Zaller's Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion initially sets out an epistemic view of politics in which the ultimate determinants of political action are ideas about the society in which we act. These ideas are usually mediated to us by others, so Zaller begins the book by describing its topic as the influence of the media on public opinion, and he includes journalists among the “political elites” who exert this influence (along with politicians, public officials, and experts). But (...) the book eventually reduces journalists to being messengers of politicians' cues to the public. This understanding of the media is built into the book's model of opinion formation, in which cued predispositions are pivotal to the acceptance or rejection of culturally mediated “messages”—but are themselves insulated from cultural influence. A cueing model of message reception, however, ignores messages that are differentially persuasive not because of the predispositions they cue but the content they convey. Gauging the heterogeneous persuasiveness of messages requires qualitative content analysis and cultural contextualization, and if this research is to contribute to a general understanding of public opinion, it will have to extend beyond news-media messages to ideational influences carried in high culture, formal education, and the entertainment media. All of these sources of ideas, in turn, may contribute to the shaping of predispositions, as suggested in part by public opinion regarding the Vietnam War. Research of this kind would signal a new type of political science that focused on the actual thoughts of real people trying to understand a complex environment: exactly the type of political science suggested at the beginning of Zaller's book. (shrink)

Whatever the merits idealized liberal accounts of citizenship education may have in the seminar room, in this essay I argue that they are both unpersuasive and ineffectual. This is the case, because they are insufficiently attentive to the empirical realities, first (a) with respect to how real – versus imaginary – school systems function; and second, (b) with respect to the broader political context in which citizenship education policies are implemented. Because so much is already known about the former, (...) I devote more attention in this essay to the latter. (shrink)

This article devoted to study of the issues of formation and functioning of national political elites in the context of globalization processes. According to the author, processes of globalization, socio-political, public-legal, and financial-economic development in national societies and States led to the formation of the national political elites in a single global governing elite in the face of the global Manager class, which, in turn, forms the main approaches, requirements and principles that underlie the formation and (...) functioning of national political elites. However, all this leads to the fact that global and national management of the elite are unable on the one hand, to quickly solve global problems facing humanity, and on the other hand, to ensure the progressive development of humanity as a whole, resulting in the creation and development of a revolutionary situation in the national and international scale. The only alternative to the existing trends of the formation and development of national political elites in anti-state and anti-social manner, which inevitably can lead humankind to destruction or self-destruction, is the growing activity of civil society to the state of leveling of power and influence of the global ruling elite in the face of the global Manager class. In the present work, a number of scientific methods of research were used, in particular: comparison; hermeneutic analysis; socio-phenomenological approach. (shrink)

We investigated the relation between economic and social attitudes and the psychological underpinnings of these attitudes in candidates (N = 9515) in the Finnish 2017 municipal elections. In this politically elite sample, right-wing economic attitudes and social conservatism were positively correlated (r =.41), and this correlation was predominantly driven by those on the economic left being socially liberal, and vice versa. In terms of underlying psychological processes, consistent with dual process models of political ideology, the anti-egalitarian aspect of (...) social dominance orientation was more strongly associated with right-wing economic attitudes, and the conventionalism and aggression aspects of right-wing authoritarianism with social conservatism. Our results show that even in a non-US context in which the masses organize their political attitudes on two independent dimensions, these dimensions are moderately aligned among certain parts of the political elite, and that the political attitudes of the political elite can be traced to underlying psychological motivations. We argue that equality concerns could play a role in explaining why the left-right and liberal-conservative dimensions are more strongly aligned among those on the left and those more liberal. (shrink)

Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders. Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather (...) than showing macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt at examining the value configuration and the socio-demographical profiles of the local political elites in four countries of East-Central Europe: Romania, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland. The treatment is a comparative one, predominantly descriptive and exploratory, and employs, as a research method, the case-study, being a quite circumscribed endeavor. The cases focus on the members of the Municipal/Local Council in four towns similar in terms of demography and developmental strategies (i.e. small-to-medium sized (...) communities of around 35,000 inhabitants, with economies largely based on food industry and commercial activities): Tecuci (Galați county, Romania), Česká Lípa (Liberec region, Czech Republic), Targovishte (Targovishte province, Bulgaria), and Oleśnica (Lower Silesia province, Poland). Hypothesizing that the local elites of the former Sovietized Erurope tend to differ in outlook, priorities, and value attainment, as compared to their Western counterparts, the paper considers the former’s attitudes and perspectives in regard to seven values: a series of values customarily connected with the concept of ‘democracy’ (i.e. citizen participation, political conflict, gradual change, economic equality), state intervention in economy, decentralization and increased local autonomy, cultural-geographical self-identification. The study uses, as well, five models of value attainment in what concerns the ‘ideal portrait’ of the local councilor (Putnam 1976): ethical, pragmatic, technocratic, political, and gender. According to the results of a study applying a standard written questionnaire among the local councilors of the three communities in the period December 2010-February 2013, the paper distinguishes among three corresponding types of local elites: (1) ‘predominantly elitistic,’ (2) ‘democratic elitist,’ and (3) ‘predominantly democratic,’ following two types of explanation accounting for the differences among the four cases: the legacy of the defunct regime and the degree of administrative decentralization. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the collective portrait of the 40 women occupying the highest posts in the communist party and state apparatus in Poland during the Stalinist period. It focuses on the vast majority of people involved in the communist movement, while it also examines the cases of Socialists and women from the younger generation. The first part of the study presents the milieus they came from, their educational and professional careers and – above all – (...) the motivations and patterns of their political engagement. The second part engages with their position in the structures of power, as well as the circumstances of their political advances and declines. The key biographical category is that of “widowhood”, understood both literally – considering the percentage of women whose husbands were killed by Soviets or Germans – and symbolically – as a bitter disappointment with the Idea and its realization. (shrink)

One of the most interesting phenomena of our religious-political life is the considerable difference in attitude toward religion between the popular masses and the political elite. In our survey of public opinion, the respondents had to express their attitude to two alternative statements: "There are national, traditional religions in our country. They should have more rights than representatives of religions that are new to our country "; and "All religions should have absolutely equal rights." Only 9 percent (...) agreed with the first statement, while the vast majority agreed with the second. Even among the Orthodox, adherents of the Moscow patriarchy, only 13 percent were supporters of special patronage by the state for the traditional religions, while those who advocated an equality of religion made up 69 percent. Thus, the idea of a state church is alien to the contemporary popular consciousness. The evolution of mass consciousness is toward an even greater amorphousness and indefiniteness with regard to religion and further away from the idea of a national, state church. The data confirming this have already been presented. Let me just recall that the percentage of persons who approved of the church's participation in political life decreased from 74 percent to 48 percent from 1990 to 1991. (shrink)

Introduction. The author believes that the relationship between power and intellectuals can range from the active participation of the intelligentsia in politics to the disillusionment of the intellectual community in politics and in the ruling elites. The author analyzes the process in Georgian contexts. It is assumed that politics as a process has ceased to attract public interest, despite a dynamic political life. Purpose. The purpose of the article is to analyze the process of public disillusionment with politics in (...) the modern Georgian intellectual community. Methods. Methodologically, the article is based on the principles of analyzing intellectual communities with the elements of the universal method of historicism and a comparative approach, which make it possible to identify and systematize the main features of the process of depoliticization of Georgian society. Scientific novelty. The author presents a new interpretation of the role of intellectuals in the processes of social disappointment in politics, based on the analysis of original sources in the Georgian language. Results. It is presumed that 1) Georgian intellectual community in the second half of the 2000s began to lose active interest in its own participation in politics; 2) political parties are also forced to acknowledge the crisis of loyalty because the elites and society develop independently, and their interests coincide rarely; 3) culture became an alternative project that attracts civil society more than real politics; 4) the active political participation of the Church assists to the erosion of political culture, forcing intellectuals to become disillusioned with politics, perceived as a clannish and corrupt sphere of activity. Conclusions. It is shown that disillusionment with politics in the second half of the 2000s and the gradual migration of intellectuals to cultural practices replaced the politicization of intellectual communities, which determined the main vectors of Georgian development in the previous period. (shrink)

The paper aims to explore the relationships that exist between party structure, party system, patronage, and the appointments of the political elites. It is focused on the extent to which political parties can control the allocation of jobs as well as find out which are the institutions over whom the political parties can exercise power; the extent to which historical legacies influence patronage patterns; the extent to which party patronage is exercised in a ‘majoritarian’ as opposed to (...) a more ‘consensual’ manner across the spectrum of political parties; and the relationship that exist between the structure of the party, the appointment of political elites and patronage. The conclusion is that the party in public office and its allies in the coalition cabinet control the post of ministers and vice-ministers. While these last ones control the posts of their subordinates, it is hard to understand whether they select the employees from the party pool or from their personal networks. The other finding is that the structure of the party creates strong links between patronage and appointment, these last ones done with the scope of having control over government resources and distribution of resources. On the other hand, the research didn’t prove any link between historical legacies and patronage and party system and patronage. (shrink)

SUMMARYThis paper examines the formal filters of the public's political will defended by JS Mill as consistent with the best form of representative government. Holding that institutions must adjust to democratic society, and that democratic society must be improved to achieve wise rule, Mill rejects secret ballots and electoral pledges, and advocates a constitutional council and graduated enfranchisement. He also recommends but does not require the indirect election of the President and a unicameral legislature. Mill's historically sensitive approach puts (...) pressure on interpreters to be sensitive to their own political and social context when applying Mill's ideas. In particular, obviously undemocratic measures such as plural voting should be adjusted to reflect Mill's view that the ratio between legitimacy and competence is constantly changing. The continual readjustment between the powers of masses and elites is the way that Mill's Considerations on Representative Government manage to avoid the now-traditional charge of expertocracy. (shrink)

This article analyzes business power in the context of noisy politics by comparing business involvement in two British referendum campaigns: one about membership in the European Communities in 1975, and the Brexit referendum about European Union membership in 2016. By exploring these two contexts, the article seeks to identify the conditions under which business elites can and cannot be effective in a context of noisy politics. Three key factors are identified as determinants of business influence during periods of noisy politics: (...) the incentives to get directly involved in noisy politics; the legitimacy of business involvement; and, finally, the capacity to act in a cohesive way. The article shows that these factors have changed substantially over the last four decades because of wider changes in the nature of capitalism, and their impact on business power in the United Kingdom and more generally is discussed. (shrink)

Recent political developments leave liberal elites heartbroken. Why is it that the masses keep making poor, morally unacceptable, irrational choices? Among the many voices heard in this context, there are also those criticising those elites from the left. The elites, these voices imply, are guilty not just of past wrongs that have gotten us here, but also of patronising the masses right now, arrogantly failing to take seriously the masses and their concerns. I argue that such complaints – perhaps (...) appearances to the contrary notwithstanding – are every bit as patronising in their attitudes towards the masses they claim to respect, and proceed to discuss the question whether the elites should reason with the masses, or manage them. This practical discussion leads to more theoretical ones about justification and excuse in the public sphere, practical and epistemic reasons for belief, and ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy. (shrink)

During most of the twentieth century, it was possible to consider Switzerland a coordinated market economy, characterized by dense interfirm networks and the strong role of business associations. Thanks to their cohesion and collective organization, in a context of quiet politics and informal institutions, business elites could largely self-regulate major socioeconomic issues in the shadow of politics. However, since the end of the twentieth century, Swiss business elites have undergone profound changes not only in their composition, but also in their (...) coordinating capacity, their growing political divisions, and their connections to politics. This growing sociological and political fragmentation, combined with changes in the way of doing politics, through noisier and more formal politics, has weakened the instrumental power of Swiss business elites. To compensate for this loss of direct influence, business elites of the largest Swiss companies have developed new political strategies, relying on their growing structural power in a context of global and financial capitalism. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the micro-foundations of elite politics by focusing on changes in network structures that emerge from informal conversations. Empirically, we offer a novel “situational conflict” explanation to account for the puzzle of why reformist leaders were periodically ousted during China’s reform era (1977–1992), emphasizing the unexpected power collision that catalyzed the violent crackdown on the Tiananmen movement in 1989. To do so, we employ network analysis and narrative to utilize an original dataset of elite (...) conversations and primary sources that have only recently been made available. We find that ideological cleavage and manipulative brokerage produced each conflict to varying degrees but were contingent on the relational structure arising from elite conversational interactions. Furthermore, the actual unfolding of those conflicts often resulted from key actors’ discrepant understandings of the changing relationships via ongoing interactions at vital moments, such as during the Tiananmen movement. Integrating micro-sociological theories and network analysis, our work has methodological and theoretical implications for unpacking the black box of elite politics and its role in macro-historical change. (shrink)

Examining in detail the work of consecration carried out by elite education systems, Bourdieu analyzes the distinctive forms of power—political, intellectual, bureaucratic, and economic—by means of which contemporary societies are governed.

The financial crisis, and associated scandals, created a sense of a juridical deficit with regard to the financial sector. Forms of independent judgement within the sector appeared compromised, while judgement over the sector seemed unattainable. Elites, in the classical Millsian sense of those taking tacitly coordinated ‘big decisions’ over the rest of the public, seemed absent. This article argues that the eradication of jurisdictional elites is an effect of neoliberalism, as articulated most coherently by Hayek. It characterizes the neoliberal project (...) as an effort to elevate ‘unconscious’ processes over ‘conscious’ ones, which in practice means elevating cybernetic, non-human systems and processes over discursive spheres of politics and judgement. Yet such a system still produces its own types of elite power, which come to consist in acts of translation, rather than judgement. Firstly, there are ‘cyborg intermediaries’: elites which operate largely within the system of codes, data, screens and prices. Secondly, there are ‘diplomatic intermediaries’: elites who come to narrate and justify what markets are ‘saying’. The paper draws on Lazzarato’s work on signifying vs asignifying semiotics in order to articulate this, and concludes by considering the types of elite crisis which these forms of power tend to produce. (shrink)

Feminist scholars have long been concerned with privileged women’s activism and engagement with feminist politics and how acts of resistance from privileged subjects might best be understood. In the current moment, we are seeing a reinvigoration of interest in feminist activism particularly from young women, but not necessarily focusing on young women who are positioned as privileged. Simultaneously, there is attention in the sociology of elite schooling to the question of social justice politics in privileged spaces. In this article, (...) we contribute to both of these scholarly conversations by reporting on the feminist activism of three young women attending an elite school in Australia. We argue that these young women’s activism/feminist politics need to be understood as a complex entanglement of resistance and reproduction with regard to gender, race and class, and that drawing on recent theorisations influenced by post-humanism in feminist educational research produces fresh insights into researching gender/race/class reproduction by young women in elite educational settings. (shrink)

On the basis of his own previous research the author examines views of Europe held by the Serbian political and cultural elite in the late 20th and early 21st century. Unable to meet the challenges of the historical moment, this elite has brought Serbia into open conflict with its closest neighbors and exposed its citizens to international sanctions. War-mongering propaganda of the major state-controlled media was developing feelings of xenophobia and frustration among citizens. The collusion between authoritarian (...) government and war profiteers was systematically destroying the lives of Serbian citizens, bringing them to the brink of material impoverishment and spiritual misery. The process of dissolution of the common Yugoslav state is coming to its end in the first decade of this century. Just as it lacked wisdom political will or strength to prevent armed conflicts and crimes, the Serbian elite today is unable to condemn war crimes, to face disastrous consequences of its own policies, and to help Serbian citizens find their way to prosperity. (shrink)

Populist attributions of blame have important effects on citizens’ attitudes, cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Extending previous studies that have mostly looked at populist messages blaming political elites, we use an online survey experiment (N = 805) to investigate the effects of blaming different elitist actors in populist and non-populist ways: (1) political elites, (2) corporate elites, (3) scientific elites, and (4) a combination of these elites. We compare mere causal responsibility attribution to populist blame attributions that highlight a (...) central opposition between “pure ordinary people” and “corrupt elites” to tease out the specific effect of populist rhetoric. Results suggest that populist messages blaming all elites have stronger effects than isolated cues. Furthermore, populist blame attribution leads to more negative perceptions of the elites than non-populist blame attribution. The finding that populist frames can – under some conditions – activate negative perceptions toward different elites is alarming in times of declining trust in societal institutions, and calls for a more encompassing understanding of populists’ scapegoats. (shrink)

This article presents a longitudinal study during the Italian ‘short twentieth century’. Our focus is on the behaviour of the political field, the recruitment process of the ministerial elite and its impact on the stability of the political system. The main aim of the paper is to build a descriptive and explanatory model that sheds light on the fragility of the PS in Italy. There are two main findings: PF is formed through waves of new forces characterised (...) by impermeable bonds. The instability of the PS is largely due to a lack of inclusiveness in the PF. The National Solidarity governments showed that an inclusive PF which gathers loyal and disloyal forces even at a critical juncture phase is able to counterbalance the exogenous challenge. (shrink)

The “lost generation,” or the generation of the cultural revolution, is unique in world history: it is the result of the demiurgical will of one man, Mao Zedong, to create a whole generation “revolutionary successors” entirely devoted to the cause of socialism and to the realization of Maoist ideals. Even though Mao’s endeavor ended in complete failure, the mark it left on the young people who experienced it was deep enough to form a very specific and particularly self-conscious generation. Awareness (...) of being part of a certain generation is not limited this particular group and is more widespread in China than in most countries. Articles and books on generational phenomena are also particularly numerous in China, and the subject is frequently dealt with among observers and scholars outside the People’s Republic. But the criteria used to define different generations are not always clear and well founded. Moreover, the definition of the concept of generation itself is disputed and many social scientists, especially in the United States, reject its use outside the realm of kinship. We feel, therefore, obliged to clarify first what we mean by this concept and why it can be useful. This should help us answer our main questions: How do we define the “generation of the Cultural Revolution”? What is its role today’s Chinese politics and what could it be in the near future? (shrink)

In contemporary democracies, global capitalism exerts a significant influence over how state power is exercised, raising questions about where political power resides in global politics. This question is important, since our specific considerations about justifiability of political power, i.e. political legitimacy, depend on how we characterize political power at the global level. As a partial answer to this question, I argue that our notion of global political legitimacy should be reoriented to include the structural power (...) of the Transnational Capitalist Class as its subject matter. Structural power is a social relation in which the institutional context makes some agents comply with others’ preferences regardless of actors’ intentional efforts to bring about such outcomes. Even when global business elites do not intentionally exercise power to obtain political control of global governance, their structural power has recognizable effects that partly enforce the world order. To advance my claim, I utilize the radical realists’ argument that the notion of legitimacy is applicable to a broader range of social practices that are beyond dyadic power relations, i.e. rulers intentionally exercising power over subjects. (shrink)

This essay demonstrates that the management and contestability of power is central to Dewey's understanding of democracy and provides a middle ground between two opposite poles within democratic theory: Either the masses become the genuine danger to democratic governance (à la Lippmann) or elites are described as bent on controlling the masses (à la Wolin). Yet, the answer to managing the relationship between them and the demos is never forthcoming. I argue that Dewey's response to Lippmann for how we ought (...) to conceive of the relationship between citizens and elites if power is not to become arbitrary is located within a larger framework that avoids the problematic distinction Wolin draws between the demos and representative government. For Dewey, the legitimacy of decision-making, and, indeed, the security of freedom, is determined not merely by our actual involvement, but the extent to which non-participation does not preclude the future contestability of power. (shrink)

Istvan Bibó was the clandestine politological authority during the late Kadar period, and was rediscovered after the fall of communism. The essay examines and reconstructs the notions of elite and legitimation in Bibó''s political philosophy. As a young thinker he confronted the value crisis between the two world wars. He was influenced by Oswald Spengler''s and Ortega y Gasset''s theories of elites. The essay analyses the similarities and differences in their views. In Bibó''s conceptual world, the theory of (...) elites is connected with the issue of legitimation, because in his opinion the crisis of elites always results in a crisis of legitimation. Bibó''s analysis of elites, their social responsibilities as well as the types of legitimization are highly instructive for us since they help us rethink our conceptions of the social roles of elites and political legitimation under conditions of globalisation. (shrink)

Urban elites and their relative income levels are windows on the emerging socioeconomic order in China. We add to the research literature a new view that economic sectors are the institutional contexts in which different elites seek their material gains. Conducting a trend analysis with 1988 and 1995 national surveys of urban China, we found that political, administrative, and managerial elites maintained consistently higher levels of income relative to professional elites, but this applied mainly to a monopoly sector of (...) industries that were restricted to state operation. Managers in the open industry sector that allowed for free entry and exile experienced income declines relative to professionals within the sector, even though the former had moderately higher income levels than the latter in 1988 and 1995. All elite groups in the monopoly sector retained higher incomes than their counterparts in the open sector in 1995, but not necessarily in 1988. (shrink)

L’étude de 110 histoires de nominations individuelles dans l’administration publique au Gabon permet d’analyser l’importance des solidarités sociales situées en dehors d’une logique ethnique. Les relations individuelles qui prévalent au sein des réseaux des futures élites administratives montrent que la relation ethno-communautaire est latente dans le processus de sélection des élites de l’administration publique. Le lien ethnique devient actif dans le processus de nomination individuelle dès que s’ajoute un lien supplémentaire situé en dehors de l’affinité ethnique, comme les relations d’anciens (...) camarades de « fac », les relations avec les notables locaux et les liens engendrés par l’appartenance à des entités collectives. Cet article étudie la complexité des solidarités ethniques et les dynamiques relationnelles dans les nominations individuelles.A review of the process that led to the appointment of 110 Gabonese civil servants makes it possible to analyze the importance of social solidarity as well as ethnic solidarity factors. A close study of how future members of the elite connect within networks shows that ethnic relations act as a backdrop to the selection process of civil service elites. Ethnic relations are revived as soon as an additional factor is involved : old schools ties, relations with local prominent citizens, as well as connections resulting from memberships of political parties and freemasonry. The article assesses the complexity of ethnic logics and the relationship dynamics in the appointments reviewed. (shrink)

Issues concerning technological risk have increasingly become the subject of deliberative exercises involving participation of ordinary citizens. The most popular topic for deliberation has been genetically modified foods. Despite the varied circumstances of their establishment, deliberative “minipublics” almost always produce recommendations that reflect a worldview more “precautionary” than the “Promethean” outlook more common among governing elites. There are good structural reasons for this difference. Its existence raises the question of why elites sponsor mini-publics and if policy is little affected by (...) the results of deliberations, questions the possibility of deliberative legitimation of public policy. We make this argument by looking at mini-publics on GM foods in France, the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and Switzerland. Deliberative legitimation becomes plausible if elites can attenuate their Promethean outlook. This is possible if ecological modernization discourse pervades their politics; Denmark provides an illustration. (shrink)

In this article we examine elite formation in relation to money power within the city of London. Our primary aim is to consider the impact of the massive concentration of such power upon the city’s political life, municipal and shared resources and social equity. We argue that objectives of city success have come to be identified and aligned with the presence of wealth elites while wider goals, of access to essential resources for citizens, have withered. A diverse national (...) and global wealth-elite is drawn to a city with an almost unique cultural infrastructure, fiscal regime and ushering butler class of politicians. We consider how London is being made for money and the monied – in physical, political and cultural terms. We conclude that the conceptualization of elites as wealth and social power formations operating within urban spatial arenas is important for capturing the nature of new social divisions and changes. (shrink)

For fifty years, Bolivia’s political party system was a surprisingly robust component of an otherwise fragile democracy, withstanding coups, hyperinflation, guerrilla insurgencies, and economic chaos. Why did it suddenly collapse around 2002? This article offers a theoretical lens combining cleavage theory with Schattschneider’s concept of competitive dimensions for an empirical analysis of the structural and ideological characteristics of Bolivia’s party system from 1952 to 2010. Politics shifted from a conventional left-right axis of competition, unsuited to Bolivian society, to an (...) ethnic/rural–cosmopolitan/urban axis closely aligned with its major social cleavage. That shift fatally undermined elite parties and facilitated the rise of structurally and ideologically distinct organizations, as well as a new indigenous political class, that transformed the country’s politics. Decentralization and political liberalization were the triggers that politicized Bolivia’s latent cleavage, sparking revolution from below. The article suggests a folk theorem of identitarian cleavage and outlines a mechanism linking deep social cleavage to sudden political change. (shrink)