the Buddhists call ‘I’-making ( ahaṃkāra ). This emergent process of self-making is grounded in the fundamentally recursive processes that characterize lived experience: autopoiesis at the biological level, temporalization and self-reference at the level of conscious experience, and conceptual and narrative construction at the level of intersubjectivity. In Buddhist terms, I will develop an account of the self as dependently originated and empty, but nevertheless real. (shrink)

When one says, “I had a desire to have a glass of water and this was followed by my action to fetch the glass of water” then the common sense observation would assume that one’s mind caused this action. In this paper, I assume that there is a mind or there are ‘mental states’ which either belong to an enduring self or constitute a selfless stream of consciousness. I will provide the debate between Advaita Vedanta and Abhidharma Buddhism (...) to present this tension between enduring self and selfless stream of consciousness clearly. However, the aim of this paper is to look at how the mind is assumed to have causal powers. Is this assumption valid or not? Jaegwon Kim presents three problems that arise out of this assumption: “mental anomalism,” content externalism and causal exclusion. I shall look at these problems in detail in part I. In part II, I shall provide Buddhist arguments in favour of mind especially consciousness that can escape the reductionist arguments formulated by Kim by looking at the recent debates in contemporary physics especially quantum mechanics. (shrink)

While Derek Parfit is aware that his reductionism about persons is anticipated in early Buddhism and Abhidharma, he has not explored that tradition for any clues it might yield concerning the consequences of adopting the position. In this essay, the tradition is used to construct a taxonomy of possible views about persons, and then examine the meta-physical commitments that Buddhist reductionists claim are entailed by their view. While these turn out to be significant, it is argued here that (...) this is a price a reductionist should be prepared to pay. (shrink)

The suicide accounts of three bhikkhus in sutta literature probably inspired the formulation of a particular type of person who attains Arahantship at death, later designated as an ‘equal-headed’ person in the Abhidhamma. The Therav?da tends to depict those bhikkhus as non-Arahants before suicide. The Pali commentary explains that they did not attain Arahantship until their deaths and refers to two of them as each being an ‘equal-header’. By contrast, the Sarv?stiv?da s?tras and Abhidharma portray them as Arahants during (...) their lifetimes. The Sarv?stiv?dins deny the concept of samas?sin proposed by the Vibh?jyav?dins, which include the Therav?da and Dharmaguptaka schools. The Pali commentaries provide various explanations and classifications of samas?sin, which have one idea in common: the term signifies the concurrence of two events, and it denotes at least a person who only becomes an Arahant at death, and sometimes someone who becomes an Arahant at the same time as a certain kind of event occurs. The Pa?isambhid?magga, a quasi-Abhidhamma text, has a chapter that expounds ‘equal-head’ in an oblique way by enumerating various kinds of sama and of s?sa separately. The Pa?isambhid?magga commentary tries to make sense of the term samas?sa by associating this textual exposition of sama and s?sa with the more commonly found term samas?sin. (shrink)

This book offers a systematic and radical introduction to the Buddhist roots of Pātañjalayoga or the Yoga system of Patañjali. By examining each of 195 aphorisms of the Yogasūtra, along with discussions on the Yogabhāṣya, it shows that traditional and popular views on Pātañjalayoga obscure its true nature. The book argues that Patañjali's Yoga contains elements rooted in both orthodox as well as heterodox philosophical traditions, including Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist thought. With a fresh translation and a detailed commentary on (...) the Yogasūtra, the author unearths how several terms, concepts, and doctrines of Patañjali's Yoga can be traced to Buddhism, particularly the Abhidharma Buddhism of Vasubandhu and the early Yogācāra of Asaṅga. The work presents the Yogasūtra of Patañjali as a synthesis of two perspectives: the metaphysical perspective of Sāṅkhya and the empirical-psychological perspective of Buddhism. Based on a holistic understanding of Yoga, the study explores key themes of the text, such as meditative absorption, means, supernormal powers, isolation, Buddhist conceptions of meditation, the interplay between Sāṅkhya and Buddhist approaches to suffering and emancipation. It further highlights several new findings and clarifications on textual interpretation and discrepancies. An important intervention in Indian and Buddhist philosophy, this book opens a new way of looking at the Yoga of Patañjali in the light of Buddhism beyond standard approaches, and will greatly interest scholars and researchers of Buddhist studies, Yoga studies, Indian philosophy, philosophy in general, literature, religion and comparative studies, Indian and South Asian Studies, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

This book philosophically introduces the basic truths, doctrines, and principles of Buddhism. Its goal is to explain the teachings of the Buddha and of Buddhism clearly and consistently. Though the book treads beyond the Buddha’s life, including into the Abhidharma and Mahayana traditions, it remains throughout a philosophical discussion and elaboration of the Buddha’s thought. It is meant to be an accessible guide for those who have no background in Buddhism, and to be beneficial to the (...) philosophical understanding of those who do. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss (...) Vasubandhu’s theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work. (shrink)

One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help situate meditation practice in its (...) originating tradition, but it will also clarify a Buddhist perspective on consciousness. In this article, I present the Abhidharma account of mindfulness—as explicated in the Abhidharmakośa, the root text for the Abhidharma tradition—and the theoretical model of the mind that underlies its practice. Abhidharma–Yogācara model of the mind, I believe, contains critical philosophical insights relevant to contemporary concerns while at the same time placing mindfulness meditation in its proper philosophical context. (shrink)

While committed to the view that Buddhist Reductionism offers the best account of the Abhidharma distinction of the two truths, Siderits (2009) argues that Buddhist Reductionism has the surprising consequence of making itself inexpressible. This inexpressibility follows from the semantic insulation between conventional and ultimate discourses that Siderits argues is required in order to preserve classical logic for both types of discourse, avoiding contradiction and bivalence failure. I argue that inexpressibility is a problematic consequence that threatens to constitute a (...) reductio of Buddhist Reductionism. (shrink)

Self is central to our ordinary understanding of the mind and ourselves. The fifth-century Abhidharma Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu presents a radical no-self metaphysics in his Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya. Selfless Minds offers a new reading of this no-self view as defending not only eliminativism about self but also about persons, and illusionism about the sense of self and all kinds of self-representation. This radical no-self thesis presents several challenges for Abhidharma Buddhist philosophy of mind. Even if we then grant that there (...) is no self, we are left with deeper questions about the sense of self or self-representations implicated in our ordinary everyday experience and thought about the world and ourselves. This sense of self is involved in all kinds of experiential phenomena: episodic memories, unity of consciousness, sense of ownership, sense of agency, etc. And if we grant that there are no persons, questions remain about the status of our person-related concerns and interpersonal practices. Selfless Minds answers these questions on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist. The first part (Chapters 3–7) of the book defends the hypothesis that we can salvage much of our experience and thought without implicating self-representations. The second part (Chapters 8–9) of the book examines the normative implications of the revisionary no-person metaphysics. Some of these seem unpalatable, if not downright absurd. These revisionary implications for our normative commitments give us reason to re-evaluate both the Abhidharma metaphysics and our ordinary person-related practices and concerns in light of each other by using some sort of wide reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts of early Mah y na Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yog c ra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non-Mah y na schools such as the Therav da and the Sarv stiv da. This paper attempts to locate early Yog c ra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yog c ra concepts such as layavij na, vij apti-m trat and citta-m tra are discussed (...) insofar as they relate to pre-existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibh sika and Sautr ntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmakośa and the corresponding bh sya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yog c ra literature. (shrink)

Abstract This article seeks to determine if Buddhism can best be understood as primarily a functionalist tradition. In pursuing this, some analogies arise with various Western strands?particularly James? ?pragmatism?, Dewey's ?instrumentalism?, Braithwaite's ?empiricism?, Wittgenstein's ?language games?, and process thinkers like Hartshorne and Jacobson. Within the Buddhist setting, the traditional Therav?da framework of sila (ethics/precepts), sam?dhi (meditation) and pañña (wisdom) are examined, together with Therav?da rituals. Despite some ?correspondence? approaches with regard to truth claim statements, e.g. vipassan? ?insight? and (...) class='Hi'>Abhidharma analysis, a more profound functionalism seems present. This is even more clear with the Mah?y?na. Apart from the basic and explicit Mah?y?na underpinning of up?ya, the M?dhyamika, Tantras and Ch'an (Zen) schools are clearly functionalist. Moreover, despite initially seeming more ?absolutist? in their positions, other strands like the Pure Land and Nichiren faith traditions, and Dharmakirti's Vijñ?nav?da epistemology can also be tied into this functionalist setting. (shrink)

The first Chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā offers a critique of causation that includes the Abhidharmic category of the ‘four conditions’. Following the South-Asian commentarial tradition, this article discusses the precise relationship between Madhyamaka philosophy and its fundamental Abhidharmic background. What comes to light is a more precise assessment of Madhyamaka ideas about viable conventions, understood as the process of dependent arising. Since this is primarily in the sense of conceptual dependence, it involves sentiency as a necessary causal element, and the (...) relationship between sentiency and conceptuality is highlighted by Nāgārjuna and his commentators. Viable conventions exclude the possibility of a non-contingent core, and the systems and categories that revolve around such non-contingent element (ātman) are discarded by the Madhyamaka even at a conventional level. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy is an outstanding reference source to the principal philosophers in the diverse Buddhist traditions of India, from the early Pāli writings to the twentieth century. The Handbook provides thorough coverage of the most significant figures, texts and debates that animate Buddhist philosophy. A key feature is the attention given to the ideas and works of particular Buddhist thinkers, placing the author at the centre of inquiry. Forty chapters by an international team of contributors (...) are divided into eight clear sections, each of which includes an introduction by the editors: Buddhas as Philosophers Poet Philosophers Abhidharma Philosophers Philosophical Founders Early Period Philosophical Commentators (fifth - eighth century) Middle Period Philosophical Commentators (eighth - ninth century) Late Period Philosophical Commentators (tenth - twelfth century) Modern Philosophers. Essential reading for students and researchers in Eastern and comparative philosophy and especially Buddhist philosophy, The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy will also be of interest to those studying Buddhism in religious studies and related subjects. (shrink)

"This book offers a systematic and radical introduction to the Buddhist roots of Pātañjala-yoga, or the Yoga system of Patañjali. By examining each of 195 aphorisms (sūtras) of the Yogasūtra and discussing the Yogabhāṣya, it shows that traditional and popular views on Pātañjala-yoga obscure its true nature. The book argues that Patañjali's Yoga contains elements rooted in both orthodox and heterodox philosophical traditions, including Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist thought. With a fresh translation and a detailed commentary on the Yogasūtra, the (...) author unearths how several of the terms, concepts and doctrines in Patañjali's Yoga can be traced to Buddhism, particularly the Abhidharma Buddhism of Vasubandhu and the early Yogācāra of Asaṅga. The work presents the Yogasūtra of Patañjali as a synthesis of two perspectives: the metaphysical perspective of Sāṅkhya and the empirical-psychological perspective of Buddhism. Based on a holistic understanding of Yoga, the study explores key themes of the text, such as meditative absorption, means, supernormal powers, isolation, Buddhist conceptions of meditation and the interplay between Sāṅkhya and Buddhist approaches to suffering and emancipation. It further highlights several new findings and clarifications on textual interpretation and discrepancies. An important intervention in Indian and Buddhist philosophy, this book opens up a new way of looking at the Yoga of Patañjali in the light of Buddhism beyond standard approaches and will greatly interest scholars and researchers of Buddhist studies, Yoga studies, Indian philosophy, philosophy in general, literature, religion and comparative studies, Indian and South Asian Studies and the history of ideas."--. (shrink)

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu is known for his critical contribution to Buddhist Abhidharma thought, his turn to the Mahayana tradition, and his concise, influential Yogacara-Vijñanavada texts. _Paving the Great Way_ reveals another dimension of his legacy: his integration of several seemingly incompatible intellectual and scriptural traditions, with far-ranging consequences for the development of Buddhist epistemology and the theorization of tantra. Most scholars read Vasubandhu's texts in isolation and separate his intellectual development into distinct phases. Featuring close studies of (...) Vasubandhu's _Abhidharmakosabhasya_, _Vyakhyayukti_, _Vimsatika_, and _Trisvabhavanirdesa_, among other works, this book identifies recurrent treatments of causality and scriptural interpretation that unify distinct strands of thought under a single, coherent Buddhist philosophy. In Vasubandhu's hands, the Buddha's rejection of the self as a false construction provides a framework through which to clarify problematic philosophical issues, such as the nature of moral agency and subjectivity under a broadly causal worldview. Recognizing this continuity of purpose across Vasubandhu's diverse corpus recasts the interests of the philosopher and his truly innovative vision, which influenced Buddhist thought for a millennium and continues to resonate with today's philosophical issues. An appendix includes extensive English-language translations of the major texts discussed. (shrink)

The article analyses and interprets the critique of the special dharmic theory of the early Buddhist school of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. Special attention is paid to the critique of the theory of the existence of dharmas, elementary psycho-physical data, in all three time periods. At the beginning, a general Buddhist theory of two truths is presented, which tries to legitimize the so-called philosophy of abhidharma as a “higher teaching” regarding reality (dharma theory) which is only (...) rudimentarily present in the Buddha’s discourses. Then we turn to a concise presentation and analysis of the key ontological concepts of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika, and then to the critique of the same undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. It is concluded that sautrāntika, with its critique, “returned” Buddhist philosophy on the path of pure phenomenology after the sarvāstivada-vaibhāṣika’s attempt to interpret the Buddha’s teaching in line with a realistic reductive ontology. (shrink)

The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that (...) Buddhists are not just denying the diachronically unified, extended, narrative self but also minimal selfhood insofar as it associated with sense of ownership and sense of agency. The view is deeply counterintuitive and the Buddhists are acutely aware of this fact. Accordingly, the Abhidharma-Buddhist writings are replete with attempts to explain the phenomenology of experience in a no-self world. The second part of the paper reconstructs the Buddhist explanation using resources from contemporary discussions about the sense of agency. (shrink)