Markus Gabriel’s metaphysical nihilism—elaborated and defended most completely in his book Fields of Sense—contends that there is no legitimate ontological sense or reference attached to the words “the world.” In this paper, I present a detailed case for concluding that this project, at least in its current form, is unsuccessful. I argue, in particular, that Gabriel has at best shown that an absolutely unrestricted extensional domain cannot exist, but that his attempt to parlay this into a general rejection of metaphysics (...) is unsuccessful and indeed incoherent. Finally, I offer a speculative diagnosis of how Gabriel ended up in this predicament. (shrink)
This article examines the critique of materialism in the work of Noam Chomsky which treats the doctrine as lacking in any clear content. It is argued that Chomsky’s critique is a coherent one drawing on an understanding of the Newtonian revolution in science, on a modular conception of the mind, and on the related conception of epistemic boundedness. The article also seeks to demonstrate the limits of Chomsky’s position by drawing attention to his use of the third-person point of view (...) in considering the mental and his resulting failure to make good sense of consciousness. Finally, a dual-aspect theory is recommended which would incorporate Chomsky’s agnosticism about the nature of matter. (shrink)
It is traditionally assumed that there is only one theory of causality in Hume's writings. In this article it is shown that we can distinguish between an early and mature theory. It is argued that the mature theory, strongly influenced by Newton's physics, accords with the New Hume interpretation by asserting that real causal relations are not accessible to the human mind.
Tento článek se zastává skepticko-realistického tzv. novo- humovského, výkladu Humovy teorie kauzality navzdory kritice ze strany Zuzany Parusnikové. Autor však v souladu se svou vývojovou interpretací hájí tzv. „nového Huma" pouze pro pozdní tvorbu tohoto skot- ského filosofa.
This essay argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke’s conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley’s views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form ofinnatism to be found in Descartes’ later writings and in Leibniz. (...) Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying this―at least in the case of the concepts of self, causation, substance, and virtue―Berkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism. (shrink)
According to Markus Gabriel, the world does not exist. This view—baptised metametaphysical nihilism—is exposited at length in his recent book Fields of Sense, which updates his earlier project of transcendental ontology. In this paper, I question whether meta-metaphysical nihilism is internally coherent, specifically whether the proposition ‘the world does not exist’ is expressible without performative contradiction on that view. Call this the inexpressibility objection. This is not an original objection—indeed it is anticipated in Gabriel’s book. However, I believe that his (...) response to it is inadequate and that I have something illuminating to say about this state of affairs. My claim is that we can distinguish between two senses of ‘the world’, one of which is benign and acceptable, the other not. The acceptable sense of ‘the world’ suffices to answer the inexpressibility objection—at a certain theoretical cost, of course. To explain what this cost is, I turn briefly to an examination of Martin Hägglund’s radical atheism. (shrink)
In this paper I shall focus attention on a principle which lies at the heart of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is to be found explicitly or implicitly stated at many places in the Essay , but its clearest expression is at E.II.viii.11, where Locke writes that ' Impulse [is] the only way which we can conceive Bodies operate in'. Let us call it 'the impulse principle'. The first task is to describe what exactly the term impulse (...) means here and to what the principle amounts. Next, I shall consider the kind of role the principle plays in the Essay and whether Locke changed his mind about it in the fourth edition. Then, in the main part of the paper, I shall try to show how the impulse principle helps make possible Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In the course of my discussion I shall refer to some of Locke's pre- Essay writings: the Epitome, the Abr g , his review of Newton's Principia and Draft C.1 It is a subsidiary aim of the paper to show how these writings - particularly the Abr g which ran to over ninety pages of the Biblioth que universelle and was published in 1688 - can be of help in disentangling the main line of argument in Locke's Essay. (shrink)
It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be classed as a mental ability, not a belief-system. Common sense is to be distinguished from theoretical understanding which, in Berkeley’s view, is frequently corrupted either by learned prejudice, or by language that lacks meaning or camouflages contradiction. It is also to be distinguished from the deliverances of divine revelation, which—however enlightening Berkeley supposed them to (...) be—are not necessarily available to all people. This interpretation of common sense is supported both by attention to Berkeley’s own texts, including his sermons, letters and philosophical writings, and by attention to the views of John Locke and René Descartes, who also understand ‘common sense’ as susceptibility to the ‘natural light’. In addition, this interpretation renders Berkeley’s appeal to common sense in support of his immaterialism a straightforward appeal to the reader’s native reason. No longer, then, are we forced to see Berkeley as improbably maintaining that the denial of matter is really the view of ‘the common people’, but rather that those who have least attachment to theory and doctrine will be best able to grasp the case for immaterialism. (shrink)
This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is ‘nothing but’ an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is (...) not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping ‘relations of ideas’, is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of ‘abstract’ and general relations, is dependent on language – the use of ‘terms’ – and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume's overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the ‘exceptionalism’ of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking. (shrink)
An important task for every major philosopher is to offer us an understanding of the nature of mind. The essays in this volume discuss different aspects of the philosophical theories of mind put forward in the century and a half that followed Descartes' Meditations of 1641. These years, often referred to as the 'early-modern' period, are probably unparalleled for originality and diversity in conceiving the mind. The volume not only includes two essays on Descartes' own thinking, but there are also (...) examinations of what Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, the Cambridge Platonists, and others, have to say about the nature of mind. The aim of the volume is to represent some of the best contemporary research and reflection on mind in early-modern philosophy. The contributors, who teach at a range of universities in mainland Europe, Great Britain and North America, are Margaret Atherton, Miran BozoviÄ, Petr GlombìÄek, Boris Hennig, James Hill, Nicholas Jolley, Jan Palkoska, G. A. J. Rogers, and Anthony Savile. All the essays appear here for the first time. (shrink)
Rozhovor s profesorkou Athertonovou má docela široký záběr, ale soustřeďuje se hlavně na Berkeleyho teorii vidění a na jeho imaterialismus. Athertonová zastává poměrně silné pojetí imaterialismu, jež zdaleka překračuje pouhé popření látky. Dále nabízí svůj pohled na rozdíl mezi empirismem a racionalismem a na roli ženských filosofek jak na začátku novověku, tak později.
It is argued that we should distinguish between an ‘early Hume’ and a ‘mature Hume’ on causality. In his early period, represented by the Treatise, Hume had not yet adopted Newtonian active principles. In the mature period, however, represented in particular by the First Enquiry, his theory of causation has been transformed by a reception of Newton. This leads Hume to drop the condition of contiguity, which had excluded action-at-a-distance in the Treatise. It also leads him to allow real necessary (...) connexions in nature which are inaccessible to us just as the real cause of gravitation was thought by Newtonians to be unknown. (shrink)
What did Bernard Shaw really think about doctors? Although any reader with a sketchy understanding of Shaw's work is inclined to think that he condened the entire profession, a careful reading of his most well-known play featuring medical practitioners reveals a mixed attitude. InThe Doctor's Dilemma, one finds a position that may be representative of Shaw's attitude. In this play, he places the entire Edwardian medical establishment—consultants and general practitioners — on stage, and he focuses the attention of this diverse (...) group on the problem of a patient. In doing so, Shaw is able to separate the play's characters into representatives of (1) the newscientific medicine and (2) the venerableart of medicine. He satirizes the arrogance of the former, and he presents the humane attitude of the latter in a favorable light. (shrink)
The properties of secondary qualities have recently become an object of interest again in analytic philosophy; it is generally assumed that secondary qualities - in the mind at least - tend to be irreducible to the physical: taste, smell, color perception, the aural, & the tactile all seem to be more subjectively perceived than most other qualities. This is shown to present such topics as realism vs anti-realism, description, & truth-value with a series of problems, which are then discussed. The (...) standard literature (S. A. Kripke, D. M. Armstrong, & C. McGinn) is reviewed; it is concluded that, at least for color perception, a dispositional analysis is somewhat satisfactory; secondary qualities are ubiquitous. 7 References. A. Cohen-Siegel. (shrink)
It is argued that we should distinguish between an ‘early Hume’ and a ‘mature Hume’ on causality. In his early period, represented by the Treatise, Hume had not yet adopted Newtonian active principles. In the mature period, however, represented in particular by the First Enquiry, his theory of causation has been transformed by a reception of Newton. This leads Hume to drop the condition of contiguity, which had excluded action-at-a-distance in the Treatise. It also leads him to allow real necessary (...) connexions in nature which are inaccessible to us just as the real cause of gravitation was thought by Newtonians to be unknown. (shrink)
