This paper is a reply to Jan Wolenski's polemics (Filozofia Nauki 1/2000) against the author's essay „On the Epistemic Impotence of Analytical Philosophy” (Filozofia Nauki 3-4/1998). The author expresses his conviction that it is in analytical philosophy that the most interesting - and at the same time well-established - cognitive results have been reached, but many of these results have been obtained, not thanks to the declared semantic method, but thanks to the phenomenological method, which have been used at least (...) unconsciously. Therefore the gap between phenomenology and analytical philosophy is not so huge as it might seem at first glance. (shrink)

Przyglądam się tej kognitywistycznej książce z kognitywistycznej perspektywy. Zastanawiam się nad recepcją wydanej przed pięciu laty pracy, jej aktualnością i wpływem na rozwój relacji między fenomenologią a kognitywistyką.

Within the content of the following paper I aim to reveal some epistemological benefits, related to Husserl's concept of an eidetic intuition. In order to do so, I refer to Kant's radical division of the subject's cognitive activity into two main epistemic faculties, namely intuition, which – according to Kant's statements – may be just empirical, and being strictly and only discursive intellect. Having presented it I further proceed to describe certain difficulties, being the result of the rejection of possibility (...) of an intuitive use of intellect, such as the objective validity of cognizing an apriorical forms, or the process of creating an empirical notions. Finally I refer to Husserl's acceptation of an eidetic intuition, being – according to my opinion – the only way of solving all the problems presented above. (shrink)

Explikácia patrí medzi kľúčové metódy analytickej filozofie. V tejto práci predstavujem návrh explicitného odlíšenia metódy explikácie od jej výsledku. V nadväznosti na prácu Rudolfa Carnapa sa snažím jeho explikačný projekt rozvinúť. Poukazujem na otvorené problémy Carnapovych kritérií adekvátnej explikácie; ukazujem, v čom sa explikácie od definícií líšia, aká je ich logická forma a ktoré explicitné kroky sú typické pre metódu explikácie. Napokon, približujem dôvody, pre ktoré je možné explikáciu chápať ako reláciu nahradenia medzi významovou charakterizáciou a definíciou určitého druhu.

Význam Thomase Kuhna z hlediska jeho vlivu na další vývoj představ o povaze vědy a konkrétně na vznik tzv. sociologie vědeckého poznání bývá dnes běžně spojován s jeho Strukturou vědeckých revolucí, zatímco jeho starším historickým pracím je v tomto ohledu jen zřídkakdy věnována pozornost. Příspěvek analyzuje právě tyto práce a pokouší se charakterizovat základní metodologické rysy Kuhnova přístupu k dějinám vědy, který je v nich uplatňován. Prostřednictvím jejich porovnání s metodologickými východisky rané sociologie vědeckého poznání se snaží zjistit, nakolik lze (...) již Kuhnovy historické práce považovat za významné ze sociologické perspektivy. Jelikož tyto práce pocházejí z doby, kdy byla historiografie vědy pod výrazným vlivem Alexandra Koyrého, příspěvek zkoumá také metodologická východiska jeho prací, aby bylo možno zjistit, do jaké míry se Kuhnův přístup vymykal standardní poválečné historiogra) i vědy navazující na Koyrého tradici. (shrink)

[The method of doubt in Descartes’ “First Meditation”: Comments on the interpretation of Josef Moural].

The paper depicts the evolution of the conception of the method of analytical description of Czeżowski, one of the most important figures of the Lvov-Warsaw School of Philosophy. It portrays Czeżowski as an author, whose voice on relation between theory and experience, as well as language and empirical reality, can be still considered important and significant. Generally speaking, Czeżowski distinguishes between two kinds of methods: the inductive ones and the no inductive, i.e. the method of analytic description. The results of (...) the former are the base of every further scientific activity, from the empirical sciences to philosophy. The method serves, first of all, to define abstract concepts and to precise scientific terms, what allow next to set and to express relations between them. Its application is an indispensable and essential part of process of building every abstract scientific theory. Despite some similarities between Czeżowski’s method and other methods of conceptual analysis, the former is not subjected to the paradox of analysis, according to the author of the paper. (shrink)

The method of dissoi logoi in Pre-Platonic testimonies The paper analyzes some references to the method of "dissoi logoi" (which is called by Plato "antilogic") in Pre-Platonic testimonies such as Aristophanes’ The Clouds, fragments of Euripides' Antiope and The Phoenicians, and the anonymous work called "Dialexeis" (Dissoi logoi). The analysis of these Pre-platonic sources results in the following conclusions: (1) The method of dissoi logoi was the universal strategy adopted by the sophists to argue on both sides - for and (...) against any thesis. (2) The Sophists are pointed out by all the testimonies as those who invented this method. (3) the same as it is in Plato's dialogues the criticism of the method in these Pre-platonic sources is based on the conviction that the method can be used immorally. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest porównanie wczesnopsychoanalitycznych koncepcji sztuki z metodą aktorską Konstantego Stanisławskiego oraz wykazanie analogii pomiędzy nimi. Na początku przedstawiono zarys głównych założeń metody aktorskiej rosyjskiego reżysera, następnie wskazano na podobieństwa zachodzące między nią a poszczególnymi elementami Freudowskiej i Jungowskiej koncepcji sztuki.

The paper deals with the L.J.Cohen's method of relevant variables, which is supposed to be a reconstruction of idealization in science. The author is going to show that Cohen's method is not a method of idealization, but a certain similar procedure. Nevertheless, the method of relevant variables can be paraphrased as the method of normalization and specification. This paraphrase allows the idealization approach to science better to handle the complexity of empirical research in science.