While there is much to be valued in William Abraham’s book, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, in this article I develop a couple lines of critique using Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology as a point of comparison. While Abraham clearly wants to avoid what he sees as methodological and theological mistakes in Plantinga’s project, I suggest that he both misconstrues Plantinga’s project and, in fact, falls prey to some of the same problems that purportedly plague Plantinga’s approach.

Divine revelation is a topical subject, given the many claims to revelation in the modern world. This article looks at recent discussion within the analytic tradition of philosophy which particularly relates to how to evaluate claims about divine revelation. The subjects covered are: defining divine revelation; direct cognition of God; evidence‐based approaches; divine testimony; conversion and faith; competing claims about divine revelation. Brief comments are then made on some related areas.

In this paper I argue that the propositional model of Divine revelation deserves renewed attention due to both criticisms stemming from misunderstanding and recent arguments in favor of the propositional model. I begin by clarifying what I mean by the propositional model of Divine revelation and by pointing out misunderstandings of the implications of this model. Subsequently, I offer a few arguments in favor of the propositional model of Divine revelation based on three assumptions that I take (...) to be basic elements of Christianity. Finally, I explain why I think the propositional model is doctrinally significant for the Christian Faith. (shrink)

Obstacles to Divine Revelation examines the notion that there are obstacles to God giving revelation, if God exists. Rolfe King argues that exploring these significantly refines ideas of evidence for God, including the claim that God must operate within a logically necessary structure of revelation. Examining obstacles to divine revelation clarifies this structure and paves the way to evaluating its significance.

Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism. Peter Masefield. George Allen & Uwin, London / The Sri Lanka Institute of Traditional Studies, Colombo 1986. xx, 187pp. £18.00.

Divine revelation as a subject matter cannot be properly considered in the framework of theology, as theology already presupposes revelation. In order to conceive revelation in a non-theological way, we need a philosophical approach. Thus we can recognize the need for a renewed understanding of revelation as God’s self-revelation. In this paper I argue for the understanding of God’s self-revelation as radical revelation, which is opposed to partial understandings ofrevelation, such as the propositional one. A given notion of (...) class='Hi'>divine revelation goes together with a given notion of human persons; and as soon as it becomes clear that divine revelation is properly understood as radical revelation, the need of a radical understanding of human persons can be recognized too. Human persons can be determined in terms of their ad se or ad aliud dimensions, but it is the former that leads to a proper understanding of human persons as being basically related to the radically self-revealing God. (shrink)

The present article analyzes and compares the idea of divine revelation to justify religious beliefs from the viewpoints of Paul Moser and Mulla Sadra. Moser suggests a kind of moral transformation experience that includes direct cognition and internal experience of self-revelation and God’s unselfish love while he considers mere theoretical reason to be inefficient and emphasizes God’s authority and His attributes and goals as well as the axis of divine revelation. Knowledge-by-presence and direct experience of God in Mulla (...) Sadra’s philosophy which is the only way to access true recognition of God is close to divine revelation. The present article shows that, considering the relationship between love and salvation, and knowledge-by-presence and the practical intellect, in Sadrian belief in God, Moser’s approach is close to Mulla Sadra’s even though the method of argumentation of these two philosophers in representing this type of cognition is not completely the same. Considering the commonalities and differences between Moser and Mulla Sadra in justifying belief in God, it seems possible to revise Moser’s approach with a Sadrian reading with a combination of innate nature arguments and self-knowledge. (shrink)

One of the most important questions about divine revelation is the question – what is the nature of divine revelation? This conceptual question even precedes such epistemological questions as whether we can know that a divine revelation occurred, or whether divine revelation can produce religious knowledge. In this paper, I argue for a particular analysis of the concept of divine revelation. Key to my proposal is that ‘to reveal’ is a term of epistemic appraisal: if (...) a subject revealed a proposition to a receiver, then this implies that the receiver actually accepted the information offered. I will end this paper by investigating what the consequences of my proposal are for answering the two epistemological questions. (shrink)

In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation,1 William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. While I believe there is much about Abraham’s work that is commendable, my remarks in this paper will be primarily critical. But the fact that Abraham’s work is worthy of critical comment should be evidence enough of the importance of Abraham’s book. My focus here will be on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I will (...) argue that Abraham’s remarks about epistemic fit and the epistemic standards we bring to bear in making evaluations of divine revelation claims commit him to a species of epistemic relativism. This may not be a problem. I am not interested in offering an argument against epistemic relativism.2 I suspect, however, that Abraham does not think of himself as an epistemic relativist.3 If this is the case, then I believe Abraham needs to rethink his metaepistemological commitments that imply epistemic relativism. (shrink)

Although the relationship between theology and philosophy is a perennial issue in the history of thought, recent debates surrounding the so‐called theological turn of continental phenomenology have created a new space in which it can be explored from a fresh perspective. In this vein, I propose three theses concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy of religion, with particular focus on the phenomenon of divine revelation. First, a philosophy of religion that ignores theology's claim about divine self‐revelation will (...) remain incomplete and unsatisfactory, at least from the perspective of a Christian theology which begins with the faith in God's self‐revelation in one particular human person. Second, a theology that does not acknowledge the possibility of philosophical reflections on the human aspect of divine revelation will not be able to escape blind dogmatism, but rather will isolate itself from the academic community. Third, and finally, despite the concerns of both parties, a dialogue between theology and philosophy centred on the phenomena of revelation can develop into mutually critical and mutually constructive interactions. (shrink)

For Christian education, this book provides a theological rationale for the use of methods of teaching and learning of educationally proven effectiveness.

I discuss Dante’s understanding that human existence is “ordered by two final goals” and how, for Dante, this understanding defines philosophy’s and revelation’s respective scopes of authority in guiding human conduct. Specifically, I show that, although Dante subordinates our earthly beatitude to spiritual beatitude in a way that seems to suggest the subordination of the authority of philosophy to that of revelation, he in fact limits philosophy’s scope to an arena in which its authority is not only legitimate but also (...) crucial to the cultivation of the higher, spiritual beatitude of human activity. (shrink)

This paper examines the issue of Islamic political philosophy in terms of prophecy, revelation and divine law. It is important to note that philosophy, and Islamic politics are in a good relation with religion. In the present study I have developed this connection through the philosophical theories of the medieval philosopher Al-Farabi. What are the differences and similarities between philosophy and divine law, or between a philosopher and prophet? What are Al-Farabi’s most important political theories and what are (...) the concepts of virtuous city and democratic city? What is the philosophy of the Quran? Our study seeks to answer all this questions. The divine law sets the beliefs and actions of the Islamic community, while the theoretical aspects which relate to it are entrusted to the philosophers. Theology is a discipline which protects divine law and establishes the truth of a special revelation, political theology being complementary to political philosophy. Theology tries to develop a rational and coherent understanding of the divine law, to find out what is the prophecy and to differentiate the true prophets from the false ones. (shrink)

An account of Socrates' encounter with divine revelation.

This article has two main parts. The first part argues in favor of a multiverse theodicy. God has created our particular universe because it contains unique goods. While God could have made our universe better, that would in fact have turned our universe into another universe, which God has also created. Our universe remains as it is to actualize its specific goals. The second part uses this basis to defend why God's revelation is so vague. It could have been clearer, (...) which again would have turned our universe into another universe, which also exists. Since our kind of independent universe with vague revelation actualizes unique goods, God has created our universe where the vague revelation serves specific purposes. (shrink)

Des choses divines et de leur revelation est le testament philosophique de son auteur, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. La premiere evaluation d'ensemble du postkantisme et des grands systemes idealistes qu'il y propose determine encore l'image que nous pouvons nous faire de la philosophie classique allemande. La querelle qu'elle a declenchee et la reponse outranciere que lui a apportee Schelling, blesse par la critique du naturalisme que developpe la deuxieme partie de l'ouvrage, en font le document le plus precieux dont nous disposions (...) pour interpreter les debats qui, durant les premieres decennies du XIXe siecle, ont mis aux prises la philosophie de la religion et la theologie speculative. La discussion des rapports du realisme et de l'idealisme religieux, de la revelation de la raison et de la doctrine positive que Jacobi developpe d'abord en reponse a Matthias Claudius, puis lors d'un dialogue avec Friedrich Schlegel, non seulement eclaire cette lecture de l'histoire de la philosophie a l'heure de l'avenement du nihilisme, mais permet aussi de comprendre ce que l'auteur entend par ce vrai rationalisme qu'il oppose aux philosophes de son temps. Elle donne ainsi a celui qui fut l'un des peres de l'idealisme allemand en meme temps que son critique le plus acerbe l'occasion de preciser une derniere fois les rapports de la raison et de l'entendement, question qu'avec Kant, il fut l'un des premiers a poser a la pensee moderne. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius II:On Divine RevelationSimon Francis Gaine, O.P.With chapter 2 of Dei Filius, the First Vatican Council's Constitution on the Catholic Faith moves on from the confession of faith in God, the Creator of all things, to the fact of God's revelation to us human creatures. The chapter covers first natural revelation through creation and the possibility of our natural knowledge of God, then why we also need (...) a further revelation which is supernatural, the presence of that supernatural revelation in Scripture and Tradition, and finally the canonicity, inspiration, and interpretation of the Bible.1The first sentence of the chapter declares that "holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason."2 This sentence, with its affirmation of the possibility of sure natural knowledge of God without the benefit of supernatural revelation, is perhaps the most well-known of the chapter, the most hotly debated at the council itself, and the most discussed in the secondary literature.3 Hardly any comment is [End Page 839] ever made, however, on how the second chapter begins with the statement that the Church "holds and teaches" what follows. This phrase tenet et docet contrasts neatly with how the first chapter began: "The Holy Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true and living God," and so on. While chapter 1's opening sentence spoke of the Church believing and confessing, chapter 2's opening sentence speaks instead of the Church holding and teaching, employing the verb teneo (hold) in contrast to credo (believe).4One can easily recognize a structural parallel between the two phrases: the inner act of holding in chapter 2 corresponds to the inner act of believing in chapter 1, and the external act of teaching in chapter 2 corresponds to the external act of confessing in chapter 1. I shall say something about the Church's holding and teaching, and its overall contrast as a unit with the earlier unit of believing and confessing, before going on to say something about the wider content of the chapter in that light. I do this partly because this symposium is about not only Vatican I's Constitution on the Catholic Faith, but also theology today. Catholic theology today is familiar with a precise distinction between "believing" and "holding," and while it is closely related to the distinction between believing and holding found in Dei Filius, I do not think the two distinctions are quite the same. So, in order to avoid confusion, I shall say something about the distinction familiar in theology in today, and then say something about the distinction at work in Vatican I. [End Page 840]The Profession of Faith in use in the Church since 1989, after quoting the Nicene Creed, continues as follows: "With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed."5 But to this primary profession of what is usually called theological or divine faith, since it is a response to God's revelation, there is then added the following: "I also firmly accept and hold each and every thing definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals."6 A third category, which pertains to non-definitive teaching and to which the appropriate response is "religious obedience of will and intellect," need not detain us here.7The Latin of "I accept and hold" is amplector et retineo, and in the 1989 Profession, it is said in definite contrast to faith and belief as an assent distinct from but related to that of divine faith itself. Though officially translated as "hold"—which might also have rendered teneo—retineo seems to connote guarding and preserving something, holding onto it, rather than merely holding it. The difficulty in interpreting such formulas (including terms such as "profess," "hold," and so on) is indicated by the fact that the previous Profession of... (shrink)

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. (...) In this paper, I offer a novel counterexample to ALVE. I offer a case where an individual forms a belief on the basis of divine revelation. Intuitively the person has knowledge, but ALVE predicts otherwise. The upshot is not only that we have a counter example to ALVE, but also, that ALVE may not serve the needs of an adequate religious epistemology. (shrink)

Divine revelation (waḥy), as a Qur'anic and religious concept in exegetical sources, isusually mentioned together with the institution of Prophethood (nubuwwa). Revelation came to itsend with the end of Prophethood. Therefore, although some have evaluated inspiration (ilhām) andtrue dream (ruʾyā sādiqa) within the this context of revelation, according to most of Islamic scholars,it is not permissible to refer to the recevings of the divinely saints as revelation. Revelation, for whichthe holy Qur'an designates three pattern of descension, is discussed also (...) in three categoriesthroughout the history of Islamic intellectual thought. Scholars of tafsir and theologians,philosophers, and mystics, all hold and bolster different views on the nature of revelation. Claims inSufi literature that inspiration can descend to divinely saints -beyond immediate delivery to theheart- through direct or indirect divine communication from behind a veil and through angles can beevaluated as an effort to create a conception of revelation that corresponds to the three modes ofrevelation, adressed in Qur’an, peculiar to prophets. With regard to the issue of continuity of divine revelation, a thorough examination of the Sufiliterature leads to the conclusion that revelation continues to decsend in its verbal form asinspiration but also, according to some Sufi authorities, in its noun forms unaniously considered aspeculiar to the prophets. Therefore, especially since the period of Sufism’s intermingling withphilosophy, the issues of accommdating sainthood (walāya) within the framework of generalprophethood (nubuwwa ʿāmme), the distinction between revelation and inspiration and itscontinuity appear as a very complex, unframed and unlimited field. This can be observed in theinstances addressed in this study. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the concepts ‘destination’, ‘revelation’, ‘foreknowledge’, ‘will’, ‘transmission’, ‘motion’, and ‘grace’, as they appear in Gregory Palamas’ treatise De opera-tionibus divinis. According to the Christian theologian, these terms correspond to specific ways of God’s manifestation, i.e. His natural and supernatural revelation. Since they illuminate God’s energies, but not His essence, they are participated by the beings of the natural world. The first two terms mainly refer to a general version of the revelation, while the third contains (...) epistemological elements as well and the fourth contains elements referring also to the divine will. The fifth term condenses the content of the afore-mentioned terms seen as an ad extra bestowment. By means of these concepts, Palamas preserves the ontological difference between the supernatural and the natural, while, at the same time, he defines the exact way of their communion, which excludes pantheism. He introduces into the divine realm the state of distinction, which, however, does not restrict its unity at all. He accepts the development of a metaphysical multitude, which is regulated by the divine uniqueness. What emerges is not a kind of Neoplatonic polytheism, but the infinite richness of the divine existence. Thus, Palamas steadily moves within the tradition founded by Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, and George Pachymeres, the main characteristic of which is ontological monism. This is a tradition which formulated common places as to the content, the concepts and the relevant methodology, while the distinction between negative and affirmative theology is dominant. (shrink)

The mystery of divine Fatherhood is first of all a mystery of eternal Fatherhood. As God, the Father is absolute being; as Father, he is relational being for he exists as Father only through his relationship to the Son and also in a relationship to the Holy Spirit. It is important to show how this relatedness combines with the absolute character of the divine being. It is even more important to show how the divine fatherhood is involved (...) in the mystery of the incarnation. The transcendent Fatherhood has become virginal Fatherhood and redemptive Fatherhood. The involvement of the Father in redemption raises many problems and has often been misunderstood. It can only be given its true meaning by showing in the drama of the passion the generosity of the Father who gives his Son and with him sacrifices his fatherly love for the salvation of humankind. (shrink)

One of the issues discussed about the subject of faith in divine scripture is the preservation of the revelation. For instance, is "the preservation of revelation" possible both in terms of the Qurʾān and previous texts of revelation? What are the reasons for its possibility or impossibility with reference to the historical and sociological reality? If protection is possible, is its source the divine authority or human elements? If the divine authority is dominant, did this authority only (...) manifest itself in the Qurʾān? Could the Qurʾān be different in this respect than the previous holy books? Likewise, the recognition that the Qurʾān has survived to the present day without any changes or distortion since its revelation leads to the question of why other books lacked this quality. The answers for this question are based on the argument that the Qurʾān, unlike other holy scripts, is "under divine protection"; therefore, it is not possible to change or distort it. Thus, the study first briefly discusses issue of whether the Torah, Psalms and the Gospel preserved their originality and then draws attention to the Qurʾān. Although the protection of the authenticity of the Qurʾān is beyond dispute, the nature of this preservation and what stages it covers are controversial. In this context, the interpretations commonly made regarding the commonly cited the verse of Surah al-Hijr (15/9) were examined, and this verse was majorly interpreted by the early commentators as the preservation of the Qurʾān which concerns the revelation process. In the tafsirs written in the first three Hijri centuries in particular, it makes sense that the issue of the preservation of the Qurʾān is addressed in relation to the process of its revelation and that the protection relates to a process in which Allah and the Prophet were involved. On the other hand, in the commentaries written in later times, it is clearly seen that the interpretations evolved into the idea that the Qurʾān is under the guarantee of divine protection forever. In the present study, which was carried out to reveal what could be the reasons for the change in the interpretations of the aforementioned verse in the commentaries, we discovered particular reasons. Therefore, one could say that there are sectarian motives underlying the different interpretations of the verse in question. (shrink)

the midrash, the advisability of staying at home during this festival is promoted through the dictum, “When you bind your lulav, bind your feet (restrain ...

In his recent book on revelation, Jorge Gracia rejects the authorial intention view of textual interpretation, arguing that the only interpretation that makes sense for texts regarded as divinely revealed is theological interpretation. Both his position and the authorial view face the problem of the Hermeneutical Circle. I contend that the arguments he provides in his own defense do not successfully avoid the circularity present in his own view. His thesis about expected behavior might provide resources for a solution, but (...) this thesis in turn can be used to respond to his own objections against the authorial intention view of interpreting divinely revealed texts. (shrink)

Revelation is a central category in many religions. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism or Unificationists are difficult if not impossible to imagine without it. For some, revelation signifies a decisive event in the past, for others it is a present reality. It plays a central role in shaping religious identities, and it is the reason for much criticism. Some follow a religion only because of its claim to divine revelation, whereas others criticize it as "hearsay upon hearsay" (Paine) on which (...) they would never rest their belief. Some religions have built elaborate institutions of priests and privileged interpreters to safeguard their revelation, control access to it and to protect the right way of interpreting and communicating it. But claims to revelation have also been criticized as strategies of self-immunization, which allow religions to avoid critical public debate of their views and teachings, or legitimize the position of those in power. The 33rd Conference of Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate University in 2012 addressed these complex issues by concentrating on three areas of debate: I. Revelation and Reason, II. Hermeneutics of Revelation, III. Phenomenology of Revelation. (shrink)