Every year in this country, some 10,000 college and university courses are taught in applied ethics. And many professional organizations now have their own codes of ethics. Yet social science has had little impact upon applied ethics. This book promises to change that trend by illustrating how social science can make a contribution to applied ethics. The text reports psychological studies relevant to applied ethics for many professionals, including accountants, college students and teachers, counselors, dentists, doctors, journalists, nurses, school teachers, (...) athletes, and veterinarians. Each chapter begins with the research base of the cognitive-developmental approach--especially linked to Kohlberg and Rest's Defining Issues Test. Finally, the book summarizes recent research on the following issues: * moral judgment scores within and between professions, * pre- and post-test evaluations of ethics education programs, * moral judgment and moral behavior, * models of professional ethicseducation, and * models for developing new assessment tools. Researchers in different professional fields investigate different questions, develop different research strategies, and report different findings. Typically researchers of one professional field are not aware of research in other fields. An important aim of the present book is to bring this diverse research together so that cross-fertilization can occur and ideas from one field can transfer to another. (shrink)

Derrida est-il aujourd'hui un philosophe qui peut nous aider à penser ce qui nous arrive? Résolument oui. La pensée de Derrida est toujours d'une brûlante actualité à condition de savoir la lire. Cet essai l'explicite en interrogeant à travers "l'excès de vie", cet étrange concept de "spectre" qui fait de la philosophie derridienne une philosophie inouïe, pour ne pas dire une philosophie de l'inouï. Comment penser le spectre? Voici un concept peu philosophique qui travaille de manière absolument inédite toute la (...) philosophie derridienne. La philosophie de Derrida est un "corps spectral" dont cet essai reconstitue les articulations. En montrant que la déconstruction peut être pensée comme le résultat de la jonction improbable de l'intentionnalité husserlienne (ou du Présent-Vivant) et de la compulsion de répétition freudienne, il laisse ressurgir un survivant qui bien loin de porter la mort, excède la vie présente pour se projeter vers l'à venir. De manière tout à fait inattendue, une telle approche per- - met tout d'abord de comprendre comment la philosophie derridienne s'inscrit dans la tradition philosophique tout en la déconstruisant, pour l'ouvrir sur son dehors. Elle permet enfin, et surtout, de saisir la grande cohérence de la pensée de Derrida, qui a profondément renouvelé notre réflexion sur des sujets pour le coup très classiques en philosophie, comme la technique, la virtualité,-la politique et l'éthique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Mon article se propose d’examiner la manière dont Derrida couple l’intentionnalité de Husserl à la Nachträglichkeit de Freud, qui ne se pense pas indépendamment de la compulsion de répétition. En centrant mes analyses sur La voix et le phénomène et plus particulièrement sur son chapitre V, « Le signe et le clin d’œil », qui déconstruit la temporalité husserlienne du Présent-Vivant, j’essaie de montrer comment Derrida parvient enfin à faire de l’intentionnalité donatrice du sens et productrice d’une représentation idéale, une (...) compulsion de répétition aveugle et mécanique. (shrink)

Bernard Stiegler was the first distinguished critic to have recognized that Derrida’s deconstruction is, concurrently, a philosophy of techniques. Stiegler’s perceptive thesis is widely endorsed by Derrida's recent commentators. It is possible to locate in Derrida’s earliest writings a reflection on the genesis of the “technical supplement,” which allows us to situate Derridan philosophy in a specific tradition concerned with the philosophy of techniques. By thinking of Life—and not Man—as a producer of “technical objects,” Derrida joins a well-established philosophical lineage, (...) subsuming Bergson’s “vital impulse”’ the “general organology” of Canguilhem, Simondon and Stiegler; and Leroi-Gourhan’s “technical life.” In this article, I attend to the genesis of the technical object in Derrida’s philosophy, in order to show how and why it is possible to rethink it within the horizon of “vitalist” philosophies of techniques. (shrink)

After long neglect, in English-language scholarship at least, the question of how Julius Caesar wrote and disseminated hisGallic War—as a single work? in multi-year chunks? year by year?—was revived by T.P. Wiseman in 1998, who argued anew for serial composition. This paper endeavours to provide further evidence for that conclusion by examining how Caesar depicts the non-Roman peoples he fights. Caesar's ethnographic passages, and their authorship, have been a point of contention among German scholars for over a century, but reading (...) them and the rest of the text with eyes unclouded by the exhausted debate about possible interpolation reveals details that bear upon wider questions of composition. In these passages Caesar devised an ethnographic framework in order to rank against one another the levels of threat posed by different barbarian peoples, downplaying the relative ferocity of the Gauls in contrast to other groups in an effort to magnify the peril the others posed to Rome and the glory to be obtained from their defeat. This ethnographic framework is significant for understanding Caesar's method both because it provides insight into Caesar's reasons for including the ethnographic passages and because it implies that theGallic Warwas composed in, at a minimum, four stages: Books 1–2, where the framework is first developed and used, by 56b.c.; Books 3–4 and 5–6, where it is elaborated and extended, by 54 and 52b.c.respectively; and finally Book 7, after 52b.c., when Caesar, in recounting the campaign against Vercingetorix, was forced to abandon and contradict the ethnographic framework in a fashion that suggests that the earlier books were already in circulation, preventing him from adjusting them to the new circumstances of the campaign of that year. (shrink)

The archive produces a linear time that reaches towards ‘what could be’ by asserting ‘what has been’, providing us reassurance of our existence through the assertion of a reliably past past. But the Anthropocene is an era of uncontained material ramifications, where the past juts into the future and temporality warps as change accelerates unexpectedly. As an ecological and geologic epoch, documentation of the Anthropocene inherently has a relationship to natural history museums and archives. These institutions, however, troublingly rest (...) on what Elaine Graham calls ‘ontological hygiene’ – the separateness of the human subject from ‘nature’. The Anthropocene however, challenges the western post-Enlightenment binary of man vs. nature, as it (supposedly) naturalizes humans into an earth systems force. As such, documentation of this epoch might resist ontological sanitation. This article outlines an artistic research practice to create artefacts of the Anthropocene – one that invites material idiosyncrasies, objects-in-becoming, ephemerality, and decay. I suggest that artistic ‘anarchices’ prioritize process over objects, and resist linear and static representation in lieu of material, embodied and sensory artefacts. These include relational encounters with waste materials, reworked forms of ‘geology’, edible artefacts and multimedia works at landfills and feral sites. The anarchives are interpolated by a rejection of hegemonic logic, positivism and ‘objective’ truths about environmental phenomena; Situated, ambiguous and material knowledges are inwrought into the so-called Anthropocene (and any alternatives to this term). By focusing on waste as an analytical category, I explore some of the ontological breakdowns present in the Anthropocene and question how to unorder systems and disturb materiality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and the Problem of Universals JOHN F. BOLER ABAILARD t IS A CLEVERman, but in one respect he is just like the rest of us: Given one clear idea of which he is convinced, he tends to become intolerant, thinking the worst of everyone else. Abailard's clear idea goes something as follows. In what does universality consist? It consists, says Abailard, in the signifying of many things (...) by one sign? Abailard's predecessors had been searching for some thing which was universal. But a sign must signify many things to be universal; and furthermore, the sign itself, as a thing--a noise, gesture, or statue--is individual. ~ It may help to describe the model which crops up here and there in Abailard's examples and which, I think, dominates his analysis. Consider, then, a statue which is not meant to stand for any one particular individual: for example, the Minute Man at Concord, Massachusetts.* First of all, the statue is an individual thing. Second, just as a piece of metal, it need not stand for anything--anymore than a bird bath would, had the town council decided to build that instead. What is more, it is information from other sources which leads us to take the statue as "general" rather than as depicting some individual (like Nathan Hale). And even though the statue stands for "all" minute men, not only is the statue an individual thing but all those things for which it stands are (or were) individuals. And finally, we might also point out that the statue must be taken as signifying; it does not have "representative" qualities in quite the same way that it has properties like weight and shape. t The text of Abailard to which I have referred is: Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schrqte, herausgegeben yon Dr. Bernhard Geyer, I Die Logica "Ingredientibus,'" II Die Logica "'Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum" which is to be found in Beitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band XXI (1933). A partial translation of this text appears in R. McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers (New York: Scribners, 1929), II, 208-258. Hereafter I shall refer to the latin text as "G" followed by the page number and lines; and to the translation, where possible, as "'M" with the page number. 9Abailard feels that when Aristotle says that a universal is what is fitted for being predicated of many things, it is the signifying of many things which is at stake; and he chides Aristotle for seeming to ascribe universality to things as well as to words. G ~ (M 221). The reference to Aristotle is On Interpretation, 17a (38-40). *See note 7, below. 9I have interpolated on two passages: G 22t~-~ (M 241-242), and G 522*t-=. [37] 38 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The upshot of Abailard's insight is that universality pertains to the interpretation of signs: the effort to locate universal things is misguided. Some want to say that the universal is a collection; but do collections signify their members? ~ Some want to say that the universal is a substance of which individuals are accidents; but is a substance predicated of its accidents? e And some want to say that universals are words--that is noises; but noises are also individual things. ~ In short, to signify or to show ("monstrare") pertains to words; to be signified or shown pertains to things. 8 And to transfer the properties of one to the other leads to hopeless difficulties. ~ One can understand Abailard's exultation (and exaltation) at having shown both sides of a seething controversy to be equally misguided? ~ But what then remains as the problem of universals? It is this: one would expect that every sign would have some subject which it signifies; but universals seem to lack a proper subject. And does this not mean that universals are fictions (like goat-stag or chimera)? = Having thus set out rather baldly what I take to be Abailard's "clear idea," let me now try to show more fully how he goes about establishing the problem and providing for a solution. Abailard's position on universals is set forth in his two logic books, both of which begin... (shrink)

It neither is nor need be doubted that tutamen opis, preserved like many another true lection in the margin of G and R, is what Catullus wrote. The tutū opus which OGR present in their texts is a simple error arising from the abbreviation of tamen as S0009838800022916_inline1. But the verse still fails to satisfy and is universally esteemed corrupt. The description of Peleus as dear exceedingly to his yet unborn and unbegotten son is so absurd a form of address (...) that all editors now adopt from the interpolated MSS the conjecture ‘clarissime nato.’ This description is neither absurd nor untrue, but it is yet untimely, and sorts ill with the bridegroom's other titles. The ‘decus eximium,’ the ‘magnae uirtutes,’ the ‘tutela Emathiae,’ all are already his: the glory reflected from his heroic son belongs to the future and is part of that prophecy to which in the next two verses he is bidden to give ear. clarissime nupta would be appropriate, and would resemble 25 ‘eximie taedis felicibus aucte’ and Ouid. met. XI 217 sq. ‘coniuge Peleus | clarus erat diua’; but ‘most illustrious in thy son’ breaks away from the rest of this prelude and forestalls what is to come in 338 and the following verses. There is therefore an undercurrent of feeling that even now all is not well: ‘de coniectura ilia dubitari potest, cum propriae Pelei ipsius uirtutes hie praedicentur’ says Baehrens, and Schwabe even proposes so wretched an alternative as ‘carissime fato.’. (shrink)

This chapter examines global policing as it takes shape through the work of Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization. Global policing emerges in the legal, political and technological amalgam through which transnational police cooperation is carried out, and includes the police practices inflected and made possible by this phenomenon. Interpol’s role is predominantly in the circulation of information, through which it enters into relationships and provides services that affect aspects of governance, from the local to national, regional and global. The (...) chapter describes this assemblage as a noteworthy experiment in developing what McKeon called a frame for common action. Drawing on Interpol publications, news stories, interviews with staff, and fieldwork at the General Secretariat in Lyon, France, the history, institutional structure, and daily practices are described. Three cases are analyzed, concerning Red Notices, national sovereignty, and terrorism, in order to explore some of the problems arising in Interpol’s political and technical operating arrangements. In conclusion, international and global policing are compared schematically, together with Interpol’s attempts to give institutional and procedural direction to the still-evolving form of global policing. (shrink)

We discuss the interpolation property on some important families of non classical logics, such as intuitionistic, modal, fuzzy, and linear logics. A special paragraph is devoted to a generalization of the interpolation property, uniform interpolation.

In this article we show that bi-intuitionistic predicate logic lacks the Craig Interpolation Property. We proceed by adapting the counterexample given by Mints, Olkhovikov and Urquhart for intuitionistic predicate logic with constant domains [13]. More precisely, we show that there is a valid implication $\phi \rightarrow \psi $ with no interpolant. Importantly, this result does not contradict the unfortunately named ‘Craig interpolation’ theorem established by Rauszer in [24] since that article is about the property more correctly named ‘deductive interpolation’ (see (...) Galatos, Jipsen, Kowalski and Ono’s use of this term in [5]) for global consequence. Given that the deduction theorem fails for bi-intuitionistic logic with global consequence, the two formulations of the property are not equivalent. (shrink)

We analyse the structure of propositional proofs in the sequent calculus focusing on the well-known procedures of Interpolation and Cut Elimination. We are motivated in part by the desire to understand why a tautology might be ‘hard to prove’. Given a proof we associate to it a logical graph tracing the flow of formulas in it . We show some general facts about logical graphs such as acyclicity of cut-free proofs and acyclicity of contraction-free proofs , and we give a (...) proof of a strengthened version of the Craig Interpolation Theorem based on flows of formulas. We show that tautologies having minimal interpolants of non-linear size must have proofs with certain precise structural properties. We then show that given a proof Π and a cut-free form Π′ associated to it , certain subgraphs of Π′ which are logical graphs correspond to subgraphs of Π which are logical graphs for the same sequent. This locality property of cut elimination leads to new results on the complexity of interpolants, which cannot follow from the known constructions proving the Craig Interpolation Theorem. (shrink)

Preservation and interpolation results are obtained for L ∞ω and sublogics $\mathscr{L} \subseteq L_{\infty\omega}$ such that equivalence in L can be characterized by suitable back-and-forth conditions on sets of partial isomorphisms.

Interpolation has become one of the standard properties that logicians investigate when designing a logic. In this paper, we provide strong evidence that the presence of interpolants is not only cogent for scientific reasoning but has also important practical implications in computer science. We illustrate that interpolation in general, and uniform splitting interpolants, in particular, play an important role in applications where formality and modularity are invoked. In recognition of the fact that common logical formalisms often lack uniform interpolants, we (...) advocate the need for developing general methods to engineer a specification logic so that some critical uniform interpolants become available. (shrink)

A new technique is presented for proving that a consequence system enjoys Craig interpolation or Maehara interpolation based on the fact that these properties hold in another consequence system. This technique is based on the existence of a back and forth translation satisfying some properties between the consequence systems. Some examples of translations satisfying those properties are described. Namely a translation between the global/local consequence systems induced by fragments of linear logic, a Kolmogorov-Gentzen-Gödel style translation, and a new translation between (...) the global consequence systems induced by full Lambek calculus and linear logic, mixing features of a Kiriyama-Ono style translation with features of a Kolmogorov-Gentzen-Gödel style translation. These translations establish a strong relationship between the logics involved and are used to obtain new results about whether Craig interpolation and Maehara interpolation hold in that logics . (shrink)

We investigate uniform interpolants in propositional modal logics from the proof-theoretical point of view. Our approach is adopted from Pitts’ proof of uniform interpolationin intuitionistic propositional logic [15]. The method is based on a simulation of certain quantifiers ranging over propositional variables and uses a terminating sequent calculus for which structural rules are admissible.

Preservation and interpolation results are obtained for L ∞ω and sublogics $\mathscr{L} \subseteq L_{\infty\omega}$ such that equivalence in L can be characterized by suitable back-and-forth conditions on sets of partial isomorphisms.

We investigate interpolation properties of many-valued propositional logics related to continuous t-norms. In case of failure of interpolation, we characterize the minimal interpolating extensions of the languages. For finite-valued logics, we count the number of interpolating extensions by Fibonacci sequences.

Several extensions of the basic modal language are characterized in terms of interpolation. Our main results are of the following form: Language ℒ' is the least expressive extension of ℒ with interpolation. For instance, let ℳ be the extension of the basic modal language with a difference operator [7]. First-order logic is the least expressive extension of ℳ with interpolation. These characterizations are subsequently used to derive new results about hybrid logic, relation algebra and the guarded fragment.

Arrow and turnstile interpolations are investigated in UCL [introduced by Sernadas et al. ], a logic that is a complete extension of classical propositional logic for reasoning about connectives that only behave as expected with a given probability. Arrow interpolation is shown to hold in general and turnstile interpolation is established under some provisos.

Craig's interpolation lemma (if φ → ψ is valid, then φ → θ and θ → ψ are valid, for θ a formula constructed using only primitive symbols which occur both in φ and ψ) fails for many propositional and first order modal logics. The interpolation property is often regarded as a sign of well-matched syntax and semantics. Hybrid logicians claim that modal logic is missing important syntactic machinery, namely tools for referring to worlds, and that adding such machinery solves (...) many technical problems. The paper presents strong evidence for this claim by defining interpolation algorithms for both propositional and first order hybrid logic. These algorithms produce interpolants for the hybrid logic of every elementary class of frames satisfying the property that a frame is in the class if and only if all its point-generated subframes are in the class. In addition, on the class of all frames, the basic algorithm is conservative: on purely modal input it computes interpolants in which the hybrid syntactic machinery does not occur. (shrink)

We provide a direct method for proving Craig interpolation for a range of modal and intuitionistic logics, including those containing a "converse" modality. We demonstrate this method for classical tense logic, its extensions with path axioms, and for bi-intuitionistic logic. These logics do not have straightforward formalisations in the traditional Gentzen-style sequent calculus, but have all been shown to have cut-free nested sequent calculi. The proof of the interpolation theorem uses these calculi and is purely syntactic, without resorting to embeddings, (...) semantic arguments, or interpreted connectives external to the underlying logical language. A novel feature of our proof includes an orthogonality condition for defining duality between interpolants. (shrink)

The Interpolation Theorem, first formulated and proved by W. Craig fifty years ago for predicate logic, has been extended to many other logical frameworks and is being applied in several areas of computer science. We give a short overview, and focus on the theory of software systems and modules. An algebra of theories TA is presented, with a nonstandard interpretation of the existential quantifier . In TA, the interpolation property of the underlying logic corresponds with the quantifier combination property . (...) It is shown how the Modularization Theorem, the Factorization Lemma and the Normal Form Theorem for module expressions can be proved in TA. (shrink)

We show in this paper that all fragments of intuitionistic propostional logic based on a subset of the connectives $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \neg$ satisfy interpolation. Fragments containing $\leftrightarrow$ or $\neg\neg$ are briefly considered.

An interpolation theorem holds for many standard modal logics, but first order $S5$ is a prominent example of a logic for which it fails. In this paper it is shown that a first order $S5$ interpolation theorem can be proved provided the logic is extended to contain propositional quantifiers. A proper statement of the result involves some subtleties, but this is the essence of it.

A method is presented that connects the existence of uniform interpolants to the existence of certain sequent calculi. This method is applied to several modal logics and is shown to cover known results from the literature, such as the existence of uniform interpolants for the modal logic \. New is the result that \ has uniform interpolation. The results imply that for modal logics \ and \, which are known not to have uniform interpolation, certain sequent calculi cannot exist.

An interpolation Theorem is proved for first order logic with infinitary predicates. Our proof is algebraic via cylindric algebras.1.

Decision theory requires agents to assign probabilities to states of the world and utilities to the possible outcomes of different actions. When agents commit to having the probabilities and/or utilities in a decision problem defined by objective features of the world, they may find themselves unable to decide which actions maximize expected utility. Decision theory has long recognized that work-around strategies are available in special cases; this is where dominance reasoning, minimax, and maximin play a role. Here we describe a (...) different work around, wherein a rational decision about one decision problem can be reached by ‘interpolating’ information from another problem that the agent believes has already been rationally solved. (shrink)

We present tableau proof systems for the annotated version of propositional justification logics, that is, justification logics which are formulated using annotated application operators. We show that the tableau systems are sound and complete with respect to Mkrtychev models, and some tableau systems are analytic and provide a decision procedure for the annotated justification logics. We further show Craig’s interpolation property and Beth’s definability theorem for some annotated justification logics.

Given some links between Lyndon’s Interpolation Theorem, term distribution, and Sommers and Englebretsen’s logic, in this contribution we attempt to capture a sense of interpolation for Sommers and Englebretsen’s Term Functor Logic. In order to reach this goal we first expound the basics of Term Functor Logic, together with a sense of term distribution, and then we offer a proof of our main contribution.

We study interpolation for elementary fragments of classical linear logic. Unlike in intuitionistic logic (see [Renardel de Lavalette, 1989]) there are fragments in linear logic for which interpolation does not hold. We prove interpolation for a lot of fragments and refute it for the multiplicative fragment (→, +), using proof nets and quantum graphs. We give a separate proof for the fragment with implication and product, but without the structural rule of permutation. This is nearly the Lambek calculus. There is (...) an appendix explaining what quantum graphs are and how they relate to proof nets. (shrink)

A proof of the (propositional) Craig interpolation theorem for cut-free sequent calculus yields that a sequent with a cut-free proof (or with a proof with cut-formulas of restricted form; in particular, with only analytic cuts) with k inferences has an interpolant whose circuit-size is at most k. We give a new proof of the interpolation theorem based on a communication complexity approach which allows a similar estimate for a larger class of proofs. We derive from it several corollaries: (1) Feasible (...) interpolation theorems for the following proof systems: (a) resolution (b) a subsystem of LK corresponding to the bounded arithmetic theory S 2 2 (α) (c) linear equational calculus (d) cutting planes. (2) New proofs of the exponential lower bounds (for new formulas) (a) for resolution ([15]) (b) for the cutting planes proof system with coefficients written in unary ([4]). (3) An alternative proof of the independence result of [43] concerning the provability of circuit-size lower bounds in the bounded arithmetic theory S 2 2 (α). In the other direction we show that a depth 2 subsystem of LK does not admit feasible monotone interpolation theorem (the so called Lyndon theorem), and that a feasible monotone interpolation theorem for the depth 1 subsystem of LK would yield new exponential lower bounds for resolution proofs of the weak pigeonhole principle. (shrink)

In this paper by using a model-theoretic approach, we prove Craig interpolation property for Formal Propositional Logic, FPL, Basic propositional logic, BPL and the uniform left-interpolation property for FPL. We also show that there are countably infinite extensions of FPL with the uniform interpolation property.

We prove a generalization of Maehara’s lemma to show that the extensions of classical and intuitionistic first-order logic with a special type of geometric axioms, called singular geometric axioms, have Craig’s interpolation property. As a corollary, we obtain a direct proof of interpolation for (classical and intuitionistic) first-order logic with identity, as well as interpolation for several mathematical theories, including the theory of equivalence relations, (strict) partial and linear orders, and various intuitionistic order theories such as apartness and positive partial (...) and linear orders. (shrink)