In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve (...) mental agency at all. This personal-level difference in agency and purposiveness has, furthermore, the consequence that instances of mind-wandering do not constitute unified and self-contained segments of the stream of consciousness—in stark contrast to focused daydreams. Besides, the two kinds of mental phenomena differ in whether they possess a narrative structure, and in how we may make sense of the succession of mental episodes involved. (shrink)

Research on the specific features of daydreaming compared with mind-wandering and night dreaming is a neglected topic in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of spontaneous thought. The extant research either conflates daydreaming with mind-wandering (whether understood as task-unrelated thought, unguided attention, or disunified thought), characterizes daydreaming as opposed to mind-wandering (Dorsch, 2015), or takes daydreaming to encompass any and all “imagined events” (Newby-Clark & Thavendran, 2018). These dueling definitions obstruct future research on spontaneous (...) thought, and are insufficiently precise to guide empirical studies. They also fail to illuminate the phenomenal core of daydreaming, namely, its dreamlike qualities. Although daydreaming is related to both mind-wandering and narrative imagination, it is not reducible to either. We argue that daydreams are experiences of spontaneous, immersive imagination in the waking state. The main task of our investigation is to distinguish daydreaming, conceptually and phenomenologically, from mind-wandering, on the one hand, and night dreaming, on the other. Although daydream experiences can vary widely, we distinguish prototypical experiences of daydreaming from adjacent imaginative activity, including fleeting imagery and “focused daydreaming,” or crafted visualization. We consider our phenomenological analysis as preparatory work for conceptually distinguishing different spontaneous and imaginative states so that they can be investigated accordingly with questionnaires and qualitative methods. We argue that precision about the phenomenal character of daydreaming can guide neurophenomenological investigations, help delimit studies on individual variance in daydreaming features, and identify differences among daydreaming, mind-wandering, and night dreaming conceptually and phenomenologically, and possibly eventually in terms of neural correlates. (shrink)

Daydreaming appears to have a complex relationship with life satisfaction and happiness. Here we demonstrate that the facets of daydreaming that predict life satisfaction differ between men and women , that the content of daydreams tends to be social others , and that who we daydream about influences the relation between daydreaming and happiness variables like life satisfaction, loneliness, and perceived social support . Specifically, daydreaming about people not close to us predicts more loneliness and less (...) perceived social support, whereas daydreaming about close others predicts greater life satisfaction. Importantly, these patterns hold even when actual social network depth and breadth are statistically controlled, although these associations tend to be small in magnitude. Individual differences and the content of daydreams are thus important to consider when examining how happiness relates to spontaneous thoughts. (shrink)

The central questions that guide phenomenological investigations of daydreaming can be formulated as follows: What must consciousness be if it is to be capable of daydreaming? How does daydreaming relate to other modes of experience, especially mind-wandering, lucid and non-lucid dreaming, and phantasizing? What are the eidetic features and constitutive functions of daydreaming in the overall life of consciousness? My goal in this chapter is to show that a phenomenological analysis of daydreaming can make an (...) important contribution to the cross-disciplinary science of daydreaming precisely because it directly addresses these fundamental questions. The phenomenological analysis of daydreaming developed here suggests the following: (1) The life of consciousness is characterized by the intertwining of sleep and wakefulness. Just as there is wakefulness in sleep, so also is there sleep in wakefulness. (2) The life of consciousness is not confined to the here and now. Besides those experiences which unfold from the present standpoint, there is also another group of experiences that can be qualified as absorbed, or displaced, experiences. (3) A phenomenological analysis of daydreaming brings to light how different modes of experience are characterized by different modes of self-awareness. (shrink)

Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. 1 begin by (...) making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on these phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us. (shrink)

This case study describes a patient presenting with a long history of excessive daydreaming which has caused her distress but is not incident to any other apparent clinical psychiatric disorders. We have treated this patient for over 10 years, and she has responded favorably to fluvoxamine therapy, stating that it helps to control her daydreaming. Our patient, and other psychotherpists, have brought to our attention other possible cases of excessive daydreaming. We examine the available literature regarding (...) class='Hi'>daydreaming, mind wandering, and fantasy proneness relative to current cognitive and neuroanatomical models of executive attention. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 outbreak, individuals with or without mental disorders may resort to dysfunctional psychological strategies that could trigger or heighten their emotional distress. The current study aims to explore the links between maladaptive daydreaming, psychological symptoms of depression, anxiety, and negative stress, and COVID-19-related variables, such as changes in face-to-face and online relationships, during the COVID-19 lockdown in Italy. A total of 6,277 Italian adults completed an online survey, including socio-demographic variables, COVID-19 related information, the 16-item Maladaptive (...) class='Hi'>Daydreaming Scale, and Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21 Items. Based on an empirically derived cut-off score, 1,082 participants were identified as probable maladaptive daydreamers. A binary logistic regression revealed that compared to controls, probable MDers reported that during the COVID-19 lockdown they experienced higher levels of anxiety and depression, decreased online social relationships, and, surprisingly, stable or increased face-to-face social relationships. Given the peculiar characteristics of the pandemic context, these findings suggest that the exposure to the risk of contagion had probably exacerbated the tendency of probable MDers to lock themselves inside their mental fantasy worlds, which in turn may have contributed to further estrangement from online social relationships and support, thus worsening their emotional distress. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 46, no. 2. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 327 Callie Danae Hirsch pandemic daydreams Artist’s Statement I am a painter who works in oils and acrylics on canvas and found objects. I am also a photographer as part of my daily practice. My work is an exploration of everything that surrounds me in my daily life, observing the overlooked, honing in and reimagining it. I seek (...) out discarded items on the streets, in parks, and on the beaches around the five boroughs of New York City and imagine their reincarnation. This series, pandemic daydreams, explores my subconscious in a time of profound anxiety. I sometimes drift off into sleep and, upon waking, remember clearly for a moment the scenario the dreamlet contained. A dream fragment during the day, or as I reframe it here as a daydream, allows my subconscious to float to the surface of consciousness. What is revealed is not always easily understood, but now it is the plague that plagues my sleeping life. Strange ideas emerge; comical, nightmarish, filled with chaos and disruption, the invisible made visible, interpreted from brush to canvas. The paintings serve as a visual diary of my psyche during the coronavirus outbreak, created using acrylic on canvas, measuring from 24 by 20 inches to 44 by 36 inches. My quarantine cocoon strolls include Green-Wood Cemetery in Brooklyn, where newly dug soil can be seen on numerous fresh graves as I make my way through the hills seeking fresh air and exercise. Rising smoke from the crematorium is a constant reminder of those we have lost. Migrating birdsong fills my ears, but death hovers in the whirlwind 328 Callie Danae Hirsch around us. Who are we losing today? What will remain of our pre-COVID life and society when this is over? When can we hug each other again? As the pandemic hit, I felt the desire to connect and reflect with others about what we are all losing: our elders, our community members, our friends, our family, and our “IRL” connections with each other. I look forward to the day when this chapter is a distant memory, but for now I will investigate the discomfort of our present moment.  All images shown in this art essay courtesy of Callie Danae Hirsch: Pandemic daydreams i– xvii, 2020. Acrylic on canvas, variable dimensions.  Pandemic daydreams vii, 24 × 36 × 1 inches. left to right  Pandemic daydreams i, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams xvii, 20 × 24 × ½ inches. this page, top to bottom  Pandemic daydreams xiii, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams xvi, 20 × 24 × ½ inches. opposite, top to bottom  Pandemic daydreams v, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams xv, 44 × 36 × 1 ½ inches. left to right  Pandemic daydreams ix, 16 × 20 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams xii, 20 × 30 × 1 ½ inches. left to right  Pandemic daydreams xi, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams ii, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams viii, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams xiv, 20 × 24 × ½ inches. previous page  Pandemic daydreams vi, 20 × 28 × 1 ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams iii, 20 × 24 × ½ inches.  Pandemic daydreams x, 48 × 36 × 1 ½ inches.... (shrink)

Although the cognitive neurosciences are currently conducting research to determine the brain networks that are implicated in the production of ‘earworms’, my project seeks to address the technical nature of these abstract parasites that hears their spontaneous irruption in thought as both a product and source of contemporary capitalism’s aim to draw value from involuntary nervous activities. In this respect, I approach the earworm from a deliberately speculative perspective in order to conceptualize its appearance as a technical matter expressive of (...) the way historically ‘useless thinking’ is being imaginatively recuperated as a passive technology of the self. However, the earworm is a peculiar case of useless thinking, for its redundancy not only implicates it in the broader process of recuperation, but seems to realize a fatal tendency in sonic technics in ways that at once rely on, advance and disturb contemporary capitalism’s encroachment on human cognitive capacities. (shrink)

Chapter Introduction The field of artificial intelligence is concerned with the construction of computer systems which exhibit intelligent behavior in order ...

Preliminary evidence suggests that daydreaming about other people has adaptive value in daily social lives. To address this possibility, we examined whether daydreaming plays a role in maintaining close, stable relationships using a 1-year prospective longitudinal study. We found that individuals’ propensity to daydream about their marital partner is separate to general daydreaming. In contrast to general daydreaming, which was associated with lower subsequent relationship investment size in the marital partner, partner-related social daydreaming led to (...) a greater subsequent investment size. Additionally, attachment styles moderated these effects. The effect of daydreaming regarding investment size was found only in securely attached individuals. This research advances the emerging field of social daydreaming and highlights self-generated thought as a critical tool that can help people navigate the complex social world. (shrink)

In _Earworm and Event_ Eldritch Priest questions the nature of the imagination in contemporary culture through the phenomenon of the earworm: those reveries that hijack our attention, the shivers that run down our spines, and the songs that stick in our heads. Through a series of meditations on music, animal mentality, abstraction, and metaphor, Priest uses the earworm and the states of daydreaming, mind-wandering, and delusion it can produce to outline how music is something that is felt as thought (...) rather than listened to. Priest presents _Earworm and Event_ as a tête-bêche—two books bound together with each end meeting in the middle. Where _Earworm _theorizes the entanglement of thought and feeling, _Event _performs it. Throughout, Priest conceptualizes the earworm as an event that offers insight into not only the way human brains process musical experiences, but how abstractions and the imagination play key roles in the composition and expression of our contemporary social environments and more-than-human milieus. Unconventional and ambitious, _Earworm and Event_ offers new ways to interrogate the convergence of thought, sound, and affect. (shrink)

The basic aim of this paper is to show that philosophy is not what it is natural to take it to be, I.E., A high-Order investigation of what there is. It is contended that behind the superficial appearance they present, Philosophical utterances have no truth-Value and do nothing more than advance emended nomenclature. To illustrate this general thesis about philosophy hume's view that causal connection is nothing more than constant conjunction is examined in some detail, The conclusion reached being that (...) the view introduces a causal vocabulary from which the term "dependent occurrence" and its equivalents have been suppressed. (shrink)

This article analyzes the sociality of illegal file sharing as one domain of teletechnology, using poststructural theory to conceptualize the file-sharing setting. It reveals the assumptions about file sharing in popular media, and demonstrates how the persistence of illegal file sharing across racial, economic, and status lines might be attributed to psychological and neurophysiological causes. To conclude, I consider the implications of poststructuralism for extension and synthesis in future social theory.

This is an empirical phenomenological inquiry into everyday experiences of daydreaming. The theoretical literature was found to be deficient in accounting for the ambiguity inherent to the phenomenon and lacking in concrete empirical descriptions. This study's phenomenological method was implemented in response to a body of natural scientific studies utilizing methods that were found to be inadequate to the task of comprehending and understanding the lived subjective experience of the phenomenon. From five subject interviews and their subsequent analysis via (...) the phenomenological method, the researcher was able to derive a general structural description of the experience of daydreaming. It was found that daydreaming is essentially the representation/enactment of a mood, the understanding of which is inseparable from the situated biographical project of the individual. As an act of consciousness it was described as a passive movement into two, distinct subject-world relationships, sustained by a directing-spectator position that is both detached and interfused with these two world relations. Details of these findings and their implications are discussed. (shrink)

A thought experiment on the ultimate non-essence of Time.

Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].

No início do artigo, reconstruo a posição complexa de Husserl em relação à noção de fantasia. Por um lado, a fantasia aparece como severamente limitada, do ponto de vista da progressão da consciência na constituição de objetidades em um mundo objetivo. Por outro lado, uma vez esclarecidas as opções metodológicas de Husserl para dar destaque a essa constituição objetiva, aparece a riqueza da associatividade inerente ao fantasiar. Pretendo avançar essa investigação ao propor uma sistematização dos padrões de associação por semelhança (...) das experiências comumente chamadas de “devaneios”. (shrink)

Cílem studie je interpretovat fenomenologii obrazotvornosti Gastona Bachelarda jakožto fenomenologickou redukci sui generis. Autor článku představuje snění jako proces návratu do naivního vědomí prvotní (zakládající) a primitivní povahy, v němž je možné dosáhnout stavu dětství, harmonizujícího vztah subjektu ke světu. Svět je v této koncepci znovu zhodnocován (valorizován) a otevírá se jako domov, a to jednak prostřednictvím vzpomínek, jednak recipročním charakterem obrazotvornosti. Studie ukazuje fenomenologickou redukci v Bachelardově pojetí jako opozitní, ale komplementární k vědeckému rozumu a zdůrazňuje její terapeutický charakter.

Selon Léonard de Vinci, le peintre doit « se mettre à la place de l’esprit même de la nature », entendue comme genèse perpétuelle, force vitale et métamorphique. Dans sa démesure, un tel projet fascine autant qu’il terrifie. Pour répondre à ce défi, Léonard renouvelle profondément l’art de la peinture jusqu’à en faire, en théorie comme en pratique, un exercice sans cesse recommencé. Les notes et préceptes du Traité de peinture comme les techniques qu’il invente (ou réinvente) en témoignent – (...) chiaroscuro, sfumato, perspective aérienne, componimento inculto [esquisse informe ou sauvage], etc. À la jonction de la main et de l’esprit, l’exercice de peindre sollicite une ascèse perceptive et imaginative, à travers le jugement, le regard (« jugement de l’œil », giudizio dell’occhio), porté sur le monde et ses formes mouvantes. Ascèse, au sens fort d’un désapprentissage permettant de détisser les rets de l’habitude et les tropismes subjectifs. Cet exercice opère non seulement le crayon à la main, par le déploiement de l’esquisse et la fécondité du repentir [pentimento], mais, dans un plus grand dénuement encore, en regardant « des murs souillés de beaucoup de taches », « avec l’idée d’imaginer quelque scène » – « incitation à la rêverie éveillée » comme l’appelle André Chastel. Dès lors l’exercice de peindre (ou la peinture comme exercice) prend chez Léonard une tournure très étonnante et singulière : tout en privilégiant la dimension processuelle de l’œuvre, il s’agit de faire, pour ainsi dire, de la peinture sans pigment ni pinceau. Autrement dit, la prétention cosmique du peintre n’a d’égale que son aptitude au dénuement. (shrink)

Aphantasia is a condition characterised by a deficit of mental imagery. Since several psychopathologies are partially maintained by mental imagery, it may be illuminating to consider the condition against the background of psychological disorder. After outlining current findings and hypotheses regarding aphantasia and psychopathology, this paper suggests that some support for defining aphantasia as a lack of voluntary imagery may be found here. The paper then outlines potentially fruitful directions for future research into aphantasia in general and its relation to (...) psychopathology in particular, including rethinking use of the SUIS to measure involuntary imagery, whether aphantasia offers protection against addiction, and whether hyperphantasia is a potential risk factor for maladaptive daydreaming, among others. (shrink)