Of the four complete Āgama collections, the Ekottarika Āgama (EĀ) has generated the most controversy about whether it can be attributed to any early Buddhist school and, if so, which school it could belong to. This paper examines the various hypotheses about the sectarian affiliation(s) of the EĀ. It shows that a considerable part of this corpus is likely to be of Mahāsāṃghika derivation, and that the EĀ contains numerous salient features of Mahāsāṃghika doctrine, particularly the transcendence of Buddhas and (...) Bodhisattvas. This study also argues that the seeming affinity between several legends in the EĀ and those in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya is likely to have resulted from Mahāsāṃghika influence on the Mūlasarvāstivādins. The Mahāsāṃghika hypothesis for the school affiliation of the EĀ is substantially strengthened in this inquiry while the others are shown to be probably untenable. (shrink)

Seemingly contrary ideas of Nirvana are found in early Buddhist literature. Whereas some texts describe one who attains Nirvana as being conscious of everything, others depict Nirvana as a state in which consciousness has no object but emptiness or Nirvana. In this paper I deal with this paradox of Nirvana consciousness by exploring the correlations between several statements in early Buddhist texts. A number of sutta passages are cited to show that they contain doctrinal elements which, when considered collectively, may (...) cast valuable light on how to reconcile this paradox. Two pivotal notions are ‘non-abiding consciousness’ and ‘consciousness that is infinite, pervasive all around’. These two notions are connected to each other and seem to subsume or bridge the two strikingly distinct forms of Nirvana consciousness mentioned above. Nirvana consciousness said to be ‘non-abiding’, which is analogous to ‘without object’, does ‘not abide’ in any objects in the sense that it does not cling to them or rest on them. The ‘infinite, all-pervasive’ consciousness, based on stopping normal consciousness, does not depend on any sense objects, and hence it is unconditioned by them and operates unhindered. Nirvana consciousness thus constitutes the infinite realization free from all conditioning and hindrance. This resonates with the idea that one who attains Nirvana is conscious of everything. (shrink)

In both the A?guttara Nik?ya in Pali and the Ekottarika?gamain Chinese translation, the suttas are grouped into eleven nip?tas, from the Ekaka-nip?ta/Eka-nip?ta to the Ek?dasaka-nip?ta – though in the Ekottarika?gama the nip?tas are not labelled as such. This grouping into nip?tas is based on the number of doctrinal items dealt with in the component suttas. In the Ones and Twos, it is often the case that a single original sutta has been subdivided so that its component sections become a series (...) of similarly structured derivative suttas superficially appropriate for inclusion in the Ones or Twos. Moreover, material for this process of subdividing has sometimes been provided by multiplying doctrinal sets with formulaic statements. In most of the remaining nip?tas the phenomena noted in the Ones and Twos are also present, but on a much smaller scale. In view of their Chinese counterparts in the Sa?yukta?gama, some groups of suttas in the A?guttara Nik?ya with sa?yutta-like nature were probably moved from the Sa?yutta Nik?ya to the A?guttara Nik?ya within the Pali tradition. Evidence of a comparable movement into the Ekottarika?gama is also available. The artificial suttas created by subdivision and the original suttas shared by the Ekottarika?gama and the A?guttara Nik?ya largely retained their original places at the beginning of each nip?ta, while the genuine suttas, probably earlier located in the Sa?yukta?gama and Madhyama?gama, were added progressively at the end of the growing nip?ta. (shrink)

Abstract:The Buddha seems ambivalent in his position about whether all our feelings can be ascribed to karma, even if indirectly. He unequivocally states: "Karma distinguishes beings as inferior and superior," which covers various aspects of life that affect our feelings. On the other hand, again and again he criticizes some religions for holding the doctrine "whatever a person experiences is caused by karma," or puts aside karma in favor of obvious causation. This issue can be addressed in several ways: the (...) Buddha implies a distinction between past and present karma, and the unthinkable nature of karma entails the question "Who are qualified to pronounce karma?" Also, the Buddha is careful to avoid a fatalistic view of karma doctrine, his skill in means leads to the inconsistency of his mode of expression, and the two levels of truth allow him to speak in conformity with worldly conventions endorsed by "the wise.". (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

The suicide accounts of three bhikkhus in sutta literature probably inspired the formulation of a particular type of person who attains Arahantship at death, later designated as an ‘equal-headed’ person in the Abhidhamma. The Therav?da tends to depict those bhikkhus as non-Arahants before suicide. The Pali commentary explains that they did not attain Arahantship until their deaths and refers to two of them as each being an ‘equal-header’. By contrast, the Sarv?stiv?da s?tras and Abhidharma portray them as Arahants during their (...) lifetimes. The Sarv?stiv?dins deny the concept of samas?sin proposed by the Vibh?jyav?dins, which include the Therav?da and Dharmaguptaka schools. The Pali commentaries provide various explanations and classifications of samas?sin, which have one idea in common: the term signifies the concurrence of two events, and it denotes at least a person who only becomes an Arahant at death, and sometimes someone who becomes an Arahant at the same time as a certain kind of event occurs. The Pa?isambhid?magga, a quasi-Abhidhamma text, has a chapter that expounds ‘equal-head’ in an oblique way by enumerating various kinds of sama and of s?sa separately. The Pa?isambhid?magga commentary tries to make sense of the term samas?sa by associating this textual exposition of sama and s?sa with the more commonly found term samas?sin. (shrink)

An Early Chinese Commentary on the Ekottarika-āgama: The Fenbie gongde lun 分別功德論 and the History of the Translation of the Zengyi ahan jing 增一阿含經. By Antonello Palumbo. Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing Corp., 2013. Pp. xiv + 424. NT$460.

Scholars have pointed out that the arguments for not-self recurring in the Buddhist texts are meant to refute the “self” in the Upani?ads. The Buddha’s denial of the self, however, was not only pointed at Brahmanism, but also confronted various?rama?ic trends of thought against Brahmanism. This paper investigates the extant three versions of a Buddhist text which records a debate between the Buddha and Saccaka, an adherent of a certain?rama?ic sect, over the relationship of the self and the five aggregates. (...) There exist divergences among the three versions in regard to the account of this debate. The account in sutta 35 of the Majjhima Nik?ya is generally consistent with that in s?tra 110 of the Sa?yukta?gama in Chinese translation, whereas s?tra 10 of Chapter 37 of the Ekottarika?gama in Chinese translation tells a very different story. Judging from Saccaka’s title, Niga??haputta, and his background as given in the Pali commentary, he was an adherent of Jainism. This paper demonstrates that Saccaka’s view, which was refuted by the Buddha, as stated in the two similar versions has nothing to do with Jainism, but rather it is an “invention” created by distorting Brahmanical thought. This “invention” has led the Pali commentaries and contemporary scholars to interpret the ‘self’ denied by the Buddha as what comes under one’s mastery or control, and to understand the statement “Each of the five aggregates is not self” in the Buddhist texts as denying the idea that each of the five aggregates can be seen as what comes under control. This, however, misses the point. The mainstream thought in India at that time conceived the ‘self’ or the essence of the individual or of the universe as a ‘controller’, and it is this concept that the Buddha exerted all his energy to overturn. Therefore, the account in those two versions of the text apparently has some mistake. As to the Ekottarika?gama version of the text, Saccaka’s view as stated therein is very different from what is found in the above two versions. An examination of this version shows that the views rebutted by the Buddha are very similar to those of the?j?vikas. Since the Buddhist texts frequently confuse the?j?vikas with the Jains, it is very likely that Saccaka was actually an adherent of the?j?vika faith and that this discourse is meant to criticize the?j?vika doctrines. Since the Ekottarika?gama version seems to make better sense, this version may be fairly close to the original account, while the other two versions have considerably deviated from the original. By comparing these three versions of the text, I also attempt to explore some important issues regarding the sectarian development of Buddhism, and to shed some light on the unique values of the Chinese Ekottarika?gama, which is, in terms of sectarian affiliation, significantly distant from the Pali Majjhima Nik?ya and the Chinese Sa?yukta?gama that belong to two closely related schools. (shrink)